








Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Dijkhoff, A. A. (2011). International social security standards in the European Union: The cases of the Czech.
Intersentia.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY STANDARDS 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION




IN THE EUROPEAN UNION




ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Tilburg, 
op gezag van de rector magnifi cus, prof. dr. Ph. Eijlander, 
in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van een door het college 
voor promoties aangewezen commissie in de aula van de Universiteit op 
woensdag 14 september 2011 om 14.15 uur
Cambridge – Antwerp – Portland
Promotiecommissie
Promotor
prof. dr. F.J.L. Pennings
Overige leden
prof. dr. F.H.R. Hendrickx
prof. dr. ing. W.J.H. van Oorschot
prof. dr. G. Katrougalos
prof. dr. S. Klosse
prof. dr. G.J. Vonk
dr. G. Tavits
Th e research project was subsidised by Stichting Instituut Gak, Hilversum (Nl).
Can it be done? Why not?
Treaties have been concluded between one country and another
by which they have bound themselves to kill men;
why should they not be concluded today for the purpose of
preserving men’s lives and making them happier?
J. Blanqui, Cours d’économie industrielle, 1838–1839,




As a child, I had the ambition to become a missionary worker. Saving the poor 
and ignorant, not so much from going to hell, but fi rst and foremost from their 
miserable lives on earth by bringing them food, medical care and education, 
seemed to me the only reasonable thing to do. During my early teens, I set myself 
the less ambitious goal of becoming a vet́ s assistant (nobody told me that I could 
become the vet as well…). Saving animals seemed good enough at the time. 
Growing up, my romantic ideas about the mission and the vet proved to be 
wrong, and I took another course. Yet, looking at the theme of my research, I 
have to acknowledge that remnants of the initial inner urge to save the worse-off  
are still there – a clear case of path dependency. Having left  behind romantic 
views, pretensions and religious morality, the old ideal of social justice for all 
still remains. It was this ideal, in the end, that inspired me to take up the subject 
of international standards embodying the human right to social security. 
Th is book will not save lives, nor will it bring much social justice to the many 
millions who are deprived of any form of social security. What it may do, 
however, is raise awareness in our rich Western welfare states of the fact that 
social justice is not a matter of course. On the contrary, our social welfare 
systems need to be carefully watched and preserved; all the more so in light of 
the recent economic recession, to which the Member States of the European 
Union have mainly responded by cutting social security budgets. How far can 
they go? To what extent is our social welfare guaranteed? It is precisely at this 
point that the international social security standards are at stake. 
A PhD thesis is supposed to prove that the PhD candidate has research skills. To 
me, it rather seems to prove that the candidate has perseverance. Nevertheless, 
writing this thesis was not only a struggle; it was also a great challenge and an 
exciting new experience. I especially enjoyed working in the Czech Republic, 
Estonia and Canada, and I am very happy that I was given the opportunity to do 
so. Having completed the research, I would like to thank everyone who supported 
me one way or another. In this preface, I shall be able to mention only a 
signifi cant few. 
First, my thanks go to my supervisor, Frans Pennings, for his approachability 
and generosity, his steady support, and his natural focus on the leitmotiv. He 
helped me cross the fi nishing line, while giving me lots of space during the whole 
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research process. My colleagues at the Department of Social Law and Social 
Policy in Tilburg provided me with a comfortable academic environment that 
was conducive to thorough research. I have very warm feelings for Barbara 
Hofman, Maria Korda and Saskia Montebovi, with whom I shared the sweet and 
the bitter of doing a PhD, and much more. It was great working (and walking!) 
with them. And, of course, I am grateful to Kees Boos, who was always prepared 
to correct and improve my draft s, to give practical advice, and, last but not least, 
to put things into perspective. 
I would like to thank Wim van Oorschot, Paul Schoukens, and Gijs Vonk, for 
their valuable comments on the diff erent draft s of my thesis; I highly appreciated 
their willingness to think along with me during the diff erent stages of the study. 
I would also like to thank all the members of the PhD committee for spending 
their time and energy on my work. Among them, Frank Hendrickx holds a 
special place, since he drew my attention to this PhD position when I obtained 
my Master’s degree under his supervision. I am very grateful to Stichting 
Instituut Gak for fi nancing the research project in such a generous way, and for 
providing a large research network covering diff erent scientifi c disciplines. 
It would not have been possible to write the chapters about the Czech Republic 
and Estonia without the help of national experts. I had informative and inspiring 
meetings with, among others, civil servants, representatives of trade unions and 
employers organisations, with academics, judges, and members of parliament. I 
thank them all for sharing their knowledge and opinions with me. I would 
especially like to thank Kateřina Machová, Kristina Koldinská, and Gaabriel 
Tavits, for carefully reading and correcting the country chapters and giving me 
helpful suggestions. I thank Jonatan Tomeš for his quick translations of both 
Czech and Estonian texts, and for kindly letting me use his offi  ce in Prague. 
Th anks, also, to Fiona McGrath for her great editing work; an endless and 
extremely tedious job it seems to me, but she did it without even one complaint. 
Th is is also a good opportunity to thank my parents for their continuing support 
throughout my life. My father did not live to see me receive my PhD – I wrote 
this preface at his sickbed – but he was proud to know that I would make it. As 
always, Margreet, my sweet sister and best friend, and Tomáš surrounded me 
with their humour and concern. Finally, my thanks go to Collin for simply being 
there and for reminding me that there is more to life. He helped me take my 
mind off  the big issue of social justice for all by organising great trips and 
unexpectedly taking me to concerts and movies. I hope he will carry on doing so 
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PART I
PRELIMINARIES
Th is part contains the introduction to the research.
First, the human right to social security will be introduced, and it will be shown 
that Convention No. 102 on Minimum Standards of Social Security (1952) gives 
legal substance to this universal right.
Th en, the research question will be presented and explained, and methodical 
issues will be discussed.





1.1 SOCIAL SECURITY: A GOOD OF GLOBAL 
CONCERN
1.1.1 SOCIAL SECURITY AS A HUMAN RIGHT
Th e Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, proclaims that 
‘Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security.’1 Mindful of 
the horrors of war, the recognition of social security as a fundamental right was 
based on the belief that universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is 
based upon social justice.2 Although the acknowledgment of social security as a 
human right was a milestone in the development of social rights, the substance 
of the right remained undefi ned. Moreover, the Declaration expressed a mere 
intention of the General Assembly of the United Nations, rather than providing 
a legal right. In 1966, the legal value of the human right to social security was 
strengthened through its incorporation into the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.3 Th is treaty created legal obligations for 
the Member States and made them subject to a supervisory procedure. At the 
same time, the content of the right was still indefi nite as its wording remained 
almost unchanged to that of the Universal Declaration: ‘the right of everyone to 
social security, including social insurance.’ Moreover, in contrast to civil rights, 
social rights were generally considered as objectives rather than enforceable 
rights.4 Gradually, however, the idea took root that all human rights are a 
universal, indivisible and interdependent body of rights, and that ‘a 
comprehensive approach to the promotion and protection of human rights 
ensures that people are treated as full persons and that they may enjoy 
simultaneously all rights and freedoms, and social justice.’5 Th e time was ripe for 
a formal recognition of what the human right to social security entails. To this 
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN GA res. 217A (III), 1948, Art. 22.
2 Preamble to the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, 1944; Declaration of 
Philadelphia, Art. II.
3 UN GA res. 2200A (XXI), 1966, Art. 9.
4 Betten 1996, pp. 14–17; Hare 2002, p. 154. Hare recalls in this respect that ‘social rights have 
undoubtedly been the poor cousins of the rights movement since its inception.’
5 United Nations 2005, p. vii.
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end, the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council drew up a General 
Comment on the right to social security, which was adopted in 2007.6 As a basis 
for its interpretation, the Council’s main sources included the social security 
conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO).
1.1.2 THE CREATION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL 
SECURITY STANDARDS
Aft er World War II, the ILO was incorporated into the United Nations as a 
specialised agency for the social agenda.7 In response to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, it took on the assignment of developing the right 
to social security and giving it legal substance by drawing up a new convention 
on this subject. In 1952, the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention 
(No. 102) was adopted, defi ning nine contingencies to be covered by nine 
corresponding branches of social security. Th is new comprehensive instrument 
was designed to promote social security for all by fulfi lling several purposes:8
It would give defi nite form to these new trends and a defi nite meaning to the concept 
of social security. It would serve as a basis for national and international policy, on 
the one hand guiding Members in the creation or reconstruction of their social 
security systems, and on the other hand constituting the framework for a series of 
revised and new Conventions elaborating the application of general principles to 
particular branches of social security.
Th e ‘new trends’ to be given form in the instrument referred to:9
[A] movement everywhere towards including additional classes of the population, 
covering a wider range of contingencies, providing benefi ts more nearly adequate to 
needs […], loosening the tie between benefi t right and contribution payment, and, in 
general, unifying the fi nance and administration of branches hitherto separate.
Another important reason for the adoption of international labour standards in 
general, and of social security standards in particular, was the fear of commercial 
competition between countries on the basis of labour costs. It was believed that 
agreements in the fi eld of labour and social security would help prevent 
international competition from taking place to the disadvantage of workers, and 
would constitute a kind of code of fair competition between employers and 
6 CESCR 2008.
7 For reference Works on the International Labour Organisation, see Bartolomei de la Cruz, 
Potobsky, Swepston 1996; Leary 1982; Osieke 1985; Valticos 1979; Scott 1934; Servais 2005.
8 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, p. 4.
9 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, pp. 3–4.
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between countries.10 Th us, the following objectives of international social 
security standards can be listed:11
– promotion of the right to social security for everyone, through
– defi ning the right to social security,
– guiding nations in the creation or reconstruction of their social security 
systems,
– providing a basis for higher standards, and
– preventing (international) commercial competition on the account of 
workers.
Although initially ILO Convention 102 did not yield many ratifi cations,12 it did 
serve its purposes in the sense that it provided a clear description of the content 
of social security, and indeed it has been taken as a basis for subsequent 
conventions that set out higher standards for specifi c risks. As well as the ILO, 
the Council of Europe has also developed higher standards on the basis of ILO 
Convention 102, specifi cally for the European region. Furthermore, it has been 
established that the Convention has played an important role in the development 
of welfare states all over the world, thus contributing to a level playing fi eld in 
terms of labour costs.13
1.1.3 THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION
Within the context of the European Union (EU), the right to social security has a 
poor history. In the Treaty of Rome, which forms the legal basis of the European 
Community, social policy was left  within the exclusive competence of the 
Member States. It was not deemed necessary to provide for a harmonised level of 
social protection in the Community, because it was thought that economic 
growth and the optimum allocation of resources would automatically entail 
social progress and therefore a common market would not hamper the further 
improvement of workers’ living standards.14 Th is optimistic approach has 
10 Higgins 2002, p. 56; Bartolomei de la Cruz, Von Potobsky, Swepston 1996, pp. 25–26.
11 Th ese objectives have been confi rmed repeatedly and recently, for instance, see Bartolomei de 
la Cruz, Von Potobsky, Swepston 1996, pp. 24–26; Kulke 2007; ILO 2001; Kulke & López 
Morales 2007, pp. 91–92.
12 In 1960 it had been ratifi ed by only 7 countries. Th is has been attributed, among other things, 
to the fear that by ratifying a convention, a State will be handicapped unless its main 
competitors ratify it too (see Valticos 1996, p. 408). In 2010, the number of ratifi cations 
amounted to 46.
13 ILO 2008; Kulke, Cichon, Pal 2007; Dijkhoff  & Pennings 2007; Kulke & López Morales 2007, 
pp. 91–97; Pennings 2006A; Valticos 1979.
14 See, for instance, Shanks 1977; Schutter 2005, pp. 111–112; ILO 1956, p. 54–55.
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however been undermined by reality. Th ere is a large – and still growing – 
disparity in economic performances and living standards between Member 
States. Th ere are large groups of workers that do not get their share of economic 
prosperity in the form of social protection, and the deterrent eff ects of social 
dumping and social tourism are subject to continuous concern.15 Although the 
harmonisation of social security is still not an objective of the European 
Commission, a framework of minimum regulations or recommendations as a 
protection against low social standards and unfair economic competition is 
considered desirable in order to prevent a downward trend of social protection. 
Th is issue became all the more urgent in view of the wish of several Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries to enter into the EU in the early 1990s.16 In 
an attempt to extend the framework of minimum norms without trespassing on 
the autonomy of the Member States, in the Treaty of Amsterdam a reference was 
included to the European Social Charter.17 Th e Social Charter requires, among 
others, compliance with ILO Convention 102.18 As a consequence, this 
convention may be considered the desirable minimum level of social security for 
the EU Member States. It will be shown in the study that this was actively 
propagated by the European Commission during the pre-accession period of the 
CEE countries.
It should be kept in mind, however, that the reference to the Social Charter 
within the acquis communautair does not entail any legal obligation for the 
Member States to actually accept its provisions. Despite academic discussions on 
the advisability and possibility of accepting the Social Charter at the Community 
level, for the time being this does not seem a feasible option.19 Still, the call for a 
common minimum level of social security holds ground and has become even 
more pregnant in view of ageing populations and the recent economic recession 
that has brought about severe cuts in public expenditure, oft en in the form of a 
shift  of responsibility for social risks from the public to the private sphere. Th e 
privatisation of state services accompanied by extensive economic measures 
inevitably imply an erosion of social security.20 To prevent an increase in poverty 
and social exclusion among the more vulnerable groups in society and an 
intensifi cation of economic competition between Member States on the basis of 
15 Schutter 2005, p. 112; Vaughan-Whitehead 2003; Delsen, Van Gestel, Pennings 2000, pp. 
10–13; Shanks 1977.
16 Council Recommendation of 27 July 1992 on the convergence of social protection objectives 
and policies, 92/442/EEC; European Commission 1994, point 19.
17 European Social Charter, Council of Europe, 1961; Apart from this reference to the Social 
Charter, the European Commission has started to develop recommendations in the fi eld of 
social policy, a policy that is called the Open Method of Coordination.
18 Th e Revised Social Charter (1990) requires compliance with the European Code of Social 
Security, which is almost a copy of ILO Convention 102.
19 Schutter 2005; Witte 1996.
20 Judt 2009; Müller 2007, pp. 65–66; Lamarche 2005, p. 129; Lamarche 2002, p. 96.
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labour costs, the establishment of a minimum level of social security seems vital. 
An attainable way of creating a social security fl oor within the European Union 
would be to stimulate ratifi cation, and even more importantly, to stimulate the 
proper application of ILO Convention 102 or the European Code of Social 
Security among the EU Member States. Questions have arisen, however, as to the 
applicability and adequacy of these instruments. Are they still suitable for the 
promotion of social security in the context of the present day EU, 60 years aft er 
their creation?
1.1.4 INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY STANDARDS 
UNDER REVIEW
Drawn up aft er an extensive investigation of the existing social security schemes 
and objectives in many ILO Member States at the time, Convention 102 refl ects 
the ideas and practices regarding social security of the post-war period. In the 
framework of the 75th anniversary of the ILO in 1994, the International Labour 
Conference reaffi  rmed, among others, that through national solidarity and fair 
burden sharing, social security contributes to human dignity, equity and social 
justice. Furthermore, it was agreed in 2001 that the ILO should base its future 
activities on the concept of decent work and the values laid down in international 
labour standards on social security, most importantly, Convention 102.21
From this perspective, it may be concluded that the social security conventions 
are still adequately applicable in present day EU Member States, and are thus 
able to be promoted in the EU context.22 However, this is only one side of the 
coin. Th e conventions are also subject to criticism at various levels. For example, 
notwithstanding the ILO resolution of 2001, they are argued to be out-of-date, 
lacking the fl exibility needed for adapting social systems to changed economic 
and societal conditions, not tailored to the post-industrial society, discriminatory, 
prescribing benefi ts that are too low for the European context, not contributing 
to social protection for all, and lacking legal power.23 It must be said that these 
points of criticism are generally not well-substantiated, especially those relating 
to the conventions being outdated, and most oft en they refl ect opinions of 
(undefi ned) others than the authors themselves. Several points are also refuted 
21 ILO 2001, pp. v, 26.
22 Th is was also concluded during the International Expert Workshop on Right to Social 
Security in Berlin, 6–7 April 2005: Bierweiler 2007, p. 179.
23 Langendonck 2009, pp. 217–218; Maydell 1996, p. 188; Pennings & Schulte 2006; Lamarche 
2002, p. 95; ILO 2001, p. 22; Nußberger 2007, p. 110; Bierweiler 2007, pp. 179–180; Servais 
2005, p. 311; Langendonck 2007, pp. 7–8; Brinkmann 1996, p. 204; ILO 2001C, pp. 10–11; 
Kulke, Cichon, Pal 2007, pp. 18–28.
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again.24 Nevertheless, the discussion about the (in)applicability of the 
international social security standards and the diff erent opinions on this matter 
emphasises the need for in-depth research at this point. Th is book meets this 
need by providing a systematic study of the application of the international social 
security standards and their eff ect on social security legislation in two EU 
Member States that have been rethinking and reconstructing their social security 
systems during the past two decades.25 Furthermore, with a review of the 
research results against the background of current trends in social security, the 
study seeks to contribute to the discussion about the international social security 
standards and their possible value for the promotion of social security in the EU 
context.
1.2 EXPLORING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
1.2.1 AIM OF THE RESEARCH
As mentioned in the previous section, the ILO Conventions have been created 
with a view to promoting the right to social security for everyone, to give 
normative substance to this right, to guide nations in the development of their 
social security systems, to create higher standards, and to prevent an imbalance 
in markets caused by unequal social costs. As such, these objectives are worth 
being promoted at the national as well as at the international level. At the same 
time, it has been shown that the eff ectiveness of the social security conventions 
in today’s societies is open to doubt, and that the political interest of EU Member 
States in entering into international obligations in the fi eld of social security is 
waning. Against the background of this tension, this study addresses the question 
of whether the objectives of the international social security standards are still 
valid in the context of the European Union. Do they indeed contribute to the 
progressive development of social security systems in EU Member States and to 
the establishment of a common minimum level of social security?
Many related questions can be asked in this respect, such as: Are these standards 
still applicable at all, 60 years aft er their creation? Are they still relevant to our 
developed welfare states, or are the standards so low that their ratifi cation merely 
has symbolic meaning? Do they, in fact, prevent social dumping? What 
application problems do countries encounter aft er ratifi cation? Do the standards 
constitute enforceable rights? Answers to these questions can be provided on the 
basis of information about the actual ratifi cation, implementation and application 
of the international standards in EU Member States. It will be made clear below 
24 Pennings & Schulte 2006; ILO 2001C; Maydell & Nußberger 1996; Riedel 2007.
25 Th e selection of the countries will be discussed in section 1.3.1.
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that studies on this subject are scarce. Th erefore, this book aims fi rst and 
foremost to increase knowledge about the eff ectiveness of social security 
conventions in contributing to a progressive development of national social 
security and in establishing a common minimum level of social security in the 
EU context. Th e outcomes may help to form an opinion on whether it would be 
advantageous to emphasise the importance of their ratifi cation and to promote 
their application within the framework of the European Union.
Ideally, all EU Member States should be included in this study, in any case, all 
Member States that have not been examined yet in view of this subject. (Un)
fortunately, all sorts of practical restraints relating to time and money made such 
an approach impossible. Choices had to be made that limit the scope of the 
research to two countries, and that, consequently, limits the main research 
question.26
1.2.2 MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION
Th e main research question is formulated as follows:
Main Research Question:
(a) What is the eff ect of international standards on social security legislation 
in the Czech Republic and Estonia, and what application problems arise?
(b) What do these problems mean for the eff ectiveness of the international 
standards?
Th e term ‘eff ect’ must be read in the sense of ‘the result of a particular infl uence’.27 
In view of the objectives of the international social security standards, the result 
of their infl uence should ideally entail:28
– promotion of the right to social security for everyone,
– clarity about the substance of this right,
– guidance in the development of the social security systems, and
– the establishment of a level playing fi eld in respect of labour costs.
Th erefore, this study seeks to uncover the eff ect of the standards that is related to 
these objectives. Following the same line of argument, the term ‘eff ectiveness’ 
must be read in the sense of ‘achievement of the intended results’.
26 Th ese choices will be justifi ed in section 1.3.1.
27 In accordance with the Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary.
28 See section 1.1.2.
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International social security standards in this study comprise the normative 
social security instruments of the ILO and the Council of Europe.29 Social 
security legislation in the context of the research question is confi ned to 
national provisions pertaining to the nine social risks covered by ILO 
Convention 102.30
Situated within the fi eld of social security law, the question implies legal research 
in two directions. Th e fi rst part of the question addresses social security 
legislation at the national level, how the law relates to and is infl uenced by 
international standards. Th e eff ect of international standards is assessed on the 
basis of a comparison of national social security law with the international 
standards. Because law-making is tightly related to politics, the political 
development relating to the social reforms is briefl y outlined, as far as the legal 
framework of this study allows for it. On the basis of the fi ndings from the 
country studies, the second part of the research question involves a review of the 
international social security standards themselves, in terms of whether they are 
suitable and adequate to meet their objectives in present day European 
countries.
1.2.3 RELEVANCE OF THE RESEARCH
As mentioned above, the main aim of this study is to contribute to academic 
knowledge. International social security standards and their application at a 
national level have not been subject to extensive academic discourse. Most of the 
existing writings pertaining to these standards fi nd their origin in the ILO 
itself.31 Additionally, a few scholars have conducted studies in this fi eld and 
initiated discussions.32 Th us, in-depth studies of the application of international 
social security standards in specifi c countries are scarce, and the availability of 
specifi c information is crucial for a discussion on the value of these standards. 
Th erefore, this study provides new information on diff erent points. First, the 
thorough analysis of ILO Convention 102 adds to an understanding of the 
international standards, whose wordings and concepts are oft en indefi nite and 
complicated. Secondly, a comprehensive overview is given of the social security 
systems of two countries that are not oft en subject to internationally oriented 
research and on whom there is little literature available in English. Finally, and 
29 For a detailed specifi cation, see section 1.3.1.
30 For a detailed specifi cation, see Chapter 2.
31 Some infl uential documents are: Valticos 1979; Valticos 1996; Bartolomei de la Cruz 1994; 
Humblet & Silva 2002; Humblet 2002; ILO 2001.
32 Servais 2005; PenningsA 2006; Pennings 2007A; Maydell and Nußberger 1996; Riedel 2007; 




above all, the study provides an actual and detailed insight into the application 
of the standards in two EU Member States and their impact on the development 
of national social security systems.
Th e research must be viewed in the context of the European Union. Since it is 
confi ned to two country studies, the outcomes cannot be generalised as if they 
would relate to all EU Member States. Still, during the study certain trends in 
social security have been detected that are present not only in these two 
countries, but Europe-wide, and even in a global context. Th e study shows that 
both in the Czech Republic and Estonia these observed trends are sometimes 
problematic in terms of the application of the international standards. Cases in 
point are the individualisation of social security rights, the rapid development of 
employment activation policies, severe cuts in public expenditure in response to 
an ageing population and the latest economic crisis, and a withdrawal of the state 
from the social security domain through privatisation. Although the outcomes 
of this study are based on these countries only, they are also relevant for other 
EU Member States since they focus in on application problems relating to these 
common trends.
In the end, the information and discussion provided in this book may contribute 
to the eff ectiveness of international social security standards in the furtherance 
of national social security and in the realisation of a common minimum level for 
social security within the European Union. Furthermore, a critical refl ection on 
the applicability of the international standards in the 21st century may provide 
an impetus for the improvement of the instruments and further realisation of 
the human right to social security.
1.3 METHODICAL APPROACH
1.3.1 JUSTIFICATION OF THE CHOICES
Selection of international social security standards
Th e selection of international standards follows from the subject of the research 
that involves an assessment of the application of social security standards. Th e 
only normative instruments in this fi eld that are relevant for the EU Member 
States are those of the ILO and the Council of Europe. Since its fi rst conference 
in 1919, the ILO has adopted 31 conventions on social security, the oldest being 
Convention No. 3 on Maternity Protection (1919).33 From 1995 to 2002 a 




tripartite working group examined all Conventions and Recommendations on 
their actual relevance. Th e work resulted in a list of up-to-date instruments, 
adopted by the ILO Conference in 2001, to be promoted on a priority basis, 
among which are six social security conventions.34 Th ese conventions are taken 
as a basis for this study. Th ey are the following:
– Convention 102 Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 
(ILO C102)
– Convention 121 Employment Injury Benefi ts Convention, 1964 (ILO C121)
– Convention 128 Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ Benefi ts Convention, 1967 
(ILO C128)
– Convention 130 Medical Care and Sickness Benefi ts Convention, 1969 (ILO 
C130)
– Convention 168 Employment Promotion and Protection against 
Unemployment Convention, 1988 (ILO C168)
– Convention 183 Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (ILO C183)
For the European region, the instruments of the Council of Europe are also 
relevant. Th e European Code of Social Security is almost a copy of ILO 
Convention 102, and is supplemented by a protocol that provides higher 
standards at certain points. In view of the modernisation of many national social 
security systems, the Revised Code was adopted in 1990. It will come into force 
when it has been ratifi ed by two states, but to date, it has only been subject to 
ratifi cation by one state.35 In this study, the following instruments of the Council 
of Europe are taken into account:36
– European Code of Social Security, 1964 (ECSS)
– Protocol to the European Code of Social Security, 1964
– European Code of Social Security (Revised), 1990
In spite of the fact that it has not (yet) come into force, the Revised Code is 
included because the study may provide useful information about its applicability 
in view of possible future ratifi cations. Apart from these treaties, the European 
Social Charter also contains concrete normative provisions that relate to social 
security, most importantly Article 12, which directly refers to ILO Convention 
102.37 However, since these provisions do not add concrete social security 
standards relating to the nine branches of social security as specifi ed by ILO 
34 Humblet & Silva 2002, p. 4–5.
35 Th e Netherlands ratifi ed the European Code of Social Security (Revised) at 22 December 
2009.
36 Th ese instruments are published on the website of the CoE.




Convention 102, but merely refer to instruments that are already selected for this 
study, the Charter is not included in the legal comparison. Because ILO 
Convention 102 is considered the fl agship social security convention on which 
all other instruments are based, this convention constitutes the core of the 
research. Th is implies that the branches of social security under review in this 
study are confi ned to those covered by Convention 102. Of course, it would be 
interesting to also examine recognised new risks, such as long-term care and 
life-long learning in the light of international standards, but they are beyond the 
boundaries of this research.
Th ere are some other instruments that provide international standards based on 
ILO Convention 102, notably, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
Agreement on Social Security and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Code on Social Security. Because they are instruments for 
specifi c regions only – just as the European Code of Social Security is meant for 
the European region – they are not included in this study. It should be kept in 
mind conclusively that only normative instruments are subject to this study, 
which excludes treaties (including EU Regulations and Directives) in the fi eld of 
co-ordination or equal treatment.
Selection of countries
Th e research question limits the choice of countries to EU Member States. Since 
this study aims to add new information to the existing body of knowledge on the 
role of international social security standards in EU Member States, countries 
should be selected that have not been subject to examination at this point. In the 
book Between Soft  and Hard Law, edited by F. Pennings, the impact of these 
standards on social security in the United Kingdom, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Germany, and France has been described.38 Furthermore, M. Korda has 
investigated the case of Greece, and B. Hofman has carried out research into 
specifi c social security schemes in the Netherlands within the same research 
project as this dissertation was conducted.39 Th ese studies provide a rather 
representative overview of the old EU Member States, but none of the new 
Member States are included. Th erefore, it seemed expedient to choose two states 
that have recently entered the EU.
Th e post-socialist countries were thought to be of particular interest because 
their transition from a totalitarian communist regime to a democratic republic 
also involved a complete redesign of their social security systems. Th e fact that 
this transition took place within the last two decades makes it relatively easy to 
38 Pennings 2007A.
39 Korda (forthcoming), dissertation.
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investigate the reform processes and the underlying steering forces, both national 
as well as international. Out of the category of newly acceded post-socialist 
Member States, countries were sought that had ratifi ed at least the minimum 
social security standards (ILO Convention 102 or the European Code).40 From 
these countries, countries were selected that diff er in terms of historical 
backgrounds, prevailing political orientations, and geographical positions, 
assuming that these diff erences would yield a greater variety of research results. 
Th e inclusion of a Baltic state seemed especially interesting because they are 
seldom subject to qualitative research and thus there is little knowledge about 
these EU Members. Since Latvia and Lithuania had not ratifi ed the minimum 
standards, Estonia was selected. Th en, the Czech Republic was chosen out of the 
CEE countries because it was the only country that had ratifi ed, at an early stage, 
three ILO social security conventions.
It is a common opinion that a proper case study can only be conducted if the 
researcher knows the language of the country under review in order to be able to 
read the primary sources and to put the fi ndings in the right perspective. In 
general, this opinion seems valid. Nevertheless, the fact that the author of this 
book has mastered neither the Czech nor the Estonian language and still studied 
these countries can be justifi ed on the following grounds. Th e subject of the 
research is international law, which serves as an assessment framework for 
national social security legislation. Most documents used for the study were 
primary sources written in English, notably, the reports on the application of the 
conventions from the governments of the two countries to the supervising bodies 
of the ILO and the Council of Europe, and the comments or conclusions of these 
bodies. Important laws were translated in English in view of EU, ILO, and CoE 
membership. Furthermore, academic publications on this subject mostly 
contribute to the international discourse and are, therefore, written in English. 
To fi nd out the impact of the international standards on political decisions and 
law making, the lack of access to parliamentary discussions and explanations 
might be considered problematic. However, it must be noted that social security 
conventions are hardly subject to political debate, and therefore useful references 
to the impact of these instruments in offi  cial documents are also scarce in the 
local language. At best, an international section is included in explanatory 
documents to new bills on social security matters containing the remark that the 
proposed law will be in compliance with international obligations. To be able to 
discover the eff ect of the standards at the policy level, in-depth interviews have 
been held with national experts.41 Th ese interviews have also been used to verify 
the observations of the developments of the social security systems during the 
40 At the start of this study, of the eight post-socialist new Member States, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia had ratifi ed at least one of these instruments.
41 For a list of interviewees, see Appendix 2.
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research. Furthermore, the descriptions of the national systems have been 
reviewed by national experts in the last instance.
1.3.2 RESEARCH METHOD
To answer the main research question ‘What is the eff ect of international 
standards on social security legislation in the Czech Republic and Estonia, what 
application problems arise, and what do these problems mean for the eff ectiveness 
of the international standards?’, a range of sub-questions must be answered fi rst. 
Th e research is conducted along the line of these sub-questions, involving a 
description of international and national social security legislation, an assessment 
of national legislation on the basis of the analysed international law, and an 
evaluation of the results. Th e main research tool is literature study. In addition, 
in-depth interviews are held with national experts in the fi eld of social security.
Th e fi rst three sub-questions make up the descriptive part of the research.
1. What is the precise content of the ILO and CoE social security standards?
 A comprehensive analysis of the international standards is based on the 
fl agship ILO Convention No. 102 on Minimum Standards of Social Security, 
and is supplemented with a concise overview of the higher standards in 
Appendix 1. Th e analysis involves a description of the concrete norms as well 
as the general principles incorporated in the diff erent instruments. 
Complicated or ambiguous norms are explained on the basis of the 
preparatory documents. Th is sub-question is dealt with in Chapter 2.
2. To what extent and in what ways are the international social security standards 
implemented and applied in the selected countries?
 Th e treatment of this question conveys the ways the two countries have dealt 
with the international social security standards since their attainment of 
independence. It gives insight into the actual impact of the international 
standards on national legislative and judicial practice through the diff erent 
functions they have served during the reform processes. Th is sub-question is 
dealt with in Chapters 3 and 4 (notably, sections 1 to 4).
3. What are the concrete standards within the social security systems of the 
selected countries?
 Th e social security systems of the Czech Republic and Estonia, as developed 
during the past two decades, are consecutively described. For the purpose of 
the research, only the nine branches of social security as covered by ILO 
Convention 102 are studied in depth. Th is sub-question is elaborated on in 
Chapters 3 and 4 (notably, sections 5 to 14).
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Th e next questions involve a comparison of national social security law with the 
international standards:
4. What are the similarities and diff erences between the international and 
national standards?
 Social security legislation of the two countries is examined on the basis of the 
analysis of the international standards. Th us, the international standards are 
used as an assessment framework. Diff erences and similarities are recognised 
and described in Chapters 3 and 4 (notably, sections 5 to 14). Additionally, a 
table is composed, providing a collated, systematic overview of the diff erences 
and similarities between national and international standards (Appendix 1).
5. What application problems can be identifi ed?
 On the basis of the legal comparison, problematic points regarding the 
application of the international standards are identifi ed and reviewed in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
Th e last question contains an evaluation of the observed application problems:
6. What do these problems indicate with regard to the eff ectiveness of international 
social security standards?42
 Aft er an assessment of national legislation on the basis of the international 
standards, this question involves an evaluation of the international standards 
themselves. What can be derived from the identifi ed application problems in 
terms of eff ectiveness of the international instruments? To what extent are 
the intended results of the international social security standards achieved in 
the two countries? And to what extent can the fi ndings be generalised? For 
this purpose, the identifi ed problems are discussed in the context of stated 
criticism on the relevance of the international standards and held against the 
background of topical developments in the fi eld of social security. Th is issue 
is discussed in Chapter 6.
1.3.3 DEFINITIONS
Defi nitions of specifi c terms and concepts are formulated in order to provide 
clarity as to their meaning within the framework of this study:
Eff ect (of the international standards on national legislation): the result of a 
particular infl uence.
Eff ectiveness (of the international standards): achievement of the intended 
results.
42 Eff ectiveness in the meaning of achieving the results that are intended.
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Functions (of the international standards): the way in which the international 
standards work or operate.
International social security standards: interchangeable with the term ‘social 
security conventions’.
Principles on solidarity and state responsibility: the common principles as 
prescribed in Part XIII of ILO Convention 102 involving collective fi nancing, 
state responsibility for the provision of the benefi ts and for the proper 
administration of the institutions and services, and participation of 
representatives of the persons protected in the management.43
Privatisation: any measure through which responsibility for the provision of 
benefi ts is transferred from the public to the private sphere and/or through 
which the benefi ts (partly) depend on market forces.
Social protection: protection against human damage through all kinds of 
mechanisms managed by a variety of public and private actors, including 
social security.44
Social security: protection against social risks in a way that accords with the rules 
and principles prescribed in ILO Convention 102.45
Social security conventions: if not specifi ed (for example, ILO Convention 128), 
they include all normative social security instruments of the International 
Labour Organisation and the Council of Europe. Interchangeable with the 
term ‘international social security standards’.
1.3.4 SOURCES
Th e study is based on a variety of sources. Th e analysis of international social 
security standards s almost exclusively conducted through the study of literature. 
Th e main documents used for the analysis are the texts of the conventions 
concerned, relevant ILO recommendations, preparatory reports for the creation 
of ILO Convention 102, and explanatory documents of the ILO and the Council 
of Europe relating to the standards under review. Books and discussion papers of 
and about the ILO, and academic studies relating to the content of the standards 
or to the human right to social security in general are also consulted. Because 
little is written pertaining to the content and interpretation of the social security 
standards as such, academic literature in that specifi c respect is limited. In 
addition to desk research, the social security department of the ILO are visited 
43 For an elaborate description of the principles on solidarity and state responsibility, see section 
2.5.
44 See, for instance, Lamarche 2005, p. 130; Vrooman 2009, p. 124; Vrooman terms this the 
‘broad approach’ of social security.
45 For the purpose of this research that involves a comparison of national legislation with ILO 
Convention 102, this restrictive defi nition of social security is chosen for practical reasons. 
Vrooman calls this the ‘narrow approach’ of social security, Vrooman 2009, p. 124.
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for additional information and clarifi cation of certain questions relating to the 
content of the conventions.
Th e eff ect of the international standards on law making and social policy is 
examined through comparison of international and national law, literature study 
and interviews. Literature includes academic studies on post-communist EU 
Member States, although they are oft en rather general and not specifi c to the 
diff erent countries. Moreover, decisions of the Supreme (Administrative) Courts 
and/or Constitutional Courts of the selected countries are studied to get an 
insight into the way national judges deal with international social security law.46 
Finally, for additional and specifi c information, experts in social security law and 
policy from diff erent institutions are interviewed, notably, experts from the 
ministries of social aff airs and health, trade unions, and employers organisations, 
scholars, members of Parliament, and judges of the Administrative Supreme 
Court.47
For the description of the social security systems of the Czech Republic and 
Estonia and the comparison of national legislation with the international 
standards, several sources are used. Th e main sources of information were the 
annual reports of the governments on the application of the European Code of 
Social Security to the Council of Europe and the four-yearly reports on the 
diff erent ILO conventions. Th e Czech reports to the Council of Europe are 
published on the website of the Ministry of Social Aff airs. Th e Czech reports 
concerning ILO Conventions and the Estonian reports on the European Code 
are not published, but have been kindly provided by the respective ministries for 
the purpose of this research.48 Additionally, the direct requests and observations 
of the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (CEACR) and the conclusions of the CoE Committee of 
Ministers in reply to the reports (all published on the websites of the ILO and 
CoE) are consulted. For the discussions of the observed application problems in 
the two countries, opinions of the CEACR and the Committee of Ministers 
addressed to other states are referred to as well. Furthermore, other reports of 
the Ministries of Social Aff airs or national social security bodies, available 
English language academic studies on social security in both countries,49 and 
the MISSOC database of the European Commission are used. Both country 
studies are checked by national social security experts.
46 For a list of consulted judgments, see the bibliography.
47 For a list of the interviewees, see Appendix 2.
48 All reports on the application of the European Code are consulted as from the years of 
ratifi cation. Th e reports on the application of ILO social security conventions of the Czech 
Republic are consulted as from the reporting period ending by 1999.
49 For overviews of the entire social security systems: Tröster & Vysokajová 2006 (Cz) and 
Leppik & Kruuda 2003 (Ee).
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1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
Th e book is structured as follows. Part One contains the introduction to the 
thesis. Part Two comprises the core of the research, covering three chapters. 
First, in Chapter 2, an analysis of the international social security standards is 
provided to make clear their content and meaning. Chapters 3 and 4 contain the 
country studies of the Czech Republic and Estonia. Both chapters start with a 
description of the developments in social security aft er the establishment of the 
new republics, with a focus on international infl uences. Th is is followed by a 
systematic comparison of social security legislation with the standards as 
elaborated in Chapter 2. For each branch of social security, a brief overview is 
additionally given of the matters of compliance and the observed confl icts or 
problematic issues. Part Th ree holds the synthesis of the study. In Chapter 5, 
conclusions are drawn and reviewed from diff erent perspectives on the eff ect of 
international standards on the national social security systems. Finally, Chapter 
6 comprises conclusions and discussions on the applicability and adequacy of the 
international standards in the two countries. Although these discussions are 
based on the research results and thus relate to the Czech Republic and Estonia 
in fi rst instance, they are relevant for all EU Member States and for the European 




Th is part contains the descriptive and comparative parts of the research on 
which the conclusions and discussions in Part III are based.
Chapter 2 provides an analysis of the international standards on the basis of ILO 
Convention 102 on minimum Standards of Social Security. It elaborates on the 
fi rst research sub-question: 
– What is the precise content of the ILO and CoE social security standards?
In the Chapters 3 and 4 the country studies of the Czech Republic and Estonia 
are presented. Th ey deal with the following three sub-questions:
– To what extent and in what ways are the international social security 
standards implemented and applied in the selected countries?
– What are the actual standards within the social security systems of the 
selected countries?
– What are the similarities and diff erences between the international and 
national standards?
For the comparison of national legislation and the international standards, ILO 




INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY 
STANDARDS: AN ANALYSIS ON THE 
BASIS OF ILO CONVENTION 102
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Setting international social security standards has been one of the core activities 
of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) since its establishment in 1919. 
Th e Preamble to its constitution sets forth a number of goals in this respect, 
including: the protection of workers against sickness, disease, and injury arising 
out of employment; the protection of children, young persons, and women; and 
provision for old age and injury.1 Accordingly, many conventions and 
recommendations have been developed in view of these goals. In the fi rst period, 
the standards were mainly based on the concept of social insurance, aimed at 
prescribed categories of workers and covering specifi c risks in specifi c economic 
sectors. During the Second World War, a broader conception of social security 
has been developed. Th e new ideas were consolidated into one comprehensive 
instrument containing all contingencies and extending coverage to all workers. 
Th is fl agship Convention No. 102 on Minimum Standards of Social Security 
forms the basis for several subsequent ILO conventions setting out higher 
standards.2 Furthermore, it has been used by the Council of Europe as a 
blueprint for its European Code of Social Security (1964), which only diff ers from 
Convention 102 on a few points.
In this chapter, Convention 102 will be analysed in order to gain a better 
understanding of the norms and concepts of international social security 
standards. Vague terms will be examined on the basis of the preparatory 
documents so as to recall their initially intended meaning, and important 
concepts will be clarifi ed. First, in section 2.2, the origins of the Convention will 
be briefl y explored. In the sections 2.3 to 2.8, diff erent concepts included in the 
instrument will be investigated, including fl exibility, administration and 
1 Preamble to the Constitution of the ILO, adopted by the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.
2 For a detailed description of the diff erent generations of social security standards, see 
Pennings & Schulte 2006, pp. 5–11; Kulke 2007, pp. 126–127.
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fi nancing, suspension of benefi ts, right of appeal, equal treatment, and 
supervision. Sections 2.9 to 2.17 will contain analyses of the prescribed norms in 
relation to the nine social risks, as recognised by Convention 102, and similarly, 
by the European Code of Social Security. A concise overview of the norms in the 
diff erent instruments will be given in Appendix 1. Finally, conclusions are 
formulated in section 2.18.
2.2 GENESIS OF CONVENTION NO. 102 ON 
MINIMUM STANDARDS OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 
1952
2.2.1 FROM SOCIAL INSURANCE TO SOCIAL SECURITY
Facing the hardships of World War II, the International Labour Conference 
(ILC), meeting in Philadelphia, adopted on its twenty-fi ft h anniversary, the 
Declaration of Philadelphia.3 Th e Declaration was appended onto the 
Constitution of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) as an integral part, 
and redefi ned the principles of the ILO. Th ese principles include:4
– labour is not a commodity;
– freedom of expression and of association are essential to sustained progress;
– poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere; and
– the war against want requires to be carried on with unrelenting vigour within 
each nation.
It also reaffi  rmed the statement in the Constitution that lasting peace can be 
established only if it is based on social justice, and it set out a programme of 
action to achieve ten goals, including:5
– full employment and the raising of standards of living; and
– the extension of social security measures to provide a basic income to all in 
need of such protection and comprehensive medical care.
3 For reference works on the developments leading towards the creation of Convention 102, see 
ILO Income Security Recommendation 67, 1944; ILO Medical Care Recommendation 69, 
1944; ILO Report IV (1) 1951; ILO 1952; Staff ord 1953; Otting 1993; Valticos 1996; Servais 
2005, pp. 21–44, 257–259.
4 Declaration concerning the aims and purposes of the International Labour Organisation 
(Declaration of Philadelphia), annex to the Constitution of the ILO, para. I. Th e Constitution 
was adopted in 1919, and is published on the website of the ILO.
5 Declaration of Philadelphia, para. III.
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Th e Declaration of Philadelphia was clearly inspired by the Atlantic Charter – a 
joint statement by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill – issued aboard 
the USS Augusta near the coast of Newfoundland on August 14, 1941. In this 
charter they expressed certain general principles on which they based their hopes 
for a better future for the world.6 Th e fi ft h point of the eight-point charter 
contemplates the object of ‘securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic 
advancement and social security’, followed by the aspiration that ‘all the men in 
all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.
At the same time in the UK, Sir William Beveridge was working on his report, 
which was published in 1942.7 Th is landmark report turned out to be one of the 
most important documents in the history of social security. Beveridge, who at 
one time had been a member of the ILO’s Committee of Social Insurance 
Experts, embroidered on the shared dream of the two war leaders. One of his 
basic principles was that social security means freedom from want. He specifi ed 
the scope of social security including unemployment, sickness or accident, 
retirement through age, loss of support by the death of another person, and 
exceptional expenditures, such as those connected with birth, death and 
marriage.8 His report set out a ‘Plan for Social Security’ following three 
assumptions for a satisfactory scheme of social security: children’s allowances, 
comprehensive health and rehabilitation services, available to all members of the 
community, and avoidance of mass unemployment. Th e popularity of the 
Beveridge Report was prompted by the hope that its promise of social security 
for all aft er the war was real and attainable.
Following this line of thought, the International Labour Conference (Conference) 
in 1944 at Philadelphia adopted Recommendation No. 67 concerning Income 
Security, and No. 69 concerning Medical Care. Th e preambles of both 
Recommendations state, referring to the fi ft h principle of the Atlantic Charter, 
that income security is an essential element of social security. Th e notion of 
income security proceeded from the newly embraced desiderata of social security 
for all and freedom from want, and required a broadening of both the scope and 
the coverage of the ILO instruments on this topic. By contrast, during the pre-
war period of the ILO standard setting, the so-called ‘social insurance’ period 
(1919–1939), standards adopted mainly concerned certain clearly defi ned 
questions and covered limited categories of workers. For instance, the third 
convention, adopted in 1919, concerned the question of maternity protection in 
industrial and commercial undertakings. During the following 20 years this fi rst 
social insurance convention was supplemented by standards covering industrial 
6 Parrott 1992.
7 Beveridge 1942.
8 Beveridge 1942, point 300.
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accidents and occupational disease, a number of conventions concerning 
sickness, old age, invalidity and survivors’ insurance for workers in industrial 
and commercial undertakings, out-workers and domestic servants, and a 
convention concerning unemployment. Th e objective of all these conventions 
was the establishment of a compulsory insurance scheme for each specifi c risk, 
applicable to specifi c groups of workers.
Th e Declaration of Philadelphia heralded the beginning of the ‘social security’ 
era; it marked a new approach in various respects. First of all, the new social 
security standards referred not only to workers in the strict sense of the word, 
but their coverage was extended to all human beings, and concerned society as a 
whole. Secondly, the range of subjects was broadened, including, for instance, 
preventive medical care and family benefi ts. Other novelties of the new 
generation of conventions were the coherent form of presentation, the provision 
of minimum benefi t rates, the loosening of the tie between benefi t rights and 
contribution payments, and, in general, unifi cation of the administration of 
separate branches of social security.
2.2.2 THE PHILADELPHIA RECOMMENDATIONS: 
POINTING THE WAY TO A NEW SOCIAL SECURITY 
CONVENTION
With the Philadelphia Recommendation on Income Security, the ILO took a 
prudent fi rst step towards this new way of social security standard setting. Th e 
Income Security Recommendation covered the whole range of social risks that 
was dealt with in separate pre-war conventions, but in a more extended way. For 
a start, a safety net was introduced: ‘Appropriate allowances in cash or partly in 
cash and partly in kind should be provided for all persons who are in want …’.9 
Th e so-called social assistance was meant to protect people from poverty who 
were not covered by social insurance. It also aimed to provide assistance by 
society to parents to secure the wellbeing of dependent children. Also newly 
introduced were the supplements for each of the fi rst two children to be added to 
all benefi ts payable for loss of earnings.
Th e range of persons protected by compulsory social insurance was no longer 
confi ned to specifi c categories of workers, but extended to employed and self-
employed persons in general, together with their dependants.10 At the same time, 
the range of contingencies to be covered by compulsory social insurance was to 
include, above those already known, emergency expenses, namely, ‘certain 
9 ILO Income Security Recommendation 67, 1944, point 3.
10 ILO Income Security Recommendation 67, 1944, point 17.
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associated emergencies, which involved extraordinary strain on limited incomes, 
in so far as they are not otherwise covered’.11 Such benefi ts were to be provided, 
for instance, in cases of sickness, maternity, invalidity and death. As we will see 
later, this contingency has never reached the aim of being transposed into a 
convention.
Together with the Income Security Recommendation, a Recommendation 
concerning Medical Care was adopted by the Conference. Th e principles laid 
down in this recommendation outlined the objectives to be attained by a medical 
service covering the whole population, whether organised on the principle of 
compulsory social insurance or of a public service. Th e Recommendation 
provides that complete preventive and curative care should be available at any 
time and place to all members of the community. Th e care aff orded comprises a 
long list of care and supplies that should be available without time limit and for 
as long as they are needed.12
Th e Philadelphia Recommendations were based not so much on experience as on 
plans, reports, and bills that various countries were developing towards the end 
of the war. For that reason, at the time of adoption, the Committee on Social 
Security explained to the Conference that the Recommendations could only be 
converted into conventions aft er suffi  cient time, based on actual experience. In 
fact, they were a prelude to the trends that social security policy would follow in 
the post-war period, and would cause a transformation of the pre-war systems of 
social insurance. Th ey affi  rmed the importance of the social factor in economic 
issues and set out a programme of action for the future.
2.2.3 OBJECTIVES AND MINIMUM STANDARDS OF 
SOCIAL SECURITY: A PROPOSAL
In 1950 the Committee of Social Security Experts (Committee) considered it 
urgent that the progress of the last few years and the needs of all regions of the 
world should be duly refl ected in new or revised international instruments. Th e 
Committee found that a fresh impetus and new objectives should be given to the 
social security movement, which was rapidly evolving and expanding. It was 
suggested that the fi rst step should be the consideration of a new general social 
security convention, to give defi nite form to these new trends and a defi nite 
meaning to the concept of social security. On the one hand this general 
convention would guide Members in the creation or reconstruction of their 
social security systems, and on the other, it would serve as a framework and 
11 ILO Income Security Recommendation 67, 1944, point 15.
12 ILO Medical Care Recommendation, 1944, Part III; ILO Report IV (1) 1951, p. 29.
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starting point for the revision of the existing conventions of several branches of 
social security. Th e new instrument, it was held, should proceed from a 
consideration of the principles of the Philadelphia Recommendations, with due 
regard to recent trends of the social security movement.13
Th e Governing Body accordingly placed on the agenda of the 34th session the 
item ‘Objectives and Minimum Standards of Social Security’.14 Th e Committee 
of Social Security Experts worked out a questionnaire as a starting point for 
investigation and discussion.15 Th e concept of social security envisaged was very 
much the same as that of the Philadelphia Recommendations. However, no 
distinction was made with regard to the form of administration – the form could 
be a social insurance scheme, a social assistance scheme or a public service. 
Benefi ts were to be guaranteed to as wide a circle of the population as possible, 
but primarily to workers and their dependants, and to be granted as legal rights 
and not as discretionary charity. Th e questionnaire investigated various aspects 
which are essential to any social security system, such as:
– the branches of social security to be provided;
– the range of persons to be protected by a given branch;
– the amount of the benefi ts and the qualifying conditions thereof;
– the right of appeal;
– the fi nancial resources;
– the administration.
Th e questions of what benefi ts should be provided, and to whom, were considered 
of primary importance. How the benefi ts were to be fi nanced and administered 
were secondary points. It was the view of the Committee that the new instrument 
should supplement the defi ciencies of the existing conventions in several of the 
branches of social security. Th ese conventions were very precise on certain 
matters, but on one vital respect, that is, the amount of benefi t, they were silent. 
At the same time, their precision on other matters, such as persons protected, 
was considered an objectionable stumbling block to ratifi cation by Members. It 
was found that points of relatively minor importance should not hinder the 
acceptance of the new instrument by a Member State. Furthermore, the 
convention was regarded as being acceptable for both highly developed and less 
developed countries. To meet with this idea of a more fl exible instrument, it was 
held that two standards for national social security systems should be provided: 
a ‘minimum standard’ and an ‘advanced standard’.
13 ILO 1950, para. 3 and 4; ILO Report IV (1) 1951, pp. 4–5.
14 For the draft ing process, see ILO Report IV (1) 1951; ILO Report IV (2) 1951; ILO Report V  (a)
(1) 1952; ILO 1952; Wisskirchen 2005.
15 ILO Report IV (1) 1951.
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Th ese two standards would be laid down only in the most important provisions: 
those concerning persons protected, and benefi ts, including the qualifying 
conditions. Several grades of ratifi cation should become possible, according to 
the level attained by the national system concerned. For the less developed 
countries, the immediate objectives would be those of the minimum standard, 
while the more developed countries would look to the advanced standard. 
Flexibility should even be increased by giving a country the possibility of 
ratifying the convention by complying with the prescribed standards in respect 
of a small number of contingencies of its choice. In this way the conventions 
would have a dynamic and not a static character. Governments would be 
encouraged to develop their social security systems in such a way that during the 
process of advancement, all branches would be maintained at substantially the 
same level. Ratifi cations of branches partly to the minimum standard and partly 
to the advanced standard was therefore not recommended.16
From the outset, the form of the new international regulation was to be that of a 
convention. Th is was not a matter of course, though. In the general discussion in 
the Committee, the employers’ members considered that the proposed 
instrument should only apply to employees, since in their opinion the Conference 
did not have the competence to deal with problems other than those relating to 
workers. Th e general problems of the whole country were considered to be within 
the competence of other specialised agencies of the United Nations. Furthermore, 
they argued that the consequences of a fl exible instrument as proposed would be 
incompatible with the principle that a convention should impose equivalent 
obligations upon each ratifying Member. Consequently, they felt that each 
branch of social security should be dealt with in a separate convention, 
supplemented, if necessary, by a general recommendation dealing with the whole 
problem. Th eir proposal on this matter was rejected by 36 votes to 58, with 6 
abstentions.
2.2.4 CONVENTION ON MINIMUM STANDARDS OF 
SOCIAL SECURITY ONLY
As a result of the replies from the governments to the questionnaire and the 
discussions during two sessions of the Conference, Convention No. 102 on 
Minimum Standards of Social Security was fi nally adopted in 1952. Th is 35th 
Conference had brought together the largest number of delegates recorded in the 
history of the ILO. Th ere were 654 delegates and advisers, representing the 
peoples of 60 Member States (of the 66 Member States at that time), and 40 
observers and representatives of international organisations. Th e Convention 
16 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, p. 11.
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eventually only provided minimum standards. During the fi rst discussion about 
the proposals at its 34th Session (1951), the Conference only had time to consider 
the questions concerning the minimum standards to be submitted for a second 
and fi nal discussion at the 35th Session of the Conference. Th e Conference also 
decided to place the question of ‘Objectives and Advanced Standards of Social 
Security’ on the agenda of the 35th Session for a fi rst discussion of the item.17
As regards the advanced standards, during the preparations for the 35th Session 
(1952), the Committee agreed on the submission to the Conference of a draft  
resolution, but agreement was not reached on the substance of such a resolution. 
One part of the Committee wanted the resolution to ask the Conference to 
include the question of advanced standards on the agenda of its next session for a 
fi rst discussion, as was decided by the Conference. Th e other part, however, 
wanted to invite the Governing Body to consider the matter further ‘at the 
appropriate time in the light of experience of the working of the instrument 
concerning minimum standards, as adopted at this session of the Conference’, 
which would shelve the subject for quite a number of years, considering the time-
consuming process of ratifi cation of a new convention.18 With a majority of 156 
votes to 155, with no abstentions, the latter proposal was adopted by the 
Committee and eventually submitted to the Conference. During the discussion 
about this resolution it was stressed that the majority of one vote was due to the 
fortuitous absence of one workers’ member at the time of voting. In view of the 
unsatisfactory outcome of the vote, the Belgian and French government delegates 
proposed an amendment, which invited the Governing Body to re-examine the 
question of ‘Objectives and advanced standards of social security’, and to choose 
an appropriate time for placing it on the agenda of an early session of the 
Conference. Th is compromise was to prevent the subject from getting postponed 
for an uncertain number of years, but did not oblige the Governing Body to 
include it in the agenda of the very next Conference. Th e proposal was founded 
by emphasising that it only owed to lack of time that it had not been possible to 
discuss both the minimum, as well as the advanced standards, at the current 
Conference. However, with the British government as the main opponent, the 
discussion led to a resolution simply inviting the Governing Body ‘to re-examine 
the question … and to choose an appropriate time for placing it on the agenda’, 
without any further instruction.19 Obviously, the fear of postponement of the 
proposal was not unjustifi ed, since time has shown that it was never placed on 
the agenda again. Instead, diff erent conventions have been developed on the basis 
of Convention 102, providing higher standards for (a) specifi c risk(s) only.20
17 ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 518.
18 ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 386.
19 ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, pp. 386–391.
20 For a list of the higher social security standards, see section 1.3.1.
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2.3 TRIPARTISM
Th e principle of tripartism is one important characteristic that distinguishes the 
ILO from other international organisations. Representatives of employers’ and 
workers’ organisations participate in the diff erent proceedings of the ILO, 
together on an equal footing with those of governments. Th e notion of tripartism 
arose during the preparation of the ILO Constitution by the Commission on 
International Labour Legislation of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, and has 
been the very backbone of the ILO ever since.21 It carries through to all levels of 
the Organisation, from the diff erent offi  cial bodies to the specifi c working groups 
for the preparation of one item on the agenda, each body consisting of an equal 
number of workers’ and employers’ representatives (counted together) and 
representatives of governments. Tripartism is also introduced at the national 
level, for example, by Article 23 of the Constitution, obliging Member States to 
distribute to the representative organisations copies of the information and 
reports communicated to the Director-General of the ILO.
In relation to the application of Convention 102, and likewise of the higher 
standards, tripartism plays a role at diff erent points. First, the governments have 
to send their reports (or other communications) on the application of the 
instruments to the workers’ and employers’ representatives in order to give them 
the opportunity to express their comments, either to the government or directly 
to the ILO. Secondly, it is regulated that if the administration of a social security 
scheme is not managed under responsibility of the public authorities, 
representatives of the persons protected shall participate in the management.22
2.4 FLEXIBILITY CLAUSES
2.4.1 FRAMING STANDARDS TO BE RELEVANT TO THE 
GREATEST NUMBER OF COUNTRIES
Convention 102 was designed with the idea that it ‘should take fully into account 
the possibilities of achievement open, now or in the near future, to highly 
developed countries as well as to less developed countries’.23 It was furthermore 
considered that the same general level of social security can be attained by 
diff erent means, since ‘the economic, psychological and social conditions of a 
country may render the coverage of a certain contingency, or the provision of a 
certain benefi t, particularly important’. Th erefore, a fl exible instrument was 
21 Osieke 1985, pp. 52–55.
22 ILO Convention 102, Art. 72 (1). See section 2.5.4.
23 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, p. 5.
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envisaged that would leave Member States much discretion with regard to the 
organisation of the social security schemes and the methods to guarantee the 
prescribed benefi ts. Various types of fl exibility clauses are incorporated in the 
Conventions indeed.24
2.4.2 OPTIONS REGARDING OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN
Article 2 of Convention 102 gives countries the possibility of choosing, at the 
time of ratifi cation, the extent of obligations they wish to undertake. Ratifi cation 
of the Convention always implies the acceptance of the common provisions. 
Apart from the common parts, the country can choose at least three out of the 
nine parts that correspond with the nine branches of social security. Th ese three 
accepted parts should include at least one of the following fi ve parts: 
unemployment, old-age, employment injury, invalidity, and death of the 
breadwinner. At a later stage, countries may extend their acceptance to other 
parts. Th us, this fl exibility clause permits the progressive application of the 
Convention and calls upon the governments to take further action and 
achievement. Th is call for further action is emphasised by the fact that 
contracting parties have to report to the ILO on a regular basis on their 
achievement in respect of the non-accepted parts.25 Similar provisions are 
included in ILO Convention 128 on Invalidity, Old-Age, and Survivors’ Benefi t 
(1967).
2.4.3 TEMPORARY EXCEPTIONS FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES
Article 3 of Convention 102 leaves room for a country whose economy and 
medical facilities is insuffi  ciently developed to avail itself of temporary exceptions 
pertaining to diff erent provisions. Th e exceptions involve, for example, a smaller 
personal scope or a shorter duration of benefi t.
During the draft ing procedure, it was opposed by some Member States that such 
a provision would constitute a contradiction of the concept of minimum 
standards. Th ey also suggested the exceptions to be subject to a precise time 
limit, as to three, fi ve or ten years, which was discussed at length in several 
sittings. However the Conference decided not to set any precise time limit. It 
24 See, for example, ILO Report V (a) 2 1952, pp. 192–193; Valticos & Potobsky 1995, pp. 57–60; 
López Morales, Silva, Egorov 2001, pp. 446–447; Servais 2005, pp. 259–261; Kulke 2006, pp. 
27–29.
25 Convention 102, Art. 76 (2).
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would be suffi  cient to emphasize the temporary character of the exceptions and 
to oblige the Member to state in its annual reports to the Offi  ce that the reason 
for availing itself of these exceptions still exists, or to renounce its rights in this 
respect.26
Because this study does not include developing countries, but merely addresses 
social security in EU Member States, these temporary exceptions are not 
analysed and elaborated in the following chapters.
2.4.4 OPTIONS REGARDING THE TYPE OF A SCHEME
Th e norms set out by Convention 102 can be reached through diff erent types of 
social security schemes, notably through universal schemes, occupational 
insurance schemes, social assistance schemes, or even through private and 
voluntary schemes. Furthermore, the Convention provides for fl exibility 
regarding the personal coverage of a scheme. Th e defi nition of the persons 
protected may be based on a specifi c percentage of either employees or residents. 
In respect of most branches, a country can choose to protect prescribed categories 
of employees, constituting at least 50 percent of all employees; or prescribed 
categories of economically active persons constituting at least 20 percent of all 
residents; or all residents whose means do not exceed prescribed limits.27
Th is fl exibility regarding the type of a social security scheme is further developed 
by the diff erent options for the calculation of benefi ts. Benefi ts may be earnings-
related or fl at rate, or contain components of both. Th e prescribed levels of the 
benefi ts are based on a percentage of average wages in the country concerned, 
which makes it possible to apply to developed, as well as less developed, 
countries.28
2.4.5 USE OF GENERAL TERMS
Th e fl exibility of the Convention also exists in the usage of general wording in 
diff erent respects. Several terms or concepts are not well defi ned, giving the 
countries freedom in applying the standard concerned. Cases in point are: 
‘employee’, ‘suitable employment’, ‘a qualifying period as may be considered 
necessary to preclude abuse’, and ‘the rules concerning cost-sharing shall be so 
26 ILO 1952, p. 291.
27 Th e diff erent options regarding the personal scope will be further elaborated on in the 
sections dealing with the diff erent branches of social security, notably section 2.9.2.
28 Th e diff erent options regarding the calculation of the benefi ts will be further elaborated on in 
the sections dealing with the diff erent branches of social security, notably section 2.10.3.
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designed as to avoid hardship’. Th e preparatory documents or comments of the 
supervising committees give some guidance regarding the interpretation of most 
of these vague norms, but there is still room for some discretion.29
2.5 ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCING
2.5.1 PRINCIPLES ON SOLIDARITY AND STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY
Although the Convention leaves great fl exibility to countries with regard to the 
method of organising the schemes and proving benefi ts, a set of basic principles 
has to be complied with irrespective of the type of the schemes established.30 Th e 
importance of these principles has been repeatedly emphasised by the Committee 
of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR).31 
In order to guarantee the supply of resources needed to pay out benefi ts according 
to the given norms, to cover administrative costs, and to ensure an equitable 
distribution of the fi nancial burden, the Convention lays out clear rules to be 
complied with by any scheme, public as well as private. Th ese rules contain three 
fundamental criteria, which together are termed, for the purpose of this study, 
‘the principles on solidarity and state responsibility’.
2.5.2 FINANCIAL SOLIDARITY
Th e fi rst principle involves fi nancial solidarity, requiring that contributions or 
taxes for fi nancing benefi ts should be charged on the basis of a person’s ability to 
pay, and regardless of their individual risks. More specifi cally, Convention 102 
provides that ‘the cost of the benefi ts […] and the cost of the administration of 
such benefi ts shall be borne collectively by way of insurance contributions or 
taxation or both in a manner which avoids hardship to persons of small means.’32 
In the case of contributory schemes, it is specifi ed that, on the whole employees 
protected are not to be required to pay more than 50 percent of the fi nancial 
29 Th e general terms will be further elaborated on in the sections dealing with the diff erent 
branches of social security.
30 ILO Convention 102, Arts. 71 and 72; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 230–232; ILO 1989, pp. 
95–101; Humblet & Silva 2002, pp. 11–15; Lopez Morales, Silva, Egorov 2002, pp. 446–448; 
Pennings 2007B, pp. 7–8; Kulke 2006, pp. 29–31.
31 For example, CEACR: Individual Observation concerning C102 (Peru) 1999, concerning the 
private pension scheme; CEACR: Individual Observation concerning C102 (Netherlands) 
2003, concerning employers’ liability for sickness benefi t; CEACR: Individual Direct Request 
concerning C102 (France) 2007, concerning the health care system.
32 ILO Convention 102, Art. 71 (1).
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resources allocated for their protection. For the assessment of this limit, all the 
benefi ts provided by the country concerned may be taken together, except family 
benefi ts and employment injury benefi ts. It must be borne in mind, however, that 
within each scheme, hardship for persons with meagre resources must also be 
avoided if the 50 percent rule has been fulfi lled.
2.5.3 GENERAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE
Closely connected to the obligation of collective fi nancing, the second rule 
prescribes that the state ‘shall accept general responsibility for the due provision 
of the benefi ts provided.’33 It has been made clear by the ILO in an explanatory 
memorandum that general responsibility ‘would not necessarily bind the 
Member to meet any defi cit occurring in the agency administering a scheme […], 
but it would oblige it to take measures to ensure that the benefi ts are duly 
provided.’34 Examples of such measures would be for the government to grant a 
subsidy to meet the defi cit, or to secure the provision of the benefi ts by arranging 
a loan. General responsibility also includes the government making sure that 
actuarial studies and calculations concerning fi nancial equilibrium are made 
periodically, and that contribution rates may only be raised on the basis of an 
actuarial report of the scheme concerned that shows that fi nancial balance will 
be achieved in the long-term.35 Th is implies that the state must not only supervise 
the administrative institutions, but must also ensure a balance between the 
resources raised for social security and benefi ts delivered, allowing for 
redistribution between diff erent groups in accordance with the solidarity 
principle. It has been emphasised in this respect that resources envisaged for 
social security cannot be used to fi nance non-social security expenditure, such 
as a defi cit in the state budget.36 In relation to privatised schemes, this also 
implies a prohibition on profi t-seeking for insurance funds.
Th e Convention also sets out that governments must accept general responsibility 
for the proper administration of the institutions and services where the 
administration is not entrusted to public authorities. Th is implies that the state 
has a serious task in monitoring and actively supervising the management and 
administration of private funds.
33 ILO Convention 102, Art. 71 (3).
34 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 231.
35 ILO 2008, pp. 9–10.
36 Humblet & Silva 2002, p. 12; Humblet & Zarka-Martres 2001, p. 447; ILO 2001a, pp. 57–58.
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2.5.4 REPRESENTATION OF DIFFERENT INTERESTS IN 
THE MANAGEMENT OF THE SCHEME
Because of the fl exibility provided in the Convention with regard to the form of 
organisation of social security schemes, it was considered necessary for the 
various interests to be represented in the administration of the diff erent systems, 
particularly the interests of the persons protected.37 Th erefore, it is prescribed 
that, where the administration is not entrusted to the government, representatives 
of the persons protected must participate in the management, at least in a 
consultative manner.38 Th is provision ensures that in the case of a privately 
managed insurance scheme, national regulations require the involvement of 
persons protected, for instance, through the participation of trade unions. Apart 
from this obligation, the Convention also prescribes that the participation of 
representatives of employers and of public authorities may be regulated for, but 
this is left  to the discretion of the national legislators. Private schemes that are 
administrated in line with these basic rules can be taken into account in terms of 
the fulfi lment of obligations contained in the Convention.
2.6 SUSPENSION OF BENEFITS
Convention 102 regulates the cases in which a benefi t may be suspended by way 
of a common provision that applies to all branches of social security.39 Because a 
benefi ciary will be in danger of losing a decent standard of living, a benefi t 
should only be withdrawn under carefully prescribed conditions. Th ese 
conditions can be grouped into three categories. Th e fi rst situation permitting 
suspension is when the benefi ciary is absent from the country in which the 
entitlement to the benefi t has been acquired. Th e second category contains 
situations in which the person is otherwise compensated for the (presumed) loss 
of earnings, for example, if the person is maintained at public expense or is in 
receipt of another social security benefi t, either public or private. Th e third 
category relates to the benefi ciary’s personal conduct. For example, it covers 
cases in which fraudulent claims have been made, or where the contingency has 
been caused by a criminal off ence or by the wilful misconduct of the claimant. 
Suspension of the benefi t is also allowed if the benefi ciary fails to make use of 
available medical services (sickness benefi t) or employment services 
(unemployment benefi t). Additional grounds for suspension or reduction of the 
benefi t specifi c to the contingency of unemployment, are situations in which the 
37 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 231–232.
38 ILO Convention 102, Art. 72 (1).
39 ILO Convention 102, Art. 69; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 231; Humblet & Silva 2002, pp. 
14–15.
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unemployed person has deliberately contributed to his or her own dismissal, or 
has left  employment voluntarily without just cause.
2.7 RIGHT OF APPEAL
A country that has ratifi ed Convention 102 in respect of any of the nine parts 
dealing with the specifi c contingencies should guarantee that every claimant to 
benefi t under the part concerned has a right to appeal.40 Th e right to appeal 
covers the refusal of a benefi t or complaints regarding its quality or quantity. In 
respect of medical care, the right is restricted in case the administration is 
entrusted to a government department responsible to a legislature. In these cases, 
the right of appeal may be replaced by a right ‘to have a complaint concerning 
the refusal of medical care or the quality of the care received investigated by the 
appropriate authority’. In the draft  version of the Convention, it was 
recommended that any appeal should be heard by an authority either 
independent of, or higher than, the authority that gave the decision.41 Th is was 
considered of great importance in order to protect claimants against 
administrative discretion, bias, arbitrary action or errors. On the instigation of 
the government of the United Kingdom, the restriction regarding medical care 
was included. Th e Finnish government proposed extending this restriction to all 
contingencies, however this was not accepted by the draft ing Committee of 
Experts. Nevertheless, in the adopted version of the Convention, the part of the 
provision involving an independent or higher authority than the authority that 
gave the original decision has been left  out, apparently to satisfy the Finnish 
government. In the higher standards, the very same addition has been included 
and further developed.42
2.8 SUPERVISION AND INTERPRETATION OF 
STANDARDS
2.8.1 SUPERVISION
Th e ILO’s system of supervision is founded in its original constitution and has 
evolved over the years into an advanced system with a wide variety of stages and 
procedures.43 Because it is beyond the scope of this study to examine the system 
40 ILO Convention 102, Art. 70; Servais 2005, pp. 263–264.
41 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, pp. 111–112; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 146–147, 230.
42 Humblet & Silva 2002, p. 14; Kulke 2006, p. 31.
43 ILO Constitution, Art. 22; Bartolomei de la Cruz, Potobsky, Swepston 1996, pp. 67–124; 
Valticos 1979, pp. 692–696; Leary 1982, pp. 17–34; Pennings 2006B, pp. 15–20.
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in a general and thorough manner, only a brief outline will be given that is of 
practical relevance to the application of social security standards.
Once a country has ratifi ed an ILO convention, it is obliged to report regularly 
on the application of the instrument. For social security conventions, such 
reports must be submitted every fi ve years to the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR). In between, the 
CEACR is free to request reports at more frequent intervals when there are 
serious diffi  culties in application. Th e reports must contain the information 
listed in a report form for each convention approved by the Governing Body aft er 
its adoption. In these reports, the governments are also to provide information, 
if applicable, on the non-ratifi ed parts of the convention concerned. Governments 
are required to submit copies of their reports to employers’ and workers’ 
organisations. Th ese organisations may comment on the reports and may also 
send comments on the application of conventions directly to the ILO. Th is 
procedure gives expression to the principle of tripartism that constitutes the 
ILO’s primary characteristic.
Th e CEACR is composed of 20 independent eminent jurists appointed in their 
own capacity, and not as government representatives by the Governing Body, for 
three-year terms. When examining the application of the conventions, the 
Committee makes two kinds of comments: observations and direct requests. 
Observations contain comments on fundamental questions and the most serious 
or persistent cases of non-compliance, and are published in the Committee’s 
annual report. Direct requests relate to more technical questions or requests for 
further information. Th ey are not published in the annual reports, but are 
communicated directly to the governments concerned. Th e CEACR expresses its 
comments in various diplomatic ways. In the fi rst instance, it notes a development 
or a possible inconsistency in a neutral way, for example, ‘the Committee 
observes that…’, or ‘the Committee considers that…’. Th en, if a highlighted 
inconsistency has not been brought into compliance with the applicable 
convention, the Committee will note this omission in a next communication 
‘with concern’. ‘Deep concern’ is the strongest expression of criticism, and is only 
used in exceptional cases of continuing and very serious infringements. In the 
event of the repeal of the law or the discontinuation of the practice that has been 
criticised by the CEACR, it is noted with ‘interest’, or even with ‘satisfaction’.
Th e report of the CEACR is submitted to the annual session of the International 
Labour Conference and serves as a basis for discussion by the Conference 
Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(Conference Committee). Th is Committee is elected by the delegates of the ILO 
Conference and is composed of representatives of governments, employers and 
workers, enjoying equal voting strength. Th e Conference Committee selects for 
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discussion certain cases of serious discrepancies between conventions and 
national law or practice that are noted by the CEACR in its annual report. Th ese 
discussions are of a more political nature than those of the CEACR. Th e 
Conference Committee submits a report to the plenary session of the Conference, 
which includes a section referring to states that have failed to comply with their 
reporting obligations, or whose law or practice has not been brought in 
compliance with the standards concerned. Th is sanction of naming and shaming 
is the most serious moral censure available within the supervisory system. 
Obviously, countries do not like to be named in the so-called ‘special list’.44
2.8.2 INTERPRETATION
As mentioned in section 2.4.4, the Convention contains various vague terms and 
concepts that need further explanation to ensure a uniform understanding of the 
standards. In fact, a Member State who is part of a convention is under the 
obligation to apply its provisions in the same way as other Member States.45 
Unfortunately, a general introduction or preamble has not been attached to the 
Convention. During the draft ing process in 1952, the International Labour Offi  ce 
(Offi  ce) provided an ‘Explanation of Proposed Convention’, that briefl y detailed 
the background and intentions of the diff erent provisions.46 However, this 
document is hard to fi nd as it is only available in a few libraries, and it does not 
give decisive information on several ambiguous provisions. A consistent 
interpretation of unclear norms is necessary for countries to be able to implement 
the Convention into the national legal order and to apply the standards in 
practice. Th erefore, it is important to shed light on how, and by whom, 
interpretation of the norms is eff ectuated.
Under the ILO Constitution, responsibility for the interpretation of conventions 
is assigned to the International Court of Justice and a tribunal that may be 
established for that purpose.47 However, a tribunal has never been established 
and only one case has so far been referred to the Court. Th is was done in January 
1932 by the British government, asking for an Advisory Opinion.48 On the basis 
of the Court’s opinion, which was issued in November of the same year, the 
44 Bartolomei de la Cruz, Potobsky, Swepston 1996, p. 83; Korda & Pennings 2008, p. 136.
45 Th is follows from the ILO Constitution, Art. 19 para. 5; Osieke 1985, pp. 209–210.
46 ILO Report (5)(2) 1952, pp. 192–233.
47 ILO Constitution, Art. 37; Osieke 1985, pp. 204–210; Penning 2007A, pp. 28–29; Servais 2005, 
pp. 79–80.
48 Th e question concerned the draft  Convention on employment of women during the night. 
Th e British government wanted to know whether the Convention applied to women holding 
positions of supervision or management. Th e Court replied that the Convention was couched 
in general terms and free from ambiguity or obscurity, and that it therefore necessarily 
applied to all categories of women. Osieke 1985, pp. 204–206.
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Conference decided to change the draft  Convention. Considering the fact that 
the Advisory Opinion of the Court provided clarity as to the meaning of the 
questioned provision, and that it was taken into account by the Conference as a 
decision under Article 37 of the Constitution, the procedure seemed useful and 
eff ective. Despite this, it has never been invoked by any state since then.
Instead, it has become the practice of the Member States to ask the Offi  ce for 
advice on the meaning of specifi c provisions that are found unclear. Th e formal 
requests and the opinions of the Offi  ce that are of general interest are published 
in the Offi  cial Bulletin of the ILO, but not included in the databases that are freely 
accessible through the ILO website.49 In its interpretations, the Offi  ce oft en refers 
to observations and direct requests of the CEACR on the question at hand. Th e 
Director-General of the International Labour Offi  ce, before expressing the view 
of the Offi  ce, always stresses that the Constitution does not give him any special 
authority to interpret conventions. It might be questioned whether this reservation 
is necessary, or indeed, justifi ed.50 Although it is true that the Constitution does 
not expressly authorise the Offi  ce to interpret the texts of Conventions, it does not 
prohibit it either. Indeed, the functions of the Offi  ce ‘include the collection and 
distribution of information on all subjects relating to the international adjustment 
of conditions of industrial life…’, and to ‘accord to governments, at their request, 
all appropriate assistance within its power in connection with the framing of laws 
and regulations…’.51 Th us, it does not seem far-fetched to regard the competence 
to interpret unclear provisions as within the functions assigned to the Offi  ce. 
Furthermore, its interpreting function has become an established constitutional 
practice of the ILO, since no Member State has ever objected to this practice.52 
On the contrary, many Member States have asked, and still ask, the opinion of the 
Offi  ce on various interpretation matters over the years.
Another body taking part in interpreting conventions, and whose competence 
on this point is oft en contested, is the CEACR.53 Its main task, to determine 
whether the requirements of a given convention have been met, requires a 
consistent interpretation of the norms. In this light, interpreting the conventions 
is essential for the realisation of its task. Indeed, in the observations and direct 
requests the CEACR oft en clarifi es provisions which are unclear or which are not 
correctly implemented by a Member State. Because these documents are 
published on the website of the ILO, they constitute an important and workable 
49 Informal communications between governments and the Labour Offi  ce take place as well, but 
they are not published.
50 See also Korda & Pennings 2008, pp. 135–137; Pennings 2007B, pp. 28–29; Dijkhoff  & 
Pennings 2007, pp. 163–166; Osieke 1985, pp. 206–210.
51 ILO Constitution Art. 10.
52 Osieke 1985, p. 208.
53 Nußberger 2007, pp. 46–48; Pennings 2006A, p. 174–177; Servais 2005, p. 80.
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body of ‘case law’.54 Case law is put between quotation marks here because the 
interpretations of the CEACR are generally not considered authoritative. It must 
be recognised however, that if a given interpretation is not rejected by the 
contracting parties, they are bound by it in view of their obligation to apply the 
conventions in a uniform manner.55
2.9 MEDICAL CARE
2.9.1 MATERIAL SCOPE
Medical care and sickness benefi t
Convention 102 categorises medical care and sickness into two diff erent 
contingencies. In the Philadelphia Recommendations, which have served as a basis 
for the Convention, only one branch concerning medical care was included, 
comprising medical care as well as cash sickness allowances. Initially, these two 
types of benefi t were both granted under one and the same scheme. At the time of 
the preparatory examination by the International Labour Offi  ce (Offi  ce) of the 
social security schemes eff ective in the Member States however, some countries 
provided only one of the two benefi ts, medical care or cash, and other countries 
provided both benefi ts, but under schemes of diff erent scope or type. Th e 
Convention therefore distinguishes between a branch granting medical benefi ts on 
the one hand, and a branch providing cash sickness allowances, on the other.56
Medical care of a preventive or curative nature
Member States for whom this part of the Convention is in force, committed 
themselves to provide for benefi ts ‘in respect of a condition requiring medical 
care of a preventive or curative nature’.57 A condition requiring medical care 
implies any condition requiring medical care, including ordinary sickness, 
employment injury and maternity.58 Th e term ‘preventive or curative nature’ was 
added in the course of the discussions on behalf of the workers’ members, 
referring to the opinion of the World Health Organisation that strongly 
emphasised the importance of preventive services to individuals who do not have 
a morbid condition, such as immunisations and periodic health examinations.59
54 IOLEX en APPLIS databases.
55 Osieke 1985, p. 210. Th is also follows from the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
artt. 31–32.
56 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 10.
57 Convention 102, Art. 7.
58 ILO Report IV (2) 1951, pp. 211–212.
59 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 306.
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In the fi rst draft  of the Convention, preventive care was not included as a separate 
part of social security. In the explanation on the proposed Convention, the Offi  ce 
argued in this respect that the aim of the provision of medical care under a 
minimum standard is to provide medical care to the individual protected, rather 
than to prevent the need for such care. According to the Offi  ce, the importance 
of the preventive aspects of medical care was suffi  ciently stressed by the wording 
of Article 10, paragraph 3.60 Th is paragraph stipulates the importance of 
preventive medical care by the requirement that the medical benefi t should aim, 
not only at restoring, but also at maintaining or improving the health of the 
persons protected. Moreover it is geared towards restoring, maintaining or 
improving their ability to work, as well as attending to their personal needs, 
where these capacities are diminished or threatened by ill-health. Medical 
rehabilitation should accordingly be included within the range of the medical 
care provided. Th e Offi  ce underlined that the development of a general preventive 
health service as an addition to medical care was highly recommended, but that 
the provision of preventive health care could not be made the responsibility of a 
social security medical care service, which is oft en restricted by limited fi nancial 
resources.61 Nevertheless, in the fi nal text of the Convention, the addition of 
care of a ‘preventive or curative nature’ was included as a result of the proposal 
put forward by the workers’ members, strongly backed up by the opinion of the 
W.H.O. Consultant Group.62
Any morbid condition
A condition requiring medical care has been specifi ed as ‘any morbid 
condition, whatever its cause, and pregnancy and confi nement and their 
consequences’.63 In response to the request for a defi nition of the term ‘morbid 
condition’, the Offi  ce pointed out that at that time, the World Health 
Organisation was considering the defi nition of illness. In advance of such 
defi nition, a helping hand for practical use was given by refl ecting that any 
condition that requires medical care other than normal pregnancy, confi nement 
and their normal consequences, may be deemed a morbid condition.64 It is 
clear that there is no room for any exceptions on the subject of illnesses or 
circumstances.
60 Convention 102, Art. 10 (3): ‘Th e benefi t provided in accordance with this Article shall be 
aff orded with a view to maintaining, restoring or improving the health of the person protected 
and his ability to work and to attend to his personal needs.’
61 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 85, 195–196.
62 ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 520.
63 Convention 102, Art. 8.
64 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 83.




One of the revolutionary issues of the Philadelphia Recommendation on medical 
care was the so-called complete coverage. It was recommended that the medical 
care service should cover all members of the community, whether or not they 
were gainfully occupied.65 Th e Offi  ce, following the Recommendation, fi rst 
adopted the proposal to admit a medical service protecting the whole 
population.66 Subsequently, it proposed to divide medical care and cash benefi ts 
into two diff erent branches. Th us, a Member was allowed to ratify on the strength 
of a cash sickness benefi t scheme only, or of a medical benefi t scheme only. As a 
result of this division it proved technically impracticable to verify whether 
medical assistance actually would be available to all residents, and therefore, the 
possibility of coverage of categories of the economically active population was 
included.67
Th ree alternatives
Finally, three alternatives are given in respect of the personal scope. Th ese 
alternatives apply not only to medical care, but to most contingencies covered by 
the Convention. Th e diff erent options take due account of the existence at that 
time of two distinct policies in national legislation, one tending to protect the 
entire population, and the other aiming at covering the gainfully occupied 
population, primarily the employees, and in some cases also their dependants.68 
To meet the conditions of the Convention, the persons protected shall 
comprise:69
(a) prescribed classes of employees, constituting not less than 50 percent of all 
employees, and also their wives and children; or
(b) prescribed classes of economically active population, constituting not less than 
20 percent of all residents, and also their wives and children; or
(c) prescribed classes of residents, constituting not less than 50 percent of all 
residents.
Th e term ‘prescribed classes’ implies that it is left  to national legislation to limit 
the scope of protection to certain groups of employees, economically active 
population or residents, such as, for instance, employees in industrial 
65 Recommendation No. 69 on Medical Care, 1944, point 8.
66 ILO Report IV (2) 1951, pp. 198, 327.
67 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, pp. 50–51; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 83, 194.
68 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 10.
69 ILO Convention 102, Art. 9.
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undertakings, or gainfully occupied persons in specifi ed occupations, or all 
residents within a certain income limit. In any event, those classes of persons 
must constitute at least the prescribed proportion of all employees or 
residents.70
Initially, in the fi rst draft  of the Convention, only the second and third 
alternatives were proposed. Th ese alternatives were considered to protect just 
about the same number of people. According to calculations by the Offi  ce based 
on statistical data published in 1948 by the United Nations and the Offi  ce, the 
ratio of the active population aged 15 to 65 to the total population gave an average 
percentage of about 40 percent. Th us, the proportions were fi xed in view of the 
fact that 20 percent of the population represented, roughly, 50 percent of all 
gainfully occupied persons.71 Th ese conclusions were translated in the two 
alternatives, constituting an equivalent norm. Th e choice of the exact percentages 
was also made on grounds of analyses of the then existing social security schemes 
in the Member States.72 Th e same percentages have been applied to most of the 
branches. Because the Convention prescribes minimum standards, the 
percentages were chosen so that a great majority of the countries would be able 
to meet them in respect of at least several branches.
Th e fi rst alternative was added at a later stage on behalf of the slightly developed 
countries to meet the standard more easily, as well as to place a greater emphasis 
on the protection of employees, which was the wish of the Polish government. 
Th e statistics showed that in those countries one half of all employees oft en 
constituted less than 20 percent of the population.73 Th e new alternative aimed 
to serve as a stepping-stone for less developed countries in particular, in view of 
the economic development and industrialisation that would cause an increase of 
employees.74 Furthermore, the Offi  ce argued that under an insurance scheme 
that protects employees, it may be easier to prove that 50 percent of all employees 
are protected than to prove that it protects 20 percent of the population. On the 
other hand, a scheme that includes independent workers under sickness 
insurance might be insuring 20 percent of the population without attaining 50 
percent of all employees.
All insured persons who are normally engaged in economic activity or who 
normally work as employees can be counted towards the percentages of 50 
70 ILO Report IV (2) 1951, p. 198.
71 ILO Report IV (2) 1951, pp. 198–199.
72 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 169–189.
73 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 169. In countries such as Bulgaria, Poland, Japan, and Peru, the 
ratio of the employees to the total population was below 15%; in the Western European 
countries this was about 30%.
74 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 81–83, 90.
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percent of all employees and 20 percent of all residents respectively, including 
those who are temporarily unemployed or sick.75 Th e wives and children of the 
insured persons are entitled to medical benefi t, but cannot be counted towards 
these percentages.
Coverage of all residents
Th e third alternative was formulated in consideration of countries providing 
medical care systems covering individuals as residents. Th us, under such schemes 
both the breadwinner and the members of their family are insured in their own 
right. Th e minimum protection is set at 50 percent because, in this case, the 
dependants are insured persons and may therefore be counted for the purpose of 
proving compliance with the Convention. Th is alternative would suit countries 
providing public medical care services for the whole population.
Means test
Since medical care does not include cash benefi ts, a limitation of the scope to 
persons of small or of insuffi  cient private means is not admitted. An income 
limit, or the so-called means test, under which benefi ts are granted only to those 
with insuffi  cient means, is normally admitted under schemes protecting all 
residents, but only for cash benefi ts. Income limits or means tests are, therefore, 
excluded in respect of this branch.76
2.9.3 BENEFITS
Range of care
Th e reference point in the matter of the range of care was the Philadelphia 
Recommendation on Medical Care.77 Th e Recommendation provides for a 
broad range of care, including dental care, nursing care at home, maintenance in 
sanatoria or other medical institutions, and requisite medical supplies, such as 
prosthetic limbs. For the minimum standard of medical benefi ts under this 
branch of Convention 102, these specifi c services have been left  out, restricting 
the range of care to the most essential items.78 It was envisaged that only the 
advanced standards would comprise the full range of care as defi ned in the 
Recommendation on Medical Care, with specifi c emphasis on the prevention of 
75 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 194.
76 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, p. 24–26; ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 51.
77 Recommendation No. 69 on Medical Care (1944).
78 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, p. 37, ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 18.
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sickness and the rehabilitation of the patient.79 Th e minimum standard in the 
event of employment injury, however, should also comprise the full range of 
care.80
General practitioner care
Medical care under this Convention should cover, in the fi rst place, general 
practitioner care, including home visiting.81 General practitioner care must be 
regarded as the fi rst line of defence of any medical care service, as stressed by the 
World Health Organisation. In the draft s, the Offi  ce had explicitly not included 
home visiting, taking into account the shortage of doctors in underdeveloped 
countries. At the last stage however, the workers’ members proposed to include 
home visits, referring to the report of the WHO that strongly emphasised the 
importance of this kind of care. Th e proposal was retained by the Committee, 
and thus home visiting was eventually included in the fi nal text.82
Specialist care
Th e second service that must be provided is ‘specialist care at hospitals for 
in-patients and out-patients, and such specialist care as may be available outside 
hospitals’.83 Th e latter part of the provision was added because an emphasis on 
hospital specialist care could split specialist services into hospital and non-
hospital services, which might result in an increased demand for hospital care. 
Moreover, a survey of the countries had shown that specialist services were 
commonly made available in other ways than in connection with hospitalisation, 
especially in outlying, rural districts.84 Dental care was not included as it was 
not considered essential.
Pharmaceutical supplies
Th e third kind of care to be provided is ‘the essential pharmaceutical supplies as 
prescribed by medical or other qualifi ed practitioners’.85 Th e initial idea of the 
Offi  ce was to simply require the provision of all essential drugs and preparations, 
irrespective of their cost. Th is point of view was supported by the WHO 
Consultant Group, but regarded as excessive by the Canadian and Norwegian 
governments. Th e condition that the supplies should be prescribed by 
79 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, p. 40.
80 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, p. 38.
81 Convention 102, Art. 10, para. a (i).
82 ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 520.
83 Convention 102, Art. 10, para. a (ii).
84 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 86.
85 Convention 102, Art. 10, para. a (iii).
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practitioners was considered to satisfy both opinions.86 In spite of the fact that 
dental care, as such, has been excluded from the material scope of the minimum 
standards, other qualifi ed practitioners in this provision include dentists.87
Hospitalisation
Fourth, the Convention requires ‘hospitalisation where necessary’.88 ‘Where 
necessary’ means ‘where required by the condition of the patient or the particular 
circumstances of the case, such as the severity of the illness, danger of infection, 
lack of proper care at the patient’s home, inadequate housing conditions, etc.’.89 
It may be considered to include all the supportive services required for the proper 
care of persons in a hospital.90
Maternity care
Finally, medical care has to be provided in respect of care relating to childbirth, 
including pre-natal and post-natal care, either by medical practitioners or by 
qualifi ed midwives. Where necessary, hospitalisation has to be available.
Cost-sharing
According to Article 10 of Convention 102, ‘the benefi ciary or his breadwinner 
may be required to share in the cost of medical care in respect of a morbid 
condition’. Th e last part of the provision implies that cost-sharing is not allowed 
in the case of care related to childbirth. Th e provision continues by setting out 
that ‘the rules concerning cost-sharing shall be so designed as to avoid hardship’. 
Th e wording of this provision is rather vague as a result of diff erent opinions put 
forward by the Member States during the draft ing process. Th e following abstract 
of the development of this regulation may shed some light on this matter.
First of all, the preparatory documents make clear that ‘cost-sharing’ should be 
understood as ‘a direct contribution at the time when the benefi ciary receives the 
care, in addition to any insurance contribution which the person protected may 
pay under an insurance scheme’.91 In the fi rst questionnaire it was suggested 
that cost-sharing should be permitted ‘especially as regards pharmaceutical 
benefi ts, of which there is frequently considerable waste’ and to the extent of one 
86 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 86–87.
87 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 195.
88 Convention 102, Art. 10, para. a (iv).
89 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 195.
90 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 307, statement of WHO Consultant Group.
91 ILO Report V (a) 2 1952, p. 195.
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third of the cost of the medical benefi ts for all persons protected.92 Taking stock 
of the replies of a number of governments on this issue, the Offi  ce came to the 
following proposal:93
– Th e person protected may be required to share in the cost of the medical care 
they receive, except where the condition requiring such care is due to 
maternity, employment injury, or a disease known to entail prolonged care 
and likely to be cured, and provided such cost-sharing does not involve 
hardship.
– Th e proportion of the cost of medical care borne by the benefi ciary in 
conformity with paragraph (1) may not to exceed one third.
However, there was still little consensus on this point. Some countries (Poland, 
Yugoslavia and Argentina) considered the limit of one-third on cost-sharing too 
high, while it was regarded as too restrictive and not suffi  ciently fl exible by other 
countries (for example, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway). Th e 
Dutch government wanted to delete the exception concerning diseases recognised 
as entailing prolonged care in favour of a more extensive range of care than 
described in Article 10. Belgium proposed allowing certain restrictions to this 
exception that would fi t in with the Belgium system. Germany envisaged, 
regarding this matter, a possibility of cost-sharing by the breadwinner in the case 
of care received by his wife and children.94 Th e idea of excluding, as such, from 
cost-sharing, diseases entailing prolonged care, like chronicle diseases, was 
largely embraced, though with diff ering remarks. Th e proposed exceptions in the 
cases of maternity and employment injury were not commented upon by any 
country.
Th e survey of national social security systems by the Offi  ce showed that the 
degree of cost-sharing varied widely from one country to the other.95 Th is led to 
the decision that the proposed maximum of one-third of the costs was too high 
for some countries and too general a rule for others. In order to avoid this issue 
from becoming an obstacle to ratifi cation, it was fi nally regulated that no cost-
sharing was allowed for pregnancy related care, or in the event of an employment 
injury. For all other cases, it was provided that cost-sharing should not involve 
hardship. In fact, this requirement merely emphasises the importance of the 
general principle of fi nancial solidarity, namely, that within each scheme, 
hardship for persons with meagre resources must be avoided.96 Th e exception 
concerning chronic diseases was deleted in its entirety from the minimum 
92 ILO Report IV (2) 1951, p. 218.
93 ILO Report IV (2) 1951, pp. 332–333; ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, pp. 18, 33.
94 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 7–88 (replies of the governments).
95 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 172–173.
96 See section 2.5.1.
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standards, apparently to satisfy the Dutch government. Instead, the Offi  ce 
included in the proposal for the advanced standards, which was raised 
simultaneously with the minimum standards, the following provision:97
(a) that the rules concerning such cost-sharing are so designed as to avoid hardship; 
and
(b) that provision is made to enable cost-sharing to be dispensed with for prescribed 
diseases recognised as entailing prolonged care.
By subdividing the cost-sharing alternatives in minimum and advanced 
standards, the Offi  ce obviously intended to bridge the gap between the countries 
with diff ering cost-sharing policies. Since the advanced standards have never 
been eff ectuated in the intended form, this eff ort has failed, resulting in a 
provision that is somewhat remote from the initial and generally accepted 
intentions.
Duration of the benefi t
Th e Convention stipulates that medical care should be granted as long as 
required by the condition of the person protected.98 However, in case of a 
morbid condition, a maximum benefi t period may be prescribed, provided that 
such a period is not less than 26 weeks in each case of treatment. If medical care 
is required in respect of a disease other than that which led to the previous 
treatment, the person protected should be entitled to a new period of treatment 
of up to 26 weeks. It must be taken into account that medical care should not be 
suspended as long as the benefi ciary receives a sickness allowance.99 Th is implies 
that medical care may have to be given for more than 26 weeks in case the patient 
already received medical care before becoming incapable of work. Pre-natal, 
childbirth and post-natal care should be granted throughout the contingency. 
Th e last point of the provision with regard to the duration is the requirement to 
extend the maximum benefi t period in the case of patients suff ering from 
diseases recognised as entailing prolonged care, for instance, tuberculosis, heart 
disease or mental illness. To which diseases this provision exactly refers may be 
prescribed by national laws or regulations.100
In the fi rst proposal, the Offi  ce made a distinction between healthcare schemes 
covering all residents and sickness insurance schemes for employees, providing 
both medical and cash benefi ts and fi nanced by contributions. It was stated that 
97 ILO Report V (b) 1952, p. 124.
98 Convention 102, Art. 12.
99 Th e minimum duration of cash benefi ts in case of sickness is also 26 weeks, Convention 102, 
Art. 18.
100 ILO Report V (a) 2 1952, pp. 88–89,196–197.
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under a public medical care service protecting all residents, time limits for 
treatment would be impracticable, because of the administrative complications 
involved and for reasons of health preservation by early treatment. It was 
accordingly suggested that for the minimum standard for medical benefi ts 
granted under such services, no time limit should be allowed. Th e Offi  ce argued, 
furthermore, that under a sickness scheme limited to employees, the persons 
protected should receive a somewhat higher standard of care than they would 
obtain under a public medical care service. It was therefore proposed that under 
such a sickness scheme, care should be given for not less than 26 weeks per case 
of illness. However, in no circumstances should medical benefi ts be suspended 
as long as the patient continued to be unable to work and was in receipt of cash 
benefi t. Th ese suggestions took into account the standards which had already 
been attained by the vast majority of sickness schemes.101 Th e advanced standard 
was supposed to include medical care as long as required by the condition of the 
person protected, without limitation of time periods.102
Some countries considered that a possible limitation of medical care of 26 weeks 
not acceptable in cases of illnesses requiring prolonged care, such as cancer or 
tuberculosis. Th is led to the proposal that with a condition recognised as 
entailing prolonged care, the limit should not be less than 52 weeks in each case 
of illness. Aft er examination of the statistics and further discussion, this proposal 
was found, however desirable, too infl exible a standard.103 Instead, it was 
proposed that the benefi t period may be limited to 26 weeks, but that provision 
should be made to extend the limit of 26 weeks for medical care in the case of 
patients suff ering from diseases entailing prolonged care, as may be prescribed 
by national laws or regulations.
In the explanation attached to the fi nal proposal of the Convention, it was 
stipulated that medical benefi t should be provided as long as required by the 
condition of the person protected. However, in case of a morbid condition – not 
in the case of maternity – a maximum benefi t period might be prescribed, but 
101 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, pp. 38–39. According to the medical care table provided by the Offi  ce, 
which comprises statistics of 20 countries, only in the Netherlands (6 weeks) and Turkey (13 
weeks) was the minimum period of benefi t as regards hospital care beneath the standard of 26 
weeks. Th erefore, the Dutch Government pleaded for a shorter benefi t period than 26 weeks 
for hospital care where a fuller range of benefi t was provided and the insured person would 
have the opportunity to arrange for voluntary insurance against the uncovered part of the 
contingency. It was pointed out that medical benefi ts under the Dutch legislation were much 
more extensive than those suggested in Art. 10, and that it would be most undesirable if a 
country with such an extensive system of medical care were to fail to comply with the 
minimum standards. Th e Committee responded on this matter by emphasising that the 
proposed duration of hospital care might also be secured by voluntary insurance, in virtue of 
the provision concerning such insurance, ILO Report V (a) 2 1952, pp. 88–89.
102 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, p. 127; ILO Report IV (2) 1951, p. 225.
103 ILO Report V (a) 2 1952, pp. 88–89.
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not less than 26 weeks in each case of treatment. Th e distinction between a public 
medical care service, in which no limitation of the benefi t period would be 
permitted, and a sickness scheme for employees, which would be more extensive 
and therefore a limitation of 26 weeks would be acceptable, had been removed 
during the process without (traceable) comment. Treatment in the context of this 
provision must be interpreted as referring to any consecutive period of treatment. 
It was stressed that it depends largely on the judgment of the attending 
practitioner at what stage the treatment may be deemed to be completed. 
National laws or regulations may also lay down rules on this matter. In any event, 
if medical care is required in respect of a disease other than that which led to the 
previous treatment, the person protected should be entitled to a new minimum 
treatment period of 26 weeks.104
2.9.4 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
Convention 102 allows for a qualifying period pertaining to medical care ‘as may 
be considered necessary to preclude abuse’.105 In the general provisions of the 
Convention, a qualifying period is defi ned as a period of contribution, a period 
of employment, or a period of residence, or any combination thereof, as may be 
prescribed.106 For the prescription of the qualifying periods for the distinctive 
contingencies, the Offi  ce took into account the fact that the main purpose of a 
qualifying period in relation to short-term allowances and medical benefi ts is to 
ensure that the benefi ts are, in fact, received by the categories of persons for 
whom they are intended. It was deliberated that the length of the period of 
contribution, employment or residence, as the case may be, would depend largely 
on the scope of protection and the nature of the scheme concerned. In order to 
preclude abuse and to safeguard the fi nancial interests of the general body of 
contributors, the period may have to be longer where the scope of a scheme is 
narrow, or where insurance is voluntary, than under a scheme with an extensive 
or universal scope, such as medical care. Accordingly, only a general statement is 
included in the present text of the Convention, the detailed provision being left  
to be determined by national laws or regulations.107
However, the analysis of national social security systems shows that most 
countries did not prescribe any qualifying period for medical care. In general, it 
was suffi  cient if the claimant possessed, at the time when the contingency 
occurred, the requisite status of a person protected, for instance, employee or 
104 ILO Report V (a) 2 1952, pp. 196–197.
105 Convention 102, Art. 11.
106 Convention 102, Art. 1 para. f.
107 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 16; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 196.
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resident.108 It was also recalled that none of the pre-war conventions on the 
subject allowed a qualifying period for medical care. Th e Offi  ce brought against 
this that slightly developed countries might need to prescribe a short qualifying 
period during the fi rst years of operation of the service.109 According to the 
proposal, the advanced standard would not permit any qualifying period.110
2.10 SICKNESS BENEFIT
2.10.1 MATERIAL SCOPE
According to Article 14 of Convention 102, a sickness scheme is supposed to 
cover ‘incapacity for work resulting from a morbid condition and involving 
suspension of earnings, as defi ned by national laws or regulations’. Th e term 
‘earnings’ implies income derived from a gainful occupation, whether the person 
is employed or is an independent worker, or an employer who manages his 
business himself.111 Sickness due to employment injury has to be covered, but 
can, of course, also be covered by a separate employment injury insurance 
scheme, whether or not it is combined with a sickness scheme. A condition may 
be deemed morbid as long as medical care is required. Once the condition has 
been stabilised and care is no longer needed, it ceases being sickness and becomes 
invalidity. When and where the link between sickness benefi t and invalidity 
benefi t is exactly established depends on national legislation.112 Incapacity for 
work, as a rule, is the incapacity of the claimant to do their usual work, and, for 
the minimum standards, implies that it is total.113
2.10.2 PERSONAL SCOPE
Similar to the medical care branch, three alternatives are given in respect of the 
personal scope of a sickness benefi t scheme. Th ese alternatives take account of 
the existence at that time of two distinct policies in national legislation, one 
tending to protect the entire population and the other aiming to cover the 
gainfully occupied population.114 To meet the conditions of the Convention as 
regards sickness, the persons protected shall comprise:115
108 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, p. 92.
109 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 88.
110 ILO Report V (b) 1952, p. 81.
111 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 91.
112 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, p. 82.
113 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, p. 81; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 197.
114 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, pp. 10–11. For further explanation, see section 2.9.2 concerning 
medical care.
115 Convention 102, Art. 15.
Chapter 2. International Social Security Standards
Intersentia 53
(a) prescribed classes of employees, constituting not less than 50 percent of all 
employees; or
(b) prescribed classes of economically active population, constituting not less than 
20 percent of all residents; or
(c) all residents whose means during the contingency do not exceed limits prescribed 
in such a manner as to comply with the requirements of Article 67.
Diff erent from the requirements in relation to a medical care scheme, the wives 
and children of insured persons under the fi rst two options are not included in 
the personal scope. Th is is, of course, because of the nature of the risk that 
provides for a substitute income in the case of suspension of earnings.
Th e third alternative is formulated to make it possible for Member States to 
comply with the standard in respect of sickness on the basis of social assistance, 
protecting all residents whose means, during a period of sickness, do not exceed 
a prescribed limit. A means test is strictly reserved for schemes that cover all 
residents.
2.10.3 BENEFITS
Introduction on the calculation of benefi ts in general
Benefi ts under the Convention must be provided in the form of periodical 
payments, for example, per month or per week. A lump sum benefi t is only 
allowed, under strict conditions, in the case of employment injury.116 Th ree 
options for assessment of the level of benefi t are given, so as to ensure that 
contracting parties with diff erent types of systems fulfi l equivalent minimum 
standards. Because the standard of living varies in each country, the benefi t 
amounts are not set in terms of dollars or another currency, but are instead 
related to the average earnings in each country. Th e fact that the minimum 
standards have to be equally applied by countries with diverging benefi t systems 
and diff ering income levels has resulted in complicated provisions on the 
calculation of the benefi ts. In this section, the diff erent options will be detailed 
and explained, with sickness benefi t as a starting point. However, the underlying 
ideas of the diff erent options and the method of calculation apply to most of the 
contingencies covered by Convention 102.
116 See section 2.13.3.
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Amount of the benefi t
A sickness benefi t in accordance with the Convention has to be at least at a rate 
that amounts to:117
– 45 percent of individual earnings, where classes of employees or classes of the 
economically active population are protected and the benefi t is proportionate 
to the previous earnings of the benefi ciary. A ceiling on earnings may be fi xed, 
or a maximum benefi t set, but the maximum benefi t shall not be less than 45 
percent of the average wage of a skilled adult manual male employee; or
– 45 percent of the wage of an ordinary (unskilled) adult male labourer, where 
classes of employees or classes of the economically active population are 
protected and the benefi t is at a fl at rate, or
– 45 percent of the wage of an ordinary (unskilled) adult male labourer subject 
to a means test, where all residents are protected.
Th e replacement rate of the benefi t was fi xed by taking into account the rates in 
various Member States at the time, and the necessity of not impairing the 
benefi ciary’s will to resume work where this is practicable.118 Initially, the Offi  ce 
had proposed a percentage of 50 percent for all short-term benefi ts and of 40 
percent for all long-term benefi ts. During the Conference in 1951, the Conference 
Committee on Social Security recommended a reduction to 40 and 30 percent 
respectively, which was adopted by 49 to 46 votes, with 6 abstentions. However, 
at the time this voting took place, only 21 out of the 40 government members of 
the Committee were present, a circumstance that defi nitely infl uenced the 
outcome of the voting. In its next draft , the Offi  ce had overruled the outcome of 
the voting with reference to the available statistics. It emphasised that the 
Conventions could not be founded on the lowest common denominator, but 
should rather correspond to a level attained by a majority of the countries, 
leaving aside the most highly developed countries.119 Accordingly, the 
percentages of long-term benefi ts were set again at 40 percent (except survivors’ 
benefi ts), and short-term benefi ts at 50, with an exception for unemployment 
benefi t, which was kept at 40 percent.120
During the last discussion by the Conference Committee, several amendments 
to the distinctive rates were made again, but fi nally the percentages were set at 45 
percent for sickness, unemployment and maternity, at 50 percent for employment 
117 Convention 102, Art. 16 in conjunction with Arts. 65, 66, 67 and the Schedule to Part XI. Th e 
diff erent options will be explained below.
118 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, p. 62.
119 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 56.
120 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, pp. 56–57, 92; ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 525.
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injury, and at 40 percent for old-age, invalidity and survivors’ benefi t, albeit with 
a very narrow majority in some cases.
Underlying principles
Before reading up on the subject of cash benefi ts, the Offi  ce refl ected on their 
nature.121 Th e rates of social security cash benefi ts in contingencies involving 
loss of earnings are governed by one or other of two leading principles. First, 
there is the principle of conserving the previous standard of living of the 
benefi ciary to an extent that does not negatively aff ect his will to resume work. 
Th e second principle implies a moral obligation on society to maintain its 
members and their families in health and decency during contingencies 
involving loss of income, by guaranteeing at least the minimum of subsistence. 
Th e fi rst principle was chiefl y applied by countries aiming to protect all 
gainfully occupied persons and their dependants, especially in relation to 
benefi ts for short-term contingencies. Th e minimum-of-subsistence principle 
was implemented mainly by countries aiming to protect all residents. As a 
short-term benefi t, sickness benefi t was subject to the principle of maintaining 
the previous standard of living of the benefi ciary in most European countries. 
According to the analysis of national systems, the rates of short-term benefi ts 
were generally higher than the rates of long-term benefi ts, since in the case of 
long-term benefi ts. account was taken of the fact that the expenses involved in 
gainful activity were eliminated. Th ose expenses included transport to and 
from work, social obligations of a professional nature, special clothing, holidays, 
etc.
Th e Offi  ce furthermore noted that the principle of conserving the previous 
standard of living during the contingency was under pressure because of a 
limitation of fi nancial possibilities. Th erefore, it was practice to leave out of 
consideration any excess of earnings above what was determined a ‘reasonable’ 
standard of living. As a result, those with incomes above the ceiling in fact 
received a smaller proportion of their previous income, namely, the amount 
regarded as a subsistence minimum for the middle class. Only for persons 
with earnings below the ceiling did the benefi t represent the percentage 
prescribed.
121 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, pp. 43–44.
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Calculation of the benefi t: three options
As mentioned above, to meet the condition of fl exibility, the Convention off ers 
three options with regard to the calculation of the amount of the benefi t.122 Th e 
options are the following: If a country uses an insurance system for employees or 
economically active persons, there is a choice between a benefi t based on the 
previous earnings of the benefi ciary, or a fl at rate allowance determined in 
relation to the wage of an unskilled adult male labourer. In the case that sickness 
is covered by a social assistance scheme providing for a fi xed benefi t subject to a 
means test, the benefi t has to be determined at least at a level that will be suffi  cient 
to maintain the family of the benefi ciary in health and decency.
Addition of family benefi t
In all cases, for the purpose of calculating the percentage of the standard wage, 
family allowances, where such are paid, shall be added to the earnings. If those 
family allowances are continued to be paid during the contingency, they shall 
also be added to the benefi t.123 Finally, it must be recalled that by defi ning the 
minimum level of benefi ts in relation to the wages in the country, the provisions 
take into account diff erences in levels of economic development between Member 
States.
Standard benefi ciary
Th e percentages of individual earnings or standard wages, as stipulated in the 
Convention, relate to what is termed a ‘standard benefi ciary’. Th is standard 
benefi ciary is not the same for all contingencies; the defi nition is specifi ed on the 
basis of the statistical data from Member States and depends on the character of 
the benefi t.124 It is provided that benefi ts for other benefi ciaries, such as single 
persons and families of diff erent sizes, shall bear a reasonable proportion to 
those of a standard benefi ciary.125 Accordingly, taking the standard benefi ciary 
as a reference point makes it possible to compare the benefi t granted with the 
122 Convention 102, Art. 16 in conjunction with Arts. 65, 66, and 67. ILO ILO Report V (a)(1) 
1952, p. 19; ILO Report IV (1) 1951, pp. 43–64; ILO Report IV (2) 1951, pp. 230–248; ILO 
Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 135, 220–227.
123 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 167, 223.
124 In the case of old age, the standard benefi ciary is a man who has a wife of pensionable age 
dependent on him; in the case of the death of the breadwinner, the standard benefi ciary is a 
widow with two children under school leaving age or under 15 years of age. In the case of 
maternity, the standard benefi ciary is a woman. In the other cases, the standard benefi ciary is 
a man with a dependent wife and two dependent children. Convention 102, schedule to Part 
XI; ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 57.
125 Convention 102, Art. 65 (5), Art. 66 (3).
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requirements of the Convention.126 In the case of sickness, the standard 
benefi ciary is a man with a dependent wife, not herself engaged in gainful 
activity, and two children under school leaving age or under 15 years of age, as 
the case may be.
Benefi t related to earnings
According to the fi rst alternative, the sickness benefi t (including family benefi t) 
for the standard benefi ciary must attain or exceed 45 percent of his previous 
earnings (including family benefi t).127 However, in the case that his previous 
earnings exceeded the earnings of a ‘standard’ skilled manual male employee 
(hereaft er called the ‘standard wage of a skilled worker’), the benefi t needs only 
to be 45 percent of the standard wage of a skilled worker.128 Th us, although the 
benefi t is based on previous earnings, a ceiling may be prescribed as a safeguard 
for the solvency of the insurance scheme.129 In other words, this method obliges 
Member States to grant every worker with earnings equal to or below the 
standard wage of a skilled worker 45 percent of his individual earnings, but 
permits them to grant workers with earnings above the standard wage of a skilled 
worker a benefi t of not more than 45 percent of that wage. In practice, in the 
calculation of the previous individual earnings, any part of earnings exceeding 
the standard wage of a skilled worker may be disregarded. It must be kept in 
mind that under such income related schemes, a benefi t can be much less than 
45 percent of the standard wage of a skilled worker, that is, if the benefi ciary had 
only a small income.
For the calculation of the previous earnings it is also permitted to take as a basis 
the basic wages of the wage class to which the benefi ciary belongs. Th is may be 
practical for countries with insurance schemes where the persons protected are 
classifi ed according to their earnings in wage classes, for each of which, a 
so-called basic wage is fi xed. In this event, the benefi t must be at least 45 percent 
of the relevant basic wage.130
Apart from prescribing a ceiling for the earnings taken into account in the 
computation of benefi t as a way to safeguard the solvency of the insurance 
scheme, a country can also limit the benefi t to a prescribed maximum amount. 
Such a maximum shall, again, not be less for the standard benefi ciary than 45 
percent of the standard wage of a skilled worker.131
126 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 226–227.
127 Convention 102, Art. 16 (1) in conjunction with Art. 65 and the Schedule to Part XI.
128 Th e concept of ‘standard wage’ will be explained below.
129 ILO Report IV(1) 1951, p. 61; ILO Report V (a) (1) 1952, p. 19.
130 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 221.
131 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 221.
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Flat rate benefi t
According to the second alternative, the amount of the benefi ts payable to the 
standard benefi ciary must meet or exceed 45 percent of the earnings of a typical 
unskilled male labourer (hereaft er called the ‘standard wage of an unskilled 
worker’).132 Th us, for all benefi ciaries the rate of benefi t will be the same, 
irrespective of their previous earnings, providing that they have similar family 
charges and fulfi l the qualifying conditions.133 Th e benefi t required under these 
uniform benefi t schemes will be lower than the amount of the maximum benefi t 
paid under schemes with wage-proportionate benefi ts, since the maximum 
benefi t is related to the standard wage of a skilled worker instead of an unskilled 
worker. Such diff erentiation is justifi ed on the grounds that under a wage-
proportionate scheme, a benefi ciary will receive 45 percent of his individual 
previous earnings, however low these earnings may be. Under a system of uniform 
rates, on the other hand, a benefi ciary will receive the fi xed amount, even if his 
previous earnings were lower than the wage of the typical unskilled labourer.134
Benefi t depending on means or income during the contingency
Th e third alternative is practicable where the scheme concerned protects all 
residents and imposes a test of need, in other words, through a social assistance 
scheme.135 In this case, the benefi ts are to be fi xed according to a scale laid down 
by the competent public authorities.136 Th e benefi t should be suffi  cient to keep 
the benefi ciary and his family in conditions conducive to health and a decent 
standard of living. Th e Member State wishing to comply on the basis of social 
assistance will therefore have to prove that the maximum benefi t to a family 
without suffi  cient means is actually a subsistence benefi t, and large enough to 
permit the family to live under tolerable conditions. In any case, in order to 
provide a standard of comparative value, such benefi t may not be less than 45 
percent of the wage of the typical unskilled labourer, as determined in the second 
alternative.137
Th e maximum benefi t may be reduced where the benefi ciary has income or 
means of his own.138 Aft er all, social assistance is intended to supplement the 
means of a person suff ering a loss of earnings as a result of, in this case, sickness. 
Nevertheless, it is stipulated that the benefi ciary should be allowed to have a 
certain amount of means in addition to the maximum benefi t. Th e Convention 
132 Convention 102, Art. 16 (1) in conjunction with Art. 66 and the Schedule to Part XI.
133 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 19.
134 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 224.
135 Convention 102, Art. 16 (2) in conjunction with Art. 67.
136 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 19.
137 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 225.
138 Report IV (1) 1951, p. 138; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 225–226.
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does not fi x the amount to be exempt, but simply states that it should be a 
substantial amount, fi xed by the competent public authority in conformity with 
prescribed rules. In the explanation of the proposed Convention, the Offi  ce 
added at this point: ‘It is hoped that these safeguards will be suffi  cient to ensure 
that a social assistance scheme exempts a reasonable amount.’139 It was pointed 
out, furthermore, that the value of a house belonging to the claimant was not 
usually taken into account, and exemptions were also made in respect of life 
insurance, certain savings, and a limited amount of other cash income. Income 
in excess of the exempt amount may then be deducted from the maximum 
benefi t, as long as the income during the contingency does not fall below the 
stipulated percentage of the standard wage for unskilled labour or does not 
guarantee a decent standard of living.
It is evident that persons whose means, other than those exempt, meet or exceed 
the amount of the maximum benefi t, have no entitlement to benefi t.140 In other 
words, the sum of the maximum benefi t and the maximum amount of the means 
exempt represent the means limit which excludes a sick person from the right to 
benefi t.
Standard wage of the skilled employee
If a country chooses the fi rst alternative, which means that it applies a scheme 
which grants benefi ts related to previous earnings, the maximum benefi t may 
not be less than 45 percent of the standard wage of a skilled worker.141 Although 
this standard wage will diff er from country to country, it has to be determined 
according to the rules laid down in the Convention.142 Th ese rules require that 
the standard wage applicable to an earnings related benefi t scheme shall be the 
wage of a skilled manual male employee who is deemed to be typical of the 
industry with the largest number of the economically active male persons that 
are protected under the sickness scheme. Additionally, this industry must be 
categorised in the major group of economic activities with the largest number of 
protected persons as well. In order to ensure a certain amount of uniformity in 
the determination of the standard wage, the Convention imposes the use of the 
International Standard of Industrial Classifi cation adopted by the United Nations 
for classifying the major group of economic activities.143 Since the standard 
earnings are based on rates of wages, the typical skilled worker can only be an 
employee.144 It has been stipulated that the standard wage must be fi xed on the 
139 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 225–226.
140 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 226.
141 Convention 102, Art. 65 (3).
142 Convention 102, Art. 65 paras. 6–7.
143 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 220–221.
144 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 140.
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basis of rates of wages for normal hours of work, determined by collective 
agreements, by custom, or by national laws or regulations.145 Th e Offi  ce explicitly 
explained that overtime is not considered to be normal hours of work.
To give an example of the standard wage of a skilled worker: where the largest 
number of insured persons is engaged in manufacturing, and within 
manufacturing, the largest number of persons protected is found in the 
manufacture of textiles, the standard wage will be the typical average wage of a 
skilled manual worker in the textile industry.
In order to facilitate the choice of the typical skilled worker in countries where 
statistics of classifi cation of the persons protected are not available, or where no 
single major group of economic activities predominates, a Member State may 
deem fi tters and turners in the manufacture of machinery (except electrical 
machinery) as representing the typical skilled worker.146 Th is group was chosen 
for bench-marking because at that time this industry was important in a large 
number of countries and paid relatively high wages. Moreover, data on wages in 
this industry were regularly supplied to the Offi  ce, making it easy for countries 
to submit evidence regarding compliance with the Convention on this point. 
Where the largest number of persons protected were found in branches of 
economic activity with considerably lower wages, such as textiles or agriculture, 
the former way of fi xing the standard wage would be expedient.147 Th e 
Convention gives additional regulations where rates of wages for the selected 
typical worker vary by region.148
Additionally, the Convention gives two other methods of establishing the 
standard wage of a skilled worker, both relatively easy to calculate, but considered 
to yield a higher outcome then the other options. Th e fi rst of these options is to 
take as a standard the wage of a person whose earnings are equal to or greater 
than the earnings of 75 percent of all the persons protected, and secondly, the 
wage of a person whose earnings are equal to 125 percent of the average earnings 
of all the persons protected.
Standard wage of the unskilled labourer
For the purpose of a scheme providing fl at rate benefi ts that are not proportionate 
to previous earnings, the standard wage represents the wage of an ordinary adult 
male labourer.149 Th e typical unskilled labourer shall be a person employed in 
the major group of economic activities with the largest number of persons 
145 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 222.
146 Convention 102, Art. 65 (6) sub a.
147 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 138–139.
148 Convention 102, Art. 65 (8); ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 140, 223.
149 Convention 102, Art. 66 (1).
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protected by the scheme concerned, in the division comprising the largest 
number of persons protected, or an unskilled labourer in the manufacture of 
machinery, at the behest of the Member State.150 Th e wages of an adult unskilled 
labourer in industry may be assumed to provide a reasonable measure of the 
income needed for maintaining an average sized family in the conditions 
prevalent in the country concerned.151
Duration of the benefi t
In principle, social security benefi ts should continue as long as the need for 
support caused by the contingency persists. Th is principle is universally 
recognised as the fi nal goal. In practice, however, it is only applied in the case of 
long-term contingencies, such as old-age, employment injury or child 
maintenance.152 Furthermore, a fi xed waiting period may be prescribed in 
relation to several benefi ts.
Accordingly, the Convention requires a sickness benefi t to be paid throughout 
the contingency, but it provides that the benefi t may be limited to 26 weeks in 
each case of sickness. Moreover, the benefi t need not be paid for the fi rst three 
days of the suspension of earnings.153 Th e waiting period of three days excludes 
cases of very short duration and, where payment is not retroactive, a fraction of 
all other cases, just as the maximum benefi t period excludes a fraction of the 
cases of very long duration.154 Th e principle of meeting the need for support 
caused by sickness as long as the contingency persists implies the payment of 
sickness benefi t as long as there are prospects of recovery. When and where the 
link between sickness benefi t and invalidity benefi t is established depends on 
national legislation.
Th e permissive limitations of the maximum benefi t period refl ect the prevailing 
practice under social security systems at the time of the realisation of the 
Convention.155 It was seen that under insurance schemes in more highly 
150 Convention 102, Art. 66 paras. 4–7; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 140, 225.
151 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, p. 63.
152 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, p. 78.
153 Convention 102, Art. 18.
154 On the basis of experience, analysed by the Offi  ce, and on the assumption that the maximum 
benefi t period is one year, it was found that a waiting period of three days, without retroactive 
payment, would have reduced the volume of compensated incapacity by about 8, to 13 percent. 
A study at that time of the U.S. Public Health Service showed a percentage of 30 in the United 
States. Th e eff ect of an increase of the maximum benefi t period from 26 to 52 weeks, both 
durations with a waiting period of three days, was estimated to be between 2 and 12 percent, 
and 7 percent in the U.S. Th e combined eff ect of a waiting period of three days and a 
maximum benefi t period of 26 weeks was estimated as including 781 to 849 days of incapacity 
out of 1000. ILO Report IV (1) 1951, pp. 83–84.
155 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 174–175: Analysis of selected national systems, Table III: 
Sickness.
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developed countries, and under normal health conditions, a waiting period of 
three days and a maximum benefi t period of 6 to 12 months resulted in a sickness 
rate approaching ten days per person per year.156
In the original text, the Offi  ce had proposed an alternative of a waiting period of 
7 days in combination with a benefi t period of 52 weeks, instead of 3 days and 26 
weeks. Th is alternative was rejected at an early stage, aft er which the Offi  ce 
proposed another alternative, consisting of a waiting period of 7 days, providing 
that there was no limitation of the benefi t period, in view of Australia and New 
Zealand where this was current practice. However, this alternative was turned 
down again on the initiative of the workers’ members by a majority of votes 
during the fi nal vote on the Convention.157 It was thought that a waiting period 
of longer than 3 days would risk minor diseases being neglected in the absence of 
cash benefi ts. Minor diseases could become major diseases if people did not go 
to see the doctor in time.
Adjustment of short-term benefi ts to the cost of living
Th e importance of the adjustment of cash benefi ts to changes in the cost of living 
has been generally underlined.158 For sickness benefi ts on the basis of previous 
earnings, the previous earnings will normally be calculated over a prescribed 
period which is fairly short, and adjustment to the cost of living is, therefore, 
eff ected automatically. Since the maximum benefi t may not fall below 45 percent 
of the wage of the typical skilled employee, such a maximum will have to be 
adapted to changes in the level of wages. Where a fl at rate benefi t is related to the 
wage of the typical unskilled labourer, either in respect of an insurance system 
for workers or a social assistance scheme, the position will be the same.159 In 
relation to long-term benefi ts, specifi c adjustment requirements are prescribed, 
as will be dealt with in the relevant sections.
2.10.4 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
Preclusion of abuse
Convention 102 gives room for countries to prescribe a qualifying period for 
entitlement to a sickness benefi t. Th e Member States are free to determine a 
qualifying period ‘as may be considered necessary to preclude abuse.’160 In fi xing 
156 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, p. 85.
157 ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 333.
158 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 227.
159 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 228.
160 Convention 102, Art. 15.
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the qualifying conditions, the Offi  ce took into account the fact that, for short-
term allowances and medical benefi ts, the main purpose of a qualifying period is 
to ensure that the benefi ts are, in fact, received by the categories of persons for 
whom they are intended.161
Survey of qualifying periods prescribed by Member States
Th e analysis of national social security systems made by the Offi  ce, showed that 
some countries – such as Th e Netherlands, Germany and Sweden – did not 
prescribe a qualifying period for sickness benefi t.162 In countries that did 
prescribe a qualifying period, the character and length of those periods varied 
greatly. For example, they could be related to contributions paid, or to 
employment, or to insurance under the scheme concerned. Th e lengths of the 
prescribed periods varied from 60 hours of employment in the quarter year 
preceding the fi rst diagnosis of the illness in France, to 156 weekly contributions 
in order to qualify for benefi t of unlimited duration in the United Kingdom.163 
Taking account of the state of aff airs at that time, the fi rst questionnaire 
suggested a minimum period of six months of contributions or employment 
within the 12 months, or 12 months of residence. Th ese qualifying periods were, 
however, considered too long by quite a few countries, and some of them did not 
wish to provide for any qualifying period at all. In view of these diff ering 
opinions, it was deemed preferable not to specify qualifying conditions for short-




At the time of the making of Convention 102, Convention 44 on Unemployment 
Provision already existed.165 Th is Convention, however, did not determine the 
amount of cash benefi ts to be granted. At present, Convention 44 has been 
shelved, which means that it is considered outdated and therefore not open to 
new ratifi cation, but it is still subject to a supervision procedure for those 
161 See section 2.9.4 on medical care.
162 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 174; ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, pp. 93–94.
163 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, pp. 93–94.
164 ILO Report IV (a)(2) 1952, pp. 287–288, 294.
165 ILO Convention No. 44 (Shelved) Unemployment Provision Convention, 1934. Th is 
Convention had a covering Recommendation, No. 44 (1934). In 1952, Convention 44 had only 
been ratifi ed by 8 countries, 7 of which were European countries, plus New Zealand.
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countries that ratifi ed it in the past. Ratifi cation of Convention 102 with 
acceptance of Part IV on Unemployment, does not imply that Conventions 44 is 
no longer applicable. In those cases, both Conventions apply next to each other. 
ILO Convention 168 substitutes Convention 44, but out of all the EU Member 
States, only four have ratifi ed Convention 168 until now, including Norway and 
Switzerland, who had previously ratifi ed Convention 44. Because Convention 44 
played an important role in the formulation of the unemployment part of 
Convention 102, a brief insight into the former Convention is also given in this 
section, where expedient.
Defi nition of the contingency
According to Convention 102, the contingency covered ‘shall include suspension 
of earnings, as defi ned by national laws or regulations, due to inability to obtain 
suitable employment in the case of a person protected who is capable of, and 
available for, work.’
Th e point of departure is clearly the ‘suspension of earnings’, which excludes 
newcomers to the labour market from benefi tting from this protection until they 
fi nd employment.166 When the Yugoslavian government explicitly asked to 
include these persons, the Offi  ce replied that it was not possible to accede to that 
request, since the scope of unemployment schemes was generally limited to 
employees. Only two of the countries of which statistics were available extended 
their schemes to persons not normally employed.167 Furthermore, Convention 
102 focuses on full unemployment; partial unemployment is not included. A 
reason for this is not given, which is striking, given that Convention 44 applies to 
both full and partial unemployment.
Suitable work
Th e material scope of the contingency covers the ‘inability to obtain suitable 
employment.’ With regard to the reach of the contingency, the meaning of 
‘suitable’ in this context is of crucial importance. However, the Convention does 
not provide a defi nition of ‘suitable employment’. Furthermore, during the 
draft ing process surprisingly few comments were made regarding the content of 
this concept. Only three governments made remarks on this point. Th e 
Yugoslavian government wanted it to be specifi ed that the qualifi cations and the 
personal aptitude of the claimant should be taken into account. Th e Argentinean 
government considered the defi nition too generally formulated, whereas the 
Austrian government argued that the claimant must explicitly be willing to 
166 See also Bartelomei de la Cruz 1994, p. 41.
167 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 96–97.
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work. Th e Offi  ce responded to these remarks that ‘suitable’ may be interpreted as 
meaning that the claimant’s training and personal aptitude should be taken into 
account. Additionally, it stated that the inclusion of ‘available’ means that the 
claimant must also be willing to accept suitable work.168 Further specifi cations 
as to the meaning of ‘suitable employment’ were left  to be determined by national 
laws or regulations, in light of the particular conditions of the countries’ 
economies and employment markets.169
More clarity on the exact meaning of the term ‘suitable’ is provided in Convention 
44. Th is Convention states that a claimant may be disqualifi ed from the receipt 
of benefi t for an appropriate period if they refuse an off er of suitable employment. 
Th e Convention subsequently points out when an employment shall not be 
deemed to be suitable. Roughly, that would be the case in the following 
situations:170
– if acceptance of a job would involve residence in a district in which suitable 
accommodation is not available;
– if the rate of wages off ered is lower, or the other conditions of employment 
are less favourable (subject to some conditions);
– if the situation off ered is vacant due to a trade dispute; and
– if, for any other reason, bearing in mind all the considerations involved 
including the personal circumstances of the claimant, its refusal by the 
claimant is not unreasonable.
Recommendation 44, which accompanied Convention 44, additionally specifi es 
that the length of the claimant’s service in the previous occupation, their chances 
of obtaining work in it, their vocational training, and their suitability for the 
work must be taken into account. Within the preliminary reports as regards 
Convention 102, no reference was made at this point to Convention 44, or to the 
accompanying recommendation. Nevertheless, Convention 102 was considered 
to set out, in general, higher standards than were provided by the existing pre-
war conventions on social security. Moreover, Recommendation 67 on Income 
Security, which had explicitly served as a guide for the development of 
Convention 102, also indicates what should be considered suitable employment. 
It says that during an initial period reasonable in the circumstances of the case, 
only the following should be deemed to be suitable employment:171
168 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 96–97.
169 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 15.
170 Convention 44, Art. 10.
171 Recommendation 67 on Income Security, Annex, Art. 14 (3).
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(a) employment in the usual occupation of the insured person in a place not involving 
a change of residence and at the current rate of wages, as fi xed by collective 
agreements where applicable; or
(b) another employment acceptable to the insured person.
Aft er the expiration of the initial period, suitable employment may include, 
under conditions, a change of occupation, change of residence, or employment 
under conditions less favourable that in the usual occupation.172
Taking stock of the defi nition of suitable employment in the ILO instruments 
that have served as a basis for the formulation of the part of Convention 102 on 
unemployment, it can be concluded that a benefi t must be granted if an 
unemployed person is unable to obtain a job that meets a number of requirements, 
in any case during the fi rst period of unemployment. During such an initial 
period, the occupation of the jobseeker, the distance to work, and the previous 




In respect of unemployment benefi t, the following persons shall be protected:173
(a) prescribed classes of employees, constituting not less than 50 percent of all 
employees; or
(b) all residents whose means during the contingency do not exceed limits prescribed 
in such a manner as to comply with the requirements of Article 67.
Th e country surveys prepared by the Offi  ce showed that, at that time, the scope 
of unemployment insurance was relatively limited. In several countries only 
urban employees were protected, in other countries (certain classes of) employees 
were insured subject to an income limit, and in three countries the insurance was 
voluntary.174 It was found that countries with a voluntary unemployment scheme 
might have diffi  culty, especially at the outset, in covering as much as 50 percent 
of all employees. Th erefore, the Offi  ce had reduced, in the last proposal, the 
percentage from 50 to 40, so as to make the standard more attainable for countries 
wishing to introduce unemployment insurance initially on a modest scale. 
Proposals for a higher standard were to be taken into account in the advanced 
172 See also Bartelomei 1994, point 121, 126, 131.
173 Convention 102, Art. 21.
174 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, pp. 68, 72.
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standards. However, the Conference Committee on Social Security amended this 
alteration and made it 50 percent again, which was adopted at the last vote.
In view of the fact that the majority of unemployment schemes were meant only 
for employees, the term ‘all residents’ in the second alternative had been changed 
in the last proposal to ‘all employees’. However, in the end this alteration was 
reversed again without explication.175 In any case, the two options imply that 
insurance schemes for employees that provide means tested benefi ts are not in 
line with this provision.
Compliance with this part of the Convention can, as with most other parts 
(except employment injury and family benefi t), be eff ected on the basis of 
compulsory as well as voluntary insurance, or of a public service, or any of these 
combined. All insured persons, whether at work or unemployed but still insured, 
can be counted towards the required percentage.
Convention 44
Convention 44 applies to all persons habitually employed for wages or a salary.176 
Th e scope of this Convention seems very wide. However, a long list of exceptions 
allows the Member States to considerably reduce the scope, such as persons 
employed in domestic service, home workers, workers in the service of the 
government, or seasonal workers. In practice, the scope can be far more limited 
in the end compared to Convention 102.
2.11.3 BENEFITS
Amount of the benefi t
Th e allowance for a standard benefi ciary has to be a periodical payment at a rate 
which amounts to at least:177
– 45 percent of individual earnings, where classes of employees or classes of the 
economically active population are protected and the benefi t is proportionate 
to the previous earnings of the benefi ciary. A ceiling on earnings may be fi xed, 
or a maximum benefi t set, but the maximum benefi t shall not be less than 45 
percent of the average wage of a skilled adult manual male employee; or
175 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 96; ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 521.
176 Convention 44, Art. 2 (1).
177 Convention 102, Art. 22, in conjunction with Arts. 65, 66, 67, and the Schedule to Part XI. For 
an explanation of the method of calculation, see section 2.10.3 on sickness benefi t.
Part II. Analysis and Comparison
68 Intersentia
– 45 percent of the wage of an ordinary (unskilled) adult male labourer, where 
classes of employees or classes of the economically active population are 
protected and the benefi t is at a fl at rate; or
– 45 percent of the wage of an ordinary (unskilled) adult male labourer subject 
to a means test, where all residents are protected.
Th e standard benefi ciary in respect of the unemployment benefi t is a man with a 
wife and two children (under school leaving age or under 15 years of age) 
dependent on him. Th e applicable percentages are the same as those concerning 
the other short-term benefi ts, i.e. sickness and maternity benefi ts. Th e statistics 
provided by the Offi  ce, comprising 45 countries, showed that a minority of 
countries were maintaining, at that time, an unemployment scheme. Th ese 
countries, including UK, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia and Greece, had 
relatively high incomes per capita and provided comparatively high benefi ts. Th e 
relative value of the benefi ts in none of these countries amounted less than 50 
percent of the reference wage, the percentage that was initially proposed by the 
Offi  ce.178 As a result of several alterations and amendments, as explained in 
section 2.10.3 on sickness benefi t, the rate was fi rst changed to 40 percent, and 
subsequently fi xed at 45 percent.
Duration of the benefi t
As with all social security benefi ts, the unemployment benefi t has to be granted, 
in principle, throughout the contingency.179 Nevertheless, a limit of 13 weeks 
within a period of 12 months is allowed, where the classes of employees are 
protected under an insurance scheme or a public service, i.e. under schemes 
without a means test. Alternatively, the benefi t may be limited to 26 weeks within 
a period of 12 months, where all residents whose means do not exceed certain 
limits (prescribed by national law) are protected under a social assistance scheme. 
Th e longer benefi t period required under a social assistance scheme was justifi ed 
by the fact that a means test could be applied. As a third alternative, a benefi t 
period may vary with the length of the contribution period and/or the amount of 
benefi t previously received in a given period, provided that the average duration 
of benefi t shall be at least 13 weeks within a period of 12 months.180 An exception 
is made for seasonal workers, such as building workers or certain categories of 
agricultural workers, in whose case the duration may be adapted to their special 
conditions of employment.181
178 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, pp. 60–61 (table), pp. 68–69.
179 Convention 102, Art. 24.
180 Convention 102, Art. 24 paras. 1 and 2; ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 521.
181 Convention 102, Art. 24 (4); ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 201.
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Th e Convention leaves room for a waiting period that should not exceed the fi rst 
seven days in each case of the suspension of earnings.182 Days of unemployment 
preceding and following a short spell of employment shall be counted as part of 
one and the same case of unemployment. However, as regards seasonal workers, 
the waiting period may be determined in the light of their conditions of 
employment. A ‘case’ of unemployment refers to a period of unemployment 
accompanied by a suspension of earnings, or two successive periods separated by 
intervals of work whose maximum length is to be prescribed by national laws or 
regulations.183
Before fi xing a duration limit, the Offi  ce had mentioned that unemployment is 
not a biological contingency as, for instance, maternity, sickness and old age. Its 
occurrence and duration depend on the economic situation of the country on 
the one hand, and on the individual ability, skill and initiative of the person 
protected, on the other. Th e main requirements of an unemployment scheme are, 
therefore, an effi  cient employment service, facilities for retraining, and, thirdly, a 
general programme of full employment. Only then can unemployment be 
controlled and its duration shortened if it does occur.184
During the discussions of subsequent proposals, the duration as well as the 
waiting period was changed several times. In the last proposal, only two 
alternatives were given, one comprising a minimum duration of 13 weeks within 
12 months, with a waiting period of three days per case. Th e second option was a 
benefi t period of at least 26 weeks, with a waiting period of seven days per case. 
Th e third option, involving a varying duration depending on the contribution 
period, was added only in last instance in behalf of, among others, the United 
Kingdom, which had, at that time, an unemployment scheme that provided 
benefi ts related to the insurance period of the benefi ciary.185
2.11.4 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
Entitlement to unemployment benefi t may be made subject to the completion of 
a qualifying period. However, such a qualifying period may not exceed the 
duration considered necessary to preclude abuse.186 A qualifying period can 
either be a period of contributions or employment, or a period of residence, 
depending on the scope of the scheme concerned.187 In the fi rst draft , the Offi  ce 
182 Convention 102, Art. 24 paras. 3 and 4; ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 521.
183 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 201.
184 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, p. 87.
185 ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 521; ILO Report IV (1) 1951, p. 85.
186 Convention 102, Art. 23.
187 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 30.
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had suggested two alternatives for the allowed maximum length of the qualifying 
period, either six months of contributions or employment within the 12 months, 
or 12 months of contributions within the 24 months, preceding the claim. Under 
general schemes for residents of insuffi  cient private means, 12 months of 
residence was proposed. It turned out that there was no consensus on the 
qualifying periods for short-term benefi ts in general, and especially not for the 
unemployment benefi t: less than one half of the 24 governments that had replied 
to the Offi  ce’s proposal at this point agreed with the proposal. Th e other 
governments proposed either shorter (for example, Poland and Denmark) or 
longer periods (for example, India), or had diff erent periods of reference, or 
included no detailed provisions at all (for example, the United Kingdom). In view 
of these diff erences of opinion, the possibility of reaching agreement was 
considered so small, that it was deemed preferable not to specify qualifying 
conditions of the short-term benefi ts in any detail. Accordingly, the Convention 
states no more than the instruction that it should only be long enough to ensure 




Defi nition of the contingency
In principle, to comply with Convention 102, an old age scheme has to provide a 
pension to insured persons at the age of 65 years.189 Nevertheless, the Convention 
allows a higher pensionable age ‘as may be fi xed by the competent authority with 
due regard to the working ability of elderly persons in the country concerned.’
Pensionable age
Th e phrasing of the provision regarding pensionable age has been substantially 
changed since the Offi  ce’s fi rst draft . It was presumed that an old age pension 
should be paid at the age at which people commonly become incapable of regular 
work and at which invalidity and unemployment, if present, tend to become 
permanent. A table, provided by the Offi  ce, showed that the percentage of 
persons who had reached the age of 65 diff ered greatly from country to country. 
It appeared that in India, for instance, in 1931 only 3.8 percent of the population 
188 ILO Report IV (2) 1951, p. 106, 288–289, 294–295; ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 16; ILO Report 
V (a)(2) 1952, p. 176–177 (table).
189 Convention 102, Art. 26 paras. 1and 2.
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aged 15 to 64 was over that age, while in the Netherlands the corresponding 
percentage was 9.8, and in Norway, 13.1. It was found that in countries with a 
moderately advanced stage of economic and social development, the number of 
persons aged 65 or over represented, roughly, 10 percent of the active population. 
Accordingly, the Offi  ce had fi xed the normal pensionable age at 65, but with the 
possibility of countries with a higher proportion of persons of over 64 setting a 
higher pensionable age. Th e determination of that higher age was, initially, not 
left  to the national authorities, but restricted by the provision itself. It was 
regulated that the age could be higher, on condition that the proportion of people 
having reached the pensionable age was not less than 10 percent of the active 
population. At a later stage, an exception to the 10 percent rule was added, which 
took account of the possibility that the proportion of persons of pensionable age 
might fl uctuate. Th erefore, a percentage of 9 percent was deemed satisfactory for 
a period of not more than fi ve years.190
However, during the last discussion at the Conference in 1952, Norway, having 
its pensionable age set at 70, submitted an amendment to this provision.191 Th e 
government adviser stressed the fact that the normal working age varied 
considerably in the diff erent countries, according to diff erent climatic conditions, 
general health conditions and other factors. He argued that the implementation 
of the 10 percent formula would give diff erent results according to the 
demographic structure of the population in the diff erent countries. Moreover, 
even in one country, the ratio between people having reached the prescribed 
retirement age and the active population would continuously vary from year to 
year. It could well be, therefore, that a country which fulfi ls the condition one 
year would suddenly fi nd its old age scheme falling outside the scope of the 
Convention in another year, not because there had been any change in its 
legislation, but merely because there had been a change in the demographic 
structure of the population. A temporary broadening of the 10 percent rule to 9 
percent was not found to be suffi  cient. Th us, Norway considered this provision 
too infl exible, all the more since the 10 percent rule was not to be applied in 
connection with the 65-year age limit, although it was shown that there were 
several countries where the amount of persons that had reached the age of 65 did 
not represent 10 percent of the active population. In short, the amendment 
implied that the retirement age would be for the legislative authorities in each 
country to decide. It should be noted that the same amendment presented by 
Norway had been defeated earlier in the Committee of Social Security by a vote 
of 147 for to 147 against, with 12 abstentions.192 Th is time it was more successful; 
190 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, pp. 301–303; ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, pp. 52–53; ILO Report V (a)(2) 
1952, pp. 101–103.
191 ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, pp. 333–334.
192 ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 522.
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To meet the conditions of the Convention as regards old age, the persons 
protected shall comprise:194
(a) prescribed classes of employees, constituting not less than 50 percent of all 
employees; or
(b) prescribed classes of economically active population, constituting not less than 
20 percent of all residents; or
(c) all residents whose means during the contingency do not exceed limits prescribed 
in such a manner as to comply with the requirements of Article 67.
Compliance with this part of the Convention, as with most other parts (except 
employment injury and family benefi t), can be eff ected on the basis of compulsory 
or voluntary insurance, or of a public service, or any of these combined.
Th e tables prepared by the Offi  ce showed that, at that time, most countries 
aff orded some protection in old age. Schemes protecting all residents (with or 
without a means test) or the whole economically active population were relatively 
frequent, especially in the upper income group of countries.195 Th e distinctive 
options were designed in consideration of the fact that some countries might 
fi nd it easier to prove that they would cover 50 percent of all employees than that 
they would cover 20 percent of the population, since their old age insurance was 
confi ned to employees. Countries including independent workers in their old 
age schemes might insure 20 percent of the population without reaching 50 
percent of all employees and would prefer the second option. For countries with 
public services covering old age, the third alternative would be the most 
applicable.196
193 ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 334. Th e rejected 10 percent formula has been included in 
the European Code of Social Security, Art. 26.
194 Convention 102, Art. 27. For an explanation of diff erent options, see sections 2.10.2 on 
sickness benefi t and 2.11.2 on unemployment benefi t.
195 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, pp. 69, 62–63.
196 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 203.
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2.12.3 BENEFITS
Amount of the benefi t
Th e allowance for a standard benefi ciary has to be a periodical payment at least 
at a rate that amounts to:197
– 40 percent of individual earnings, where classes of employees or classes of the 
economically active population are protected and the benefi t is proportionate 
to the previous earnings of the benefi ciary. A ceiling on earnings may be 
fi xed, or a maximum benefi t set, but the maximum benefi t shall not be less 
than 40 percent of the average wage of a skilled adult manual male employee; 
or
– 40 percent of the wage of an ordinary (unskilled) adult male labourer, where 
classes of employees or classes of the economically active population are 
protected and the benefi t is at a fl at rate, or
– 40 percent of the wage of an ordinary (unskilled) adult male labourer, subject 
to a means test where all residents are protected.
Th e standard benefi ciary in respect of the old-age benefi t is a man with a 
dependent wife of pensionable age.198 Under an insurance scheme where the 
man alone is the benefi ciary, any supplement to the pension for his dependent 
wife can be added to prove compliance with the Convention. However, any 
pension which the wife receives in her own right cannot be taken into account 
for this purpose. Under a social assistance scheme or an insurance scheme 
applying to all residents, in which cases thus both husband and wife receive a 
pension, the two pensions may be taken together; together they will have to 
attain the fi xed percentage of the reference wage.199 In all cases, benefi ts for 
single persons must be reasonably proportionate to those fi xed for standard 
benefi ciaries.200 Unlike other benefi ts, in view of the age of the benefi ciaries, 
family allowances are not to be added to the benefi t and earnings.201
As regards the percentage of 40 percent, the Offi  ce had initially proposed this 
very percentage for all long-term benefi ts. Aft er a discussion that ranged from 
the deletion of any percentage to the regulation of diff erent percentages for each 
branch, the Labour Conference in 1951 decided, with a narrow majority, to lower 
the percentage for long-term benefi ts to 30 percent. Nevertheless, in the next 
197 Convention 102, Art. 28 in conjunction with Arts. 65, 66, 67 and the Schedule to Part XI. For 
an explanation of the way of calculation, see section 2.10.3 on sickness benefi t.
198 Convention 102, Schedule to Part XI.
199 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 165, 205.
200 ILO Report IV (2) 1951, p. 246.
201 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 205.
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draft  the Offi  ce proposed 40 percent again, a move criticised by not more than 
four countries, and apparently based on the statistics showing that only a few of 
the investigated countries could not meet this standard in respect of one or more 
contingencies at the time.202 One of those countries appeared to be Norway, 
which argued that the personal scope of the Norwegian scheme was very 
extensive, and therefore the benefi ts were lower than under schemes of much 
more restrictive scopes.203
Suspension or reduction of the benefi t
Th e Convention permits the pension to be suspended in case the benefi ciary is 
engaged in any gainful activity.204 Furthermore, in a contributory system, 
pensions may be reduced by earnings exceeding an amount fi xed by national 
laws or regulations. Under a non-contributory system, a reduction is allowed in 
respect not only of earnings exceeding the fi xed amount, but also in respect of 
other means of the pensioner.205 Originally, it had to be a ‘substantial’ amount, 
however, the word ‘substantial’ was deleted by the Conference Committee, on 
the proposal of the employers’ members in the last instance.
Duration of the benefi t
No limitation on the duration of benefi t, other than to that of the contingency, is 
permitted for old age pensions.206
Adjustment of long-term benefi ts to the cost of living
For long-term benefi ts, the adjustment of cash benefi ts to changes in the cost of 
living is more complicated than it is for short-term benefi ts.207 Indeed, the 
purchasing power in the case of long-term benefi ts will continually diminish 
aft er they have been awarded. Moreover, if they are based on previous earnings, 
they are calculated over a long prescribed period during which the earnings are 
not adapted to the wage level at the time of calculation. For these reasons, special 
provisions have been added where the benefi t is related to previous earnings or 
to the wage of the typical unskilled labourer. Th e provisions require long-term 
benefi ts to be ‘reviewed following substantial changes in the general level of 
earnings where these result from substantial changes in the cost of living.’208 
202 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 178–181, 186–187 (tables).
203 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 144.
204 Convention 102, Art. 26 (3).
205 ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 522.
206 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 21.
207 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 227–228; For the adjustment of short-term benefi ts, see section 
2.10.3 on sickness benefi t.
208 Convention 102, Art. 65 (10) and Art. 66 (8).
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Where the rate of the benefi t is subject to a means test and is supposed to be 
suffi  cient to maintain the family of the benefi ciary in health and decency,209 a 
certain adaptation to the cost of living is implicit; therefore, in this case a special 
provision was found redundant. Th e Convention does not prescribe a particular 
method to ensure the automatic adjustment of benefi ts to a cost of living or wage 
index. It merely imposes a moral obligation on countries to review the rates of 
current periodical payments when they are no longer in line with present 
economic conditions as a result of substantial changes in the cost of living.210
2.12.4 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
Qualifying period for a full benefi t
Th e concept of a qualifying period plays an important role in old age benefi t. 
Even so, the regulation included in the Convention in this respect is rather 
complicated. Th e main rule stipulates that a full old age benefi t – to be discerned 
from a reduced benefi t – has to be paid to all persons protected who have 
completed a qualifying period, which may be, at most, either 30 years of 
contribution or employment, or 20 years of residence.211 Th ese periods are based 
on the conditions most commonly required in national legislation for entitlement 
to full pensions at the time.212 Th e prescribed qualifying period has to be 
completed ‘prior to the contingency, in accordance with prescribed rules’. Th is 
clause implies that a country can regulate that the required period, either of 
contribution, employment, or residence, must have been completed within a 
specifi ed number of years prior to the attainment of pensionable age. Th e 
prescribed period may also be the total period that has elapsed since the person 
concerned fi rst entered insurance, or, when their insurance has been interrupted 
for a longer period, since they last entered insurance.213
As an alternative, a country is allowed to require that the person protected must 
have paid, or have paid in respect of him, a prescribed yearly average number of 
contributions during his working life.214 Th is option has been designed 
exclusively for countries where old age insurance extends to the whole 
economically active population. Evidently, under such a scheme, every claimant 
will have been insured during the greater part of their working life, and thus 
qualify for a pension.
209 Convention 102, Art. 67.
210 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 228.
211 Convention 102, Art. 29 (1) sub a.
212 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 16.
213 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 105.
214 Convention 102, Art. 29 (1) sub b; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 204.
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Qualifying period for a reduced benefi t
A pension must also be granted to persons protected who have completed half 
the qualifying period for the normal pension.215 Such pensions may then be 
lower than the normal pension. Th us, a person who has completed 15 years of 
contribution or employment, where the qualifying period for a full pension is 30 
years, qualifi es for a reduced pension.216 Similarly, a person who has paid half of 
the average number of contributions is also entitled to a reduced pension.217 Th e 
Convention does not stipulate that a reduced pension must be paid to persons 
protected who have less than 20 years of residence under a public service or a 
social assistance scheme, where residence is the only qualifying condition.218 In 
the third proposal, the condition of 10 years of residence had been included, but 
the Offi  ce had dropped that clause again because it had been proved that, in 
practice, reduced pensions were never provided for under such schemes.219 
Inserting a provision requiring a reduced pension in such cases would, therefore, 
exclude ratifi cation on the basis of social assistance and public services, however 
high the pensions in the county concerned might be; logically, this was not found 
expedient.220
To what extent the benefi t may be reduced, is not specifi ed. Th e Belgium 
government had proposed to include that the amount of the benefi t must not be 
less than half of the normal, ‘full’ benefi t. Th e Offi  ce replied on this point that, 
desirable as such provision might be, the statistics showed that it would not be 
realistic in view of the fact that even countries with relatively advanced systems 
of social security did not always pay a reduced pension at all aft er ten years.221 
For that reason, the extent of the reduction was left  blank.
Limited qualifying period
In last instance, the Committee on Social Security proposed adding two 
provisions concerning the relation between the length of the required qualifying 
period and the amount of benefi t; both of these provisions were adopted by the 
Conference.222 One of these supplemental clauses stipulates that where an old 
age scheme prescribes a qualifying period for a full pension of only ten years of 
contribution or employment, or fi ve years of residence, the amount of the full 
215 Convention 102, Art. 29 (2).
216 Convention 102, Art. 29 (2) sub a.
217 Convention 102, Art. 29 (2) sub b.
218 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 204.
219 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 31.
220 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 106.
221 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 106.
222 Convention 102, Art. 29 paras. 3 and 4.
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benefi t may be reduced by ten points, thus amounting to 30 percent of the 
reference wage.223 Th is exception to the 40 percent rule makes it easier for 
countries with a scheme requiring a limited qualifying period, and thus with a 
broader scope, to meet the conditions of this part of the Convention.
Th e second supplemental clause points out that where the required qualifying 
period for a full pension is more than ten years, but less than 30 years of 
contribution or employment, a reduction of the prescribed 40 percent of the 
reference wage may be eff ected, proportional to the reduced 30 percent 
mentioned in the previous section. For example, where a qualifying period of 20 
years has been fi xed, aft er 20 years of contribution a full pension of 35 percent of 
the reference wage should be granted. Moreover, where a qualifying period of 
more than 15 years of contribution or employment is required, a reduced pension 
must also be paid to any person protected who has at least fulfi lled 15 years of 
contribution or employment, upon reaching the pensionable age; this provision 
has to be in conformity with the rules concerning the reduced pensions explained 
in the former section. Again, it has been left  to national laws or regulations to 
determine the amount of such reduced pensions. In other words, where the old 
age scheme imposes a qualifying period of between 15 and 30 years, a reduced 
pension has to be granted, where a person protected has fulfi lled at least 15 years 
of that period. Th us, where a scheme requires 20 years of employment, certain 
benefi t should also be payable to a pensioner who has been employed for only 15 
years within the prescribed period prior to the attainment of the pensionable 
age.224
2.13 EMPLOYMENT INJURY BENEFIT
2.13.1 MATERIAL SCOPE
Defi nition of the contingency
An employment injury scheme has to cover not only one, but several contingencies, 
to comply with Convention 102.225 In the fi rst place, the scheme has to cover any 
morbid condition due to an accident or a prescribed disease resulting from 
employment.226 Secondly, compensation must be paid in respect of incapacity for 
work involving suspension of earnings due to employment injury, as defi ned by 
223 ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 522; Bartelomei 1994, point 208.
224 ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 522.
225 Convention 102, Art. 32; ILO Report IV (2) 1951, pp. 305–306; ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, 
pp. 14, 29.
226 Convention 102, Art. 32 (a).
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national laws or regulations.227 Incapacity for work should be interpreted as total 
incapacity for the victim’s usual work continuing as long as medical care is required 
and received.228 Th irdly, when the victim’s condition has been stabilised and it 
becomes apparent that he has suff ered a loss of earning capacity which is likely to 
be permanent, or a permanent loss of faculty, compensation has to be granted 
proportionate to the degree of permanent incapacity.229 Full compensation has to 
be paid in respect of total loss of earning capacity or corresponding loss of faculty. 
Where loss of earning capacity or of faculty is only partial, a minimum degree of 
incapacity that will give rise to an allowance can be prescribed by national laws or 
regulations. Th e compensation for partial loss of earning capacity must, however, 
be a suitable proportion of that specifi ed for total loss thereof.230 Finally, if the 
victim of employment injury dies as a result of such injury, their widow and 
dependent children have to be entitled to survivors’ pensions, which may be 
conditional on their being presumed incapable of self-support. In the case of a 
widow, it is left  to national laws or regulations to determine the conditions in which 
incapacity for self-support is presumed to exist.231 In the case of a child, they must 
be presumed to be incapable of self-support as long as they are under school leaving 
age, or are aged under 15 years, as the case may be.232
In brief, an employment injury scheme should provide:
– Medical benefi ts in the case of a morbid condition due to employment injury;
– Sickness allowances in the case of incapacity for work involving suspension 
of earnings as a result of a morbid condition due to employment injury;
– Invalidity pensions in the case of inability, which is likely to be permanent, to 
engage in any substantially gainful occupation, due to employment injury 
and (total or partial loss of earning capacity); and
– Survivors’ pensions in the case of presumed incapacity of the widow and the 
children or orphans of a breadwinner, whose death was due to employment 
injury, to self-support.
Disease resulting from employment
In the initial proposal of the Offi  ce, the provision referred to any disease resulting 
from employment. Th e British government considered this too general, and 
suggested instead referring either to diseases which are prescribed by national 
laws and regulations, or to those scheduled in Convention No. 42 concerning 
227 Convention 102, Art. 32 (b).
228 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 206.
229 Convention 102, Art. 32 (c).
230 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 206.
231 Convention 102, Art. 32 (d).
232 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 206–207.
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workmen’s compensation for occupational diseases. Since most countries had 
composed a list specifying diseases that were deemed to result from employment, 
or the conditions under which a disease was deemed to be occupational, it was 
decided to substitute the term ‘prescribed disease’ for ‘disease’. Th us, it is left  to 
national regulations to determine whether a disease resulting from employment 
is covered by the scheme.233
Distinction between incapacity for work and invalidity
Th e Dutch government was of the opinion that the fi rst proposal was not clear 
about the distinction between temporary incapacity and loss of working capacity 
that is likely to be prolonged or permanent. Th e Offi  ce pointed out in its response 
that there is incapacity of the victim to carry out their usual work, continuing as 
long as medical care is required on the one hand, and invalidity on the other, 
which means a condition that has become stabilised or consolidated. In this 
latter case, the criterion applied in determining the degree of invalidity will be, 
as a rule, either loss of earning capacity in the general employment market, or 
loss of faculty, rather than incapacity of the victim to do their former work. To 
establish this distinction, the term ‘incapacity for work’ is used in the case of a 
morbid condition, and ‘loss of earning capacity’ in the case of invalidity.234
Partial loss of working capacity
Diff ering opinions existed on the minimum degree of partial loss of earning 
capacity in respect of which a periodical payment would have to be granted. 
Because of the fact that the minimum degree of permanent incapacity giving 
rise to compensation in the form of pensions diff ered considerably from 
country to country, the Offi  ce had chosen not to propose a fi xed minimum 
degree at all. Belgium and France in particular, opposed this (in their eyes) 
unfortunate decision. Belgium suggested subscribing a minimum degree of 
incapacity of 20 percent. However, considering the widely varying national 
regulations at that time (not supported by fi gures, though), the Offi  ce replied 
that it did not fi nd it possible to propose a minimum degree at which a 
compensation would have to be granted, but that it would leave it to the 
Conference to decide whether or not such a possibility could be taken into 
account.235 Apparently, this did not succeed, since the actual provision leaves 
the determination of the degree to national laws or regulations. In its 
explanatory document to the fi nal proposal, the Offi  ce emphasised that, unlike 
under a general invalidity scheme, partial loss of earning capacity has to be 
covered, and that ‘the compensation of partial loss or earning capacity should 
233 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 63, 109.
234 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 38, 110.
235 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 9, 110.
Part II. Analysis and Comparison
80 Intersentia
be a suitable proportion of that specifi ed for total loss thereof”, thus providing 
a rather practicable guideline aft er all.236
Survivors’ pensions
In the preliminary text it was stipulated that incapacity of the widow to self-
support was presumed to exist where the widow was either responsible for one or 
more children, or where she had reached a prescribed age, or when she was an 
invalid.237 It was suggested by the Chilean government that a pension should be 
granted to a widow, regardless of whether or not she had children, and 
irrespective of her age or invalidity. Th e Conference, however, decided to treat 
death due to employment injury in the same way as death not due to employment 
injury. As a consequence, it is left  to national laws or regulations to prescribe the 
conditions in which the widow, whether or not she has children, shall be entitled 
to compensation in her own right.238 Th e compensation in the widow’s own right 
must be distinguished from additional pensions or family allowances for the 
children.
In reply to a proposal of the Belgian government concerning benefi ts for full 
orphans, the Offi  ce clarifi ed that the child of the deceased breadwinner, 
irrespective of whether the latter was their father or mother, as well as the child 
who has lost both their father and mother, should be entitled to a survivors’ 
pension.239
2.13.2 PERSONAL SCOPE
In respect of the employment injury benefi t, the Convention requires the 
following persons to be protected:240
(a) prescribed classes of employees, constituting not less than 50 percent of all 
employees, and, for benefi t in respect of death of the breadwinner, also their wives 
and children.
Th e tables prepared by the Offi  ce showed that employment injury benefi ts were 
generally reserved for employees, and that in most cases no income or means test 
was applied.241 Th erefore, the second and third option that is given in respect of 
236 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 206.
237 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, pp. 82–83, Art. 33 paras. d (i) and (ii).
238 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 111, 206.
239 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 110–111.
240 Convention 102, Art. 33 (a). For an explanation of this option, see section 2.10.2 on sickness 
benefi t.
241 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 59.
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most other risks was left  out in respect of employment injury. Th e Polish 
government proposed extending the scope to all employees, without exception. 
Th is was, however, not accepted with regard to the minimum standards, 
particularly in view of the fact that in many countries it did not seem possible to 
extend employment injury insurance to agricultural workers in the short-term. 
Th e Polish proposal was supposed to be taken into account in the formulation of 
the advanced standards of social security.242
Compliance with this part of the Convention can only be eff ected on the basis of 
compulsory employment injury insurance. Th e Offi  ce opined that compensation 
in the case of employment injury was recognised in the labour legislation of the 
great majority of countries, and that its provision could not be left  to the hazard 
of voluntary insurance or the individual liability of the employer.243 An 
employers’ liability scheme may serve as a basis for ratifi cation only if benefi ts 
are guaranteed by a fund which is collectively fi nanced.244 Ratifi cation on the 
basis of social assistance covering all residents, fi nally, is not allowed in view of 




Medical care in cases of employment injury must comprise:246
(a) general practitioner and specialist in-patient care and out-patient care, including 
domiciliary visiting;
(b) dental care;
(c) nursing care at home or in hospital or other medical institutions;
(d) maintenance in hospitals, convalescent homes, sanatoria or other medical 
institutions;
(e) dental, pharmaceutical and other medical or surgical supplies, including 
prosthetic appliances, kept in repair, and eyeglasses; and
(f) the care furnished by members of such other professions as may at any time be 
legally recognised as allied to the medical profession, under the supervision of a 
medical or dental practitioner.
242 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 108–109.
243 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 78. Th e same view was expressed in relation to maternity and the 
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Th is enumeration of the items to be included is meant to be exhaustive.247 All 
services shall be aff orded with a view to maintaining, restoring or improving the 
health of the person protected, as well as their ability to work and to attend to 
their personal needs.248 Th e provision was copied from the Medical Care 
Recommendation. Whereas under the general medical care branch the range of 
care has been restricted to the most essential items, in the event of employment 
injury, the full range of care as defi ned in the Recommendation has been 
adopted. Since the majority of schemes provided all medical services required 
for full rehabilitation, no objections were made on this point.249 Th e Offi  ce has 
made clear that compliance with this part of the Convention can be eff ected on 
the basis of an employment injury insurance scheme and a sickness insurance 
scheme jointly satisfying the requirements of this provision.250
Cost-sharing
In the second last draft , no reference was made to cost-sharing.251 Th is is striking, 
since in the preceding draft , following the replies of several governments, a 
specifi c provision concerning cost-sharing had been included that allowed 
demanding from the person protected a share in the cost of medical care, except 
where the condition requiring such care was due to maternity, employment 
injury, or to a chronic disease.252 Th e government of the United Kingdom 
observed the absence of such clear provision in the next draft  and recalled that 
cost-sharing under the general medical care branch had been explicitly 
permitted. As a consequence of the absence of such provision, cost-sharing 
would not be allowed under this branch. Th e Offi  ce responded to this comment 
by pointing out the problem that could arise, indeed, for countries where all 
medical care services were brought under a health scheme that did not make a 
distinction as to the cause of the condition requiring medical care. It was found 
that, in that event, any cost-sharing allowed in respect of medical benefi t 
provided in compliance with the general medical care branch would also have to 
be allowed in respect of the same medical benefi t provided in compliance with 
the employment injury branch.253 Accordingly, a provision was introduced in 
the succeeding draft  allowing cost-sharing where the same range of medical care 
was provided in any condition requiring medical care, whether due or not to 
employment injury. Th is would have been, as it was in the general medical care 
part, subject to the safeguard that no hardship was infl icted.254
247 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 207.
248 Convention 102, Art. 34 (4).
249 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, pp. 37–38.
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However, at the instance of the workers’ members, this aft erthought was left  out 
again in the fi nal text, with the remark that the provision had been intended 
chiefl y to meet the case of a national health service, and not an insurance scheme 
covering employees.255 With the deletion of this provision that explicitly allowed 
cost-sharing in the case of employment injury under specifi c circumstances, it 
must be concluded that cost-sharing is prohibited under this branch in all cases.
Periodical payment or lump sum
In principle, benefi ts have to be provided in the form of periodical payments; a 
lump sum will generally not satisfy the requirements of the Convention. 
Nevertheless, two exceptions to this principle are made in respect of employment 
injury, one in the case of permanent total loss of earning capacity of a minor 
degree, the limit of that degree to be fi xed by national regulation, and the other, 
where the competent authority is satisfi ed that the lump sum will be properly 
utilised.256 Th ese exceptions – the latter of which was copied from the 
Conventions of 1925 on workmen’s compensation – were added in last instance 
at the proposal of the Conference Committee of Social Security, as a result of 
various proposals and an exchange of views.257
On previous occasions it had been discussed, however, that the time had come to 
insist more on the payment of periodical pensions than was done 25 years 
previously, because the payment of a capital sum might deprive the person 
protected of security for the future. Only a few countries proposed that in the 
case of a young and childless widow, or in the case of incapacity of a minor 
degree, a lump sum could perhaps be considered.258 Th e Offi  ce had fi rmly 
rejected these suggestions at the time, referring to former discussions that had 
resulted in the adoption of the principle of periodical payment by the 
Conference.259 Apparently, during the 14 sittings of the Conference Committee 
on Social Security, this principle had been called into question again, and, in the 
end, was considerably watered down. Th is is likely to be due to the fact that, 
according to the statistics, in a considerable number of countries the survivors of 
victims of employment injury received, at that time, only one-off  grants and not 
periodical payments.260 Without the adoption of quite a general exception, these 
countries would not qualify for ratifi cation on the basis of employment injury.
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Amount of the benefi t in the event of incapacity for work and invalidity
Th e allowance for a standard benefi ciary has to be a periodical payment at a rate 
which amounts to at least:261
– 50 percent of individual earnings, where the benefi t is proportionate to the 
previous earnings of the benefi ciary. A ceiling on earnings may be fi xed, or a 
maximum benefi t set, but the maximum benefi t shall not be less than 50 
percent of the average wage of a skilled adult manual male employee; or
– 50 percent of the wage of an ordinary (unskilled) adult male labourer, where 
the benefi t is at a fl at rate.
Th e standard benefi ciary in this respect is a man with a dependent wife and two 
children. Th e applicable percentages are higher than those with respect to the 
long-term benefi ts in case of old age, invalidity and survivors. According to the 
statistics provided by the Offi  ce, in the majority of countries benefi ts were related 
to previous earnings, and among the richer countries, the rates were generally 
higher; in more than half of those countries the rate was as much as 70 percent 
or more.262 Consequently, the fi xed percentage of 50 percent has not been subject 
to heated discussions. As explained in section 2.13.1, the compensation for 
partial loss of earning capacity must be a suitable proportion of that for total loss 
thereof.263
Amount of the benefi t in the event of death of the breadwinner
Th e allowance in the event of death of the breadwinner has to be at a rate which 
amounts to at least:264
– 40 percent of individual earnings, where the benefi t is proportionate to the 
previous earnings of the benefi ciary. A ceiling on earnings may be fi xed, or a 
maximum benefi t set, but the maximum benefi t shall not be less than 40 
percent of the average wage of a skilled adult manual male employee; or
– 40 percent of the wage of an ordinary (unskilled) adult male labourer, where 
the benefi t is at a fl at rate.
Th e standard benefi ciary in this respect is a widow with two dependent children. 
Th e Offi  ce stipulated that the compensation of at least 40 percent of previous or 
261 Convention 102, Art. 36 (1), in conjunction with Arts. 65 and 66 and the Schedule to Part XI. 
For an explanation of the way of calculation, see section 2.10.3 on sickness benefi t.
262 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, pp. 60–65, 181.
263 Convention 102, Art. 36 (2).
264 Convention 102, Art. 36 (1), in conjunction with Arts. 65 and 66 and the Schedule to Part XI. 
For an explanation of the method of calculation, see section 2.10.3 on sickness benefi t.
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standard wages could be complied with either by granting a pension to the 
widow in her own rights, and additional pensions or family allowances for the 
children, or by granting pensions or family allowances to the children only. 
What exactly the rate of a benefi t should be for orphans is not given. Th e Belgian 
government had proposed that the case of orphans should be treated separately 
from that of a widow with children, providing for a benefi t of 10 percent of the 
reference wage. Th e Offi  ce responded by stressing that the actual provision 
included the entitlement to a survivor’s pension of a child who has lost both their 
father and their mother. However, no attention was paid to the suggested 
percentage.265 Apparently, the general provision that in the case of other 
benefi ciaries the benefi t shall be reasonably proportionate to the benefi t for the 
standard benefi ciary was deemed suffi  cient.266
Duration of the benefi t
Both medical benefi t and fi nancial compensation shall be granted throughout 
the contingency.267 Th us, no maximum benefi t period is permitted for 
compensation in respect of total incapacity for the victim’s usual work (sickness), 
nor in respect of permanent loss of earning capacity (invalidity) in excess of a 
prescribed degree, nor for survivors’ pension. Th e only exception that has been 
made is the insertion of a maximum waiting period of three days in respect of 
incapacity for work.268
2.13.4 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
No qualifying period in terms of contribution, employment, or residence may be 
prescribed.269 Th e only qualifying condition that may be required is that the 
accident resulting in employment injury or death must have occurred while the 
victim was employed in the Member’s territory. In the case of an occupational 
disease, the claimant may be required to have been employed in the territory at 
the time when they contracted the disease. Th is provision was in accordance 
with the employment injury schemes at the time, since it was deemed suffi  cient 
for the injured person to have been employed at the time of the accident or the 
exposure of the disease.270
265 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 110–111.
266 Convention 102, Arts. 65 (5) and 66 (3).
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Defi nition of the contingency
Th e contingency covered under this part of the Convention is responsibility for 
the maintenance of children as prescribed.271 Th e term ‘child’ means a child 
under school leaving age or under 15 years of age, at the choice of the country 
concerned. Th is defi nition of the contingency is a quite vague compromise 
between several more specifi c options.
Number of children
Indeed, in its fi rst draft , the Offi  ce proposed that allowances be payable from the 
second child. Th is was based on a survey among the Member States that showed 
that in most countries the usual earnings of a breadwinner were considered to be 
suffi  cient for the full maintenance of one child and for defraying part of the 
expenses of maintenance of other children. It was noted, however, that in some 
countries family benefi ts were granted in respect of every dependent child (for 
example, Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Sweden), and only in a few 
countries as from the third, or even the fourth child (Germany, and Brazil).272 In 
the subsequent draft , drawn up aft er the fi rst reading at the Conference in 1951, 
the provision was retained unamended. However, the replies of the Member 
States during the second round showed, again, diff ering views on the number of 
children in respect of whom an allowance should be paid, and a few countries 
insisted on another solution. On the one hand, there was Germany suggesting 
that child benefi t should be ensured only as from the third child, stressing that it 
would otherwise make heavy demands on fi nancial resources.273 On the other, 
Yugoslavia argued strongly in favour of a benefi t from the very fi rst child.274
In view of these opposing views, the Offi  ce passed over the arguments of 
Germany and retained the original defi nition, however, with the addition of an 
alternative provision. Th is new alternative provided for ratifi cation on the basis 
of benefi ts for all children, including the fi rst, while the total rate of the benefi ts 
would be proportionately about the same.275 During the last meeting of the 
Conference Committee on Social Security in 1952, this solution could not hold 
up; on the proposal of the employers’ members, the Committee decided to 
271 Convention 102, Art. 40.
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replace the two alternatives with the actual provision. It was argued that the 
changed wording would fi t with a great variety of systems, leaving it to national 
regulations to determine the number of children in respect of whom benefi ts are 
payable.276 While Germany could breathe a sigh of relief, the Dutch government 
delegate remarked on this last-moment revision that the provision had become 
extremely vague. It was pointed out that under the new defi nition a state was 
permitted to ratify this part of the Convention even by giving a family allowance 
only aft er the third child, and, moreover, on a decreasing scale, according to the 
number of children. Th e latter was considered to discourage large families and 
was therefore found undesirable. In order not to complicate the situation, the 
Dutch government did not propose amendments on this matter, but instead the 
necessity for drawing up a special convention concerning family allowances was 
suggested.277 History has shown, however, that specifi c conventions on all 
contingencies were adopted subsequently, except on family allowances.
2.14.2 PERSONAL SCOPE
Persons covered
To meet the conditions of the Convention as regards family benefi t, the persons 
protected shall comprise:278
(a) prescribed classes of employees, constituting not less than 50 percent of all 
employees; or
(b) prescribed classes of economically active population, constituting not less than 
20 percent of all residents; or
(c) all residents whose means during the contingency do not exceed prescribed 
limits.
Means test
Until the last draft  that was presented by the Offi  ce, the Convention provided for 
only two alternatives in respect of the personal scope. Th e third option, allowing 
for a means test, was not included. On the contrary, the Offi  ce had previously 
recalled that the Conference did not wish to allow for a means test regarding 
family benefi t, and emphasised this again in the accompanying explanation of its 
last draft .279 Th e same point of view was taken by the Conference at an earlier 
276 ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 523.
277 ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 317.
278 Convention 102, Art. 41. For an explanation of the diff erent options, see sections 2.10.2 on 
sickness benefi t and 2.11.2 on unemployment benefi t.
279 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 21; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 210.
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stage, and, accordingly, in none of the draft s was a means test allowed.280 
Nevertheless, in last instance, the Conference Committee created a new text that 
diff ered substantially from the Offi  ce’s proposal.281 Indeed the text adopted by 
the Conference, in the end, included the previously rejected means test. Since the 
Committee did not provide explanatory notes to the alterations of the last 
proposal, it is not clear why a means test was still accepted.
Voluntary insurance
As is the case with employment injury and maternity, compliance with this part 
of the Convention is not possible on the basis of voluntary insurance.282 In its 
last report on the proposed Convention, the Offi  ce affi  rmed explicitly that family 
allowances could not be assured by voluntary insurance, referring in this respect 
to the decision of the Conference Committee that social assistance was not to be 
recognised as a method of covering these contingencies.283 Apparently, in the 
view of the Offi  ce, these two matters were interconnected in such a way that 
where social assistance was not seen as an appropriate way of covering the 
specifi c contingency, voluntary insurance would not be appropriate either. Th is 
approach however, was put aside by the Conference when, in the end, social 
assistance was accepted with regard to family benefi ts while, at the same time, 
voluntary insurance remained prohibited.
2.14.3 BENEFITS
Benefi ts in cash or in kind
Th e Convention provides for two types of benefi ts: one being periodical 
payments, and the other, to be provided exclusively in respect of children, 
benefi ts in kind. Th e latter includes food, clothing, housing, holidays or domestic 
help. Examples of such benefi ts are free meals for schoolchildren and free milk 
or vitamins for infants, or rent subsidies for large families. To comply with the 
requirements of the Convention, a combination of both types of benefi ts is also 
allowed.284
Th e idea of including benefi ts in kind was not embraced unanimously. Germany, 
for example, proposed removing this option altogether, since verifi cation would 
be very diffi  cult and it might lead to abuse. Poland urged allowing such benefi ts 
280 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 12; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 78.
281 ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 523.
282 Convention 102, Art. 6; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 210.
283 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 78–79.
284 Convention 102, Art. 42; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 210.
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only to the extent of 50 percent of the value of cash allowances, while the 
Norwegian government wanted to also take into account tax exemptions in 
respect of children. It was recognised by the Offi  ce that allowing benefi ts in kind 
to be counted to the extent of their value in addition to family benefi ts in cash, 
gave rise to a number of diffi  culties. First of all, the Offi  ce explained, the cost of 
benefi ts in kind in any one period must probably be estimated, since benefi ts in 
kind may be provided for all children, but also for certain groups of children, 
such as schoolchildren, who are not necessarily the children of the persons 
protected. Th en, the estimated cost has to be added to the value of the cash 
allowances.285 Th e suggestion that a calculation may be made by estimating the 
cost was apparently found suffi  cient to overcome the diffi  culties mentioned, since 
the provision was retained in spite of the various objections. It was also noted by 
the Offi  ce that benefi ts in kind would be particularly expedient for less developed 
countries, where a low level of nutrition or housing may exist.286
Amount of benefi t
Th e total value of both benefi ts in cash and in kind has to be such as to 
represent:287
(a) 3 percent of the wage of an ordinary adult male labourer, as determined in 
accordance with the rules laid down in Article 66, multiplied by the total number 
of children of persons protected; or
(b) 1.5 percent of the said wage, multiplied by the total number of children of all 
residents.
In contrast to the provisions of all other contingencies, the level of family benefi t 
is not related to a standard benefi ciary, but has to be reached at a global level.288 
Th e Offi  ce argued at this point that benefi ts for the maintenance of dependent 
children are distinguished from other benefi ts under the Convention in that they 
do not replace, but supplement, earnings or other income. Th ey are paid while 
the breadwinner is working, as well as during sickness, unemployment, or 
invalidity, and also oft en aft er the breadwinner’s death. Since the benefi ts are 
intended to assist with the cost of family charges, they are proportionate to the 
size of the family rather than to the benefi ciary’s individual earnings.289
To prove compliance with the Convention, the total amount of (periodical) 
family benefi ts granted during a given period has to be calculated and, if applied, 
285 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 119–121.
286 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, pp. 73–74.
287 Convention 102, Art. 44.
288 See the schedule to Part XI of Convention 102, in which maintenance of children is not 
included; Humblet 2002, p. 440.
289 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, p. 70.
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the total value of benefi ts in kind provided during the same period has to be 
added. Th e total amount has to be divided by the number of children covered by 
the scheme. Th e quotient then has to be the fi xed percentage of the average wage 
of an unskilled labourer. To be specifi c, when classes of employees or 
economically active persons are protected, the total value of the benefi ts, divided 
by the total number of children of the persons protected, has to amount to 3 
percent of the standard wage of an unskilled labourer. In case a government 
chooses to protect all residents, the value of the benefi ts, divided by the total 
number of children of all residents, has to amount to 1.5 percent of the standard 
wage.290
Duration of the benefi t and adjustment to the cost of living
Th e benefi t has to be paid throughout the contingency.291 Th is means at least 
until the child reaches school leaving age, or the age of 15 years – it is the choice 
of the country concerned.
Since the amount of the benefi t is related to the average wage of unskilled labour, 
the benefi t will automatically change with the changing level of wages.
2.14.4 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
Entitlement to family benefi t may be made subject to the completion of a 
qualifying period of three months of contribution or employment, or of one year 
of residence, as may be prescribed. Initially the Offi  ce had proposed 6 months of 
residence; this was, however, raised at an early stage, since several countries were 
in favour of longer periods.
2.15 MATERNITY BENEFIT
2.15.1 MATERIAL SCOPE
For a maternity scheme to comply with the requirements of the Convention, it 
has to cover two contingencies, namely, pregnancy and confi nement and their 
consequences, and the resultant suspension of earnings as defi ned by national 
laws or regulations.292 Th us, on the one hand, medical care has to be required, 
and on the other, maternity allowances must be paid in the case of suspension of 
earnings.
290 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 120–121.
291 Convention 102, Art. 45.
292 Convention 102, Art. 47.
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Th ere were no comments made in respect of the defi nition of this contingency. 
Th e clause ‘as defi ned by national laws or regulations’ was, however, added by the 
Conference Committee on Social Security only in last instance. Th is addition 
was referred to as a ‘draft ing amendment’, therefore no explanation is given 
regarding the discretion of a Member State when it comes to prescribing the 
defi nition of suspension of earnings.
2.15.2 PERSONAL SCOPE
To meet the conditions of the Convention as regards maternity, the persons 
protected shall comprise:293
(a) all women in prescribed classes of employees, constituting not less than 50 
percent of all employees and, for maternity medical benefi t, also the wives of men 
in these classes; or
(b) all women in prescribed classes of economically active population, constituting 
not less than 20 percent of all residents and, for maternity medical benefi t, also 
the wives of men in these classes.
Compliance with this part of the Convention may be eff ected on the basis of 
compulsory insurance or of a public service, or a combination of these. Th e 
insurance or public service may separately or jointly secure both medical care 
and maternity allowances for the women protected. In any case, medical care 
must not only be secured for the women protected, but also for the wives of men 
covered by the scheme concerned. For the purpose of proving compliance with 
this article, all insured persons, or all persons who are covered by the public 
service, both men and women, can be counted towards the given percentages.294
Th is part of the Convention cannot be ratifi ed on the basis of voluntary 
insurance. It was found by the Offi  ce that compensation in the case of abstention 
from work before and aft er childbirth was fi rmly recognised in the labour 
legislation of the great majority of countries, just as it was in the case of 
employment injury. Th erefore, it did not seem appropriate to leave their provision 
to the hazard of voluntary insurance or to the individual liability of the 
employer.295 Ratifi cation on the basis of social assistance is not allowed because 
of the fact that an income limit or means test was not found permissible in 
respect of maternity.296
293 Convention 102, Art. 48.
294 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 211–212.
295 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 78.
296 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, p. 26; ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 12; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, 
p. 212.




Th e Convention provides for both medical and cash benefi ts. Medical care must 
include at least pre-natal, confi nement and post-natal care, either by medical 
practitioners or by qualifi ed midwives. Hospitalisation must be made available 
where necessitated by the circumstances of the case.297 Th e care shall be aff orded 
with a view to maintaining, restoring or improving the health of the women 
protected, as well as their ability to work and to attend to their personal needs.298 
It is additionally provided that the women protected shall be encouraged to avail 
themselves of the general (preventive) health services which are organised by the 
public authorities, or by other bodies recognised by the public authorities.299
Cost-sharing
Th e Convention does not allow for out-of-pocket payments for maternity related 
medical care.300 It has been made clear under the general medical care branch 
that cost-sharing may be required only if it is explicitly allowed. Article 10 makes 
such an exception for medical care in relation to a morbid condition. Under the 
employment injury and maternity branches, the Convention does not provide 
for the possibility of imposing out-of-pocket payments, which thus implies that 
it is prohibited.
In its explanatory document, the Offi  ce emphasised again that for maternity 
medical benefi t, cost-sharing is not permitted.301 Th is indeed is considered a 
matter of principle. Imposing out-of-pocket payments for pregnancy related 
health care discriminates women against men. Furthermore, it may imperil the 
vulnerable condition of mother and child, especially since the breadwinner, at 
the time, was usually the man.
Amount of cash benefi t
In the event of the suspension of earnings resulting from pregnancy, confi nement 
and their consequences, a periodical payment must be paid.302 Th e allowance for 
a standard benefi ciary has to be a periodical payment at a rate which amounts to 
at least:
297 Convention 102, Art. 49 paras. 1 and 2; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 212.
298 Convention 102, Art. 49 (3).
299 Convention 102, Art. 49 (4).
300 Convention 102, Art. 49.
301 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 212.
302 Convention 102, Art. 50.
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– 45 percent of individual earnings, where classes of employees or classes of the 
economically active population are protected, and the benefi t is proportionate 
to the previous earnings of the benefi ciary. A ceiling on earnings may be 
fi xed, or a maximum benefi t set, but the maximum benefi t shall not be less 
than 45 percent of the average wage of a skilled adult manual male employee; 
or
– 45 percent of the wage of an ordinary (unskilled) adult male labourer, where 
classes of employees or classes of the economically active population are 
protected and the benefi t is at a fl at rate.
Th e typical benefi ciary in the case of maternity allowances is simply a woman 
protected by the scheme, irrespective of her conjugal status and family charges.303 
Th e statistics prepared by the Offi  ce showed that in most upper income countries, 
the maternity allowance represented well over 50 percent of average earnings.304 
Th e Convention allows the amount of the periodical payment to vary in the 
course of the contingency, under the condition that the average rate complies 
with the required percentages.305
Duration of the benefi t
Th e medical and cash benefi ts shall be granted throughout the contingency, 
however, the cash benefi t may be limited to 12 weeks, unless a longer period of 
absence from work is required or authorised by national laws or regulations, in 
which case the benefi t must be paid during the whole period of absence.306 As 
regards the minimum period, the Offi  ce opined that the necessity for absence 
from work in the case of maternity depends, to some extent, on national customs 
and on general health conditions. Nevertheless, there was a consensus of opinion 
among the Member States that the health of the expectant mother and the child 
require a minimum period of absence of 12 weeks. Th is should preferably be 
divided into 6 weeks before and 6 weeks aft er childbirth, on the assumption that 
the confi nement would be a normal one.
A time limit regarding medical care is not permitted under this branch, as is the 
case under a general health care scheme. It was stressed by the Offi  ce that medical 
care regarding pregnancy, confi nement and its consequences are usually covered 
by general health or sickness insurances, but where there is no general insurance, 
the coverage by maternity insurance becomes essential.307 On the suggestion of 
one Member State to limit the duration of hospitalisation, the Offi  ce argued that 
303 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 19; Schedule to Part XI.
304 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 72; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 184 (table).
305 Convention 102, Art. 50.
306 Convention 102, Art. 52.
307 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, pp. 80–81; ILO Report IV (2) 1951, pp. 223–224.
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hospitalisation is already restricted to ‘necessary’ hospitalisation; a further 
lowering of the standard was considered unacceptable.308
2.15.4 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
Both medical care and cash benefi t shall be secured at least to women in the 
classes protected who have completed such qualifying periods as may be 
considered necessary to preclude abuse. Th e medical benefi t shall also be secured 
to the wives of men in the classes protected, where the latter have completed such 
qualifying periods.309
Th e Offi  ce explained that a reasonable qualifying period for a maternity 
allowance should show that the women protected are bona fi de working women 
and have not undertaken insurance or taken up work only for the purpose of 
obtaining benefi t.310 Th e reports show that a great number of governments 
proposed diff erent qualifying periods, from no such period at all, to a period of 
15 months.311 In its reply, the Offi  ce noted that, even under advanced social 
security systems, medical care in the case of maternity was not infrequently 
made conditional upon the completion of a qualifying period of ten months 
preceding the confi nement.312 However, in view of the lack of agreement on this 
matter, as was the case regarding the other short-term benefi ts, the detailed 
provision is left  to the discretion of the Member States, without much guidance 
as to the length of a ‘reasonable’ qualifying period. Nevertheless, it is clear that it 
is a matter of weeks or months, and not of years.
2.16 INVALIDITY BENEFIT
2.16.1 MATERIAL SCOPE
Defi nition of the contingency
Th e contingency covers the ‘inability to engage in any gainful activity, to an 
extent prescribed, which inability is likely to be permanent or persists aft er the 
exhaustion of sickness benefi t.’313
308 ILO Report IV (2) 1951, p. 221.
309 Convention 102, Art. 51.
310 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 212.
311 ILO Report IV (2) 1951, p. 289.
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Th e explanatory notes make clear that a pension must also be paid in the case of 
temporary incapacity for work, if the person protected has exhausted his right to 
sickness benefi t under a scheme covering sickness.314 Furthermore, the reference 
to ‘any’ gainful activity implies that the insured person’s incapacity is not only 
measured against the occupation they were engaged in prior to the injury, or the 
disease that caused the inability to work.
Th e defi nition was based on the Offi  ce’s survey of the Member States of the 
existing invalidity schemes. A person was generally deemed to be an invalid 
when they were unable to engage in any substantially gainful work by reason of a 
morbid condition that was not likely to be cured by medical care. Th e cause of 
invalidity may not necessarily be a physical injury due to an external event, but 
may also be a disease, such as tuberculosis or arthritis. Consequently, the risk 
covered under a general invalidity scheme is of a broader scope than invalidity 
under an employment injury scheme.315
Extent of inability to engage in any gainful activity
Where under the employment injury branch the Convention prescribes partial 
loss of earning capacity to be covered, under this branch no provision for 
partial invalidity is given. At the same time, the contingency does not cover 
total incapacity for work only, as indicates the phrase ‘to an extent prescribed’. 
In the last draft , this phrase was not included; instead it was provided that the 
contingency would cover a person protected who was unable to engage in ‘any 
substantially gainful activity’. As regards the term ‘substantially’, the Offi  ce 
had explained that the most common defi nition of invalidity in the existing 
schemes at the time was the loss of working capacity of at least two-thirds, and 
that those schemes were supposed to comply with the provision. Some schemes 
had a broader concept, and only one country (Australia) had a more stringent 
one, requiring total incapacity for work in any occupation in order to be 
entitled to an invalidity pension.316 In spite of the broad consensus regarding 
the extent of incapacity, the provision was redraft ed at the request of the 
employers’ members to ensure that the extent of inability to be eligible to a 
benefi t was left  to national regulations to determine.317 However, the Offi  ce 
stressed in its explanation to the last draft  that the payment of benefi t in respect 
of total incapacity alone would not satisfy the requirement of the Convention.318 
Th is implies that the prescribed benefi t also has to be provided when a person 
314 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 127.
315 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, pp. 95–96.
316 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 126, 186–187 (table), 213.
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has a loss of working capacity of more than two thirds, but less than hundred 
percent.
2.16.2 PERSONAL SCOPE
To meet the conditions of the Convention as regards invalidity, the persons 
protected shall comprise:319
(a) prescribed classes of employees, constituting not less than 50 percent of all 
employees; or
(b) prescribed classes of economically active population, constituting not less than 
20 percent of all residents; or
(c) all residents whose means during the contingency do not exceed limits prescribed 
in such a manner as to comply with the requirements of Article 67.
An extension of the personal scope was proposed by the Canadian government 
to include the dependants of the persons in the classes protected, except those 
for whom family allowances were paid. It was pointed out that invalidity oft en 
results from a disease or an accident suff ered by the individual before they reach 
working age, which means that they never become a member of the economically 
active population. Th e Offi  ce replied that it would be diffi  cult to realise such an 
extension under schemes of limited scope, the coverage under which is 
determined by the status of the employee or of the gainfully occupied person. 
However, a country the third option, would evidently have to cover invalidity 
existing prior to the attainment of working age.320
Compliance with this part of the Convention can, as with most other parts, be 
eff ectuated on the basis of compulsory or voluntary insurance, or of a public 
service, or any of these combined. Under an insurance scheme, all insured 
persons who are normally engaged in an economic activity, or who normally 
work as employees, can be counted towards the given percentages, but not 
benefi ciaries of invalidity pensions.321 Countries providing for public services 
covering invalidity can count towards the percentage all residents who are 
entitled to invalidity pensions in the event of invalidity of the degree covered.322
As is the case regarding all contingencies, the distinctive options are designed in 
consideration of the fact that some countries might fi nd it easier to prove that 
they cover 50 percent of all employees than that they cover 20 percent of the 
319 Convention 102, Art. 55.
320 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 125.
321 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 214.
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population, since their invalidity insurance is confi ned to employees. Countries 
including independent workers under their invalidity schemes may be insuring 
20 percent of the population without attaining 50 percent of all employees; they 
would prefer the second option.323
2.16.3 BENEFITS
Amount of the benefi t
Th e allowance for a standard benefi ciary has to be a periodical payment at a rate 
that amounts to at least:324
– 40 percent of individual earnings, where classes of employees or classes of the 
economically active population are protected and the benefi t is proportionate 
to the previous earnings of the benefi ciary. A ceiling on earnings may be 
fi xed, or a maximum benefi t set, but the maximum benefi t shall not be less 
than 40 percent of the average wage of a skilled adult manual male employee; 
or
– 40 percent of the wage of an ordinary (unskilled) adult male labourer, where 
classes of employees or classes of the economically active population are 
protected and the benefi t is at a fl at rate, or
– 40 percent of the wage of an ordinary (unskilled) adult male labourer subject 
to a means test, where all residents are protected.
Th e standard benefi ciary in respect of the invalidity benefi t is a man with a 
dependent wife and two children.325 Th e Offi  ce pointed out in its explanatory 
notes that, where the pension is more or less proportionate to earnings, or 
consists of both a uniform amount and increments depending on earnings, the 
Member may elect the fi rst as well as the second option, but the second option 
was expected to be considered preferable.326
Duration of the benefi t and adjustment to the cost of living
Th e benefi t has to be provided throughout the contingency, no limitation other 
than to that of the contingency is permitted for invalidity pensions. Th e only 
exception is that the benefi t may be substituted by an old-age pension when the 
323 For further explanation of the diff erent options, see sections 2.10.2 on sickness benefi t and 
2.11.2 on unemployment benefi t.
324 Convention 102, Art. 56 in conjunction with Arts. 65, 66, 67.
325 Convention 102, schedule to Part XI; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 216.
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benefi ciary reaches pensionable age.327 Th e Offi  ce had not found it necessary to 
put the latter possibility in this provision, because it was supposed to be covered 
already by a common provision on the suspension of benefi ts. However, the 
Committee of Social Security considered this common provision to be 
insuffi  cient, therefore in last instance it was explicitly inserted in the actual 
provision.328
Where the benefi t is related to previous earnings and/or to the wage of the typical 
unskilled labourer, the rates of current periodical payments have to be reviewed 
when they are no longer in line with economic conditions as a result of substantial 
changes in the cost of living.329
2.16.4 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
Qualifying period for a full benefi t
Th e structure of the regulation concerning the qualifying periods in respect of 
invalidity benefi t is quite similar to that of old-age pensions, although the 
number of years required are diff erent. Th e main rule is that a full benefi t has to 
be paid to all persons protected who have completed a qualifying period which 
may be, at most, 15 years of contribution or employment, or 10 years of 
residence.330
A third alternative is given for countries whose scheme covers the whole 
economically active population. In that case, for a full pension, a country is 
allowed to require that the claimant has completed three years of contribution 
and, additionally, a prescribed yearly average number of contributions must have 
been paid in respect of the claimant while they were of working age.331 According 
to this formula, the qualifying period varies with the age at which the person 
protected becomes an invalid, increasing from three years of full contributions 
that may be fi xed as a minimum for those who become invalids shortly aft er 
reaching working age, to a prescribed average number of contributions per year 
during 48 years or so for those who become invalids at the age of 64.332
In comparison with employment injury schemes, the provision for a qualifying 
period under general invalidity schemes had been justifi ed by the fact that the 
chance of abuse was greater than under employment injury insurance. It was 
327 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 21.
328 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 129; ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 523.
329 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p 228; Convention 102, Arts. 65 (10) and 66 (8).
330 Convention 102, Art. 57 (1) sub a.
331 Convention 102, Art. 57 (1) sub b; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 215.
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also pointed out that the risk covered under an invalidity scheme is considerably 
higher, especially since the cause of invalidity may not only be due to an external 
work-related event, but also due to a disease, whatever its cause.333 Initially, the 
Offi  ce had proposed a qualifying period of 5 years, which was the most common 
period at that time. In many countries, the length of the qualifying period 
depended on the range of persons protected and on whether or not the pension 
varied in contributions or duration of employment.334 At a later stage this 
provision was further itemised and developed, by distinguishing a ‘full’ benefi t, 
to be paid aft er the above-mentioned qualifying periods, and a ‘reduced’ benefi t, 
to be paid aft er, at most, fi ve years of contribution or employment.
Qualifying period for a reduced benefi t
A pension must also be granted to a person protected who has completed a 
qualifying period of fi ve years of contribution or employment.335 Where all 
economically active persons are protected, a pension must additionally be paid 
aft er a period of three years of contribution and half the yearly average number 
of contributions demanded for the normal pension. Such pensions may then be 
lower than the normal pension.336 To what extent the benefi t may be reduced, is 
not given. Th us, a person who has completed fi ve years of contribution or 
employment where the qualifying period for a full pension is 15 years, qualifi es 
for a reduced pension. Th e Convention does not stipulate that a reduced pension 
must be paid to persons protected who have less than 10 years of residence under 
a public service or a social assistance scheme.
Limited qualifying period
In last resort, the Committee on Social Security proposed adding two provisions, 
in line with the proposals in respect of old age, concerning the relationship 
between the length of the required qualifying period and the amount of benefi t. 
Both the provisions were adopted by the Conference.337 One of these 
supplemental clauses stipulates that where an invalidity scheme prescribes a 
qualifying period for a full pension of only fi ve years of contribution or 
employment, or fi ve years of residence, the amount of the full benefi t may be 
reduced by ten points, thus amounting to 30 percent of the reference earnings or 
wages instead of 40 percent.338 Th is exception to the 40 percent rule makes it 
easier for countries with a scheme requiring a relatively short qualifying period, 
333 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 96.
334 ILO Report V (a)(1) 1952, p. 97.
335 Convention 102, Art. 57 (2) sub a; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 215.
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337 Convention 102, Art. 57 (3) and (4).
338 Convention 102, Art. 57 (3).
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but with a broader scope, to meet the conditions of this part of the Convention. 
Additionally, where the required qualifying period for a full pension is more 
than fi ve years, but less than 15 years of contribution or employment, the pension 
may be correspondingly lower than 40 percent, provided that it is higher than 30 
percent.339 For example, where a qualifying period of 10 years has been fi xed, a 
full pension of 35 percent of the individual or standard wages should be granted.
In any event, under an insurance scheme where a full pension is secured aft er a 
qualifying period of more than fi ve years but less than 15 years, a reduced 
invalidity pension must be paid aft er fi ve years of contribution or employment. 
Th is means that where the qualifying period is 10 years of contribution with the 
corresponding pension of 35 percent, a reduced pension has to be paid aft er, for 
instance, seven years of contribution. Again, the rate of such a reduction has 
been left  to national regulations.
2.17 SURVIVORS’ BENEFIT
2.17.1 MATERIAL SCOPE
Th e contingency covered is the loss of support suff ered by the widow or child as a 
result of the death of the breadwinner.340 Th us, the protection concerns widows 
and children who were maintained by the deceased breadwinner. A child in this 
context means a child under school leaving age or under 15 years of age, 
according to national legislation.341 In the case of a widow, the right to benefi t 
may be made conditional on her being presumed, in accordance with national 
laws or regulations, to be incapable of self-support.342 Th is defi nition leaves it to 
the discretion of the ratifying countries to determine the conditions in which 
such incapacity should be presumed to exist.
Th e Conference Committee on Social Security had, in the course of the 
discussion, decided in favour of a more specifi ed defi nition of the presumed 
incapacity of self-support of the widow.343 Accordingly, it had been stipulated 
that such incapacity should always be presumed to exist:
– where the widow had one or more dependent children; or
– where she had reached a prescribed age or was invalid, even if she was not 
responsible for children.
339 Convention 102, Art. 57 (4); ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 523.
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It was left  to the ratifying country to prescribe the age at which the childless widow 
should become entitled to a survivors’ pension, and to decide in what other cases a 
childless widow should be presumed incapable of self-support. Furthermore, a 
provision had been included that permitted a prescribed period of marriage for 
the aged or invalid childless widow as an additional qualifying condition.
However, the Offi  ce cancelled this specifi cation, again as a result of the survey of 
the Member States.344 It stated that the statistics showed that the conditions in 
which a survivors’ pension was paid to a widow varied widely from country to 
country. In view of the found diversity, the Offi  ce proposed to stipulate, as a 
general rule, that the child of a breadwinner shall be entitled to a survivors’ 
pension, whether the breadwinner was the father or the mother. In the case of 
the widow, however, the right to benefi t is not absolute, but may be conditional 
on her being presumed to be incapable of self-support. Th e conditions in which 
such incapacity is presumed to exist are left  to be determined by national 
legislation. Th is appeared to be the best achievable formulation, as it was adopted 
by the Conference. Th e Offi  ce explained that the prescribed conditions may, for 
instance, be the care of dependent children, the age or invalidity in the case of a 
childless widow, or the age and invalidity only, or another condition that proves 
that the widow is incapable of self-support.345
To comply with the requirements of the Convention, it is apparently not 
necessary that the scheme covers a widower who was dependent on his deceased 
wife’s earnings. In its explanation of the fi rst proposal, the Offi  ce stated that 
widowers must, as a rule, be incapable of work in order to obtain the pension.346 
However, the text of the Convention refers to the dependant wife, which is, 
considering the division of roles between men and women at that time, not very 
surprising. It must be kept in mind that the Convention provides minimum 
standards, which means that a country is always free to extend the defi nition by 
including dependent widowers.
2.17.2 PERSONAL SCOPE
To meet the conditions of the Convention as regards death of the breadwinner, 
the persons protected shall comprise:347
(a) the wives and the children of breadwinners in prescribed classes of employees, 
constituting not less than 50 percent of all employees; or
344 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 130–131.
345 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 216–217.
346 ILO Report IV (1) 1951, p. 80.
347 Convention 102, Art. 61.
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(b) the wives and the children of breadwinners in prescribed classes of the 
economically active population, constituting not less than 20 percent of all 
residents; or
(c) all resident widows and resident children who have lost their breadwinner, and 
whose means during the contingency do not exceed limits prescribed in such a 
manner as to comply with the requirements of Article 67.
Compliance with this part of the Convention can, as with most other parts, be 
eff ected on the basis of compulsory or voluntary survivors’ insurance, or of a public 
service, or any of these combined. Under an insurance scheme, all insured persons, 
whether breadwinners or not, who are normally engaged in an economic activity 
or who normally work as employees, can be counted towards the given percentages, 
but old-age pensioners and benefi ciaries of invalidity pensions cannot. Under a 
public service, all residents in the classes covered by the scheme concerned, 
whether or not they have dependants, can be counted towards the percentage.
If a country has chosen to fulfi l the requirements of this part of the Convention 
on the basis of social assistance, which means that all resident widows and 
orphans whose means do not exceed a prescribed limit are protected, a number 
of additional conditions regarding the amount of the benefi t are stipulated, 
which are referred to in the benefi t section.348
2.17.3 BENEFITS
Amount of the benefi t
Th e allowance for a standard benefi ciary has to be a periodical payment at a rate 
that amounts to at least:349
– 40 percent of individual earnings, where classes of employees or classes of the 
economically active population are protected and the benefi t is proportionate 
to the previous earnings of the benefi ciary. A ceiling on earnings may be 
fi xed, or a maximum benefi t set, but the maximum benefi t shall not be less 
than 40 percent of the average wage of a skilled adult manual male employee; 
or
– 40 percent of the wage of an ordinary (unskilled) adult male labourer, where 
classes of employees or classes of the economically active population are 
protected and the benefi t is at a fl at rate, or
– 40 percent of the wage of an ordinary (unskilled) adult male labourer subject 
to a means test, where all residents are protected.
348 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 217–218.
349 Convention 102, Art. 62 in conjunction with Arts. 65, 66, 67.
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Similar to invalidity and old-age pension, the Offi  ce pointed out that where the 
pension is more or less proportionate to earnings, the Member can elect the fi rst 
as well as the second option, as long as the benefi t complies with the additional 
requirements of the applicable provision.350 Th e standard benefi ciary in the case 
of death of the breadwinner is a widow with two children under school leaving 
age or under 15 years of age, as the case may be. Th e pensions payable in respect 
of the widow and the two children, or in respect of the two children where the 
widow has no pension of her own, must be at least 40 percent of the deceased 
husband’s previous earnings, or of the standard wage.351
In previous draft s, the rate of the general survivors’ benefi t amounted to 30 
percent, while under an employment injury scheme the survivors’ pension must 
be at least 40 percent of the reference wage. Th e Conference Committee on Social 
Security proposed in last instance to raise the percentage under a general scheme 
to 40 percent, especially because the percentage may be up to ten points lower 
where the scheme requires a qualifying period of only fi ve years for entitlement 
to a full benefi t. Furthermore, it seemed logical to adapt the rate to the same level 
as that for old-age and invalidity pensions. Th e Conference adopted this proposal 
during the fi nal voting with a narrow majority of 144 to 141 votes.352
Suspension or reduction in case of gainful activity
Similar to old-age benefi t, it is stipulated that a benefi t may be suspended if a 
person who is otherwise entitled to it, this may be the widow or orphan, is 
engaged in any prescribed gainful activity. It is left  to national laws or regulations 
to determine the defi nition of a gainful activity.353 Th e reason for this provision 
has been dealt with in the old-age section. Another option in the case of gainful 
activity is to reduce the pension if the benefi ciary earns more than a prescribed 
amount. In the case of social assistance pensions, means other than earnings 
may also be taken into account.354
Duration of benefi t and adjustment to the cost of living
No limitation of the duration of benefi t, other than to that of the contingency, is 
permitted for survivors’ pensions.355 Where the benefi t is related to previous 
earnings and/or to the wage of the typical unskilled labourer, the rates of 
350 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 219.
351 Convention 102, schedule to Part XI; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 227.
352 ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 525.
353 Convention 102, Art. 60 (2).
354 ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, pp. 523–224.
355 Convention 102, Art. 64.
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periodical payments have to be reviewed when they are no longer in line with 
economic conditions as a result of substantial changes in the cost of living.356
2.17.4 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
Qualifying period for a full benefi t
Th e concept of qualifying period in respect of survivors’ benefi t is similar to that 
of invalidity benefi t. Th e main rule is that a full benefi t has to be paid to a person 
protected whose breadwinner has completed, within a prescribed period 
preceding their death, a qualifying period which may be, at most, 15 years of 
contribution or employment, or 10 years of residence.357 A third alternative is 
given for Member States whose scheme covers the wives and children of all 
economically active persons. In that case, the normal pension may be reserved 
for the survivors of a breadwinner who has a minimum of three contribution 
years and, additionally, in respect of whom a prescribed yearly average number 
of contributions have been paid while they were of working age. It has to be clear 
that, for this alternative, the minimum qualifying period for the full pension 
may not be more than three years. According to this formula, the qualifying 
period varies with the age of the breadwinner at the time of their death: the 
length of the contribution period required increases with age at death.358
Qualifying period for a reduced benefi t
A pension must also be granted to the persons protected whose breadwinner had 
completed a qualifying period of fi ve years of contribution or employment at the 
time of their death.359 Where all economically active persons are protected, a 
pension must also be paid aft er a period of three years of contribution and half 
the yearly average number of contributions demanded for the normal pension. 
Such pensions may then be lower than the normal pension.360 To what extent the 
benefi t may be reduced, is not given. Th us, the survivors of a breadwinner who 
had completed fi ve years of contribution or employment, where the qualifying 
period for a full pension is 15 years, qualify for a reduced pension. Th e 
Convention does not stipulate that a reduced pension must be paid to persons 
protected who have less than 10 years of residence under a public service or a 
social assistance scheme.
356 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 228; Convention 102, Art. 65 (10) and Art. 66 (8).
357 Convention 102, Art. 63 (1) sub a.
358 Convention 102, Art. 63 (1) sub b; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 133, 218.
359 Convention 102, Art. 63 (2) sub a; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 218–219.
360 Convention 102, Art. 64 (2) sub b; ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 218–219.
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Limited qualifying period
As with old-age and invalidity pensions, a rate of benefi t ten points lower than 
that for a full pension is permitted, where such benefi t is paid aft er a qualifying 
period of fi ve years of contribution or employment, instead of 15 years, or aft er 
fi ve years of residence, instead of ten years.361
Additional condition for a childless widow
In the case of a widow without dependent children who is presumed to be 
incapable of self-support, an additional qualifying condition relating to the 
minimum duration of marriage may be required.362 Th e reason for such a 
condition is to preclude abuse. A widow may be presumed incapable of self-
support on the grounds of, for instance, age or invalidity, as prescribed by 
national regulations.363 A proposal to make a social assistance pension 
conditional upon the completion of a period of residence by the widow, as well as 
by the husband, was not accepted. It was, however, pointed out that normally the 
widow with children would have resided in the country with her husband for a 
number of years, and that a childless widow can be required to have been married 
for a prescribed period.364
2.18 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
ILO Convention 102 is a comprehensive treaty that covers the nine social risks 
that were generally recognised at the time of its creation. With the adoption of 
this instrument in 1952, the ILO switched from its former way of standard 
setting that focused on the insurance of specifi c categories of workers in specifi c 
fi elds of industry, towards a method that aimed at social security for all. Indeed, 
Convention 102 comprises many features that serve that aim. In order to be 
attainable for the greatest number of countries, fl exibility clauses have been 
included regarding diff erent subjects, and quite a lot of discretion is left  to 
national legislators. At the same time, clear and concrete norms have been fi xed 
that provide a minimum level of social protection for all contracting parties. In 
addition, certain principles on solidarity and state responsibility have been 
formulated to guarantee the eff ective provision of the prescribed benefi ts. 
According to the ILO’s system of supervision, Member States submit reports on 
the application of the Convention on a regular basis, which are assessed by a 
361 Convention 102, Art. 64 paras. 3 and 4; ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 524.
362 Convention 102, Art. 63 (5).
363 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 219. See section 2.17.1.
364 ILO Record of Proceedings 1952, p. 524.
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tripartite Committee of Experts. By way of a special list, cases of incompliance 
are notifi ed to the International Labour Conference.
Th e defi nitions of the nine contingencies are generally clear and unambiguous, 
while at the same time they leave room for interpretation at the national level. 
Sometimes, however, important concepts are very vague, such as ‘suitable 
employment’ or ‘a widow presumed to be incapable of self-support’, which makes 
it diffi  cult to determine the exact scope of the risk concerned. Moreover, some 
risks that were not yet recognised in the post-war period, but which are topical 
in the 21st century, are not included. Cases in point are long-term care, the 
necessity of life-long learning as a result of changed labour relations, and the 
combination of work and family responsibilities. Since the ILO Convention 102 
is broadly considered to substantiate the human right to social security, these 
‘new social risks’ are, as yet, on the periphery of international attention as it 
comes to legislation.
With the diff erent options for the personal scope of social security schemes, the 
Convention is applicable to countries with diff erent designs of welfare systems. 
For countries with a system that is based on the Bismarckian insurance concept, 
the option of coverage of categories of employees to prove compliance with the 
Convention is most expedient. States with a social democratic welfare model may 
prefer the option of coverage of categories of the economically active population, 
or of all residents.365 Th e possibility in relation to most risks of covering all 
residents subject to a means test is useful, especially for liberal welfare states 
providing universal means tested benefi ts as a last resort, when all other 
resources have been exhausted. Although the Convention fi rst and foremost 
refl ects the insurance methods applied in the 1950s, the given options for 
personal coverage are fl exible enough to be applied in present times as well.
Th e Convention also gives diff erent options regarding the calculation of benefi ts 
in order to assess compliance with the prescribed norms. Th e norms consist of a 
fi xed percentage of wages, which makes them attainable for highly, as well as less 
developed, countries. Th e assessment takes place on the basis of the average wage 
of a ‘standard benefi ciary’, which varies according to the type of scheme, for 
example, an income related, fl at rate, or universal scheme. It must be 
acknowledged that the diff erent methods of calculation and the determination of 
the wage of a standard benefi ciary for each risk are very complicated and diffi  cult 
to perform in practice.
Th e required levels of benefi ts have been fi xed in such a way that ratifi cation of 
the Convention was considered possible for most more or less developed 
365 For a description of the diff erent welfare models, see Esping Andersen 1990.
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countries at the time. Th e fact that the Convention sets out minimum standards 
of social security, and that it was intended to be supplemented by higher 
standards for countries with a relatively high standard of living, means that the 
norms must be considered rather low for Member States of the European Union 
at the present time. For each risk, the duration of the diff erent benefi ts is 
formulated as ‘throughout the contingency’, but may be limited to a prescribed 
number of days, weeks, months, or years, depending on nature of the risk. 
Several fl exibility clauses have been inserted at this point as well, allowing for a 
fi xed duration per calendar year, or per instance of occurrence of the risk.
Th e qualifying conditions are diff erent for each risk. In general, for short-term 
risks a period of contribution, employment or residence may be prescribed that 
is no longer than necessary to prevent abuse. Th e determination of the exact 
length of such a period is left  to the national legislator, and the Convention does 
not provide any guidance on this point. For the long-term risks, the Convention 
sets out specifi c maximum periods that may not be exceeded.
Th e fact that the Convention is not prefaced by a preamble to point out the 
underlying thoughts and goals, nor accompanied by an explanatory 
memorandum, makes it an instrument that is diffi  cult to comprehend. Another 
thing that does not help to clarify the vague norms and undefi ned concepts is 
the absence of a court that could provide certainty with regard to the meaning of 
unclear provisions through case law. Th e Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations and the Labour Offi  ce fi ll in 
this gap by formulating requests, observations, and interpretations, but the 
Labour Offi  ce always emphasises that it does not have special authority to 
interpret conventions. Such reserve seems unnecessary and a may hamper the 





COMPARISON OF NATIONAL SOCIAL 
SECURITY LEGISLATION WITH 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
– The Czech Republic –
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the Czech social security system will be examined in light of the 
international standards and compared with the norms of ILO Convention 102 
(ILO C102), and implicitly with the European Code of Social Security (ECSS), as 
discussed in the previous chapter.1 Additionally, it will briefl y be assessed 
whether or not the national provisions comply with the higher standards. Before 
the diff erent schemes will be described in detail and the comparison made, a 
general introduction to the Czech social security system will be given. Firstly, 
the actual social security system will be briefl y outlined, prefaced by a reference 
to its historical roots for the purpose of a better understanding of the present. 
Th en, the role of the social partners will be discussed, especially in connection 
with international obligations. Th is is relevant in order to be able to conclude 
whether the social partners are suffi  ciently involved in national social security 
matters, which is one of the fundamental requirements in respect of all ILO 
Conventions, as well as the ECSS.2 Th ereaft er, in a comprehensive section on 
the eff ect of the international standards on the Czech social security system, it 
will be discussed which social security conventions are ratifi ed, how the Czech 
Republic deals with the international standards in respect of legislation and the 
judiciary, and its position regarding the international supervising bodies will be 
considered. In sections 3.5 to 3.13, the Czech social security provisions pertaining 
to the nine social risks will be described and compared with the international 
standards. For this purpose, the order of ILO C102 will be followed. In the nine 
1 Th e main part of the research for this Chapter was fi nished in August 2008; the data used are, 
therefore, generally the most recent data available in that year. Changes in legislation that 
took place in 2008, 2009, and January 2010, which are directly relevant for the comparison 
with the international standards, are incorporated into the text in later stage. Regulations 
that became eff ective aft er January 2010 are not taken into account.
2 See section 2.3.
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sections, the Czech provisions in relation to each contingency will fi rst be 
described to subsequently compare the national rules with the international 
standards. At the end of each section, in a concise table, an overview will be 
given of the matters of compliance and observed problematic issues. Finally, 
section 3.14 will contain a summary of the fi ndings.
3.2 SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC: 
AN OVERVIEW
3.2.1 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
From the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the Velvet Revolution
Th e history of the Czech social security system goes back as far as the Austro-
Hungarian Empire.3 Th e presence of social democratic political movements in 
the Czech lands began with the foundation of the Czech-Slavic Social Democratic 
Party in 1878. In 1906, the Parliament, infl uenced by Bismarck’s corporatist 
insurance model, adopted the fi rst mandatory pension insurance scheme for 
employees. Aft er World War I, when the Czechoslovakian Republic was formed, 
the pension system suff ered fragmentation because diff erent pension schemes 
existed in diff erent parts of the newly created country. Eff orts were made to 
unify the systems, while increasing the quality and coverage of the scheme. 
Worth mentioning in this respect is that the country was an active member of 
the ILO from the formation of the Organisation, and was thus involved in the 
global discussion about the protection of workers and the development of 
occupational insurance schemes. All this led to the creation of a new social 
insurance law for manual workers in 1924, providing for pensions consisting of 
two components: a fl at rate base supplemented by an earnings-related element, a 
structure that appears to have been restored again in the present pension 
scheme.
During World War II, while German occupiers were confi scating the funds of 
several pension schemes, the Czechoslovakian government in exile became 
impressed by the Beveridgean model of their host country, the UK. Th ey 
prepared social reforms in which the old traditions of the Czech lands, as well as 
modern trends, were refl ected. In 1948, the Law on National Insurance was 
adopted, covering both pension and health insurance, incorporating the 
formerly fragmented schemes into one, and providing similar conditions for all 
workers, including the self-employed. In the same year, however, the communists 
3 Cerami 2007, pp. 5–6; Potůček 2007B, p. 23; Natali 2004A, p. 1; Mácha 2002, p. 75; Müller 
1999, p. 127.
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took over, and started to change the existing social insurance schemes 
fundamentally, following the example of the Soviet system.4 Some important 
alterations they made were the abolition of contributions for the greater part, 
together with the introduction of fi nancing from taxation, and the lowering of 
the retirement age to 60 years for a man, and 53 to 57 for a woman, depending 
on the number of children she had raised. In conformity with the Soviet 
ideology, Czechoslovakian citizens had the right to free health care, a fl at rate 
pension benefi t, and family allowances. In principle, all social rights were 
derived from the employment status, which did not diff er from the former 
corporatist approach. In practice, because of the almost non-existence of 
unemployment, coverage was universal. It must be acknowledged that the 
benefi ts were very low, and for most people, there was a chronic shortage of all 
kinds of resources, including medicines and medical devices. All in all, it might 
be concluded that the Czech social security system stems from a tradition quite 
similar to western European countries, but has suff ered signifi cantly by changes 
under the Soviet oriented regime. With the Velvet Revolution in 1989, the 
paternalistic Soviet system in Czechoslovakia came to an end, and the 
reconstruction of the welfare state was to begin.
Developing a new social security system: 1989 onwards
From the very beginning, important reform steps were taken by the socio-liberal 
federal government that were widely supported within the political scene as well 
as in society. Th ese steps mainly concerned the elimination of the social 
privileges of the former communist establishment, and the introduction of an 
insurance contribution system to be administrated by an autonomous 
administrative body. In the meantime, the federal government adopted a 
Scenario of Social Reform (1990), which was a long-term reform plan in which 
both social democratic and liberal ideologies were incorporated. Th e plan 
included the creation of compulsory universal health and social insurance, a 
means tested state social support scheme, an active employment policy, and the 
development of a social safety net.5 Th is conceptual document became the 
basis for the Czech social policy reform that turned out to be a slow and lengthy 
political process, mostly because of the weak coalition structure and a series of 
minority cabinets.
Aft er the election of a neoliberal government in 1992 and the following split of 
the Czechoslovakian federation on 1 January 1993, the Czech government 
focused primarily on the division of the federation and on economic reform, 
which placed the social scenario onto the backburner. It is true that some of the 
4 Večerník 2008, pp. 497–499; Cerami 2007, pp. 8–10; Mácha 2002, pp. 75–78.
5 Večerník 2008, p. 500; Potůček 2007B, pp. 26–27.
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intended reform steps were realised, most importantly the creation of the 
compulsory social insurance and the introduction of state social support in 1995, 
but other reform plans were totally abandoned, such as the creation of a pension 
fund that would be separated from the state budget, and the introduction of a 
supplementary occupational pension insurance.6 At the same time, the country 
faced an economic downturn, which infl uenced the elections of 1996. Although 
the neoliberals won the elections, the social democratic party gained political 
power. Th erefore, and because of strong opposition from the trade unions, 
proposals of the government towards a radical pension reform with reference to 
the World Bank, focussing on a compulsory private co-insurance scheme and 
largely abandoning the pay-as-you-go concept, were not accepted. When the 
social democrats were able to form a minority government in 1998, they started 
to re-constitute the initial social reform concept. Th eir fi rst landmark policy was 
the ratifi cation of the European Social Charter, which showed the renewed 
emphasis on social reform and the willingness for social dialogue. In practice, 
however, successive governments were not able to hold a steady course, mainly 
due to budgetary constraints and political deadlock. As a consequence, the Czech 
Republic has been experiencing a continuous and fragmented reform of its social 
security system that still has not been completed.
3.2.2 EXTERNAL INFLUENCES DURING THE REFORM 
PROCESS AFTER 1989
International infl uences verses internal factors
Th e moment Czechoslovakia had recovered from the shock of the revolution and 
prepared for social reforms, global actors from diff erent directions were ready to 
make recommendations on the design of a new social security system. It has 
been argued, however, that internal factors were decisive forces in the Czech 
reform process rather than international interferences.7 Th is was mainly 
because of the fact that the Czech Republic was not aff ected by a deep economical 
crisis as other CEE countries were at that time, and therefore it was not dependent 
on loans from the IMF and the World Bank. Neither was the country in such a 
critical state in terms of social policy that organisations such as the CoE, ILO, 
and EU were given much room to interfere. Nevertheless, it will be shown below 
that these organisations still played a specifi c role in the reform of the social 
security system, both directly and indirectly.
6 Potůček 2007A, p. 141; Mácha 2002, pp. 95–97.
7 Večerník 2008, p. 506; Potůček 2004, p. 259; Mácha 2002, p. 106.
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International Labour Organisation
Under the fi rst federal government, aft er the completion of the initial reform 
plan that included the determination of the diff erent social security benefi ts, a 
delegation of experts went to the ILO Offi  ce in Geneva to discuss the plan and to 
gather information and advice.8 As a matter of fact, there was not much 
concern about the ILO standards as such, since the intended schemes were 
considered rather generous in terms of the level of the benefi ts, as well as their 
personal scope. Consequently, the government was open-minded with regard to 
the ILO and willing to make new commitments in the fi eld of social security, 
which was demonstrated by the ratifi cation in 1990 of Convention 102 on 
Minimum Standards of Social Security, Convention 128 on Invalidity, Old age 
and Survivors’ benefi ts, and Convention 130 on Medical Care.9 Furthermore, 
the idea and implementation of the subsistence minimum as a universal standard 
for the various benefi ts was developed and realised with the technical assistance 
of the ILO.10 A few years later, the new Pension Act (adopted in 1995) was 
discussed with the ILO before it was submitted to Parliament, to be sure that the 
proposed act was in line with the ratifi ed conventions.
In the course of the 1990s, under the successive neoliberal governments, the 
active commitment towards the ILO weakened. Th is was not only caused by the 
neoliberal preferences in politics, but also because the political focus shift ed 
towards the preparations for EU accession. Neither new conventions in the fi eld 
of social security, nor the unratifi ed parts of ILO C102 and C128, have been 
nominated for ratifi cation since, although national legislation was considered in 
line with the requirements of C168 on Unemployment and Part IV of ILO 
C102.11 In 2005, under the Social Democratic government, the fi ndings of an 
expert team on the future of the Czech pension scheme were discussed during a 
conference organised by the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs in cooperation 
with the ILO Offi  ce for Central and Eastern Europe.12 Although this was a clear 
signal that the Czech Republic had dissociated itself from the ideas of the global 
fi nancial institutions on the replacement of public pensions by private schemes, 
the substantive input of the ILO was limited and did not lead to the ratifi cation 
of higher standards. Furthermore, the recent economic recession has hampered 
the political will to take up new international obligations in fi eld of social 
security even more.
8 Information obtained from experts.
9 Concerning Convention 102: Part IV on Unemployment and Part VI on Employment Injury 
were not accepted. Concerning Convention 128: only Part III on Old age was accepted.
10 Orenstein 1995, p. 183.
11 Information obtained from experts.
12 National Tripartite Seminar on Pension Reform in the Czech Republic, 5–6 December 2005, 
Prague.
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Council of Europe
As far as the Council of Europe is concerned, the Czechoslovakian Republic 
became a member in 1993, the date the preparations for EU accession also began. 
At that time, the CoE heavily promoted the Social Charter among the CEE 
countries, stressing its importance in relation to EU accession. In 1999, the Czech 
Republic took the step to ratify this instrument, and included in its ratifi cation 
Article 12 on social security, which requires compliance with the standards of 
ILO Convention 102. In fact, this step did not imply commitment to higher social 
security standards as such, since this Convention had already been ratifi ed and 
legislation had been kept in line through time. Nevertheless, at the invitation of 
the CoE, the social democratic government additionally ratifi ed the European 
Code of Social Security in 2000. Th is time, the ratifi cation did imply commitment 
to higher standards, since it also involved Part IV on Unemployment, one of the 
parts that had been left  aside when Convention 102 was accepted a decade 
earlier.
European Union
Th e infl uence of the EU on the reform process was limited. First of all, 
preparations for accession were mainly focused on economic reform on the basis 
of the Copenhagen criteria of 1993. Social goals in this respect were very limited 
and were at the bottom of the list of priorities. Besides, the neoliberal 
governments from 1992 until 1998 were not so much in favour of joining the EU, 
and therefore not much eff ort was made in general to adapt to European rules 
unless it was strictly necessary.13 And, of course, since the European 
Commission is not competent to develop legislation on social security matters, 
the EU did not impose specifi c standards in the fi eld of social protection. 
Nevertheless, the EU Commission did point out in its reports on progress 
towards accession that the country had not yet ratifi ed the Social Charter, thus 
implicitly emphasising the necessity of ratifi cation.14 Indeed, as has been shown 
above, both the European Social Charter and the Code of Social Security were 
ratifi ed during the accession period. Although these ratifi cations did not directly 
follow from EU obligations, the prospect of accession persuaded the government 
to accept these international standards, thus communicating that from a social 
point of view the Czech Republic was ready for the EU adventure.15
13 Potůček 2004.
14 European Commission 1998.
15 Schoukens 2007, p. 90; information obtained from experts.
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3.2.3 MAIN FEATURES OF THE CURRENT SOCIAL 
SECURITY SYSTEM
Social security as a fundamental right
Social protection for Czech citizens is fi rmly anchored in the Constitution of the 
Czech Republic. As a part of the Constitution, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms16 proclaims the basic rights on, among other things, social 
security: the right to work and to material security for those who are unable to 
do so;17 the right to adequate material security in old age, during periods of 
work incapacity, and in case of loss of the breadwinner;18 the right to free health 
care and medical aids;19 the right to special care of pregnant women and 
children.20 Th ese rights are more specifi cally enacted by individual laws and 
international agreements.
Social insurance
Th e social security system is divided into three strata: social insurance, state 
social support, and social assistance.21 Firstly, the obligatory social insurance 
scheme represents the core of the system, providing protection against the risks 
of loss of income due to old age, sickness, childbirth, invalidity, death of the 
breadwinner, and unemployment. Th e unemployment benefi t is embedded in the 
so-called ‘state employment policy’, developed in the early 1990s with the 
objective to ‘preserve full and eff ective employment and to provide services that 
would facilitate the achievement of the goal through the network of regional 
labour offi  ces.’22 It comprises not only fi nancial compensation in the case of 
temporary loss of employment, but the labour offi  ces also manage an active 
employment policy including retraining programmes, investment incentives for 
the creation of new jobs, and public works programmes.23 Th e labour offi  ces 
operate separately from the social insurance scheme, but fi nancially the 
employment policy is part of the insurance scheme. Th e social insurance scheme 
is funded by employees, employers and the state. Additional voluntary private 
16 Resolution of the Presidium of the Czech National Council of 16 December 1992 on the 
declaration of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, as a part of the constitutional 
order of the Czech Republic. Published on the website of the Constitutional Court of the 
Czech Republic.
17 Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms, Art. 26.
18 Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms, Art. 30.
19 Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms, Art. 31.
20 Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms, Art. 32.
21 Tröster & Vysokajová 2006; Potůček 2004, pp. 258–261; Mácha 2002, pp. 77–78; website of the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs.
22 Potůček & Radičová 1997, p. 9.
23 For more information, see the website of the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs.
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pension insurance is available, but it is rather underdeveloped, mainly due to 
political controversy that brings about half way measures, resulting in 
fragmented state supervision, low security of invested funds, a lack of 
transparency, and high operating costs.24 Th is supplementary pension scheme 
is based on individual pension savings accounts to which employers are not 
required to contribute.
Social support
Th e second tier of social security, the state social support, complements the social 
insurance scheme and is mainly aimed at parents with children. Benefi ts, funded 
directly from the state budget and not related to participation in the labour 
market, include: child allowance, social allowance, housing allowance, parental 
allowance, foster care benefi ts, birth grants, and funeral grants. Initially, all these 
benefi ts were universal, however, in 1995 the fi rst three were transferred into 
means tested benefi ts. Attempts of the government in the period 1998–2006 to 
switch these three benefi ts back to universal allowances were blocked by both 
coalition parties and the opposition.25
Social assistance
Citizens who are not able to work and who do not have (suffi  cient) recourse to 
social insurance and/or social support benefi ts can call upon the third tier: social 
assistance. Th e social assistance benefi t is regarded as a social fl oor, the level of 
which is set as the subsistence minimum, and codifi ed by the Act on Assistance 
in Material Need. Th e defi ned subsistence minimum depends on the structure of 
the household and the age of the benefi ciary. Based on the idea that ‘all persons 
who work must be better off  than those who are out of work or who avoid 
work’,26 social assistance is subject to the principle of subsidiarity, which states 
that the individual is responsible for their own support and the support of their 
family, and only if a person is objectively unable to increase their income, will 
social assistance by the state be provided.27
Health care
Another part of the social security system, that has not been mentioned yet, is 
health care. Separate from the general social insurance scheme in terms of its 
codifi cation, organisation, and fi nancing, health care is covered by a compulsory 
24 Antošík 2003, p. 20; Král 2000, III.7; Mácha 2002, pp. 84–88.
25 Potůček 2007B, p. 31.
26 Website of the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs.
27 Potůček 2004, p. 261.
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public health insurance scheme, providing care to all persons with permanent 
residence in the Czech Republic, and to persons who are employed by an 
employer registered in the Czech Republic. Supplementary forms of voluntary 
contractual insurance are possible for care beyond the reach of the public 
insurance, such as cosmetic operations, acupuncture, or operations not 
considered necessary.
3.2.4 ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCING
Czech Social Security Administration
Th e central player in the fi eld of social security administration is the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Aff airs, as the responsible body for the Czech Social Security 
Administration (CSSA).28 Th is administrative institution, established in 1990, 
is an organisational body of the state, and it reports directly to the Ministry. It is 
currently divided into the Central Administration and about 90 District Social 
Security Administrations, which are linked together by 15 regional offi  ces.29 
Th e main tasks of the CSSA include: collecting premiums for the social insurance 
scheme (comprising the pension schemes and sickness insurance) and the state 
employment policy; calculating and paying benefi ts from these schemes; 
performing doctor appraisal services; keeping record of the individual accounts 
of insured persons; and fulfi lling obligations ensuing from international 
conventions and EC law.30 Th e CSSA does not deal with the ILO conventions or 
the European Code of Social Security; in its annual reports only the EU 
obligations and bilateral agreements are mentioned.31 Yet, the ILO conventions 
and the ECSS are not completely ignored, since the two-yearly Actuarial Reports 
on Social Insurance contain a brief section on the obligation of ILO Conventions 
102 and 128, in which the ECSS is also mentioned. However, these reports are 
drawn up by the Ministry, not by the CSSA itself.
Financing
Th e fi nancing of the social insurance system is based on the pay-as-you-go 
system, which means that the benefi ts provided in a certain period are paid 
for from the contributions collected in that same period. Payment of the 
benefi ts is guaranteed by the state, in the case of pensions, this is at least the 
basic part. Th e contributions for the pension scheme, medical care, sickness 
28 Ripla & Mareš 2009; Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs (Cz) 2006, pp. 17–18; Tröster & 
Vysokajová 2006, points 73–82.
29 Website of the Czech Social Security Administration.
30 Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs (Cz) 2006, p. 19; Mácha 2001, pp. 78–80.
31 See, for example, Czech Social Security Administration 2007, pp. 44–46.
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benefi ts, and employment policy, amount to 45 percent of gross salary, of 
which 11 percent is paid by the employee and 34 percent by the employer.32 
Th e premiums for the public health insurance are allocated to the health 
insurance companies, the employment policy premiums are paid into the state 
budget, and the contributions to the pension scheme are deposited into a 
separate account for pension insurance that was created in 1996 as a part of 
the state budget. Th e funds in this account may only be used for the payment 
of pension insurance benefi ts and for making up any defi cit between revenues 
and expenditures.
3.2.5 JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SOCIAL SECURITY MATTERS
Re-establishment of the Supreme Administrative Court
Th e Czech system of administrative justice was, aft er its suppression by the 
communist regime, re-established in 1991 with the adoption of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. A new administrative justice procedure was 
hastily adopted in 1992, but proved to be inadequate from the very beginning. To 
remedy the defi ciencies, during the 1990s several attempts were made to improve 
the legislative framework, but without success. Eventually, it was the 
Constitutional Court that paved the way for new legislation by annulling a 
considerable part of the Code of Civil Procedure, namely, the part concerning 
administrative procedures.33 It was found that judicial review in administrative 
justice was inconsistent with international obligations, specifi cally with the 
Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, because the 
law did not cover protection against the inaction of an administrative body or 
unlawful interference that did not result in an administrative decision.34 In 
2003 the new Code of Administrative Justice came into force and the Supreme 
Administrative Court was re-established, fi ft y years aft er its abolition.
Administrative procedure
Under the current legislation, citizens have the right to stand up against the 
decision of an administrative body concerning a social insurance benefi t. Within 
two months of the notifi cation of the fi nal decision, an action can be brought 
before the administrative chamber of the competent regional court. Th is can be 
an action for judicial review of unlawful acts, an action for the failure to act, as 
well as an action against unlawful interference that is not a decision. Th e 
32 MISSOC (Cz), 2009.
33 Constitutional Court, judgment No. Pl. ÚS 16/99, 27 June 2001.
34 Wagnerova 2005, p. 7.
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petitioner does not need to be legally represented before these regional courts, 
which act as courts of fi rst and last instance. Additionally, a cassation complaint 
against the fi nal decision of a regional court, by invoking one of the grounds of 
cassation, can be fi led before the Supreme Administrative Court within two 
weeks of the regional court’s decision becoming fi nal. In this case, the 
complainant must be represented by an attorney.35 It must be noted, however, 
that Czech citizens do not go to court easily. By and large, there is a lack of 
confi dence in judiciary, partly stemming from its poor performance in the past, 
partly because of the continuous occurrence of problems such as a lack of 
uniformity of decisions, extreme formalism resulting in unjustifi able outcomes, 
and delays in proceedings.36
3.3 THE ROLE OF THE SOCIAL PARTNERS
3.3.1 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CZECH SOCIAL DIALOGUE
Transition from state unions to trade unions
Obviously, during the communist regime there was no such thing as tripartite 
social dialogue, since the state was the only employer and trade unions were 
rather state unions. Trade unions were not seen as independent associations to 
protect workers’ interests, but used as transmission belts between the communist 
party and the employees, with administrative and control functions over the 
working class.37 Th eir activities were restricted to formal collective bargaining 
and open support for state policy. Organising strikes for more favourable 
working conditions did not belong to their range of duties. Not surprisingly, the 
trade unions distanced themselves from the massive demonstrations and strikes 
that took place during the last months of 1989, and which resulted in the 
overthrow of the communist rule. As a matter of fact, they remained faithful to 
the communist party until the very last moment. It goes without saying that the 
collapse of communism and the emergence of democracy turned the 
fundamental basis of trade unions upside-down, left  behind as they were, empty-
handed without the back-up of the regime. Th e new trade union movement 
originates from the November strikes, when the then established strike 
committees took over the old trade unions and started sweeping reforms from 
the inside out.
35 Website of the Supreme Administrative Court; Bobek 2006, point 2.4.2; Tröster & Vysokajová 
2006, points 559–568.
36 Balik 2004, p. 5; Kühn 2004.
37 Svoreňová 2000, pp. 131–132.
Part II. Analysis and Comparison
120 Intersentia
Th e ups and downs of social dialogue
Under Vaclav Havel’s presidency, the fi rst federal government acknowledged the 
need for a political and institutional basis to prevent, or at least minimise, social 
confl icts.38 Indeed, it was decided to establish institutions to represent diff erent 
interests and provide feedback. In co-operation with the trade unions and the 
emerging associations of businesses and employers, the government created the 
tripartite Council for Economic and Social Agreement, with the intention of 
starting serious and systematic social dialogue in society to maintain social 
peace.39 Th is institution still exists and aims at making voluntary agreements 
between the three parties involved. Th e rules for its activities are formulated in a 
statute and are based on the principle of consensus.40 It should be noted that the 
existence of neither the Council, nor its relationship to Parliament, was (and still 
is) set down in legal regulations. Th erefore the existence, tasks and competences 
of the Council have been constantly under discussion. Under the neoliberal 
government aft er the elections of 1992, the Council’s functions were gradually 
curtailed from bringing about agreements, to providing information on a 
narrowed range of topics, resulting in a new statute in 1995 and a new name: 
Council for the Dialogue of the Social Partners.41 Th is strategy gave away the 
government’s hidden agenda of getting rid of a tripartite bond as an intervening 
body and boosting Parliament as the main place where interests should be 
defended.42 It also refl ected the view of Vaclav Klaus, Prime Minister at the 
time, on the concept of ‘civil society’ that should include ‘a standard system of 
political parties without national fronts and civic movements.’43
Aft er the elections of 1996, a minority coalition government was formed of the 
same parties as the previous coalition, however this government was dependent 
on the support of the social democratic party, which had signifi cantly gained 
strength. Th is shift  of power, together with the worsening of the economic 
situation and growing social tension, gave cause for a greater willingness on the 
part of the government to negotiate with the social partners to seek support for 
intended reform steps. In 1997, the tripartite Council was reconstituted in its 
previous form and with its previous name, and started to recover its former 
signifi cance.44 From then on, the infl uence of the trade unions increased hand 
38 Hála & Kroupa 2005; Kroupa & Mácha 1999, pp. 103–108.
39 Initially, the body was called the Council for Social Agreement, but shortly aft erwards 
changed in order to refl ect the functions of the Council more precisely.
40 Eurofound 2006, p. 5.
41 Cox & Mason 2000, p. 339; Myant, Slocock, Smith 2000, p. 731; Kroupa & Mácha 1999, p. 104.
42 Kroupa & Mácha 1999, p. 105.
43 Myant, Slocock, Smith 2000, pp. 730–731; Potůček 1999, p. 165.
44 Th e body currently consists of eight representatives of the government, and seven 
representatives of both the trade unions and the employers.
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over fi st. Th e successive social democratic governments thus far have attached 
considerable importance to social dialogue, engaging the social partners in 
preparation of policies aff ecting, among other things, social security.45 
Additionally, the access to the EU has defi nitely stimulated social dialogue, as 
the EU encouraged active engagement of the social partners during the accession 
process. Consequently, these days, the trade unions are considered veto fi gures 
opposing radical reform, such as the introduction of a mandatory savings system 
for old-age pension.46 Nevertheless, the growth to maturity of the trade unions 
is not mirrored in the scale of membership; there has been a steady decrease in 
membership from 84 percent of all employees in 1990, to 22 percent in 2004 and 
20 percent in 2009.47 It should be born in mind, of course, that the high fi gure 
of 1990 stems from the socialist period, when membership was required to 
obtain or keep a job. Th e public’s confi dence in the trade unions, on the other 
hand, has slightly increased over the years,48 and the level of unionisation is not 
that far below the EU average of 23 percent (2009).49
As far as the employers’ side is concerned, with the transition to a market 
economy, accompanied by a major withdrawal of the state, a large number of 
employers’ organisations began to emerge. Because of the initial lack of strong 
and demanding trade unions as their counterparts, they were formed as interest 
or lobbying groups, and were not focused so much on social dialogue.50 In 
terms of political power and the rate of organisational articulation, the employer 
organisations were initially weak, not in the least part because they were 
extremely fragmented. It was by intervention of the government, which required 
employer representation within the Council for Economic and Social 
Agreement, that they became organised into a more coherent structure.51 
Nevertheless, the employers’ organisations have never strongly infl uenced the 
social debate. On specifi c issues on which employers and employees have 
opposite views, such as collective bargaining or legal regulation of strikes, they 
form a bond with the government against the unions, but on most issues they 
have no specifi c opinion.52 Accordingly, their infl uence and impact have 
remained limited.
45 Mácha 2002, pp. 105–106; Myant, Slocock, Smith 2010, p. 53.
46 Mácha 2002, p. 104.
47 Kroupa & Hála 2006; OECD StatExtracts, Trade Union Density.
48 Kroupa 2004, p. 3.
49 Website of the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI).
50 Kauppinen 2004, p. 38.
51 Cox & Mason 2000, p. 339.
52 Mácha 2002, p. 104; Myant, Slocock, Smith 2000, p. 73.
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3.3.2 PARTICIPATION RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL 
LEGISLATION
When it comes to the matter of international instruments on social security, the 
role of the social partners is twofold. In the fi rst place, within the Council of 
Economic and Social Agreement a working group has been set up especially for 
ILO matters, with three representatives of the government, trade unions and 
employers’ organisations. In this expert group, the social partners can express 
their views on specifi c issues relating to ILO conventions and the annual ILO 
conferences. Although the line of approach in the working groups is to achieve a 
certain level of consensus on important issues, it also happens that the respective 
viewpoints cannot be brought together. One case in point is the non-cooperation 
of the employers at the signing of the ILO Employment Relationship 
Recommendation in 2006.53
Th e second way of co-operation follows from the ILO regulations. According to 
the ILO Constitution, the government is obliged to distribute to the social 
partners copies of information and reports on the application of the ratifi ed 
conventions.54 Th e same goes regarding the reports on the ECSS. Th rough this 
requirement, the social partners are able to provide additional information or 
express their opinions on specifi c matters. Another way participation is achieved 
in this respect is that the social partners are consulted prior to the submission of 
newly adopted conventions and recommendations to Parliament. Th e Ministry 
of Labour and Social Aff airs prepares the documents, on the basis of which 
Parliament has to decide whether or not to ratify the convention in question, or 
to adapt national regulations to meet objectives of the specifi c recommendation. 
For this purpose, the international instrument is translated and compared with 
national legislation. Th e prepared documents are sent to prescribed bodies and 
organisations for comment, among which are the social partners, aft er which 
they are forwarded to the Cabinet. In practice, substantive discussions on social 
security treaties take place exclusively within the Working Group ILO. In 
general, it has been found by the trade unions that there is no real dialogue and 
that only minor comments from their hands concerning less important issues 
are taken into account. Furthermore, the procedure seems rather formal, since 
politicians in charge of the ratifi cation of international (social security) 
instruments have taken their position beforehand, on the basis of party strategy, 
and no annexed comment of a social partner will change their points of view on 
a specifi c matter. An example of this is the request in 2006 of the tripartite 
working group to the Cabinet to ratify ILO Conventions 151 on Labour Relations 
and 154 on Collective Bargaining, as it was found that the Czech legislation met 
53 Information obtained from experts.
54 ILO Constitution Art. 23 section b.
Chapter 3. Th e Czech Republic
Intersentia 123
the required conditions. Although there was consensus on this issue within the 
working group, the request did not result in political action. As mentioned above, 
the employers are not very interested in these matters and, consequently, they 
are hardly involved in these procedures.
3.4 THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY 
STANDARDS WITHIN THE CZECH LEGAL 
SYSTEM
3.4.1 RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
In total, the Czech Republic has ratifi ed 62 ILO conventions (both labour and 
social security conventions),55 which is just about average within the EU. On the 
website of the ILO it is not traceable when most conventions were ratifi ed, 
because the ILO uses in its databases the year of origin of the current Czech 
Republic, namely 1993, when Czechoslovakia split up. Aft er the separation, both 
countries took over, as legal successors, the existing obligations towards the ILO. 
In spite of a request of the government to use the real ratifi cation dates in order 
to provide a historically correct overview, the statistics give 1993 as the 
ratifi cation year of all conventions ratifi ed before the separation from Slovakia. 
Th ey do, however, show that since 1993 twelve conventions have been ratifi ed in 
mainly two rounds: four in 1996 and six in 2000/2001. Aft er that, only two 
conventions have been ratifi ed, one in 2007 and one in 2008. None of these 
conventions dealt with social security. It must be recalled at this point that 
several conventions – both social security and labour conventions – could have 
been nominated for ratifi cation, since national legislation had already been 
considered in line with the requirements for several years. Cases in point are 
Convention 168 on Unemployment, Convention 102 Part IV on Unemployment, 
and also the above-mentioned Conventions 151 and 154. Th is seems to indicate 
that the government’s commitment to the ILO is waning, and that currently 
there is no political will to accept international obligations in the social sphere.
In total, ten social security conventions have been ratifi ed by the Czech Republic, 
of which only three are considered up-to-date, namely, Conventions 102, 128 and 
55 Situation of 1 January 2011. Of all ratifi ed conventions, 25 are considered outdated, generally 
because the standards are not relevant anymore or because the specifi c subjects have been 
dealt with in newer conventions. Th erefore, most of these outdated conventions have been 
shelved (not open for new ratifi cations), and in some cases, the reporting obligations have 
been lift ed in order to limit the administrative burden for the Member States. For the Czech 
Republic, there are another 39 up-to-date conventions open for ratifi cation. See ILO website, 
ILOLEX or APPLIS database.
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130. Of Convention 102, all parts have been ratifi ed, except Part IV on 
unemployment and Part VI on employment injury. Ratifi cation of Convention 
128 only covers old age; the parts on invalidity and death of the breadwinner are 
not included. Next to these ILO conventions, the Czech Republic has also ratifi ed 
the European Code of Social Security, with the exception of Part VI on 
employment injury. Th e additional Protocol of the Code has not been ratifi ed. 
Th e European Social Charter has also been ratifi ed, with the inclusion of Article 
12 on social security, requiring acceptance of the standards of Convention 102. 
Conclusively, in respect of the nine social risks, the government is bound by the 
standards shown in Table I. To be complete, in this table the ILO standards that 
are outdated but towards which the obligation to submit regular reports has not 
been lift ed, are included.
Table I. Social security standards ratifi ed by the Czech Republic
Medical care C102, Part II; ECSS, Part II; C130
Sickness benefi t ECSS, Part III; C130*
Unemployment benefi t ECSS, Part IV
Old-age benefi t ECSS, Part V; C128, Part III*
Employment injury benefi t C12; C17; C42
Family benefi t C102, Part VII; ECSS, Part VII
Maternity benefi t C102, Part VIII; ECSS, Part VIII
Invalidity benefi t C102, Part IX; ECSS, Part IX
Survivorś  benefi t C102, Part X; ECSS, Part X
* Ratifi cation of Convention 130 automatically replaced Part III of Convention 102 
(Convention130, Article 36 sub 1) and Convention 128 replaced Part V of Convention 102 
(Convention128, Article 45 sub 1 b).
3.4.2 FULFILMENT OF THE OBLIGATION TO REPORT ON 
THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS
Aft er ratifi cation, the government is required to submit regular reports to the 
ILO on the application of conventions.56 Between 1993 and 2008 the Czech 
government received 134 direct requests from the CEACR in reply to its regular 
reports concerning the 62 ratifi ed conventions. Th ese direct requests deal with 
possible confl icts with conventions concerned, or simply require more detailed 
56 For the reporting procedure, see section 2.8.1.
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information on specifi c issues.57 Th e number of direct requests may say 
something about the quality of the reports, or the complexity of the national 
legislation, or the number of cases of non-conformity with the conventions; in 
any case it indicates that the country submits its reports. Th ree times in the given 
period the government failed to send in its reports, and, additionally, from 1996 
until 1999, the CEACR observed that the government had failed to submit newly 
adopted conventions to Parliament. It should be noted, though, that in 2009 and 
2010 the Czech Republic failed to submit any reports on the application of 
ratifi ed conventions, while 22 reports were due. Specifi c issues in connection 
with social security conventions that the Committee addressed in its requests 
concerned Conventions 102, 128 and 130, and Conventions 17 and 42 on 
Workmen’s Compensation (accidents and occupational diseases).58 Th ese issues 
will be examined in the relevant sections of this chapter.
All reports on ILO conventions and the ECSS are prepared by the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Aff airs.59 However, in practice, necessary information 
concerning Convention 130 on Medical Care and Sickness, Part II of Convention 
102, and Part II of the ECSS, is requested from the Ministry of Health. It is to be 
expected that the former ministry has a more structural and systematic approach 
regarding the reporting obligations of the great number of conventions than the 
Ministry of Health, where the ILO conventions are not well-known. Th is perhaps 
explains the continuous requests for information about national legislation in 
connection with Convention 130 as of 1992 until the date of writing, as well as 
the repeated requests made concerning other conventions. An obstacle for 
preparing effi  cient reports seems to be the fact that intended changes of 
legislation, especially in the fi eld of medical care and employment injury, have 
been obstructed for years. For example, aft er years of tussling, a new Act on 
Occupational Accident Insurance was adopted and published in 2006, to come 
into eff ect on 1 January 2007. Th is was put in the report of 2006 on Convention 
42, as this Act was supposed to solve one of the issues the CEACR had raised 
several times.60 However, it happens frequently in the Czech Republic that 
before an act becomes eff ective, Parliament adopts a bill that postpones the date 
the act concerned will come into force, especially aft er there has been a shift  in 
political power. In the case of the Act on Occupational Accident Insurance, 
57 For comparison: Hungary has ratifi ed 58 conventions and received 143 direct requests in the 
same period; Greece 63 conventions, 108 direct requests; Estonia 32 conventions, 80 direct 
requests; Sweden 76 conventions, 137 direct requests; Germany 72 conventions, 108 direct 
requests. See ILO website, ILOLEX database, universal query form.
58 Conventions 17 and 42 are replaced by Convention 121. However, since the Czech Republic 
has not ratifi ed this Convention, it is still bound by these pre-war standards.
59 Th e annual reports on the ECSS are published on the website of the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Aff airs; the reports on the ILO conventions are not published.
60 CEACR: Individual Direct Request concerning C042 (Czech Republic) 2007.
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shortly before it was to come into force, the date was postponed on the initiative 
of the newly elected government until 2010, and in 2009 it was postponed again 
until 2013. In view of the fact that the government at that time did not agree with 
this act, it was then expected that the Act would never come into eff ect, despite 
the fact that it had already been adopted by Parliament. Instead, it will probably 
be superseded by its forthcoming successor. In this situation it is, indeed, not 
easy to report in a consistent way.
3.4.3 LEGAL STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Th e Constitution of the Czech Republic (CCR) prescribes that international 
agreements approved by Parliament are part of the legal order and take 
precedence over national law:61
Article 10
Promulgated treaties, to the ratifi cation of which Parliament has given its consent 
and by which the Czech Republic is bound, form a part of the legal order; if a treaty 
provides something other than that which a statute provides, the treaty shall apply.
Judges are competent to decide on alleged inconsistencies of lower regulations 
with legislative acts and treaties that are part of the legal order. A confl ict 
between a legislative act and the constitutional order is exclusively within the 
competence of the Constitutional Court:62
Article 95
(1) In making their decisions, judges are bound by statutes and treaties which form a 
part of the legal order; they are authorised to judge whether enactments other 
than statutes are in conformity with statutes or with such treaties.
(2) Should a court come to the conclusion that a statute which should be applied in 
the resolution of a matter is in confl ict with the constitutional order, it shall 
submit the matter to the Constitutional Court.
Th e Constitutional Court has exclusive competence to annul statutes or other 
legal enactments if they are in confl ict with the constitutional order.63 
Constitutional laws, altogether forming the constitutional order, are legislative 
acts of the highest level and are passed by a special majority in both chambers of 
Parliament.64 An important question for the application of the international 
61 Constitution of the Czech Republic of 16 December 1992, Art. 10 (as last amended in 2002 – 
the so-called ‘Euro Amendment’ – in view of EU accession). Published on the website of the 
Constitutional Court.
62 Constitution of the Czech Republic of 16 December 1992 (as amended in 2002), Art. 95.
63 Constitution of the Czech Republic of 16 December 1992 (as amended in 2002), Art. 87 par 1.
64 Constitution of the Czech Republic of 16 December 1992 (as amended in 2002), Art. 39 par 4; 
Bobek 2006, point 3.2.1.
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social security standards is whether they are part of the constitutional order. 
Aft er all, only then can a case be submitted to the Constitutional Court, which 
can annul confl icting provisions and provide case law relating to these standards. 
Article 112 CCR exhaustively defi nes the content of the constitutional order and 
this defi nition does not contain international agreements.65 Nevertheless, it is 
not as clear as it seems.
A particular reason for confusion about the status of treaties stems from the 
period prior to an amendment of the Constitution in 2002 (in view of EU 
accession) that changed, among other things, Article 10. As a matter of fact, 
before this amendment, the text of Article 10 dealt with human rights treaties 
only:66
Article 10 [Human Rights Treaties]
Ratifi ed and promulgated international accords on human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, to which the Czech Republic has committed itself, are immediately binding 
and are superior to law.
Th ese human rights treaties took precedence over national acts and were part of 
the constitutional order. As to the position of ordinary treaties, no reference was 
made. An international agreement qualifi ed as a human rights treaty if the 
prescribed procedure for the approval of constitutional acts and Article 10 
treaties was followed.67 Most remarkable in this respect is a decision of the 
Constitutional Court in 2000 concerning Article 16 of the European Social 
Charter.68 In this decision, the Court treated the Charter as a human rights 
treaty, in spite of the fact that just one year before, Parliament had refused to 
qualify it as a human rights instrument under Article 10 of the (as yet 
unamended) Constitution, approving it only as an ordinary international 
agreement.69 Th e status of a treaty ratifi ed before 1992, such as the ILO social 
security conventions, was not clear, but was hardly discussed. In fact, this would 
depend on the vision of the Constitutional Court.
With the above-mentioned amendment of the Constitution in 2002, all treaties 
ratifi ed with the approval of Parliament were part of the legal order and took 
precedence over national legislation. Th is included the ILO social security 
conventions and the European Code. Since the amended provision explicitly 
classifi ed treaties as part of the legal order and not of the constitutional order, 
65 In respect of EU treaties, specifi c provisions are included in the Constitution; they are not 
taken into account.
66 Constitution of the Czech Republic of 16 December 1992, Art. 10.
67 Constitution of the Czech Republic of 16 December 1992, Art. 39 (4).
68 Pl. Ús 3/00.
69 Wagnerova 2005, footnote xvii.
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human rights treaties ceased to qualify as constitutional law. Th e Constitutional 
Court, however, decided diff erently. Th e Court ruled that:70
Th erefore, the scope of the concept of constitutional order cannot be interpreted only 
with regard to §112 para.1 of the Constitution, but also in view of Art. 1 para. 2 of the 
Constitution, and ratifi ed and promulgated international agreements on human 
rights and fundamental freedoms must be included within it.
Article 1 paragraph 2 says that ‘[t]he Czech Republic shall observe its obligations 
resulting from international law.’ In its reasoning, the Court also referred to the 
fact that ‘changes in the essential requirements for a democratic state governed 
by the rule of law are impermissible.’71 In this context, the Court further argued 
that ‘no amendment to the Constitution can be interpreted in such a way that it 
would result in limiting an already achieved procedural level of protection for 
fundamental rights and freedoms.’72
Consequently, diff erentiation of legal status among treaties has been 
re-established, which again means that it is not clear to what category a specifi c 
international agreement belongs until the Constitutional Court has decided to 
use it as a referential norm in a proceeding. Furthermore, the eff ectiveness of the 
preference of ‘ordinary’ treaties over national acts is dubious. Indeed, in the same 
judgment, the Court pointed out that in the case of a confl ict between a statute 
and an international agreement, a general court judge is, under Article 10 of the 
Constitution, obliged to proceed according to the international agreement. 
However, the Court argued that íf such a decision were taken, it could never have 
de facto derogative consequences, since judicial precedent does not constitute the 
binding nature of a source of law.73 Th e Court continued to point out that general 
courts are obliged to interrupt proceedings and submit the matter for evaluation 
to the Constitutional Court. In the view of the Court it was, therefore, necessary 
to include (only!) the human rights treaties in the constitutional order, to the 
eff ect that a general court is required to submit the matter to the Constitutional 
Court for evaluation. Th e reasoning of the Court does not explain why this 
dichotomy between human rights treaties and other treaties has been created, or 
when a treaty is considered a human rights treaty. It only makes clear that, 
apparently, the Court does not want to take all international agreements 
automatically as referential norms, but it wants to be able to decide in every 
individual case whether it will base its judgment on a relevant treaty or not. Th e 
ambiguous and inconsistent (constitutional) legislation at this point gives room 
for the Court to make its own rules. Th us, whether confl icts between national 
70 Pl. Ús 36/01 (25 June 2002), point VII; an English translation of this judgment is published on 
the website of the Constitutional Court.
71 Art. 9 (2) CCS.
72 Pl. Ús 36/01 (25 June 2002), point VII.
73 Pl. Ús 36/01 (25 June 2002), point VII, 4th indentation.
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law and international social security standards can be brought before the 
Constitutional Court depends on whether they are recognised by the Court as 
human rights treaties, which will not become clear until an actual procedure is 
initiated.
3.4.4 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND LEGISLATIVE 
PRACTICE
In order to fulfi l the obligations stemming from the international social security 
instruments, it is regulated that any bill must contain information on compliance 
with, among others, international treaties. Accordingly, it is general practice to 
compare draft  bills with the international standards before they are presented to 
Parliament. Th e bill concerned is sent to the relevant ministries and, since it 
concerns social matters, also to the social partners. Each party has the 
opportunity to examine the proposal in connection with the relevant 
convention(s). Although the policy is aimed at monitoring all bills in this respect, 
in the heat of a political debate this can be easily overlooked. In practice, it does 
happen that the check on international legislation has not been carried out, due 
to the fact that the Cabinet has taken its position no matter what. Other reasons 
for this are lack of knowledge or lack of personal capacity at the ministry to keep 
an eye on all proposals and amendments, a tight time schedule for a proper 
research, or fear of a politically inconvenient outcome. Correction from the side 
of the social partners on such an omission is not likely, as they are either 
uninterested in the international standards in general (employers), or they are 
not familiar with the international standards in the fi eld of social security 
(employees).
Nevertheless, the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs seems to put a high value 
on the existing international obligations. In case a discrepancy is noticed between 
national and international legislation, a solution is searched for within the 
national framework. A good example of a change of national legislation with the 
intention of solving an emerging inconsistency with international requirements 
is the following: In 2004, the level of the old-age pension fell below the norm of 
C128, which stipulates that a pension, aft er 30 years of insurance, must amount 
to at least 45 percent of the average wage of a skilled worker. Th is occurred 
because the annual adjustment of the pensions did not keep up with the growth 
of wages. In view of the international requirements, the government increased 
the fi rst reduction limit with regard to the pension’s calculation base in 2005, a 
measure that brought the pensions in line again with Convention 128.74
74 Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs (Cz) 2006, p. 73 and 2004, p. 71. For more details, see 
section 3.8.
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Another example, also relating to old-age benefi t, concerns an amendment of the 
Pension Act that became eff ective in 2010. Apart from a further increase of the 
pensionable age, this amendment involved an increase of the qualifying period. 
It was the political wish to raise the required insurance period from 25 years to 
35 years. However, because this measure would cause a confl ict with ILO 
Convention 128, that allows an insurance period of 30 years maximum, it was 
decided to set the qualifying period at 30 years of insurance or 35 years if non-
contributory periods are included.75
Th e Ministry gives account of the fulfi lment of international obligations in its 
biennial Actuarial Reports on Social Insurance, which are published on its 
website. With the production of these reports as of 2002, the Czech Republic 
fulfi ls its obligation ensuing from ILO Convention 102 that ‘the necessary 
actuarial studies and calculations concerning fi nancial equilibrium are made 
periodically.’76 However, no reference is made to medical care in relation to 
international obligations; the existence of international standards on medical 
care seems to escape any notice.
3.4.5 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND JUDICIAL 
PRACTICE
In principle, since the social security conventions are part of the Czech legal 
order and take precedence over national law, they can be invoked by citizens 
before court and can also have direct eff ect. Th e Constitutional Court has 
stressed that ‘not all provisions of international conventions under Article 10 of 
the Constitution are also “directly eff ective”, rather only those which are 
appropriate and capable of being directly eff ective.’77 Provisions that are 
addressed to the state’s parties and do not guarantee a specifi c right in a single, 
absolute and immutable form, are not considered directly eff ective.78 Whether 
or not a specifi c provision of an ILO social security convention or the ECSS 
would be directly eff ective, has not been subject to a judgement yet. Th eoretically 
it should be possible, providing that the provision guarantees a right in a clear 
and unambiguous way.
Although the ordinary courts are obliged to apply international agreements in 
preference to national acts and regulations, they only play a role in court 
75 Information obtained from experts. See section 3.8.5.
76 ILO Convention 102, Art. 71 (3).
77 PI. ÚS 304/98.
78 For example, the Constitutional Court did not ascribe direct eff ect to Art. 6 (1) ICESCR, ‘the 
right to work’.
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proceedings in exceptional circumstances.79 Th is might contribute to the fact 
that the issue of the legal status of treaties is not subject to political debate or 
academic discourse, and therefore the urgency for creating clarity is lacking. 
Conversely, it might also be that the obscure position of conventions such as the 
ILO social security conventions and the ECSS within the legal order discourages 
lawyers and judges from using them.
Another important reason that judges do not refer to these instruments is the 
emphasis on textual positivism in the Czech judiciary. Th is typical feature of the 
judiciary in post-communist countries is rooted in the socialist legal theory that 
a judge should take nothing into account but the text of law.80 In this theory, 
law is considered to be domestic law as set down in statutes. Legal principles, for 
example, are only part of the law if they are included in the text of a statute, and 
even so, they only play an indecisive role. While aft er World War II precedents 
became an important source of law in Western Europe, the socialist legal science 
continued to deny a role for case law. Legitimisation of precedents as a source of 
law would confl ict with the principle of centralised law making,81 which was 
fully controlled by the Communist Party, and would be harmful to socialist 
legality. Interpretation of a law was seen as an easy cognitive operation of logical 
deduction of a written rule, without taking into consideration principles as unity 
of law, legal certainty, or the purpose of a law. Th is methodology, however, fi ts 
only easy cases, and is not appropriate for complex issues of, for instance, 
international legislation. Kuhn shows that aft er the ‘big bang’ of 1989, judges 
continued to adhere to textual positivism and formalism, with the exception of 
the Constitutional Court.82 As a consequence, precedents, soft  law, legal 
literature, and teleological arguments are still considered beyond the limits of 
the law. Th is doctrine also has consequences for the application of international 
conventions, which Kühn clearly points out:83
Most Central European judges are without any experience in the application of 
international law, although almost all post-communist legal systems are now based 
on monist models. Monism stands, however, only on paper. In the general legal 
community, including the ordinary judiciary, international treaties are not viewed as 
a common source of law and common legal arguments. With the exception of the 
Polish high courts, international law is rarely applied. In fact, the ordinary courts 
rarely consider even the European Convention on Human Rights, perhaps relying 
upon the implicit formalistic notion that it is not for them to use anything which is 
not the domestic law.
79 Wagnerova 2005, p. 7.
80 Kühn 2004, pp. 540–545.
81 Hondius 2007, p. 11.
82 Kühn 2004, pp. 549–567.
83 Kühn 2004, p. 562.
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A judge of the Constitutional Court illustrated during an international seminar 
the reality of the disregarding of international law in the Czech general courts by 
the following anecdote:84
In 1994, at a Prague appeals court, as a legal counsel I quoted a passage from the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, whose 
Czech text had already been known for two years, as it was contained in the Czech 
Collection of Laws. Th e chairing judge interrupted me and instructed me that ‘this 
court decides according to Czech law…’
And on top of this, íf a judge were to apply, for instance, an ILO convention, it 
would have very little impact because of the negligence of precedents, even if it 
concerned a judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court.85 It should also 
be noted in this respect, that only the case law of the Constitutional Court and 
the Supreme Administrative Court is published and available online; decisions 
of the two High Courts and the lower courts are not publically accessible, apart 
from incidental case notes in legal periodicals.86 It goes without saying that this 
attitude towards precedents does not contribute to a uniform interpretation of 
the law, including international treaties, but instead leads towards a casuistic and 
unpredictable case law.
3.4.6 APPRECIATION OF INTERNATIONAL ‘CASE LAW’
In view of this attitude towards precedents, even when it concerns case law of the 
highest courts, it is not surprising that international case law is on the sidelines 
of judicial practice. In fact, the Constitutional Court is the only court that takes 
decisions of international courts into account, in particular, the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).87 It is also true, however, that these 
anti-formalist judgements of the Constitutional Court are oft en criticised by the 
legal academia and the ordinary judiciary.88 Th e Court’s battle against textual 
positivism, as yet, has not yielded results. Moreover, its decisions are not binding 
on other public authorities or natural persons, which hampers, of course, its 
practical infl uence. It does happen, for example, that the government adopts 
measures that fl agrantly confl ict with a recent ruling of the Court.89 As regards 
the opinions of the supervising bodies of the ILO, the Constitutional Court 
seems to take a more reluctant position than it does in relation with the ECHR, 
84 Balik 2004, p. 3.
85 See also: Emmert 2003, p. 295.
86 Bobek 2006, point 2.4.1.
87 Balik 2004, p. 5.
88 Kühn 2004, p. 564.
89 Balik 2004, p. 4.
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as illustrated by the fact that only in a few cases reference has been made to the 
opinions of these bodies. One of these rare cases dealt with a complaint, 
concerning the right to strike, that was partially based on ILO Conventions 87 
and 98 and on decisions of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association 
concerning these conventions. Th e Court responded:90
[T]hat this international organisation is not an international court and its acts or 
positions of its bodies are not the source of the constitutional nor of any other law in 
the Czech Republic, and they are not part of its constitutional order nor its legal 
order. Such positions are addressed to Governments of Members States of the 
International Labour Organisation, or parties of its Conventions respectively, and 
have character of a recommendation not binding under the International Law 
(so-called “soft  law”). Such positions can in no way be a referential norm for the 
Constitutional Court in proceedings dealing with control of constitutional 
compliance of an Act, and they will not become such even in cases when the wealth 
of thought contained therein is used by the Constitutional Court as an inspiration or 
as a basis for comparative argumentation in the course of interpretation of norms of 
Czech constitutional law.
To put it into other words, the Court is willing to take the Committee’s opinion 
into consideration, but feels free whether or not to follow its decisions – which it 
did not in this particular case. Th e argument seems to touch the bounds of the 
anti-formalist attitude of the Constitutional Court. Of course, it is true that the 
decisions of the Committee on Freedom of Association and the CEACR are not 
legally binding. On the other hand, these opinions are important for a proper 
understanding and uniform interpretation of the conventions, as much as 
opinions of the ECHR. Nevertheless, at least up to 2008, recognition of the 
opinions of the CEACR as guiding principles seemed to be beyond the 




In the past twenty years, the Czech health care system has undergone major 
changes. Before the collapse of the communist regime, the system was planned 
and managed by the central government and fi nanced directly from the state 
budget. Th e health care reforms aft er 1989 were mainly aimed at solidarity, 
decentralisation, and privatisation, to be realised fi rstly by the creation of a 
90 Pl. Ús 61/04 (5 October 2006), point 39.
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national health insurance fund, secondly, by the transfer of hospitals to 
decentralised private control and of state-employed health care workers to 
private practices, and thirdly, by the creation of competition in the fi eld of health 
insurance and health care providers.91
Although the health care reform is not complete yet (more steps are to be taken 
in the fi eld of eff ectiveness and transparency in particular), the main goals have 
been achieved. Th e system is based on compulsory health insurance funded by 
employees, employers and the state. Nine health insurance companies are 
currently in operation, the biggest of which is the general Health Insurance 
Company, covering approximately 66 percent of the whole population. Health 
care is off ered by diff erent types of providers that belong either to the state, to 
municipalities, or to private owners. Most hospitals are still state-owned, while 
most of the outpatient facilities are in private hands. Patients are free to choose 
among the health insurance companies and among the health care providers that 
have a contract with the chosen insurance company. However, current legislation 
does not permit individual insurance companies to fi x their own fees or service 
package, which limits competition within the health insurance sector.92
With regard to medical care that is in general not covered by public health 
insurance, such as cosmetic surgery and acupuncture, citizens can make use of 
supplementary forms of voluntary contractual insurance.
Legislation
As mentioned above, the right to health care is primarily established by the 
Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (1992). In accordance with 
Article 31, all citizens ‘have the right, on the basis of public insurance, to free 
medical care and to medical aids under conditions provided for by law’. Th is 
right is specifi ed by Act No. 48/1997 Coll. on Public Health Insurance, which 
also regulates the personal coverage, the range of care, the qualifying conditions, 
and the duration of care. Act. No. 20/1966 Coll. on Public Health Care affi  rms 
three principles of health care, which are, roughly: the personal responsibility of 
every individual; the importance of scientifi c research; and the focus on 
preventive protection. Th e main acts with regard to the administration and 
fi nancing and the organisation of the insurance funds are: Act No. 551/1991 Coll. 
on the General Health Insurance Institution; Act No. 280/1992 Coll. on Sector, 
Branch, Enterprise and other Health Insurance Funds; and Act No. 592/1992 
Coll. on General Health Insurance Premiums.93
91 Scheffl  er 1998, p. 3.
92 For more information, see the website of the Czech Medical Chamber.
93 At the time of writing, no English translation of the relevant legislation was available. 
Th erefore, information is based on the websites of the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs 
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At the international level, the Czech Republic is bound, in respect of medical 
care, by ILO Convention 130 that replaces ILO convention 102, Part II, and by 
the European Code of Social Security, Part II.
Administration and fi nancing
Statutory public health insurance is implemented by health insurance companies 
as public law subjects. Th e sector, branch, enterprise and other health insurance 
funds, which are, contrary to the General Health Insurance Company, not 
established directly by an Act, need the permission of the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Health.94 Th e public health care system is controlled and 
managed together by the Ministry of Health and the General Health Insurance 
Company. As the contributions to public health insurance are paid directly into 
the account of the health insurance company in which the benefi ciary is insured, 
the health insurance companies are under statutory obligation to submit annual 
fi nancial statements and reports containing their health insurance plans. Th ese 
documents must be approved subsequently by the government, and by the 
Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament.95
Health insurance funds are fi nanced through contributions from employees and 
employers, amounting to 13.5 percent of the employees’ gross income, up to a 
ceiling of 48 times the monthly average wage per year. Th e employee pays 4.5 
percent and the employer 9 percent. Self-employed persons pay 13.5 percent of 
their assessment income. Th e state covers health insurance for the unemployed, 
pensioners, students, women on maternity leave, women taking care of one child 
of less than 7 years or more children aged less than 15 years old, prisoners, 
soldiers, and people receiving other social security benefi ts. In total, the state 
pays for 53 percent of the population. People without a taxable income (for 
example, housewives) pay their contributions themselves, based on the national 
minimum wage.
Th e self-governing bodies of all insurance companies include representatives of 
the insured persons, the insured persons’ employers, and the state.96 Th e 
management of the General Health Insurance Company is partially appointed by 
the government, and partially elected by the Czech Parliament.97 Representation 
of employees and employers in the sector, branch, enterprise and other health 
insurance companies is regulated by Act No. 280/1992 Coll. Section 10 of this Act 
and the Czech Social Security Administration, on reports of the government, and on 
information obtained from experts in this fi eld.
94 Tröster & Vysokajová 2006, point 85.
95 Tröster & Vysokajová 2006, point 38.
96 Tröster & Vysokajová 2006, point 86.
97 ILO C130 Report (Cz) 2000–2006, Art. 31.
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determines that the managing board of an insurance company should consist of 
fi ve members named by the government, fi ve members elected by employers, and 
fi ve by the insured employees. Moreover, the Board of Supervisors of the 
insurance companies should consist of three representatives of the Ministry of 
Finance, the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs, and the Ministry of Health, 
appointed by the government, and six representatives of the social partners, 
equally divided about employers and insured persons. With these rules, the 
Czech Republic complies with the requirement of the European Code of Social 
Security and ILO Convention 130 that where the administration of a social 
security scheme is not entrusted to a public institution, representatives of the 
persons protected shall participate in the management of the insurance company.
3.5.2 MATERIAL SCOPE
According to Act No. 48/1997 Coll., obligatory health insurance covers the costs 
of health care provided to an insured person with the purpose of maintaining or 
improving the person’s health. Any insured person suff ering from any disease or 
injury, regardless of its causes, has the right to health care. Th e same applies in 
relation to pregnancy, childbirth and its consequences.98
3.5.3 PERSONAL SCOPE
Persons protected
General public health insurance applies in the fi rst place to natural persons with 
permanent residence in the territory of the Czech Republic. Secondly, it applies 
to individuals who are not permanent residents of the Czech Republic, but who 
are employed by an employer who has a seat or permanent residence in the 
territory of the Czech Republic.99 Within these groups, the following sub-groups 
are diff erentiated: employees, self-employed, individuals without taxable income, 
and individuals for whom the insurance is paid by the state. In practice, this 
means that the scope of protected persons covers 100 percent of the population.100 
Aft er entry into the European Union, the citizens of all EU Member States are 
covered by the Czech system on the basis of EU law (coordination law). To prove 
compliance with Article 9 of ILO Convention 102 and the Code, reference is 
made to the option of coverage of prescribed classes of residents, constituting not 
less than 50 percent of all residents.101
98 ECSS Report (Cz) IV, p. 9; ILO C130 Report (Cz) 2000–2006, Art. 13; Tröster & Vysokajová 
2006, points 177–180.
99 Act No. 48/1997 Coll. on Public Health Insurance, section 2.
100 ECSS Report (Cz) IV, p. 9; ILO C130 Report (Cz) 2000–2006, Art. 10.
101 For an explanation of the diff erent options, see section 2.9.2.
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Individual basis
Every person is insured in their own right; the system is not based on the 
breadwinner’s model. Consequently, for every insured person, the insurance 
contribution amounts to 13.5 percent of the assessment base, which is, however, 
diff erent for the various groups of citizens. All individuals for whom insurance 
contributions are paid by the state are entitled to receive the complete available 
health care under the same conditions as economically active persons.
3.5.4 BENEFITS
Range of care
Health care is granted to insured persons in the form of ambulatory or 
institutional care, thus the insurance provides benefi ts in kind, depending on the 
character and the type of the required care. Th e care includes, among other 
things, out-patient and in-patient medical treatment, including general 
practitioner care, rehabilitation, care of chronically ill patients, preventive care, 
follow-up care, spa care, disability assessments, transportation of patients and 
compensation of travel expenses, provision of pharmaceuticals, medical devices, 
and dental care.102 Additionally, insurance covers health care associated with 
pregnancy and childbirth.
Cost-sharing
According to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, all citizens are 
entitled to free medical care and to medical aids under conditions provided for 
by law. Th is fundamental right to free health care was laid down by Act No. 
48/1997 Coll. up to 2008. In general, the insurance covered all costs, including 
hospitalisation, medicines and dental care. Direct fi nancial participation of 
insured persons only concerned payments for certain medicines and dental 
performances when, at the request of the insured person, a more expensive 
treatment than the regular one was carried out. In each group of medical 
treatments there was at least one that was fully covered by the public health 
insurance, and each group of dental procedures had at least one procedure that 
was fully covered.103 As of 1 January 2008, major changes have taken place in 
relation to out-of-pocket-payments. In order to combat a relatively high 
frequency of doctor’s visits by the Czech citizens and excessive use of medication, 
102 Act No. 48/1997 Coll. on Public Health Insurance, sections 19–39.
103 ECSS Report (Cz) I, p. 15; ECSS Report (Cz) V, p. 7; ESC Report (Cz) 2000, p. 75; ILO C130 
Report (Cz) 2000–2006, Arts. 13 and 17.
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so-called ‘regulatory fees’ were introduced. Charges of CZK 30 are levied on 
every visit to the doctor and on prescriptions, CZK 60 for each day spent in 
hospital, and CZK 90 for emergency services, with a maximum of CZK 5,000 per 
year.104 Th ese fees are also paid by patients with chronic diseases and victims of 
industrial accidents or occupational disease. For women, certain exemptions are 
regulated relating to pregnancy and delivery: pregnant women are exempt from 
the fi rst three prescription fees, and for babies born in hospital, no fee for 
hospitalisation has to be paid.105
Duration of the benefi t
In the case of illness or accident, health care benefi ts are provided during the 
whole period of sickness and the whole period of convalescence. Th ere is no time 
limit provided for health care.
3.5.5 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
If a person meets the requirements for participation in public health insurance, 
as stipulated by Act No. 48/1997 Coll., they do not have to comply with any other 
condition or qualifying period. Starting from the fi rst day of insurance, a person 
has all rights arising from their participation in the health care scheme.106
3.5.6 COMPARISON WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS107
Matters of compliance
In respect of the defi nition of the contingency and the personal coverage, the 
Czech health care system complies amply with the requirements of ILO C130 
and the ECSS. Insurance covers any condition requiring medical care, whatever 
its cause, including preventive care. Furthermore, with about 100 percent of the 
population insured, even the requirements of the Protocol to the ECSS and the 
ECSS (Revised) are fulfi lled although not ratifi ed. Th e same goes for the range 
and the duration of care, as well as for the qualifying conditions. Th e insurance 
covers dental care and prosthetic and orthopaedic appliances, which are not 
included in the ECSS, but they are entered on the lists of ILO C130. Health care 
104 Th e exchange rate of the Czech Koruna on 1 January 2008 was € 1.00 to CZK 26.52.
105 Act 48/1997 Coll. on Public Health Insurance, sections 16a and 31.
106 ECSS Report (Cz) IV, p. 16–17.
107 For a detailed description of the international norms regarding medical care, see section 2.9.
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is provided without a time limit, and no qualifying period is required. It can be 
concluded that the universal and comprehensive Czech health care system 
complies with the minimum as well as the higher standards.
Problematic issues
It must also be recognised, however, that a problem has emerged in respect of the 
required out-of-pocket-payments since January 2008. ILO Convention 130 and 
the European Code on Social Security allow cost-sharing in respect of a morbid 
condition, as far as it does not give rise to hardship.108 Since rules concerning 
cost-sharing are generally considered to avoid hardship when the patient has to 
contribute not more than one third of the total costs, the modest Czech patient 
fees do not cause a problem in the case of morbid conditions. Nevertheless, it has 
been made clear that under the European Code, cost-sharing is not permitted in 
the case of pregnancy, confi nement and their consequences.109 Th e Czech 
regulations on co-payments provide for some exemptions for pregnant women, 
but in most cases, the fees have to be paid by them as usual. Although the fi xed 
amounts may not be very high, it is against the principles of maternity protection, 
as laid down in the international instruments.
Summary of matters of compliance and problematic issues
Table II. Medical care (Cz) compared with the international standards
Th e Czech Republic in bound by the ECSS and ILO C130
Medical 
care
ILO C102 (1952) / ECSS 
(1964)






✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Personal 
scope
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Benefi t Out-of-pocket payments 
for pregnancy related 
care is prohibited.
Out-of-pocket payments 





✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Qualifying 
periods
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
✓ = compliance of national provisions with the international standards. 
108 ILO C102, Art. 10; ECSS, Art. 10.
109 See section 2.9.3 and 3.11.6.





In light of the social security reforms since 1989, it was found that the Act on 
Sickness Insurance of 1956 no longer refl ected the social and economic 
developments of the Czech Republic. Th erefore, extensive modifi cations were 
proposed and laid down in a new Sickness Insurance Act, which was adopted 
in 2006.110 Th e Act was intended to come into force on 1 January 2007, but that 
date was postponed to 1 January 2008, and then again to 1 January 2009, when 
it eventually became eff ective.111 Th us, the current main legal basis for sickness 
benefi ts is Act No. 187/2006 Coll. Apart from sickness, it also deals with short-
term social events, such as caring for a child or family member, pregnancy, 
and maternity. Th e Act regulates personal coverage of the insurance, the 
conditions for entitlement, and the amount and duration of the benefi ts. All 
employed individuals participate ex lege in the sickness insurance system. One 
of the striking changes included in this Act, in connection with the new 
Labour Code,112 is that the employers are responsible for the payment of their 
sick employees during the fi rst period of sick leave, which will be described 
below.
At the international level, in respect of sickness benefi t the Czech Republic is 
bound through ratifi cation by ILO Convention 130 that replaces ILO convention 
102, Part III, and the European Code of Social Security, Part III.
Administration and fi nancing
Key actors in the fi eld of sickness insurance are the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Aff airs and the Czech Social Security Administration. Th e main task of 
this social security body is the realisation of benefi t claims. In addition, the 
District Social Security Administrations fulfi l certain roles concerning the 
payment of sickness benefi ts in their own districts. Th e management and control 
of the administration is in the hands of the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Aff airs, as is the compliance with obligations arising from international treaties 
in the fi eld of social security.
110 Tröster & Vysokajová 2006, point 248a; website of the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs.
111 At the time of writing, no English translation of the relevant legislation was available. 
Th erefore, information is based on the websites of the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs 
and the Czech Social Security Administration, on reports of the government, and on 
information obtained from experts in this fi eld.
112 Act No. 262/2006 Coll., Labour Code, Arts. 192–194.
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Sickness insurance is funded through contributions from employers, and, if 
participating, from self-employed persons. Since 2010, employees no longer 
contribute to the sickness scheme. Th e percentage rate which is paid by the 
employer amounts to 2.3 percent of the calculation base.
3.6.2 MATERIAL SCOPE
Sickness insurance covers temporary incapacity of the claimant to work due to 
an illness, injury or quarantine, resulting in a loss of income.113
3.6.3 PERSONAL SCOPE
Th e compulsory sickness insurance scheme covers employees working in the 
Czech Republic. Additionally, the scheme covers certain categories of workers 
who are given equal rights as employees in this respect, including public servants, 
judges, and specifi c voluntary workers. However, in the new Act coverage is 
made subject to the length of the employment, which is set at a minimum of 15 
calendar days, and to a minimum income of CZK 2,000 – an amount that will be 
annually adjusted according to the development of average wages. Self-employed 
persons can participate on a voluntary basis, if their income is at least CZK 4,000. 
In 2007, 230,000 of the 714,910 self-employed persons were insured.114 To prove 
compliance with Article 15 of ILO Convention 102 and the Code, reference is 
made to the option that prescribed classes of employees must be covered, 
constituting not less than 50 percent of all employees.
3.6.4 BENEFITS
Diff erent kinds of benefi ts
From sickness insurance the following benefi ts in cash are provided:
– sickness benefi t;
– fi nancial aid during care for a family member;
– compensatory benefi t in pregnancy and maternity; and
– maternity benefi t in cash.
113 Website of the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs.
114 ECSS Report (Cz) V, Art. 15.
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In this section only the sickness benefi t will be dealt with, since income 
replacement during care for a family member is not part of any of the 
international instruments, and the benefi ts pertaining to maternity are described 
in section 3.11.4.
Amount of the benefi t
Sickness benefi ts are periodical payments consisting of a fi xed percentage of the 
so-called ‘daily assessment base’. As of 2009, the employer is responsible for wage 
compensation during the fi rst fourteen calendar days of incapacity for work.115 
However, a waiting period of three days is prescribed, during which the employee 
does not receive any compensation.116 From the fi ft eenth day of sickness, the 
Social Security Administration pays out the sickness benefi t.
Th e daily assessment base is, roughly, the average income subject to social 
security and state employment policy contributions per day of the claimant. Th e 
decisive period for calculation is usually the period of 12 calendar months before 
the calendar month in which incapacity for work occurs. Th e daily assessment 
base is reduced if it exceeds prescribed amounts, and as of 2009, there are three 
reduction limits fi xed by the government. For the calculation of the benefi t, 90 
percent of the daily assessment base is taken into account up to the fi rst reduction 
limit, 60 percent from the fi rst to the second limit, and 30 percent from the 
second to the third limit. Th e part of the assessment base that exceeds the third 
reduction limit is not taken into account.
During the fourth until the 14th day of sickness, the employer has to pay 60 
percent of the employee’s reduced daily assessment base. From the 15th to the 
30th day, the sickness benefi t also amounts to 60 percent of the reduced daily 
assessment base, from the 31st to the 60th day it amounts to 66 percent, and from 
the 61st day, the benefi t amounts to 72 percent of the assessment base. Th e benefi t 
amounts to 100 percent of the daily assessment base if the insured person is 
incapable of work due to their participation in specifi c kinds of rescue work, 
which includes, for instance, fi re fi ghters.
In order to examine whether the sickness benefi t complies with the minimum 
norm set out in the international instruments, the average salary of a standard 
benefi ciary has to be determined. Th e Czech Republic takes a skilled male worker 
with a dependent spouse and two children as a reference point.117 According to 
115 An extension of this period is under discussion (2010).
116 Websites of the Czech Social Security Administration and the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Aff airs.
117 ECSS Report (Cz) VI, p. 14; for a skilled worker, a metal lathe operator (tuning and service 
technician) is taken into account, according to ECSS Art. 65, para. 6(b).
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the ECSS and ILO C102, the benefi t must be at least 45 percent of the average 
wage of the standard benefi ciary, and according to ILO C130, it should be 60 
percent of that wage.
Calculation example118
In 2008, the monthly average gross salary of a skilled worker was CZK 24,757, and the daily 
assessment base was CZK 814.119 In 2009, the reduction limits were fi xed at CZK 786, CZK 
1,178, and CZK 2,356.120 Th is means that, for this example, 90 percent of CZK 786 has to be 
taken into account, and 60 percent of CZK 28.
Reduced daily assessment base:
(786 * 0.90) + (28 * 0.60) = CZK 725
4th to 30th day: 60% of CZK 725 = CZK 435
Monthly benefi t: 30 * 435 = CZK 13,050
Benefi t (2008) for 2 children aged 6 to 15 = CZK 1,220
Sickness benefi t incl. child benefi t = CZK 14,270
Th e average net monthly salary of a skilled worker with a dependent wife and two children 
amounted to CZK 22,570, which, supplemented with child benefi t, was CZK 23,790. Th e ratio 
between the sickness benefi t, which is not subject to taxation, and the net income during 
employment, was CZK 14,270 / CZK 23,790 = 0.6. 
Th e replacement rate of the sickness benefi t (including child benefi t) during the 
fi rst month that it is paid, amounted to 60 percent in 2008. Th e following months, 
the rate is higher because in the second month the benefi t amounts to 66 percent 
of the reduced daily assessment base, and from the third month, it is 72 percent. 
However, for comparison with the international standards only the lowest part is 
relevant, since the benefi t must reach the given percentage of the reference wage 
during the whole prescribed period of entitlement to the benefi t.
Duration of the benefi t
Sickness benefi ts are provided from the fi ft eenth day of sick leave until the 
termination of the incapacity for work, or the recognition of invalidity or partial 
invalidity, but with a maximum of 380 calendar days beginning from the fi rst 
118 Amounts based on ECSS Reports (Cz) VI and VII. According to Article 65 of the ECSS, the 
calculation must be based on fi gures from the same year. However, in the Czech reports, data 
from diff erent years are used. Th erefore, the outcome diff ers from those in the reports. Th e 
exchange rate of the Czech Koruna on 1 January 2008 was € 1.00 to CZK 26.52.
119 CZK 24,757 * 12 / 365 = CZK 814. Amount based on ECSS Report (Cz) VII, p. 10.
120 Amounts given in ECSS Report (Cz) VI. At the time of writing, the average wage of a standard 
benefi ciary in 2009 was not yet available in the reports of the government. However, because 
it would not be expedient to make the calculations according to the old Sickness Insurance 
Act, the new calculation method with the new reduction limits are taken into account. As a 
result, the example is based on the wages of 2008, but the benefi t is calculated according to 
the rules and reduction limits of 2009. Th is means that the calculation is not accurately 
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day of sick leave. Th us, aft er the wage compensation by the employer during the 
fi rst fourteen days, the sickness benefi t is paid for one year at most.
If a new case of incapacity for work occurs within one year aft er the fi rst day of 
the previous sick leave, the maximum period of one year for sickness benefi t 
includes both periods of sick leave. Only if the claimant has worked for at least 
190 days aft er the fi rst sick leave, or if the incapacity for work is caused by an 
industrial accident or occupational disease, the maximum period of one year 
starts anew.121
3.6.5 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
Under the new Sickness Act, no qualifying period is stipulated. To receive a 
benefi t, a medical certifi cate of temporary incapacity for work, signed by a 
physician, has to be handed over to the employer. Self-employed persons must 
submit the certifi cate to the District Social Security Administration, and for 
them a qualifying period of three months of contribution is required.
3.6.6 COMPARISON WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS122
Matters of compliance
Th e personal scope of the Czech sickness insurance scheme – covering all 
employees and more than 30 percent of the self-employed – meets the requirements 
of the ECSS and ILO C130. Regarding the ECSS, the Czech Republic refers to the 
option of coverage of at least 50 percent of all employees, and regarding the ILO 
C130, of 75 percent of the whole economically active population.123 Moreover, it 
satisfi es the conditions of the Protocol of the ECSS, which has not been ratifi ed by 
the Czech Republic, stipulating that there must be coverage of 80 percent of all 
employees, and also that of the ECSS (Revised). Under this instrument, 90 percent 
of all employees or 80 percent of the economically active population must be 
covered. Th e level of the benefi t is higher than the stipulated 45 percent by the 
ECSS and the Protocol (50 percent) and it is equal to the replacement rate of 60 
percent required by ILO C130. In order to comply with the requirements of the 
performed according to the international standards, but it can still serve as an indication of 
the ratio between previous income and the sickness benefi t.
121 ECSS Report (Cz) IV, Art. 18.
122 For a detailed description of the international norms regarding sickness benefi ts, see section 
2.10.
123 ECSS, Art. 15 (a); ILO C130, Art. 19 (b).
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conventions, a benefi t usually has to be the fi xed percentage of gross wages. 
However, for the Czech Republic, the setting of the ratio to net wages is accepted 
by the supervising bodies. Th is is sustainable because social security benefi ts are 
only taxed from an amount exceeding the amount of the average wage of a skilled 
worker, and the state pays the social security contributions.124 No qualifying 
period is prescribed, although all international standards allow for a qualifying 
period in order to preclude abuse. Th e imposed waiting period of three days, 
leaving the responsibility for the fi rst days of incapacity for work with the 
employee, is also in accordance with the international instruments.
Problematic issues
Th e CEACR made some comments in its last direct request on ILO C130.125 One 
question concerned Article 26 of ILO C130, requiring that ‘the grant of benefi t 
may be limited to not less than 52 weeks in each case of incapacity, as prescribed.’ 
Th e wording ‘in each case’ may be an obstacle for full compliance of the scheme 
with C130. Th e CEACR explained that the Convention ‘requires the grant of the 
benefi t to be not less than 52 weeks in each case of incapacity even in the event of 
an onset of a new incapacity within the time limit prescribed by section 15(4).’ 
Th is refers to the provision in the Act. No. 54/1956 on sickness insurance of 
employees that prescribes that a maximum period of one year for sickness benefi t 
may include more than one period of sick leave. As a consequence, during a 
second case of incapacity leading to sick leave within one year, and without 190 
working days in between, the claimant will receive a benefi t for a shorter period 
than prescribed in ILO C130. Th is issue has not been solved in the new Sickness 
Act, and therefore the country does not completely comply with the Convention 
in respect of the duration of the benefi t.
Another question asked of the CEACR was about the granting of funeral benefi t 
for persons qualifying for sickness benefi t, provided for in C130, Article 27. It 
was not clear from the report of the government whether this allowance was 
granted to all persons entitled to a sickness benefi t. In its next report, the 
government clarifi ed that a funeral allowance was granted in respect of all 
persons who, on the day of passing, had permanent residence in the Czech 
Republic.126 However, the state Social Support Act provides for a funeral grant to 
a person who has arranged the funeral of a dependent child, or to a person who 
was the parent of a dependent child, on the condition that the deceased was a 
permanent resident of the Czech Republic on the date of death. Th us, not all 
124 Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs (Cz) 2006, p. 73.
125 CEACR: Individual Direct Request concerning C130 (Czech Republic) 2003.
126 ILO C130 Report (Cz) 2000–2006.
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insured persons are entitled to a funeral benefi t, which implies a confl ict with 
Convention 130.
Another point that should be mentioned concerns the level of the benefi t. As 
shown above, a benefi t for the standard benefi ciary in 2008 amounted to 60 
percent of the previous net wage. Rounded up, this is exactly the required 
percentage in ILO C130. An increase in wages without a simultaneous increase 
in the fi rst reduction limit will inevitably reduce the ratio between previous 
income and benefi t. An annual adjustment of the fi rst reduction limit according 
to the increase in wages is not envisaged by the new regulations; the reduction 
limits are incidentally adjusted by a governmental decree. Consequently, aft er 
subsequent years of wage growth, the required percentage of 60 percent of the 
reference wage may no longer be met.
Finally, attention has also to be paid to the new rules on employer’s liability for 
wage compensation during the fi rst two weeks of sick leave. Apart from the 
norms pertaining to the level and duration of the payments, the principles on 
solidarity and state responsibility also have to be taken into account.127 First of 
all, according to Article 70 of the ECSS, the benefi ts must be borne collectively 
by way of insurance contributions or taxation or both. In contrast to this, the 
wage compensation during the initial two weeks of illness is paid solely by the 
employer. Secondly, in the same Article (and in C130 Article 30) it is stated that 
the government is responsible for the due provision of the benefi ts. Important in 
this respect is whether the employer’s obligation is suffi  ciently regulated in such 
a way that the stipulated income replacement for the employee is guaranteed. 
Th is is not clear in the Czech case. What happens, for instance, if the employer 
does not pay the required compensation, either willingly or unwillingly? Is a 
safety net provided in these cases? Furthermore, where the administration is not 
entrusted to a public authority, the international standards require representatives 
of the persons protected to participate in the management, which is not the case 
during this period of employers’ liability. In view of these common principles on 
solidarity and good governance, it is not obvious that this initial period of 
employers’ liability is in line with the conventions.128 As yet, the supervising 
committees have not commented on this issue, but these questions will have to 
be dealt with in the next reports of the government on the application of both 
the European Code and ILO C130.
127 For a more detailed description of these principles, see section 2.5.
128 For a further discussion on employers’ liability for sick pay, see section 6.2.3.
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Summary of matters of compliance and problematic issues
Table III. Sickness benefi t (Cz) compared with the international standards
Th e Czech Republic is bound by the ECSS and ILO C130
Sickness 
benefi t




ILO C130 (1969) ECSS Rev. (1990)
Material 
scope
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Personal 
scope
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Benefi t: 
amount
During the fi rst 
14 days: no col-
lective fi nancing, 
no state responsi-




During the fi rst 14 
days: no collective 
fi nancing, no state 
responsibility, and 
no participation of 
persons protected.
Replacement rate 
will drop below 60 
percent.
During the fi rst 14 
days: no collective 
fi nancing, no state 
responsibility and 
no participation of 
persons protected.
Funeral benefi t is 
not granted to all 
insured persons.
Replacement rate 
is less than 65 
percent.
During the fi rst 14 
days: no collective 
fi nancing, no state 
responsibility and 
no participation of 
persons protected.
Funeral benefi t is 




✓ Benefi t is not 
provided for at 
least 52 weeks in 
each case of 
sickness
Benefi t is not 
provided for at 
least 52 weeks in 
each case of 
sickness
Benefi t is not 
provided for at 
least 52 weeks in 




✓ ✓ ✓ ✓




As a rule, unemployment was non-existent under the communist regime. 
Consequently, there was no insurance for unemployment. Within the framework 
of the social security reforms aft er the velvet revolution, the fi rst step to 
unemployment insurance was taken by developing a state employment policy 
that included mediation, retraining programmes and incentives for the creation 
of new jobs, as well as fi nancial compensation in the case of temporary loss of 
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employment, paid from the state budget.129 Th e fi rst contributions to this policy 
were collected in 1993, however, a real unemployment insurance scheme has as 
yet not been realised.
Legislation
Unemployment benefi t is codifi ed in employment legislation as a part of 
unemployment and retraining support. Act No. 435/2004 Coll. on Employment 
– valid since 2004 – guarantees the right to employment to all citizens who are 
looking for a job and who are actually able and willing to work. Th e Act also 
regulates the conditions for entitlement to unemployment benefi t and the 
amount of the benefi t.
At the international level, the Czech Republic is bound through ratifi cation by 
the European Code of Social Security, Part IV on Unemployment. It should be 
noted that the unemployment part of ILO C102 was one of the two parts that 
have never been ratifi ed by the Czech Republic. Ratifi cation of this part is no 
longer considered necessary because the Czech system meets the level of 
protection of ILO C102 implicitly by fulfi lling the obligations of the Code. ILO 
C168 was not accepted because of certain obstacles to ratifi cation under the 
former legislation. Since the new Act on Unemployment of 2004, ratifi cation was 
considered possible from the legal point of view, but was not realised.130 Th e 
latest amendments of 2009 have again hindered ratifi cation of this instrument.
Administration and fi nancing
Th e obligatory contributions to the state employment policy are collected, 
together with the pension and sickness insurance contributions, by the Czech 
Social Security Administration. In 2009, the contribution for the state 
unemployment policy amounted to 1.2 percent of the employee’s gross salary, to 
be paid by the employer or by the self-employed person. Th e contributions are 
deposited into the state budget, from which the costs of unemployment benefi ts 
are transferred to the budget of the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs and 
distributed to individual labour offi  ces.131 Th e labour offi  ces carry out the 
employment mediation and retraining of jobseekers. Together with the 
employers, the labour offi  ces also carry out the so-called ‘new job generating 
programmes’, instigated by the Ministry, to broaden the selection of jobs off ered 
129 Tröster & Vysokajová 2006, points 35 and 46; Potůček 2001, pp. 89–91.
130 See section 3.2.2.
131 ECSS Report (Cz) IV, p. 5.
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in their territories.132 Th e Ministry controls and manages the labour offi  ces as a 
part of its responsibility for the administration of the state employment policy.
3.7.2 MATERIAL SCOPE
Defi nition of the contingency
A person is unemployed for the Czech system if they have no working 
activities,133 are not studying, and are registered as a jobseeker with a labour 
offi  ce for assistance in fi nding suitable employment.134 As one of the requirements 
for entitlement includes that the jobseeker has been employed for a prescribed 
period,135 unemployment does not relate to persons who are seeking a job for the 
fi rst time. However, it should be noted that certain activities are treated as 
equivalent to employment, for example, the personal care of a child of up to four 
years of age, thus meaning that fi rst-time jobseekers in such a situation can 
successfully apply for unemployment support. Unemployment includes partial 
unemployment, in the sense that a jobseeker has the right to extra earnings while 
receiving unemployment benefi t, as long as those earnings do not exceed half the 
minimum wage and the activity in question does not take up more than 20 hours 
a week.136
Suitable employment
In Article 20 of ILO C102 it is stated that ‘the contingency covered shall include 
suspension of earnings, […], due to inability to obtain suitable employment’.137 
According to the Czech legislation, employment must meet four conditions to be 
considered suitable.138 In the fi rst place, the gainful activity must imply the 
obligation of paying insurance for old-age pension and contributions to the state 
employment policy. Secondly, the working hours must be at least 80 percent of 
the stipulated weekly working hours, which means that the job must cover 32 
hours minimum. Th irdly, the employment contract must be for an indefi nite 
132 Tröster & Vysokajová 2006, points 97 and 354–359.
133 Working activities include: an employment relationship, a relationship similar to employment, 
self-employment, training for a future job, or any other activities which are an obstacle to 
inclusion and keeping in the jobseeker records, ECSS Report (Cz) IV, Arts. 19 and 20, Act No. 
435/2004 Coll. on Employment, Section 24.
134 MISSOC (Cz), 2007, Unemployment; Pieters 2003, pp. 36–37; ECSS Report (Cz) IV, p. 23.
135 Employment in this context means an employment relationship or any gainful activity that 
causes the obligation to pay insurance for old-age pension and contribution to the state 
employment policy, Tröster & Vysokajová 2006, point 364.
136 Website of the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs; MISSOC (Cz), 2007, Unemployment.
137 For the meaning of the term ‘suitable job’ in the conventions, see section 2.11.1.
138 Website of the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs.
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period or for a fi xed term of more than three months, and, fi nally, the 
employment must correspond to the jobseeker’s state of health. Th us, 
qualifi cations or skills of the jobseeker and length of previous employment are 
not necessarily taken into consideration. As a consequence, a jobseeker is obliged 
to accept a job off ered by the Labour Offi  ce for which they may be overqualifi ed, 
from the very beginning of the period of unemployment. Furthermore, the 
Labour Offi  ce may also arrange employment for a period shorter than three 
months, in which case the jobseeker has to accept the off er, whether the job is 
suitable or not. Th e only condition in such cases is that the employment has to 
correspond to the jobseeker’s state of health. Aft er one year of registration as a 
jobseeker, a job off ered by the Labour Offi  ce does not have to meet any of the 
above-mentioned requirements.
3.7.3 PERSONAL SCOPE
All persons with permanent residence in the territory of the Czech Republic who 
have been in employment or an equivalent labour law relation, as well as self-
employed persons who were obliged to pay insurance for old-age pension and 
contributions to the state employment policy, are covered by the unemployment 
policy.139 To prove compliance with Article 21 of the European Code, reference 
is made to option of coverage of prescribed classes of employees, constituting not 
less than 50 percent of all employees.
3.7.4 BENEFITS
Unemployment support
A jobseeker who is registered with the Labour Offi  ce is entitled to unemployment 
support, consisting of fi nancial support and active employment policy measures. 
Th e latter include the development of an individual action plan to increase the 
employment chances, retraining possibilities as part of the jobseeker’s further 
professional education, the provision of publicly and socially benefi cial jobs, and 
the provision of a bridging contribution for jobseekers to become self-
employed.140
139 Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs (Cz) 2009, pp. 53–54; Tröster & Vysokajová 2006, 
points 360–361.
140 Website of the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs.
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Amount of the benefi t
Unemployment benefi t is based on the previous income of the benefi ciary. Th e 
rate of the benefi t amounts to 65 percent of the previous net income during the 
fi rst two months of unemployment, falling back to 50 percent during the next 
two months, and to 45 percent during the remaining period.141 However, if the 
jobseeker retrains, the benefi t amounts to 60 percent of the previous income 
throughout the whole period of retraining. For the calculation of the previous 
income, the average net monthly earnings over the last quarter prior to 
registration as a jobseeker is taken into account. Th e maximum amount of 
unemployment benefi t is 58 percent of the national average wage of the fi rst to 
the third quarters of the year preceding the year of the application for the benefi t. 
During a retraining period of the jobseeker, the maximum is 65 percent.
Calculation example142
In 2008, the monthly average net salary of a skilled worker with a dependent spouse and two 
children was CZK 22,570, and the child benefi t for two children amounted to CZK 1,220. Th e 
maximum monthly benefi t amounted to CZK 12,249.
Benefi t during the fi rst two months: 0.65 × CZK 22,570 = CZK 12,249 (max. benefi t)
Benefi t during the next two months: 0.50 × CZK 22,570 = CZK 11,285
Benefi t during the last month: 0.45 ×  CZK 22,570 = CZK 10,157
Benefi t for 2 children aged 6 to 15 = CZK 1,220
Unemployment benefi t incl. child benefi t (3 months) = CZK 13,148
Unemployment benefi t incl. child benefi t (5 months) = CZK 12,665
Th e average net monthly salary supplemented with child benefi t amounted to CZK 23,790. For 
the calculation of the replacement rate, the lowest benefi t during the fi rst three months has to 
be taken as a basis, because the benefi t has to comply with Art. 65 for the duration of 13 weeks. 
Th e ratio between the unemployment benefi t (which is not subject to taxation) of the third 
month and the previous net income was CZK 11,285 / CZK 23,790 = 0.474.
Conclusively, the replacement rate of unemployment benefi t of a standard 
benefi ciary in 2008, compared to the reference wage, amounted to at least 47.4 
percent during the fi rst 13 weeks of unemployment.
Duration of the benefi t
In principle, the benefi t is granted for a maximum of fi ve months, or until the 
end of retraining. Exceptions are made for people from 50 to 55 years of age and 
141 MISSOC (Cz), 2009, Unemployment; ECSS Report (Cz) IV, pp. 25–26; ECSS Report (Cz) VI, 
p. 17; Act No. 435/2004 Coll. on Employment, Art. 50.
142 Th e calculation is based on amounts of 2008, taken from ECSS Reports (Cz) VI and VII. Th e 
method of calculation is based on the Act on Employment as amended in 2009. Th e exchange 
rate of the Czech Koruna on 1 January 2008 was €1.00 to CZK 26.52.
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for people over 55; for them the support period has been extended to eight and 
eleven months respectively.143 If a person becomes unemployed repeatedly 
within a period of three years, they are entitled again to unemployment benefi t 
aft er an employment period of at least six months, providing they meet the 
condition of the total duration of previous employment as will be discussed in 
the following section.144 Th e Czech law does not require a waiting period – a 
jobseeker is entitled to receive a benefi t as of the date of application for the 
benefi t.
Sanctions
A benefi t is not granted, or is stopped, if the jobseeker intentionally frustrates 
the eff orts of the Labour Offi  ce in employment mediation, or fails to fulfi l the 
conditions stipulated in their individual action plan. Moreover, the benefi t can 
be suspended if the jobseeker refuses suitable employment or retraining without 
serious personal or family reasons.
3.7.5 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
Qualifying periods
For entitlement to unemployment benefi t, a person must have been employed or 
self-employed for a period of at least 12 months during a period of three years 
prior to the inclusion of the applicant in the jobseeker records.145 Employment in 
this context includes any gainful activity giving rise to the obligation of paying 
insurance for old-age pension and contributions to the state employment policy, 
as well as substitute periods that are treated as equivalent to employment. 
Substitute periods include the personal care of a child up to four years of age and 
community service.
Other qualifying conditions
To successfully apply for unemployment benefi t, the claimant must be registered 
as a jobseeker with the Labour Offi  ce and must, if requested, undergo a medical 
examination. Furthermore, the jobseeker cannot be a student or a recipient of an 
old-age pension, and must be available for work. Th is means that a former self-
employed person can no longer be registered as self-employed. Lastly, no right to 
143 ECSS Report (Cz) IV, pp. 25–26; Act No. 435/2004 Coll. on Employment, Art. 43; Ministry of 
Labour and Social Aff airs (Cz) 2009, pp. 53–54.
144 Act No. 435/2004 Coll. on Employment, Art. 49.
145 ECSS Report (Cz) IV, p. 25.
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a benefi t exists if the unemployment arose due to the claimant’s own will or 
breach of obligations within six months before the registration as a jobseeker, or 
if the claimant receives an end-of-service benefi t that is higher than the 
unemployment benefi t.
3.7.6 COMPARISON WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS146
Matters of compliance
Th e personal coverage of the Czech unemployment policy includes all employees 
and self-employed, therefore it meets the requirements of all the relevant 
international instruments, whether ratifi ed or not. Th e duration and replacement 
rate of the benefi t – amounting to 47.4 percent for the duration of 5 months – 
meet the requirements of the ECSS (45 percent, for at least 13 weeks). It does not 
comply with its protocol (50 percent, for at least 21 weeks), ILO C168 (50 percent, 
for at least 26 weeks) or the ECSS (Revised) (65 percent, for at least 39 weeks). 
Th e qualifying period of twelve months within 3 years complies with all 
standards, allowing for a qualifying period in order to preclude abuse.
Problematic issues
Th e Committee of Ministers asked for additional information regarding 
unemployment in its resolution on the application of the ECSS over the period 
2003/2004. One question concerned the determination of a ‘suitable job’, and the 
other concerned the possibility of denying a benefi t to a jobseeker whose 
employment relationship has been terminated due to unsatisfactory work 
performance or for a breach of their obligations at work.147 Although the 
information was not provided by the government in the next report(s), the 
following four resolutions (the last one covering the period until 20 June 2007) 
do not refer to the former requests. It is possible that the government submitted 
the required information to the Committee in between, and as a result it was not 
published. However, looking at the current legislation, the questions still seem 
relevant.
First of all, the Labour Offi  ce is not obliged to take into account the qualifi cations 
or skills of the jobseeker and the length of their previous employment when 
off ering a job, not even during the fi rst month of unemployment. Th is regulation 
146 For a detailed description of the international norms regarding unemployment benefi ts, see 
section 2.11.
147 Resolution ResCSS(2005)3.
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is not in line with ILO C102 and the ECSS. Th is is particularly apparent in the 
direct request of the CEACR to Denmark concerning Convention 102, where the 
Committee explains that:148
Part IV of the Convention is based on the concept of “suitable employment”, which 
ensures that at least during the minimum period of protection of 13 weeks provided 
for in Article 24 of the Convention unemployed persons shall be off ered jobs with 
due regard, inter alia, to their skills, qualifi cations, acquired experience and length of 
service in the former occupation – the criteria normally used in assessing the 
suitability of employment – and that in no case covered by Article 20 (in relation to 
Article 69(h) of the Convention) their benefi t could be suspended for refusal to accept 
a job unsuitable in this respect.
Furthermore, the preliminary reports on ILO C102 point in this direction.149 
Th us, there is a clear indication that Czech law is not consistent with the 
international requirements on the point of suitable employment. Relevant in this 
respect is, of course, how the labour offi  ces deal with this concept. Although the 
research does not cover ‘law in practice’, it must be noted that, according to the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs, the labour offi  ces take into account the 
qualifi cations of the applicant during the fi rst period of unemployment. However, 
since it is not laid down in a regulation, it really depends on the offi  cial what job 
is considered suitable in a specifi c situation.
Another possible problem is that the benefi t is limited to fi ve months within 
three years. Only if the jobseeker has a period of employment of at least six 
months before they become unemployed again, is a benefi t is granted. Th e ECSS 
only allow for a limitation of thirteen weeks within a period of one year. In the 
case of several periods of unemployment within three years, without six months 
of employment in between, in the Czech system the jobseeker might be deprived 
of a benefi t in the second and third year aft er the outset of the fi rst unemployment 
period. Th e supervising bodies have not made any comments on this topic, 
however this could be explained by the fact that the government never mentioned 
this rule in its reports.
148 CEACR: Individual Direct Requests concerning C102 (Denmark) 2005 and 2007. Similar 
requests were made in relation to the United Kingdom. See also: Gómez Heredero 2009, 
p. 129.
149 See section 2.11.1.
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Summary of matters of compliance and problematic issues
Table IV. Unemployment benefi t (Cz) compared with the international standards








ILO C168 (1988) ECSS Rev. (1990)
Material 
scope
Th e interpretation 
of ‘suitable em-
ployment’ is too 
strict.
Th e interpretation 
of ‘suitable em-
ployment’ is too 
strict.
Th e interpretation 
of ‘suitable em-
ployment’ is too 
strict.
Th e interpretation 
of ‘suitable em-




✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Benefi t: 
amount
✓ Replacement rate 
is less than 50 
percent.
Replacement rate 
is less than 50 
percent.
Replacement rate 




Benefi t is not 
provided for at 
least 13 weeks in 
each case of 
suspension of 
earnings.
Benefi t is not 
provided for at 
least 21 weeks in 
each case of 
suspension of 
earnings.
Benefi t is not 
provided for at 
least 26 weeks.
Benefi t is not 




✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
✓ = compliance of national provisions with the international standards.
3.8 OLD-AGE BENEFIT
3.8.1 INTRODUCTION
Development of the pension reform
Aft er the Velvet Revolution in 1989, the transition from a strong state paternalism 
with guaranteed incomes for all, to the participation and responsibility of 
citizens for their own social situation and future, began. Th e main objectives of 
the pension reform were, on the one hand, to build on the historical traditions of 
social insurance and, on the other, to create a transparent and fi nancially stable 
pension system, persisting with the traditional intergenerational solidarity.150 In 
spite of the criticism that the traditional pay-as-you-go approach would be too 
expensive and would have an adverse impact on the market economy, the Czech 
Republic adhered to this approach wholeheartedly. It was stressed that 
150 Král 2000, pp. 4–5.
Part II. Analysis and Comparison
156 Intersentia
intervention by the government ‘is indispensable and that free market will never 
be in a position to provide adequate fi nancial protection in old age.’151
Th e pension reform can hardly be characterised by revolutionary changes, but 
merely by an ongoing evolutionary process, however pushed or slowed depending 
on the colour of political power.152 Milestones are, fi rstly, the introduction of 
insurance premiums to be paid by both employers and employees (1993), and the 
introduction of a supplemental voluntary pension insurance scheme with state 
contributions (1994). Subsequently, the retirement age was raised and a special 
account was created within the state budget in order to clearly defi ne the balance 
of the pension scheme (1996). All in all, the reform measures taken so far have 
resulted in the creation of a two-pillar system: a strong basic pillar, and a much 
weaker individual supplementary pillar.153
However, the state of pension insurance to date has been found unsatisfactory 
and insuffi  cient to cope with the ageing of the population. Th e somewhat half-
hearted realisation of the pension reforms, as planned by the federal government, 
can be ascribed to the inconsistent political opinions on this matter and the 
indecisiveness of the consecutive minority coalition governments from 1996. A 
new pension reform concept was approved by the government in 2001, with the 
aim of a reduction in pension expenditure, the expansion of voluntary pension 
insurance, and of transparency and eff ectiveness of the system.154 Nevertheless, 
two bills which sought to take the fi rst new reform steps were subsequently 
rejected when presented to Parliament. One of these draft s concerned the 
creation of a Social Insurance Corporation, a self-governing public institution 
with tripartite bodies, to take over the management of the social insurance from 
the Czech Social Security Administration. At the same time, the pension fund 
was to be completely separated from the state budget. Th e aim of these measures 
would have been to increase the transparency of management, to reduce the 
dependency on political decisions, and to improve the provision of client-centred 
services. Th e other draft  that did not pass Parliament concerned the creation of 
compulsory occupational pensions as a second pillar scheme.155
In 2003, a number of (minor) changes were adopted, such as a further raising of 
retirement ages of, roughly, one year, a limitation of possibilities for an early old-
age pension, an increase in insurance contributions of 2 percent, and a gradual 
151 Král 2000, p. 2.
152 Antošík 2003, p. 4.
153 Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs (Cz) 2005, p. 2; Mácha 2002, pp. 78–81; Vylitova 2002, 
p. 5–7; Král 2000, pp. 5–8.
154 Mácha 2002, p. 88.
155 Tröster & Vysokajová 2006, point 36; Mácha 2002, pp. 88–90; Vylitova 2002, p. 26; Král 2000, 
p. 13.
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increase of the minimum assessment base for self-employed persons.156 
Furthermore, an expert team was established in 2004 to (re)consider the future 
shape of the Czech pension scheme.157 All political parties, as well as the Prime 
Minster, the Minister of Labour and Social Aff airs and the Minister of Finance, 
had representatives on this team. Th e results of the work of the expert team, 
presented in 2005, were to be used for further political negotiations. Because of 
political deadlock, it took three years before a new reform plan was prepared, 
consisting of three stages. Under the pressure of the economic crisis, measures to 
be taken for the implementation of the fi rst stage were fi nally approved in June 
2008.158 Th ese measures included: the continuation of a gradual increase in the 
retirement age to 65 years for men and women with no or one child, and 62 to 64 
years for women with more children, an extension of the insurance period 
required for entitlement to the old-age pension, and a restriction of non-
contributory periods. Th e new regulations became eff ective on 1 January 2010.
Legislation
Th e main act in the fi eld of the fi rst pillar old-age pensions is Act No. 155/1995 
Coll. on Pension Insurance, which also covers invalidity and survivors’ pensions. 
In this act, the following subjects are regulated: the personal and material scope 
of the pension insurance, conditions for participation, insurance periods, 
including substitute insurance periods, conditions for entitlement to the benefi t, 
calculation of the benefi t, and adjustment of the benefi t to the cost of living. In 
Act No. 582/1991 Coll. on the Organisation and Implementation of Social 
Security, organisational and procedural matters are regulated, such as the duties 
and rights of employers and insured persons, and the tasks of the social security 
authorities. Matters concerning the premiums, such as who pays pension 
insurance premiums, and the cost of the premiums, are drawn up in Act No. 
589/1922 Coll. on Social Security and State Employment Policy Premiums.
Th e Czech Republic has ratifi ed several international instruments with regard to 
old-age pensions. In the fi rst place, it is bound by Part V of ILO Convention 102, 
as well as Part V of the European Code of Social Security. Furthermore, ILO 
Convention 128 has been ratifi ed in respect of the part on old-age pensions.
Administration and fi nancing
As part of the social reforms in the 1990s, the administration of the pension 
scheme was taken over from the State Pension Administration by the newly 
156 Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs (Cz) 2005, p. 11.
157 Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs (Cz) 2005, pp. 21–22.
158 Král 2009, p. 42; Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs (Cz) 2008, pp. 9–12.
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created Czech Social Security Administration.159 Th is state institution comes 
under direct responsibility of the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs. Aft er a 
history of fi nancing through general taxation, from 1993 social insurance 
contributions were imposed on employers (20.4 percent) and employees (6.8 
percent). In the fi rst three years, these contributions exceeded pension 
expenditures, however the surplus was merged into the state budget. In 1996, a 
special state budget account was created for pension insurance, and surpluses in 
this account may be used only to increase pension provisions or to fi ll up an 
overdrawn insurance account. In 1997, the pension system went into the red due 
to several factors, including a reduction in the contribution rate to 26 percent, a 
cutback in the ratio of insured persons to persons of working age, the 
introduction of so-called compensatory time or substitute periods,160 a 
favourable contribution system for self-employed persons, and the granting of 
favourable early retirement pensions. Two proposals were launched in 1998 to 
raise insurance rates, but they were rejected by Parliament. In 2004 the rate was 
eventually increased to 28 percent of gross income, of which the employers had 
to pay 21.5 percent, and the employees, 6.5 percent.161
3.8.2 MATERIAL SCOPE
Until 1995, the retirement age in the Czech Republic for men was 60 years and 
for women, 53 to 57 years, depending on whether or not they had children and 
how many children they had reared.162 In 1996, a gradual increase in the 
retirement age was introduced, consisting of a yearly increase of 2 months for 
men and 4 months for women, which would result in a retirement age of 63 years 
both for men and women without children. For women having personally taken 
care of children, the retirement age would continue to vary, ranging from 59 
years for women with fi ve or more children, to 62 years for women with one 
child. However, the reform measures adopted in 2008 included a further rise in 
pensionable ages from 2010, to 65 years for men and women without children, as 
well as for women who have raised one child. Th e pensionable age for women 
with more than one child will be 62 to 64 years, depending on the number of 
children.163 Personally taking care of a child in this context means that the 
159 Mácha 2002, p. 78–81.
160 Periods taken into account for entitlement to and the calculation of the pension, but for which 
no insurance premiums were paid, e.g., periods of education, military service and of caring 
for a child of up to 4 years of age. See also: Král 2000, p. 6.
161 MISSOC (Cz), 2009.
162 Tröster & Vysokajová 2006, point 393; Pieters 2003, pp. 32–33; Th e pensionable age for women 
who had not brought up any children was 57 years, 56 years in the case of one reared child, 55 
years in the case of two, 54 years in the case of three or four, and 53 years in the case of fi ve or 
more reared children.
163 Král 2009, p. 43; Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs (Cz) 2008, p. 10.
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woman must have taken care of a child under adult age for a period of at least 10 
years, or, if the woman has taken care of a child as of eight years of age, for a 
period of at least 5 years.164
Th e Czech law also provides for early retirement up to three years prior to normal 
retirement age if a person (man or woman) has been insured for at least 25 years, 
however this results in a permanently reduced old-age pension.165 As of 2010, the 
possibility for early retirement will be gradually extended to 5 years prior to 
normal retirement age, but only if an insurance period of 35 years has been 
completed, and with a simultaneous further reduction of the amount of the 
pension. Th e Czech system does not provide for specifi c early retirement rules 
for persons that have been engaged in arduous or unhealthy occupations.
3.8.3 PERSONAL SCOPE
Participation in pension insurance is compulsory for all economically active 
persons, both persons in dependent gainful activities, including employees, civil 
servants and members of the armed forces, as well as the self-employed.166 
Additionally, insurance is compulsory for other groups, such as soldiers in 
military service, and persons caring for a child up of to 4 years of age, or for a 
person who depends on care because of the state of their health. Th ese specifi c 
categories do not have to pay contributions during these so-called substitute 
insurance periods. Voluntary participation is possible for other persons over 18 
years of age who are not insured by law.
To prove compliance with Article 27 of the European Code, reference is made to 
option of coverage of prescribed classes of employees, constituting not less than 
50 percent of all employees.
3.8.4 BENEFITS
Amount of the benefi t
Th e old-age benefi t consists of two components, a basic part and an earnings 
related sum. Th e basic amount is a fi xed amount, determined by a decree of the 
government that is identical for all pensions. Th e earnings related sum depends 
164 ILO C128 Report (Cz) 2001–2006, Art. 15.
165 Tröster & Vysokajová 2006 points 397–400; ILO C128 (Cz) Report 2001, Art. 15; Antošík 
2003, p. 5.
166 ECSS Report (Cz) V, Art. 27; ESC Report (Cz) 2003–2004, p. 65; Tröster & Vysokajová 2006, 
points 389–390; ILO C128 Report (Cz) 2001–2006, Art. 16.
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on the level of previous income and the number of years the benefi ciary has been 
insured. Th e earnings related pension gives 1.5 percent of earnings for each year 
of contributions. Th e amount of earnings taken into account is based on the 
average gross income during the period from 1985 until the year preceding the 
year of entitlement to old-age benefi ts, with a maximum of 30 years.167 Earlier 
years’ earnings are valorised by the growth of economy-wide average earnings. 
However, this average amount is subject to two reduction limits that are set by 
the government. To be precise, for determining the personal assessment base, the 
average wage is reduced in a way that 100 percent is counted up to the fi rst 
reduction limit, only 30 percent of the person’s income is counted between the 
fi rst and second reduction limit, and only 10 percent is counted of the amount 
above the second reduction limit.168
Calculation example169
Th e average gross salary of a skilled worker (qualifi ed metal lathe operator) in 2008 was CZK 
24,757, which is the calculation base. In 2008, the reduction limits were fi xed at CZK 10,000 and 
CZK 24,800 respectively. Th e calculation base was only reduced by the fi rst limit, because it 
does not exceed the second limit.
CZK 10,000 × 100% = CZK 10,000
(24,757 – 10,000) × 30% = CZK 4,427
Total = CZK 14,427
Th e percentage sum for thirty years of insurance is 30 * 1.5% * 14,427 = CZK 6,492.170
Together with the basic sum of CZK 1,700, the monthly old-age benefi t amounted to CZK 8,192.
Th e average net salary of a skilled worker with a dependent spouse amounted to CZK 20,790. 
Th e ratio between the old-age benefi t, which is not subject to taxation, and the income during 
employment, was 39.4 percent. 
In conclusion, the replacement rate of the old-age pension of a standard 
benefi ciary, compared to the reference wage and calculated in a way as prescribed 
in Article 65 of the ECSS, amounted to 39.4 percent in 2008.
167 Originally, in 1996, it was determined as the average of gross income for the last ten years 
preceding the year of retirement. Every year this period is being increased by one year until it 
reaches 30 calendar years.
168 ECSS Report (Cz) V, Art. 28; ILO C128 Report (Cz) 2001–2006, Art. 26; Tröster & Vysokajová 
2006, points 401–405; website of the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs.
169 Th e calculation is based on data given in the ECSS reports (Cz) VI and VII, Art. 28. According 
to Art. 65 of ILO C102 and the ECSS, the wage of the skilled employee, the benefi t, and the 
family allowances must be calculated on the same time basis. However, in its reports on the 
ECSS, the government takes data from diff erent years, namely, the wage from one year earlier 
than the reduction limits, the basic sum, and child benefi t. In this example, this is corrected, 
resulting in a lower replacement rate than stated in the reports of the government. Th e 
exchange rate of the Czech Koruna on 1 January 2008 was €1.00 to CZK 26.52.
170 In this example, 30 years of insurance has been taken into account according to the 
requirements of the relevant international provisions.
Chapter 3. Th e Czech Republic
Intersentia 161
Duration of the benefi t
Th e old-age pension is paid throughout the contingency, until the death of the 
benefi ciary. Until 2010, the benefi t was paid alongside income from gainful 
activity only if the employment contract had been concluded for a defi nite period 
of time that did not exceed one year, or in case of self-employment.171 Th ere was 
no entitlement to a benefi t if the benefi ciary engaged in gainful activity on the 
basis of an employment contract for an indefi nite period, or a period of more 
than one year aft er the attainment of the pensionable age. However, with the fi rst 
stage pension reform measures, this restriction has been abolished since 2010.172
Adjustment to the cost of living
Since 2004, the periodical old-age pensions have usually increased every year in 
January through a government decree.173 Th e adjustment of pensions is 
determined on the basis of at least 100 percent of the price increase and at least 
one third of the increase in real wages. As regards the price increase, the total 
growth of the overall household consumer price index during the period from 
July to July preceding the pension adjustment is taken into account. Th e basis for 
the growth in real wages is the calendar year that precedes the year of the pension 
adjustment by two years. A diff erent procedure is used only in the case of a very 
low (less than 2 percent) or very high (more than 10 percent) infl ation rate.
3.8.5 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
Until 1 January 2010, the minimum qualifying period for entitlement to old-age 
pension was a period of 25 years of participation in insurance. Periods that 
counted for insurance periods included: care for a child of up to the age of 4, or 
up to 18 years of age if the child was severely disabled and required special care; 
periods of study in secondary schools and institutions of higher education for 
the fi rst six years of study aft er reaching the age of 18 years; military service; and 
periods of receiving unemployment benefi t and a subsequent period of 
unemployment up to three years.174 However, from 2010 the insurance period 
required for entitlement to the old-age pension is being gradually extended to 35 
years if non-contributory periods are included, or to 30 years if non-contributory 
periods are excluded. Furthermore, a limitation of non-contributory periods has 
taken place, which means that some of these periods count for only 80 percent, 
171 ESC Report (Cz) 2003–2004, p. 65; Tröster & Vysokajová 2006, points 406–409.
172 Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs (Cz) 2008, p. 10.
173 Website of the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs.
174 ECSS Report (Cz) IV, Art. 29; ILO C128 Report (Cz) 1999–2001, Art.18.
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and periods of study will no longer be taken into account as non-contributory 
insurance periods at all.175 Th e rules for a reduced benefi t are also gradually 
being changed, resulting in entitlement to a reduced pension aft er the completion 
of a period of at least 20 years of insurance. As with the full pension, each year of 
contribution counts for 1.5 percent of the calculation base.
3.8.6 COMPARISON WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS176
Matters of compliance
In spite of the consecutive increases, the retirement age in the Czech Republic is 
in line with the relevant international instruments, whether ratifi ed or not. All 
instruments set a pensionable age of 65 years, which can even be higher if this is 
justifi ed by demographic, economic and social criteria.177 Article 26 of the ECSS 
is the most specifi c on this matter: a higher pensionable age is allowed if the 
number of residents having attained that age is not less than 10 percent of the 
number of residents under that age, but over 15 years of age. Th e personal scope 
of the pension system is also suffi  cient, covering all employees as well as self-
employed persons. ILO C128 (ratifi ed) requires all employees to be covered, 
representing the highest international norm at this point, together with the ECSS 
(Revised) (not ratifi ed). Th e benefi t is granted until the death of the benefi ciary, 
therefore the duration of the benefi t is in compliance with all relevant standards. 
In conclusion, the newly fi xed qualifi cation period of 30 years of insurance (not 
comprising substitute periods) is in line with the requirements of all the 
international standards except the Revised Code, which requires a full pension 
to be paid aft er 15 years of insurance. Th e austerity of the substitute periods does 
not cause a confl ict because the international standards do not provide for such 
periods.
Problematic issues
Th e main problem with the public pension is the amount of benefi t. According 
to the ECSS Report on 2008/2009, the amount of benefi t of a standard benefi ciary, 
for example, a man with a dependent wife of pensionable age, was 42.4 percent of 
the average salary of a skilled worker, which would meet the obligations of the 
ECSS (40 percent), by which the Czech Republic is bound.178 However, for the 
175 Král 2009, p. 42; Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs (Cz) 2008, pp. 9–12.
176 For a detailed description of the international norms regarding old-age pensions, see section 
2.12.
177 ECSS, Art. 26; ILO C128, Art. 15; ECSS (Revised), Arts. 26–27.
178 ECSS Report (Cz) VI, Art. 28.
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calculation, data from diff erent years were used, which is in confl ict with Article 
65 of the ECSS. As shown above, the replacement rate of the pensions in relation 
to the average wage of the standard benefi ciary in 2008 was actually 39.4 percent, 
which means that neither of the ratifi ed standards were met. Th e fi gures given in 
the reports on ILO C128 and the governmentś  actuarial reports from 2004 on 
confi rm a steady decrease in pensions over time. In 1995, the calculated 
replacement rate amounted to 51.3 percent, in 2000 it was 47.4 percent, and in 
2004 it had dropped to 43.8 percent – below the level of ILO C128.179 At that 
time, this incompatibility with ILO C128 was solved by an increase in the fi rst 
reduction limit and in the fl at rate part of the pensions in 2005 and 2006 
respectively. Th ese measures pushed the rate to 45.2 percent in 2005 and 46.2 
percent in 2006. However, because these were random measures, they could not 
prevent the replacement rate from dropping again. Th e government is aware of 
this problem, and even points out that ‘[w]hereas up to 1999, the Czech Republic 
fulfi lled the ILO Convention No. 128 even by setting the replacement ratio from 
125 percent of the average wage in the national economy, in the following years 
the Convention was fulfi lled only when using the average wage of the skilled 
labourer (which is lower in the Czech Republic).’180
Th e main reason for the decrease in the replacement rate is the way the pensions 
are being adjusted to the general level of earnings. For a long period, the Czech 
system did not contain clear regulations on the point of regular adjustment of 
long-term benefi ts, until the adoption of an amendment to the Act on Pension 
Insurance in July 2002, which contained stricter rules for a periodical increase in 
the basic, fl at rate, pensions. Th e Committee of Experts has asked for more 
information on this matter in relation to ILO C128, as well as to the Code several 
times, lastly in 2003 and 2005 respectively. In respect of the Code, the Committee 
concluded – on the basis of the information provided by the Czech government 
– that the new law gave full eff ect to the Code. However, it remains to be seen 
whether this point of view will hold its ground in the long-term. It has been 
shown above that the valorisation of pensions is based on 100 percent price 
increase and at least one third of the increase in real wages. Moreover, as a 
starting point for the adjustment, the average wages of two years prior to the 
adjustment are taken into account. Th is means that the level of adjustment is not 
in keeping with the level of wage increases, which causes a downward trend in 
the replacement rate of the pensions.181 It has to been seen how the current 
infringements of both the ECSS and ILO C128 will be solved this time.
179 ILO C128 Report (Cz) 1999–2001; ILO C128 Report (Cz) 2001–2006; Ministry of Labour and 
Social Aff airs (Cz) 2006; Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs (Cz) 2008.
180 Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs (Cz) 2008, p. 59.
181 Th is downward development has also been pointed out by Potůček: Potůček 2001, pp. 94–95.
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A second problem concerns the qualifying period. According to the ECSS and 
ILO C128, a reduced pension has to be provided aft er 15 years of contribution. 
Since the amendments of 2010, including a gradual increase in the required 
contributions years for a reduced pension from 15 to 20 years, the Czech pension 
system no longer fulfi ls this obligation.
Summary of matters of compliance and problematic issues
Table V. Old-age benefi t (Cz) compared with the international standards
Th e Czech Republic is bound by the ECSS and ILO C128
Old-age
benefi t




ILO C128 (1967) ECSS Rev. (1990)
Material 
scope
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Personal 
scope




is less than 40 
percent.
Replacement rate 
is less than 45 
percent.
Replacement rate 
is less than 45 
percent.
Replacement rate 




✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Qualifying 
periods
A reduced benefi t 
is not provided 
aft er 15 contribu-
tion years.
A reduced benefi t 
is not provided 
aft er 15 contribu-
tion years.
A reduced benefi t 
is not provided 
aft er 15 contribu-
tion years.
✓
✓ = compliance of national provisions with the international standards.
3.9 EMPLOYMENT INJURY BENEFIT
3.9.1 INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Under the Soviet regime, compensation for occupational accidents or illness was 
the responsibility of the employer.182 However, because enterprises were generally 
state owned, income compensation was, in fact, paid out by the state. Th e benefi ts 
were generous, aiming at an income level equal to that prior to the accident or 
illness. Aft er the Velvet Revolution, the system was adapted to the new social and 
economic reality, notably the privatisation of companies, but it was not 
fundamentally changed. One of the measures that was taken was that the 
employers’ liability insurance for work accidents was made compulsory for all 
182 Biskup & Kotrusová, pp. 45, 58–60.
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employers in 1993. Compensation for loss of earnings from this insurance is paid 
on top of a sickness benefi t or disability pension, up to the level of the person’s 
average previous income, and it is provided up to 65 years of age without casual 
reviews of the state of health.
Th us, the Czech social security system does not include a specifi c insurance scheme 
for occupational injury and diseases. It is true that in 2006 an employment injury 
insurance act was adopted that provided for a comprehensive compulsory 
insurance covering all employees, which was to come into force on 1 January 
2008.183 However, this date has been repeatedly postponed – most recently until 
2013 – because of political controversy, and it is not believed that it will come into 
eff ect aft er all.184 Th erefore, employees who become unable to work because of a 
work-related accident or illness will still be covered under the general health 
scheme, sickness insurance, and pension scheme, supplemented by compensation 
from the employer. Th is compensation part will not be taken into account in this 
section, since it does not comply with several prerequisites of the international 
standards. Most importantly, the state is not responsible for the eff ective provision 
of the benefi ts, protected persons do not participate in the management of the 
scheme, the administration is not controlled by a public authority, and some 
amounts are paid in the form of a lump sum instead of periodical payments.185 
Any scheme that complies with these principles on solidarity and state 
responsibility cannot be counted for the fulfi lment of the international obligations.
Legislation
Th e legal basis for medical care, sickness benefi t, invalidity benefi t, and survivors’ 
benefi t in the case of employment injury is prescribed in the relevant sections. 
Entitlement to compensation for work injury and occupational disease by the 
employer is based on Act No. 262/2006 Coll., Labour Code.186 It prescribes the 
contingency, the content of the diff erent compensations provided, and the 
conditions for entitlement.
Th e Czech Republic has exempted the parts on employment injury from the 
ratifi cation of ILO C102 and the ECSS. Th erefore it is not bound by any up-to-
date international instrument on this point. However, the pre-war conventions 
on workmen’s compensation have been ratifi ed, and, although not open for new 
ratifi cations, they are still valid.187
183 Act 266/2006 Coll. on Occupational Accidents.
184 Information obtained from experts.
185 For a description of these principles on solidarity and state responsibility, see section 2.5.
186 Act No. 262/2006 Coll., Labour Code, Arts. 274, 365–393.
187 ILO Convention 17 on Workmen’s Compensation (Accidents), 1925 and ILO Convention 42 
on Workmen’s Compensation (Occupational Diseases), 1934.
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Administration and fi nancing
Administration of fi nancial compensation in the case of work injuries or 
occupational diseases is in the hands of the employer and the insurance company. 
Employers are ex lege insured for liability for such compensation. Th e rate of the 
insurance contributions is determined by a governmental decree.
3.9.2 MATERIAL SCOPE
Th e Czech Labour Code defi nes the contingency as damage caused by industrial 
injuries and occupational diseases.188 Th e defi nition comprises loss of earnings, 
pain and lesser employability, costs related to medical treatment, and material 
damage. In the case of an employee’s death, it additionally comprises costs 
related to the employee’s funeral, costs of the survivors’ maintenance, and a lump 
sum indemnifi cation to the survivors.
3.9.3 PERSONAL SCOPE
All employees are covered for fi nancial compensation by the employer. For the 
general insurance schemes, see the relevant sections.
3.9.4 DIFFERENT BENEFITS
Medical care
Medical treatment is covered by public health care insurance, as described in 
section 3.5.4. Any other necessary costs for medical treatment fall under the 
employer’s liability.
Incapacity for work benefi t
In the case of loss of earnings as a result of temporary incapacity for work, the 
employee receives a sickness benefi t, as described in section 3.6. On top of that, 
the employer shall compensate the diff erence between the employee’s average 
earnings before the occurrence of damage and the sickness benefi t. In the case of 
incapacity for work which likely to be permanent, an invalidity pension is 
provided, as described in section 3.12. Additionally, the employer shall 
compensate the diff erence between the employee’s average earnings before the 
188 Act No. 262/2006 Coll., Labour Code, Art. 365.
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occurrence of the damage and the earnings attained aft er the industrial injury or 
disease, including the disability pension paid due to the same cause.
Survivors’ benefi t
Compensation for the cost of survivors’ maintenance shall be paid by the 
employer to the dependents of the deceased, until the duty to maintain the 
dependents has ended. Th e compensation shall amount to 50 percent of the 
deceased employee’s average earnings if he maintained (or was under the duty to 
maintain) one person, or 80 percent if he maintained two or more persons. Th is 
amount shall be reduced by the pension benefi t awarded to the survivors.
3.9.5 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
No qualifying conditions are required of an employee for entitlement to fi nancial 
compensation. For the general schemes, see the relevant sections.
3.9.6 COMPARISON WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS189
Reasons for non ratifi cation
Th e public insurance schemes do not comply with the international standards in 
respect of employment injury on several points. For example, the rules on 
co-payment by insured persons for home visits by a family doctor, in-patient 
care, and prescription pharmaceuticals are in confl ict with ILO C102 and the 
European Code, which do not allow any cost-sharing in the case of employment 
injury. Furthermore, the prescribed levels of the diff erent benefi ts in the case of 
employment injury are higher than the normal sickness benefi ts and pensions. 
Th e invalidity benefi t in particular is too low to comply with any of the 
international standards. On other points the minimum standards are largely 
met, for example, in relation to the personal scope, and the qualifying periods. 
Under the conventions, no qualifying periods may be required. Accordingly, in 
the Czech Pension Act, all qualifying periods are waved in the case of 
employment injury.
It must be mentioned here that employers’ liability for the provision of benefi ts is 
not ruled out as a principle. If such a private form of social protection is 
189 For a detailed description of the international norms regarding employment injury, see 
section 2.13.
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implemented in line with the principles on solidarity and state responsibility 
incorporated in the international standards, it may be taken into account for 
compliance with the standards. Th e issue of privatisation of social security will 




Family benefi ts in the Czech Republic are covered by the state social support 
system, through which the state participates in certain costs of living, 
particularly those of families with children.190 Family support comprises a 
number of benefi ts, some of which are provided irrespective of income, and 
some of which are (as of 1993) dependent on the level of family income.191 Th e 
income related benefi ts are child allowance, social allowance, and housing 
allowance. Irrespective of income, the following benefi ts are granted: parental 
allowance, foster care benefi ts, birth grant, and funeral grant. Of all state social 
support benefi ts, child allowance is the most important and can be supplemented, 
under specifi c conditions, by the other above-mentioned benefi ts. For the 
purpose of this study, only child allowance is taken into account, since the 
nature of this benefi t corresponds best with family benefi ts as prescribed in the 
conventions.
Legislation
Th e state social support is regulated by Act No. 117/1995 Coll. on State Social 
Support. As the amount of the benefi t is related to the income of the family and 
the family’s subsistence level, Act No. 110/2006 Coll. on Living and Subsistence 
Minimum is additionally relevant. Th is Act came into force in January 2007, 
substituting Act No. 463/1991 Coll. on Subsistence Level.
At the international level, the Czech Republic is bound by Part VII on Family 
Benefi t of both ILO C102 and the ECSS.
190 Website of the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs, state social support; ECSS Report (Cz) 
IV, Arts. 39–40; ILO C102 Report (Cz) 1999, Art. 40; OECD 2005, p. 10; MISSOC (Cz), 2007, 
Family benefi ts.
191 Coulter 1997, pp. 314–316; Mácha 2001, pp. 93–102; Tröster & Vysokajová 2006, points 199–
247.
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Administration and fi nancing
Th e administration of the state social support benefi ts is undertaken mainly by 
the labour offi  ces and the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs. Th e Ministry is 
authorised by law to supervise the system. Th e costs of the benefi ts are entirely 
fi nanced by the state, as the system is funded by taxes. Th e child allowance is 
paid on the basis of an application, which has to be submitted on behalf of the 
dependent child by their legal guardian. Th e allowance for a minor child is paid 
to the person taking care of the child; in the case of a dependent major, it is paid 
directly to them.192
3.10.2 MATERIAL SCOPE
Th e child benefi t is a long-term benefi t provided to families with dependent 
children.193 For the purpose of the state social support, a family is understood to 
mean the cohabitation of parents and dependent children in a common 
household. A child is considered dependent at least until the termination of 
compulsory education. Education is compulsory for 9 school years, but at the 
latest, until the child reaches 17 years of age. Aft er compulsory education has 
ended, the child is considered dependent only under specifi c conditions until the 
age of 26 years as a maximum. Th ese conditions include that the child is being 
trained systematically for a future profession, or that the child is not able to do 
so, or to perform a gainful activity, due to an unfavourable health condition, 
illness or (accidental) injury.
3.10.3 PERSONAL SCOPE
According to the Act on State Social Support, all dependent children are covered 
by the system, provided that the family’s income does not exceed a specifi ed 
amount related to the minimum family subsistence level. Until 31 December 
2007, the children of families with an income of up to 4 times the subsistence 
level were covered, and as of 2008 this was downsized to families with an income 
of up to 2.4 times the subsistence level. In terms of the conventions, this means 
that all residents, whose means during the contingency do not exceed prescribed 
192 Tröster & Vysokajová 2006, points 214–215.
193 Website of the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs, state social support; Ministry of Labour 
and Social Aff airs (Cz) 2009, p. 27; Tröster & Vysokajová 2006, points 207–210; ECSS Reports 
(Cz) IV and V, Arts. 39–40.
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limits, are covered.194 Assets and property are not tested in this context.195 In 
2008 approximately 38 percent of all dependent children were provided with 
child benefi t.196
3.10.4 BENEFITS
Amount of the benefi t
Until 31 December 2007, the benefi t was calculated as a percentage of the child’s 
minimum subsistence level, fi xed by the Act on Living and Subsistence 
Minimum, whose percentage depended on the income of the family.197 Th e 
higher the family income, the smaller the percentage rate of the child’s minimum 
subsistence level. Since 1 January 2008, the monthly benefi t depends on the age 
of the child: CZK 500 for children up to 6 years, CZK 610 for children of 6–15 
years, and CZK 700 for children of 15–26 years. For the calculation of the benefi t, 
no distinction is made between fi rst, second, or subsequent children.
For the purpose of comparison with the conventions, the amount of child benefi t 
should be assessed at a general level and not, contrary to the other benefi ts, in 
relation to a standard benefi ciary. Th e total expenditure on child benefi t has to 
be calculated in relation to a fi xed percentage of the gross salary of an unskilled 
worker, multiplied by the total number of (protected) children.
Calculation example198
In 2008, the expenditure on child benefi t amounted to CZK 6.2 billion.
Th e average gross salary of an unskilled worker was CZK 14,685.
Th e number of dependent children of all residents was 2,310,600.
Th e total monthly expenditure, divided by the number of children and the average salary, gives 
a percentage of the average salary of an unskilled worker:
6,200,000,000 (expenditure) / 12 (months) / 2,310,600 (children) / 14,685 (salary) = 0.015.
In conclusion, in 2008 the total value of monthly child benefi t represented 1.5 
percent of the average gross wage of an unskilled labourer, multiplied by the total 
number of dependent children of all residents.
194 ECSS, Art. 41 (b).
195 Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs (Cz) 2009, p. 28; Mácha 2001, p. 95.
196 ECSS Report (Cz) VI, Art. 41.
197 ECSS Report (Cz) VI, Art. 42.
198 Numbers and amounts from ECSS Report (Cz) VII. Th e exchange rate of the Czech Koruna 
on 1 January 2008 was €1.00 to CZK 26.52.
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Duration of the benefi t
Th e benefi t is paid throughout the contingency.
3.10.5 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
Th e only qualifying condition for entitlement to the child allowance is 
permanent residence in the territory of the Czech Republic.199 For the purpose 
of the state social support benefi ts (to which the child benefi t belongs), equal 
status as permanent residents is granted to foreigners with temporary residence, 
however, only 365 days aft er their registration in the territory of the Czech 
Republic.200 No further qualifi cation period is required, and the right to child 
benefi t does not depend on participation in the pension scheme or health 
insurance system.
3.10.6 COMPARISON WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS201
Matters of compliance
Th e defi nition of child allowance in the Czech legislation corresponds with the 
rules of ILO C102 and the ECSS – both ratifi ed – that specify the contingency as 
‘responsibility for the maintenance of children as prescribed.’202 Th is rather 
vague specifi cation covers the Czech regulation regarding dependent children. 
Th e total cost of child benefi ts, representing 1.5 percent of the average wage of an 
unskilled labourer multiplied by the number of children of all residents, is equal 
to the requirements of ILO C102 and the ECSS, but does not meet any of the 
higher standards. Regarding the qualifying conditions, according to ILO C102, 
one year of residence may be required, whereas the ECSS allows for only six 
months of residence as a qualifying term. Th is means that, with regard to non-
nationals, the requirements of ILO C102 are also fulfi lled. Compliance with the 
ECSS on this point will be discussed in the following section. With regard to the 
duration of the benefi t, the child allowance stops when the dependency of the 
child, according to the Czech legislation, has come to an end, which complies 
with the international provisions.
199 Act No. 117/1995 Coll. on State Social Support, Section 3.
200 Act No. 326/199 Coll. on Foreigners’ residence in the territory of the Czech Republic.
201 For a detailed description of the international norms regarding family benefi ts, see section 
2.14.
202 ILO Convention 102, Art. 40; ECSS, Art. 40, ECSS (Revised), Art. 45.
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Problematic issues
To prove compliance with ILO C102 in respect of the personal coverage of family 
benefi ts, the Czech Republic has availed itself to the option of coverage of all 
residents whose means do not exceed certain limits.203 Since the Czech child 
benefi t is income tested, this is the only suitable option. Th e other options, 
coverage of prescribed classes of employees or economically active persons 
constituting at least a given percentage of all employees or residents, may not be 
used in combination with a means or income test. Th e problem here is that the 
only option that leaves room for an income test is not included in the provision 
of the ECSS: in Article 41 only the fi rst two options of ILO C102, relating to 
employees and economically active persons, are replicated. As a consequence, 
under the ECSS income tested child benefi t is not allowed. Strangely enough, no 
remarks were made on this point in the conclusions on the application of the 
ECSS. Th e reason for this might be that, fi rstly, according to the ECSS, the total 
amount spent on family benefi ts is suffi  cient, and secondly, that in the Revised 
ECSS the third option has been restored, which indicates that a prohibition on 
income tested family benefi ts is not a matter of principle (any more). It must be 
recognised however, that since the amendments of 2008, the means test implies 
that the standard benefi ciary is no longer entitled to child benefi t. Th is has major 
implications regarding the assessment of the replacement rates of benefi ts, since 
in most cases child allowance has to be added both to the previous earnings and 
to the benefi ts. It remains to be seen how the Committee of Ministers will 
respond to this development.
Th e Committee of Ministers has remarked on the qualifying period of one year 
of residence for foreigners with temporary residence in the Czech Republic. 
Where ILO C102 allows for a period of one year of residence, under the ECSS a 
qualifying period of only six months of residence is allowed. In its last report, 
the Czech government defended this requirement by introducing a semantic 
diff erence between ‘temporary residence’ and ‘ordinary residence’. It was argued 
that the provision in the ECSS refers to ‘ordinary residence’ only and that the 
Czech rule therefore complies with the ECSS, requiring no qualifying period for 
foreigners with the status of permanent residence. However, this unsubstantial 
argument is not convincing, since the international instruments do not give the 
lead for such a diff erence in any provision.
203 ILO Convention 102, Art. 41; ILO C102 Report (Cz) 1999, Art. 41.
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Summary of matters of compliance and problematic issues
Table VI. Family benefi t (Cz) compared with the international standards
Th e Czech Republic is bound by the ECSS and ILO C102
Family 
benefi t












ECSS: An income 
test is not allowed.





✓ Total child benefi t 
expenditure is too 
low.
Total child benefi t 







ECSS: 365 days for 
foreigners with 
temporary 
residence is not 
allowed.
365 days for 
foreigners with 
temporary 
residence is not 
allowed.
365 days for 
foreigners with 
temporary 
residence is not 
allowed.




Under the Czech legislation, maternity benefi t comprises several elements. 
Firstly, there is medical care in connection with pregnancy and childbirth under 
the general health system. Th en, there are two diff erent cash allowances granted 
to women for reasons of pregnancy and maternity that are embedded in the 
compulsory sickness insurance system, however, requiring diff erent qualifying 
conditions. A wage compensation is provided to female employees who have 
been transferred to a diff erent job because the work they carried out previously is 
prohibited for pregnant women and mothers with a baby under nine months of 
age, or whose previous work would endanger their pregnancy or maternity. 
Maternity benefi t is paid during maternity leave. Th e maternity benefi t is usually 
payable for a period of 28 weeks of maternity leave, provided that the woman 
suff ers loss of income from the work on which the benefi t is based. In this study 
only medical care and maternity benefi t during maternity leave is taken into 
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account. Th e compensatory benefi t is left  out of consideration, since this is, in 
fact, a surplus to the maternity benefi t that is not catered for in the conventions.
Legislation
Act No. 187/2006 Coll. on Sickness Insurance determines the personal scope, 
conditions for recognising claims to the benefi ts, duration of the benefi ts, the 
method of calculation, and gives additional rules concerning specifi c groups of 
persons entitled to benefi ts, such as citizens who are registered as jobseekers. 
Furthermore, Act No. 48/1997 Coll. on Public Health Insurance regulates 
medical care in relation to pregnancy and maternity.
At the international level, the Czech Republic is bound by Part VIII on Maternity 
Benefi t of both ILO C102 and the ECSS. ILO C130, covering medical care and 
sickness benefi ts, does not contain specifi c rules for maternity.
Administration and fi nancing
As for the administration and fi nancing, medical care in the case of pregnancy 
and delivery is covered by the public health insurance, and cash maternity 
benefi ts fall under the general sickness insurance. Th erefore, it suffi  ces here to 
refer the reader to section 3.5.1 concerning medical care, and section 3.6.1 
concerning sickness benefi t.
3.11.2 MATERIAL SCOPE
According the Czech regulations, the covered social events are pregnancy, 
childbirth, and their consequences.204 As regards the cash benefi t, these social 
events have to involve a loss of earnings. Although the Czech regulations do not 
explicitly defi ne when there is a loss of earnings, it has been made clear that it only 
covers a complete stoppage of earnings due to absence from work. Finally, a benefi t 
is also granted to employees who have taken a child into permanent care.205
3.11.3 PERSONAL SCOPE
For compliance with the conventions, the Czech Republic refers to the option of 
coverage relating to a percentage of all employees, and for medical benefi t, also the 
wives of men in these classes. For cash benefi ts, all women participating in sickness 
204 ECSS Report (Cz) IV, Art. 47.
205 MISSOC (Cz), 2007, maternity; Tröster & Vysokajová 2006, points 275–276.
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insurance are covered, which means that all female employees are protected, 
because sickness insurance is compulsory for employees. Since sickness insurance 
is not open to employees who earn less than CZK 2,000 per month, employed 
women with such small labour contracts are not covered. Self-employed women 
are covered on a voluntary basis. Th e personal coverage of health care provided 
during pregnancy and maternity includes all women who have permanent 
residence in the Czech Republic or who work in the territory of the Czech Republic 
for an employer with the registered offi  ce in the territory of the Czech Republic.206 
Th e right to health care is ascribed on individual basis, entitlement on the basis of 
insurance of the spouse is not recognised in the Czech system.
3.11.4 BENEFITS
Benefi ts in kind
Th e general health system comprises pre-natal and post-natal care, including 
confi nement care and hospital care. As mentioned in section 3.5.4, medical care 
was free of charge until out-patient fees were introduced in 2008 to combat the 
relatively high frequency of doctors visits by the Czech citizens and the excessive 
use of medication. Some exemptions are regulated for pregnancy related care, 
namely, the fi rst three doctors visits or drug prescriptions aft er the confi rmation 
of the pregnancy.207 However, for emergency care and hospitalisation, the general 
rules apply, thus also imposing out-of-pocket payments for each day spent in 
hospital on pregnant women and their newborn babies.
Benefi ts in cash
Similar to sickness benefi ts, maternity benefi ts are periodical payments 
consisting of a fi xed percentage rate of the daily assessment base. In the case of 
maternity, in 2008 the rate was 69 percent of the daily assessment base.208 Th e 
daily base is, roughly, the average income subject to social security and state 
employment policy contributions per day of the claimant. Th e decisive period for 
calculation is usually the period of 12 calendar months before the calendar 
month in which the maternity leave starts. Th e daily assessment base is reduced 
if it exceeds prescribed amounts, which are the same as in respect of sickness 
benefi ts.209 During the whole period of leave, the amount up to the fi rst reduction 
206 See section 3.5.3.
207 ECSS Report (Cz) VI, Art. 10.
208 In 2009 the rate was set at 70 percent, and in 2010 it was reduced to 60 percent, which is 
similar to sickness benefi t.
209 In 2009, the fi rst reduction limit was CZK 786, the second reduction limit was CZK 1,178 and 
the third reduction limit was CZK 2,356 (website of the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Aff airs).
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limit is fully counted, of the amount between the fi rst and second limit, 60 
percent is counted, and of the amount between the second and the third 
reduction limit, 30 percent is counted. Th e amount of income exceeding the 
third reduction limit is not taken into consideration.210 Th e standard benefi ciary 
is a woman, which implies that child allowance is not taken into account.
Calculation example211
In 2008, the monthly average gross salary of a skilled worker (metal lathe operator) was CZK 
24,757, which is the calculation base. Converted to the daily assessment base, the amount was 
CZK 814. In 2009, the reduction limits were fi xed at CZK 786, of which 90 percent was counted, 
CZK 1,178, of which 60 percent was counted, and CZK 2,356, of which 30 percent was counted. 
Th e average daily assessment base of a skilled worker was reduced by the fi rst and second limit; 
it did not exceed the third limit.
Reduced daily assessment base:
(786 * 0.90) + (28 * 0.60) = CZK 725
Daily maternity benefi t:
60% of CZK 725 = CZK 435
Monthly maternity benefi t: 30 * 435 = CZK 13,050
Th e average net salary of a skilled worker in 2008 was CZK 18,720. Th e ratio between the 
maternity benefi t, which is not subject to taxation, and the average net income, was 
CZK 13,050 / CZK 18,720 = 0.697.
In conclusion, the replacement rate of the maternity benefi t of a standard 
benefi ciary, compared to the reference wage, amounted to 69.7 percent in 2009, 
however, based on wage data of 2008.
Duration of the benefi t
Maternity benefi ts are paid out for a period of 28 weeks, starting no later than at 
the beginning of the sixth week before the anticipated date of childbirth. Th e 
period is extended to 37 weeks for women who have given birth to more than 
one child at the same time, and who are taking care of at least two of these 
children. Th e period is also extended to 37 weeks for women who are single 
210 ECSS (Cz) report V; website of the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs.
211 Amounts given in ECSS Report (Cz) VI and VII. According to Art. 65 of the ECSS, the 
calculation must be based on fi gures from the same year. At the time of writing (2009), the 
average wage of a standard benefi ciary in 2009 was not yet available in the reports of the 
government. However, because it would not be expedient to make the calculations according 
to the old Sickness Insurance Act, the new calculation method with the new reduction limits 
have been taken into account. As a result, the example is based on the wages of 2008, but the 
benefi t is calculated according to the rules and reduction limits of 2009. Th is means that the 
calculation is not accurately performed according to the international standards, but it can 
still serve as an indication of the ratio between previous income and the sickness benefi t. Th e 
exchange rate of the Czech Koruna on 1 January 2008 was €1.00 to CZK 26.52.
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mothers, widows, divorced and/or living on their own (without a spouse) for 
other legitimate reasons.212 Medical care in relation to pregnancy, childbirth and 
their consequences is not subject to any time limit.
3.11.5 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
Th e main condition for entitlement to maternity benefi t for an employee is 
participation in sickness insurance for at least 270 days during the two years 
preceding the childbirth. A self-employed woman must have participated in 
sickness insurance for at least 180 days during the year preceding the birth. 
Other conditions are suspension of earnings from the employment in which the 
maternity benefi t is granted, and a doctor’s note confi rming pregnancy. For 
medical care, no qualifying conditions are required, apart from permanent 
residence in the territory of the Czech Republic.
3.11.6 COMPARISON WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS213
Matters of compliance
With regard to the defi nition of the risk covered, the Czech system provides for 
medical care in the event of pregnancy and delivery, including hospitalisation. 
Furthermore, cash allowances are paid to substitute for the loss of income due to 
these events. According to the Czech system, the suspension of earnings has to 
be total. Th is is all in keeping with the conventions. ILO C102 and the ECSS 
prescribe the contingency covered to include pregnancy and confi nement and 
their consequences, and the suspension of earnings, as defi ned by national laws 
or regulations. Th e addition of the phrase ‘as defi ned by national laws or 
regulations’ leaves room for the governments to decide whether the loss of 
earnings may be total or partial. Neither the Protocol on the ECSS and the ECSS 
(Revised), nor ILO C102 and ILO C183, add other elements to the material scope. 
On this point, therefore, the Czech system complies with all instruments.
Th e personal scope regarding cash benefi ts, covering all women employees, is 
also in line with the ratifi ed international standards. A more extensive coverage 
in respect of cash benefi ts is set by ILO C183, which demands protection of all 
employed women, including those in atypical forms of dependent work. Th e 
212 Website of the Czech Social Security Administration.
213 For a detailed description of the international norms regarding maternity benefi ts, see section 
2.15.
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exclusion from sickness insurance of women who earn less than CZK 2,000 
means that this Convention cannot be met. Th e requirement of the ECSS 
(Revised) that all employed women, including female apprentices, should be 
protected, is also be problematic for that reason, although here the possibility is 
given of excluding specifi c categories of employees, as long as they do not 
constitute more than 10 percent of all employees.
In respect of the level of the benefi ts, the example above shows that the maternity 
benefi t amounts to 69.7 percent of the average net wage of a skilled worker. Th is 
percentage is fully suffi  cient, as the replacement rates prescribed by the 
conventions vary from 45 percent in ILO C102, to two thirds of the previous 
income in ILO C183. Th e duration of the cash benefi t of at least 28 weeks is also 
more than suffi  cient in comparison with the international standards, since the 
longest given period, in both the ECSS (Revised) and ILO C183, is 14 weeks.
Th e qualifying period for entitlement to maternity benefi ts – which is 270 days of 
participation in sickness insurance during the preceding two years – is 
compatible with the intention of the conventions. All conventions contain the 
vague statement that ‘a qualifying period considered necessary to preclude abuse’ 
may be prescribed. It has been found from the preparatory works concerning 
ILO C102 that a qualifying period of ten months preceding the childbirth would 
be acceptable.214 Th e Czech regulation falls within this guideline.
Problematic issues
Problematic in view of the conventions, is the personal scope regarding maternity 
medical care. According to ILO C102 and the ECSS, ‘all women in prescribed 
classes of employees, which classes constitute not less than 50 percent of all 
employees, and, for maternity medical benefi t, also the wives of men in these 
classes’ should be protected. Where in ILO C183 the latter requirement is left  
out, the ratifi ed standards require women who are not insured in their own right 
to be covered by their spouse’s insurance, which demonstrates the special focus 
on maternity protection in the international instruments. Th e Czech system, 
however, does not provide for such derived rights. Although theoretically, and 
maybe even principally, this is not in line with the international standards, it 
does not result in a substantial confl ict because all women with permanent 
residence in the Czech Republic are covered, as well as women who do not have 
permanent residence but who work for an employer with permanent residence. 
Still, a small coverage gap may exist, for instance, for the wives of employees who 
are not permanent residents but who work for an employer with permanent 
residence in the country.
214 See section 2.15.4.
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A more substantial problem concerns cost-sharing for maternity medical care. 
Since the amendments of the Health Insurance Act (valid as of January 2008), 
the fees for medication, doctors visits and prescriptions, hospitalisation, and 
emergency care which are levied on the patient, constitute an infringement of 
ILO C102 and the ECSS. According to all relevant international standards, 
medical care in the event of pregnancy, childbirth, or their consequences should 
be free of charge.215 Although the fi xed amounts may not be very high, imposing 
out-of-pocket payments is against the principles of maternity protection because 
of its discriminatory eff ect. Th e limited exemptions for pregnant women in the 
Czech regulations do not repair this defi cit. In its report on 2007/2008, the 
government explained the rules on cost-sharing extensively, and concluded with 
the statement that ‘[i]n cases of pregnancy, childbirth and its consequences no 
participation on the costs of treatment provided is required.’216 However, a 
thorough investigation of the regulations shows that this conclusion is not 
accurate. So far, the supervising bodies have not commented on this, but when 
they assess the rules, a critical observation will certainly follow.217
Summary of matters of compliance and problematic issues
Table VII. Maternity benefi t (Cz) compared with the international standards
Th e Czech Republic is bound by ILO C102 and the ECSS
Maternity
benefi t




ILO C183 ECSS Rev. (1990)
Material 
scope
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Personal 
scope
No derived right 
to medical care for 
wives of insured 
persons.
No derived right 
to medical care for 
wives of insured 
persons.
Women who earn 
less than CZK 
2,000 are not 
insured.
No derived right 
to medical care for 




















✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Qualifying 
periods
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
✓ = compliance of national provisions with the international standards.
215 See section 2.15.3.
216 ECSS Report (Cz) VI, p. 12.
217 For a further discussion on the issue of cost-sharing, see section 6.2.3.




Care for people with disabilities is provided through pension insurance, state 
social support, social assistance, and tax relief.218 Under the socialist philosophy, 
the care was strongly focused on income compensation rather than on activation 
and rehabilitation. Since the late 1990s, the government has set up several labour 
market programmes and fi nancial incentives to encourage the employment of 
persons with disabilities. Still, the relatively high unemployment rate among this 
population has increased over the years. It has also been reported that there are 
still relatively large numbers of persons with disabilities in institutions.219 
However, in this section only the element of income compensation will be 
assessed, which is part of the pension insurance that also covers old-age pensions. 
Th erefore, at several points reference will be made to the section on old-age 
pension.
Legislation
With regard to legislation concerning invalidity insurance, the same legislation 
applies as in respect of old age: Act No. 155/1995 Coll. on Pension Insurance and 
Act No. 582/1991 Coll. on the Organisation and Implementation of Social 
Security. Th e Czech Republic does not have any special acts defi ning the rights 
and obligation of disabled persons.220 Because the Czech system does not provide 
for a separate scheme for employment injury, this section concerns invalidity, 
irrespective of the cause of it.
At the international level, with regard to invalidity pensions the Czech Republic 
has ratifi ed Part IX of ILO Convention 102, as well as of the European Code of 
Social Security. ILO Convention 128 has not been ratifi ed in respect of 
invalidity.
Administration and fi nancing
In connection with the administration and fi nancing of the invalidity pensions, 
it is suffi  cient to refer the reader to the section regarding old age.
218 Tröster & Vysokajová 2006, points 410–439; Biskup & Kotrusová 2002; website of the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs.
219 Shima & Rodrigues 2009, p. 24.
220 Tröster & Vysokajová 2006, point 474.
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3.12.2 MATERIAL SCOPE
Until 2010, the Czech invalidity pension scheme covered full and partial 
disability.221 A person protected was fully disabled if their ability to perform 
continuous gainful activities had dropped at least by 66 percent due to their long-
term unfavourable health condition. Additionally, a person was considered fully 
disabled if they were able to work only under completely extraordinary 
conditions due to their physical disability. Partial disability included a decrease 
of between 33 and 66 percent of the person’s ability to work, due to their long-
term unfavourable health condition. It additionally included a long-term 
unfavourable health condition that made the person’s general living conditions 
considerably more diffi  cult.222
From 2010, a new defi nition of disability has been in eff ect, abolishing the 
principle division between full and partial disability. Th e idea is to have one 
single type of disability in three degrees, depending on the percentage decrease 
in working capacity of the insured person. Th e fi rst degree relates to a decrease in 
working capacity of between 35 and 49 percent. Th e second degree concerns a 
reduction of between 50 and 69 percent, while the third degree covers a reduction 
of 70 percent or more. It has been estimated that around 75 percent of insured 
persons who were categorised as partially disabled will fall within the fi rst degree, 
which will result in a reduction in pension. Th e remaining 25 percent will be 
categorised in the second degree, which will not aff ect the level of the pension.
3.12.3 PERSONAL SCOPE
Th e personal coverage corresponds with the coverage of the old-age benefi t. On 
the whole, all economically active persons are insured, either employed or self-
employed. Otherwise, the reader should refer to the section 3.8.3 on old age.
3.12.4 BENEFITS
Amount of the benefi t
Similar to the old-age benefi t, invalidity benefi t comprises two components – a 
fl at rate basic part and a percentage sum depending on the previous income of 
the benefi ciary and on the number of insured years. Th e percentage part is 
221 Tröster & Vysokajová 2006, points 410–439.
222 Act No. 155/1995 Coll. on Pension Insurance, sections 38 and 43; ECSS Report (Cz) IV, Arts. 
53 and 54.
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subject to a prescribed minimum. For third degree invalidity benefi ts, the 
percentage part amounts to 1.5 percent of the calculation base for each year of 
insurance; for second degree invalidity it is 0.75 percent for each year of 
insurance; and for fi rst degree invalidity it amounts to 0.5 percent for each year 
of insurance.223 Th e total number of insured years includes the time between the 
date on which the person qualifi ed for invalidity benefi t and the person’s 
retirement age – the so-called ‘additional period’ that is, in fact, counted in 
advance. Th e additional period is not taken into account if the disability is caused 
by self-infl icted injury, or if it is the result of a wilful criminal off ence of the 
benefi ciary. Th e determination of the calculation base, the use of reduction 
limits, and the calculation of the total benefi t work in a similar way as in relation 
to the old-age benefi t.  
Calculation example224
Th e average gross salary of a skilled worker (a qualifi ed metal lathe operator) in 2008 was CZK 
24,757, which is the calculation base. In 2008, the reduction limits were fi xed at CZK 10,000 and 
CZK 24,800 respectively. Th e calculation base is only reduced by the fi rst limit, because it does 
not exceed the second limit.
CZK 10,000 × 100% = CZK 10,000
(24,757 – 10,000) × 30% = CZK 4,427
Reduced calculation base = CZK 14,427
Th e percentage sum for thirty years of insurance is 30 years * 1.5 percent * CZK 14,427 = CZK 
6,492.225
Together with the basic sum of CZK 1,700 and the family benefi t for two children amounting to 
CZK 1,220, the monthly full invalidity benefi t aft er 15 insurance years amounted to CZK 9,412.
Th e average net salary of a skilled worker with a dependent spouse and two children in 2008 
amounted to CZK 23,790. Th e ratio between the full invalidity benefi t, which is not subject to 
taxation, and the average net income was CZK 9,412 / CZK 23,790 = 0.396. 
In conclusion, in 2008 the replacement rate of the invalidity pension of a standard 
benefi ciary, compared to the reference wage and calculated in a way as prescribed 
223 Website of the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs, Invalidity.
224 Th e calculation is based on data given in the ECSS reports (Cz) VI and VII, Art. 56. According 
to Art. 65 of ILO C102 and the ECSS, the wage of the skilled employee, the benefi t and the 
family allowances must be calculated on the same time basis. However, in its reports on the 
ECSS, the government takes data from diff erent years, namely, the wage from one year earlier 
than the reduction limits, the basic sum, and child benefi t. In this example, this is corrected, 
resulting in a lower replacement rate than stated in the reports of the government. Th e 
exchange rate of the Czech Koruna on 1 January 2008 was €1.00 to CZK 26.52.
225 Th e calculation is based on 30 insurance years instead of 15 years, as prescribed in the ECSS, 
because according to the Czech rules, the period from the date of entitlement to the benefi t 
until the retirement age is added to the number of ‘real’ insurance years. Th us, if a person 
becomes permanently incapable of work at the age of 29 and has paid contributions for only 5 
years, for the calculation of their pension, the 35 years until their pensionable age will also be 
taken into account.
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in Article 65 of the ECSS, amounted to 39.6 percent. Accumulation of the 
invalidity pension and earnings from work is allowed without limitations.
Duration of the benefi t
Disability pensions are paid during the whole period of invalidity. Upon reaching 
the retirement age, the benefi ciary can apply for an old-age pension if this is 
greater than the invalidity pension.
Adjustment to the cost of living
Th e benefi ts are regularly adjusted in the same way as the old-age benefi ts.
3.12.5 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
Entitlement to an invalidity pension is conditional on the achievement of a 
prescribed insurance period. Th e required period for an insured person up to 20 
years of age is less than one year; for a person between 20 and 22 years, it is one 
year, and so forth, up to fi ve years before the occurrence of the disability for a 
person older than 28 years.226 However, an insurance period is not required if 
the disability is caused by an industrial accident or occupational disease, or if the 
disability occurred before the insured person reached 18 years of age. Th e only 
condition for entitlement in these cases is the insured person’s permanent 
residence in the territory of Czech Republic.227
Furthermore, for entitlement to a disability pension, the insured person should 
not be entitled to old-age pension on the day the disability occurs, and, if the 
person receives an early retirement benefi t, they should not have reached the 
retirement age.228
3.12.6 COMPARISON WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS229
Matters of compliance
Th e defi nition of invalidity in the Czech legislation corresponds with the rules 
of ILO C102 and the ECSS, as well as with ILO C128, which are similar on this 
point. All these instruments require benefi t to be provided to a person 
226 Act No. 155/1995 Coll. on Pension Insurance, Section 40.
227 ECSS Report (Cz) IV, Art. 57; website of the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs.
228 Tröster & Vysokajová 2006, point 413.
229 For a detailed description of the international norms regarding invalidity benefi ts, see section 
2.16.
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protected who is unable to engage in any gainful activity, to an extent 
prescribed, and whose disability is likely to be permanent. Th e Czech system – 
providing a full benefi t to a person who is not able to perform continuous 
gainful activities and whose working capacity has dropped by at least 70 
percent – meets these regulations. However, the ECSS Protocol requires the 
prescribed pension to be paid in the case of a decreased working capacity of 
two thirds. Th e ECSS (Revised) envisages a broader concept of disability, not 
connected to loss of work or earnings, and is therefore left  out with this 
overview. Th e Czech law additionally provides for a smaller pension in the case 
of loss of earnings capacity from 35 to 70 percent, which is not prescribed by 
the conventions, unless the disability is caused by employment injury or 
occupational disease.
Th e personal scope of the pension system is amply suffi  cient, covering all 
employees as well as self-employed persons, where only 50 percent coverage of 
all employees is required by ILO C102 and the ESCC. Additionally, the 
obligations of ILO C128 (75 percent), the ESCC Protocol (80 percent), and the 
ESCC Revised (80 percent of the economically active population) are satisfi ed. 
As regards the amount of the invalidity benefi t, the calculation above shows 
that the amount of the benefi t of a standard benefi ciary – a man with a 
dependent wife and two children – was 39.6 percent of the average salary of a 
skilled worker in 2008. Th is percentage is just below the obligations of the ILO 
C102 and ECSS, which are similarly set on 40 percent if a qualifying period of 
15 years of insurance has been reached. However, if a benefi t is paid aft er only 
5 years of insurance, as is the case in the Czech Republic, the replacement rate 
may be 10 points lower.230 In view of this provision, the Czech invalidity 
benefi t complies with the ratifi ed instruments. Th e unratifi ed norms are not 
met; the ECSS Protocol and ILO C128 both require 40 percent replacement 
rate in combination with a contribution period of 5 years, and the ECSS 
(Revised) requires a rate of 65. Since the benefi t is granted throughout the 
contingency, the duration of the benefi t is in compliance with all relevant 
standards. In conclusion, the same goes for the qualifi cation period of 5 years 
of insurance.
Overall, the Czech Republic satisfi es the obligations of the ratifi ed instruments, 
and at some points also the unratifi ed ones, in respect of invalidity. A point of 
concern however is the system of adjustment of the benefi ts to the cost of living 
and wage increase, which is infl uencing the replacement rate of the invalidity 
benefi t negatively in the same way it does for the old-age benefi t. Statistics 
provided by the government show that the replacement rate is declining 
230 ILO Convention 102, Art. 57 (3); ECSS, Art. 57 (3). See section 2.16.4.
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steadily.231 If no measures are taken, the replacement rate will certainly drop 
further below 40 percent. It is by virtue of the relatively short qualifying period 
that the minimum standards will remain to be met for some years.
Summary of matters of compliance and problematic issues
Table VIII. Invalidity benefi t (Cz) compared with the international standards
Th e Czech Republic is bound by ECSS and ILO C102
Invalidity 
benefi t




ILO C128 (1967) ECSS Rev. (1990)
Material 
scope
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Personal 
scope
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Benefi t: 
amount
✓ Replacement rate 




period of 5 years).
Replacement rate 




period of 5 years).
Replacement rate 




✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Qualifying 
periods
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓




Th e pensions paid in the event of the death of a breadwinner include a pension 
for widows, widowers, and orphans. Th e widow(er)s’ pension is granted for the 
duration of one year to all widow(er)s of an insured person who complied with 
the qualifying conditions, irrespective of the survivor’s situation. Th is fi rst year 
is considered as a period necessary for the surviving spouse to adapt to the new 
situation. Subsequently, a long-term benefi t is available for widow(er)s with 
specifi ed characteristics and in specifi ed circumstances. Since all conventions 
impose a survivors’ benefi t to be paid throughout the contingency, for the 
231 ILO C102 Report (Cz) 2001–2006, Art. 56.
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purpose of this study, only the long-term benefi t, which becomes eff ective one 
year aft er the death of the insured person, is taken into account. All widow(er)s 
who are entitled to the long-term benefi t do, in any case, receive a benefi t during 
the fi rst year as well.
Legislation
As part of the pension scheme, the statutory basis for survivors’ pensions is the 
same as for old-age pensions. Act No. 155/1995 Coll. on Pension Insurance 
regulates the personal and material scope of the insurance, the qualifying 
conditions, and the duration and level of the benefi ts.
At the international level, the country is bound by Part X of ILO C102 and the 
ECSS. With the ratifi cation of ILO C128 the part on survivors’ benefi ts was not 
included.
Administration and fi nancing
With regard to the administration and fi nancing of the survivors’ pensions, it is 
suffi  cient to refer the reader to the section regarding old age.
3.13.2 MATERIAL SCOPE
Th e contingency covers loss of income due to the death of a spouse or, in the case 
of a child, the loss of one or both parents.232 Th e Czech system does not make a 
distinction between a widow and a widower, nor does it distinguish between 
whether the deceased parent was the father or the mother of the child. A 
widow(er) in the meaning of the Act on Pension Insurance must have been 
legally married to the deceased; cohabitation is not included. To fall within the 
scope of the Act, as of the second year aft er the spouse’s death, the widow(er) 
must fulfi l one of the following criteria:233
– takes care of a dependent child;
– takes care of a child dependent on the care provided by another person in 
levels II, III, or IV (medium, heavy, and total dependency);
– takes care of a parent or the parent of the deceased spouse, who shares the 
household with them and is dependent on the care provided by another 
person in levels II, III, or IV;
232 ECSS Report (Cz) IV, Art. 59; MISSOC (Cz), 2007, Survivors; Tröster & Vysokajová 2006, 
point 44.
233 ECSS Report (Cz) VII, Art. 64; website of the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs, 
pensions.
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– is disabled with the third-degree disability; or
– has reached the retirement age for men, minus 4 years, or the retirement age, 
if the retirement age is lower.
Th e state of being a widow(er) ends upon entering into a new marriage. Th e 
entitlement to the widow pension shall arise again if any of the mentioned 
conditions is met within fi ve years of the previous entitlement to the widow 
pension expiring.
An orphan under the pension system is a dependent child whose (adoptive) 
parent has died. According to the Act on Pension Insurance, a child is 
dependent until the completion of compulsory school attendance (up to 26 
years of age, maximum). Th e state of being an orphan ceases to exist in the case 
of adoption.
3.13.3 PERSONAL SCOPE
Th e personal coverage corresponds with the coverage of the old-age benefi t. By 
and large, the spouses and children of all economically active persons, either 
employed or self-employed, are insured. For further details, the reader should 
refer to the old-age section.
3.13.4 BENEFITS
Amount of the benefi t
Just like the old-age and invalidity benefi t, the survivors’ pension consists of two 
parts: a fl at rate basic part, and a percentage sum depending on the previous 
income of the deceased and on the number of insured years. For the widow(er)s’ 
pension, the percentage sum amounts to 50 percent of the old-age pension, or the 
full invalidity benefi t to which the deceased person was or would have been 
entitled. For the orphan’s pension, the orphan is, for each parent, entitled to 40 
percent of the old-age pension, or the full invalidity benefi t to which the deceased 
person was or would have been entitled.
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Calculation example234
In 2008, the percentage part of the old-age benefi t to be paid to the deceased person for thirty 
years of insurance amounted to = 30 years * 1.5 percent * CZK 14,427 = CZK 6,492.235
Th e percentage sum of the widow(er)s’ pension amounted to 50 percent of CZK 6,492 = 
CZK 3,246.
Together with the basic sum of CZK 1,700, the monthly old-age benefi t amounted to CZK 4,946.
Th e percentage sum of the orphans’ benefi t amounted to 40 percent of CZK 6,492 = CZK 2,597.
Monthly orphans’ benefi t: basic sum + percentage sum = 1,700 + 2,597 = CZK 4,297.
Child benefi ts for two children (ages 6 – 15) = CZK 1220.
Widow(er)s’ pension + orphans’ pension (2 orphans) + child benefi t (2 children):
CZK 4,946 + CZK 8,594 + CZK1,220 = CZK 14,760.
Th e average net salary of a single skilled worker with two children amounted to CZK 20,500. 
Th e ratio between income aft er distribution of the benefi ts and the reference income (net salary 
with child benefi ts for two children): 14,760 / (20,500 + 1,220) = 0.678.
In conclusion, the replacement rate of the survivors’ pension of the standard 
benefi ciary, compared to reference wage, amounted to 67.8 percent in 2008. Th e 
accumulation of a survivors’ pension and earnings from work is allowed, without 
limitation. Furthermore, if a widow(er) is, in addition to a survivors’ pension, 
also entitled to an old-age or invalidity pension, the higher of the pensions will 
be paid out in full (both the basic and percentage amounts), plus one half of the 
percentage amount of the lower pension.
Duration of the benefi t
Th e widow(er)s’ and orphans’ pensions are paid throughout the contingency. Th e 
contingency ceases to exist in case of remarriage of the widow(er) or, in the case 
of a child, with the adoption of the child, or aft er leaving compulsory school, or 
at the age of 26 years.
Adjustment to the cost of living
Th e benefi ts are being regularly adjusted in the same way as the old-age benefi ts.
234 Th e calculation is based on data given in the ECSS reports (Cz) VI and VII, Art. 62. According 
to Art. 65 of ILO C102 and the ECSS, the wage of the skilled employee, the benefi t and the 
family allowances must be calculated on the same time basis. However, in its reports on the 
ECSS, the government takes data from diff erent years, namely, the wage from one year earlier 
than the reduction limits, the basic sum, and child benefi t. In this example, this is corrected, 
resulting in a lower replacement rate than stated in the reports of the government. Th e 
exchange rate of the Czech Koruna on 1 January 2008 was €1.00 to CZK 26.52.
235 See the calculation in the old-age section.
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3.13.5 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
A survivors’ benefi t is conditional upon the insurance period of the deceased 
spouse or parent. A widow(er) or orphan is entitled to a pension if the deceased 
person:236
a. was the benefi ciary of an old-age or invalidity pension; or
b. had complied, as of the day of their death, with the conditions of the required 
insurance period to entitlement to a old-age or invalidity pension.
3.13.6 COMPARISON WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS237
Matters of compliance
In the Czech system, survivors’ pension covers loss of income due to the death of 
a spouse or parent of a dependent child, which corresponds with the international 
provisions. Of the relevant conventions, only the Revised Code includes 
widowers in the defi nition, as does the Czech legislation. As regards the 
defi nition of ‘widow’, the prescribed restrictions to eligibility for a widow(er)s’ 
pension, as described in the material scope section, are in line with the 
conventions, since the benefi t can be made conditional on the incapability of 
self-support of the widow, in accordance with national laws and regulations. 
However, it must be recalled in this respect, that the supervising committees give 
careful consideration to the discretion given to the governments regarding the 
incapability of self-support. Th e recently tightened rule of entitlement to a benefi t 
only where the pensionable age will be reached within four years, may turn out 
rather strict.238
Th e personal scope of the survivors’ insurance is amply suffi  cient, covering all 
employees as well as self-employed persons, where 50 percent coverage of all 
employees is required by ILO C102 and the ESCC, 80 percent by the ECSS 
Protocol, and 100 percent by ILO C128 and the Revised Code. As regards the 
amount of the benefi ts, the calculation shows that the survivors’ pension of a 
standard benefi ciary – a widow with two children – was 67.8 percent of the 
reference wage in 2008. Th is percentage is fully suffi  cient under the ratifi ed 
instruments, as the prescribed replacement rates vary from 40 percent in ILO 
C102 and ECSS, to 45 percent in ILO C128 and the ECSS (Protocol), and 65 
236 Website of the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs, pensions.
237 For a detailed description of the international norms regarding survivors’ benefi ts, see section 
2.17.
238 For more details on the defi nition of ‘widow’, see sections 2.17.1 and 4.13.1.
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percent in the Revised Code. Accordingly, the Czech survivors’ benefi t, granted 
throughout the contingency, complies with all relevant standards.
Overall, in respect of the death of a breadwinner, the Czech Republic satisfi es the 
obligations of the ratifi ed instruments, and for most part, the non-ratifi ed ones 
also. Th e downward impact of the system of adjustment of the benefi ts to the 
cost of living does not, as yet, threaten the compliance with the conventions in 
respect of this contingency.239
Summary of matters of compliance and problematic issues
Table IX. Survivors’ benefi t (Cz) compared with the international standards
Th e Czech Republic is bound by ECSS and ILO C102
Survivors’
benefi t




ILO C128 (1967) ECSS Rev. (1990)
Material scope ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Personal scope ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Benefi t: amount ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Benefi t: duration ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Qualifying 
periods
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Common 
principles
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
✓ = compliance of national provisions with the international standards.
3.14 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Th e Velvet Revolution in 1989 marked the end of the socialist Soviet system in 
Czechoslovakia and the beginning of serious economic and social reforms by the 
socio-liberal federal government. Aft er the split of the Czechoslovakian 
federation in 1993, the initial focus on social reform became overshadowed by 
the political focus on economic progress. Th e reform of the social security system 
turned out to be a slow and lengthy process, not only because of economic 
restraint, but most importantly because of the weak coalition structure of the 
subsequent Czech governments and a series of minority cabinets. Th e reform 
steps that were taken, were motivated by internal factors such as historical 
background, demographic changes, and economic and political realities for the 
239 Th e replacement rate has fallen from 81.8 percent in 2001, to 67.8 percent in 2008: ILO C102 
Report (Cz) 2001–2006, Art. 62.
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greater part, but were also infl uenced by international organisations and 
developments.
Th e international infl uence on social security reform mainly came from the ILO, 
the Council of Europe and, at a later stage, the European Union. First of all, 
shortly aft er regaining independence, the federal government strengthened the 
ties with the ILO. Th e ILO was consulted about the Scenario of Social Reform 
and three social security conventions were ratifi ed. At that point, it was 
established that the proposed social security benefi ts would exceed the standards 
of the ILO conventions. Some years later, in view of EU accession and under 
pressure of the European Commission to ratify the human rights instruments of 
the Council of Europe, the Czech government accepted the Social Charter, 
followed by the ratifi cation of the European Code of Social Security in 2004. 
Over the years, legislation has been kept in line with the Code and the relevant 
ILO conventions to a large extent. When the amount of the pensions dropped 
below the level set by ILO Convention 128, measures were taken to restore 
compliance within one year. Apart from that, as a principle all bills aff ecting 
social security provisions are examined with regard to inconsistencies with the 
international standards.
In accordance with the Constitution of the Czech Republic, international treaties 
are part of the Czech legal order and take precedence over national law. However, 
there is a lack of clarity about the status of many treaties because the 
Constitutional Court, following the Constitution before the Euro-amendment in 
2002, makes a distinction between the legal status of ‘normal’ international 
treaties and human rights treaties. Th is puts the ILO social security conventions 
and the European Code in an unclear position, which may contribute to the fact 
that they have never been invoked before a court as yet. In general, these 
instruments are hardly being used in court proceedings, neither as a legal basis 
for a complaint, nor as a tool for interpretation of national legislation.
Under Vaclav Havel’s presidency, the fi rst federal government attached great 
value to the voice of civil society. In cooperation with the trade unions and 
employers representatives, a tripartite Council for Economic and Social 
Agreement was established for systematic social dialogue in society to maintain 
social peace. Within this Council, the ILO Working group was created in order 
to assist the government in fulfi lling the obligations following from ILO 
membership, such as the reporting obligation on the application of the 
instruments. Under the neoliberal government aft er the elections of 1992, social 
dialogue lost value and the Council’s competences were curtailed. Over the 
course of the years, its function has more or less stabilised, but with emphasis on 
consultation rather than cooperation.
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Comparison of the Czech social security provisions with the accepted 
international standards shows that the Czech Republic complies with these 
standards in most respects. Th e personal scope of the diff erent schemes stands 
out as particularly generous. On this point, the Czech regulations generally meet 
not only the ratifi ed standards, but also the higher standards that are not ratifi ed. 
Still, two remarks can be made. Th e fi rst remark is that under the Czech 
legislation persons are insured on an individual basis, which sometimes causes a 
tension with the breadwinner concept of the conventions. Th e second remark 
concerns family benefi ts. Th e European Code does not leave room for a means 
test in relation to family benefi ts, whereas the Czech child benefi ts are only 
granted to families with an income up to 2.4 times the subsistence level. Th us, in 
spite of the broad personal scope of the schemes in general, some confl icts with 
the international standards still exist.
In respect of the material scope, a problematic issue is observed in relation to the 
international standards at one point only, namely, in relation to unemployment 
benefi t. It has been brought up by the CEACR that the interpretation of ‘suitable 
employment’ may be too strict, since the Czech labour offi  ces are not obliged to 
take into account the qualifi cations and skills of a jobseeker, or the length of 
their previous employment when off ering a job, not even during the fi rst months 
of unemployment.
With regard to the level of the benefi t, the comparison shows several confl icts, 
some of which emerged as a result of economy measures in 2009 and 2010. Th e 
old-age pension no longer meets the level of Convention 128, and has even fallen 
below the minimum level of the European Code. Sickness benefi t, unemployment 
benefi t, and child benefi t are just above the level of the ratifi ed instruments, and 
in general, the level of all benefi ts show a downwards trend. Furthermore, the 
introduction of patient fees in 2008 has caused a confl ict in relation to medical 
care in the case of pregnancy and childbirth. It has been shown that pregnant 
women are exempt from fees for the fi rst three prescriptions only, and not from 
hospital fees, doctors visits, or emergency services, while under the international 
standards cost-sharing in the case of maternity medical care is not allowed.
Th e duration of the diff erent benefi ts is largely in line with the ratifi ed standards 
and, in most cases, also with those of the Protocol to the Code. However, in two 
cases a minor confl ict with the ratifi ed conventions has come to the fore. Firstly, 
sickness benefi t is granted for a period of one year maximum, which is precisely 
the period required by Convention 130. Under the Czech scheme, if a new case of 
incapacity for work occurs within one year of the fi rst day of the previous sick 
leave, the maximum period of one year for sickness benefi t includes both periods 
of sick leave, whereas Convention 130 requires the benefi t to be paid for one year 
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in each case of sickness. A similar problem is mentioned in relation to 
unemployment benefi t, which must be paid for a period of 13 weeks within a 
period of 12 months according to the Code. In the Czech Republic the benefi t is 
limited to fi ve months within three years, except in the case of an unbroken 
period of employment of at least six months, in which case a new right arises.
Finally, as regards the qualifying periods required under the Czech social security 
schemes, two remarks can be made. First, since the amendments of the Pension 
Insurance Act of 2010, a reduced pension is granted only aft er the completion of 
20 years of insurance, whereas both the Code and Convention 128 provide for 
such benefi t to be granted aft er 15 years of contribution or employment. Secondly, 
for entitlement to a family benefi t, a qualifying period of one year of residence is 
required for foreigners.240 However, under the Code only six months of residence 
may be required.





COMPARISON OF NATIONAL SOCIAL 




In this chapter, the Estonian social security system will be examined and 
compared with the standards of the European Code of Social Security (ECSS), 
ILO Convention 102 (ILO C102) and, additionally, with the relevant higher 
standards.1 In section 4.2, an overview of the Estonian social security system 
will be given, containing a brief description of the historical developments, the 
diff erent infl uences during the reform process, the headlines of the actual social 
protection, the way of fi nancing and the judicial review of social security issues. 
In section 4.3, the role of the social partners in social security matters will be 
discussed in connection with the obligations following from the conventions. 
Section 4.4 will deal with the eff ect of the international social security standards 
on the social security reform process. Th is will be discussed from diff erent 
perspectives. Th e eff ect through ratifi cation of standards, through the reporting 
obligations, through legislative practice and the incorporation of the standards 
into the national legal order, and through judicial practice will subsequently be 
examined. Aft er that, the Estonian social security legislation will be studied and 
compared with the international standards. Th is will be done in the sections 4.5 
to 4.13, each section covering one of the social risks, as dealt with in ILO C102. 
Each section will be concluded with a brief overview of the matters of compliance 
and the problematic issues pertaining to the risk at stake. In the last section of 
this chapter, a summary of the fi ndings will be provided.
1 Th e main part of the research for this Chapter was fi nished mid 2009; the data used are, 
therefore, generally the most recent data available in that year. Changes in legislation that 
took place in 2009 and January 2010 that are directly relevant for the comparison with the 
international standards, are incorporated into the text in later stage. Regulations that became 
eff ective aft er January 2010 are not taken into account. On 1 January 2011, Estonia joined the 
eurozone. Th e exchange rate at that date was 15.6 Estonian Kroon for 1 euro.
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4.2 SOCIAL SECURITY IN ESTONIA: 
AN OVERVIEW
4.2.1 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Social security until 1991
Social security in Estonia has its roots in the period between the two world wars, 
when the country had attained its independence in 1918 aft er a long-lasting 
annexation to the Russian empire. At that time, one of the fi rst international acts 
of the Republic of Estonia was to become a member of the League of Nations, 
and, shortly aft erwards, of the ILO. During this period of independence, a 
pension and health insurance system were created that covered employees and 
their family members, according to the ideas of Bismarck and in line with the 
rest of Europe, although the insurance coverage was rather low compared to 
other European countries.2 World War II marked the end of Estonia’s short-lived 
autonomy, when it was fi rst invaded by the Russians, then occupied by Germany, 
and at the end of the war, fi nally incorporated into the Soviet Union. Interesting 
in this respect is the fact that the annexation to the Soviet Union has never been 
de jure recognised by many Western countries.3 Indeed, the Soviet leaders had 
brought Estonia and the other Baltic countries under Soviet reign through secret 
protocols and military pressure, which was considered to constitute a violation 
of basic international law principles, such as sovereignty and self-determination. 
Th erefore, the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union was judged 
to be illegal, and because no legal benefi t can be derived from an illegal act, 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania remained, in principle, separate states in the 
meaning of ‘subjects of international law’. However, interesting as this discourse 
may be, in practice, all Estonian laws were abolished in favour of the Soviet rules 
and the Soviet social policy.
Th e Soviet system provided a state pension insurance based on employment, 
which made almost everybody entitled to a pension because unemployment was 
offi  cially non-existent.4 For collective farmers a separate scheme was established. 
Pensions were fi nanced from the general state budget, which was funded through 
contributions paid by the state-owned enterprises. Th e system was characterised 
by low pensionable ages (55 for women and 60 for men), early retirement and 
other privileges for workers in specifi c occupations, and, in the event of invalidity, 
privileges for war-veterans and work injury victims. Invalidity pensions for 
disabled persons in general were not paid, as a result of a complete failure to 
acknowledge the existence of these persons, who were regarded as not fi tting in 
2 Trumm & Ainsaar 2009, p. 155; Ginneken (ed.) 2008, pp. 21–22.
3 Elsuwege 2008; Elsuwege 2003, pp. 377–378. See also: Vallikivi 2000.
4 Saar 2008, pp. 424–425; Aidukaite 2006; Leppik & Võrk 2006, p. 29.
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with the perception of the ideal state. Benefi ts were linked to former wages, 
which, in view of the socialistic ideals, did not display large diff erences and 
represented relatively high replacement rates. Th e latter, together with fi xed 
minimum and maximum pensions, made the system strongly redistributive.
Sickness benefi ts were paid throughout the contingency, without a waiting 
period, or until permanent invalidity was determined.5 Th e replacement rate 
depended on the work record of the sick person, amounting to 100 percent aft er 
eight years of employment. Unlike the current rules, a minimum and maximum 
income ceiling was introduced. Typical of the scheme was that workers who were 
not members of a trade union received only half of the sickness benefi t they 
would receive otherwise.
Maternity benefi ts were part of family policy and based on citizenship. Th e benefi t 
amounted to 100 percent of the previous income, with a fi xed minimum, for the 
duration of 112 days, and without the requirement of a qualifying period. As 
regards family support in general, the emphasis was on services such as health 
care, education, and housing rather than on cash transfers. Th ere were, 
nevertheless, lump sum birth grants, and targeted benefi ts for single mothers and 
large families. Mothers of ten or more children were awarded the title ‘Mother 
Hero’ and were authorised to wear a special badge with a gold star, which gave 
them several privileges including free public transport, special doctor services, 
and a supply of food. Paid child care leave was not introduced until 1982; in that 
year, mothers started to receive a fl at rate allowance until their child reached the 
age of one, which, aft er some years, was extended to the age of 18 months, due to 
the pressure of declining fertility rates. Because the state proclaimed employment 
for all, the system did not provide for unemployment benefi ts.
From all these diff erent provisions, some general characteristics of the Soviet 
social policy can be concluded.6 In the fi rst place, the state was the only actor in 
the fi eld of social security, both in relation to the fi nancing and the administration. 
As a result of this exclusive competence, social security benefi ts were considered 
as gift s from the state rather than entitlements on the basis of certain qualifying 
criteria. Th is, again, made people feel dependent and expectant that the authorities 
would take care of them. Th at feeling was strengthened by the fact that employees 
were not paying any contributions and by the emphasis on indirectly fi nanced 
social security provisions in the form of low prices for goods and services. Th us, 
for the employee there was no link at all between work or contributions on the 
one hand, and benefi ts on the other. Furthermore, there was no legal system of 
adjustments of the benefi ts to price or wage indexes. An increase in benefi ts was 
5 Ginneken (ed) 2008, p. 22; Aidukaite 2006, pp. 264–266; Trumm 2006, pp. 2–3.
6 Barr 2004, pp. 5–6; Bernotas & Guogis 2003, p. 12.
Part II. Analysis and Comparison
198 Intersentia
decreed by the government on an ad hoc basis, and was emphasised as being a 
donation rather than a right. In respect of judicial review, disputes were mainly 
settled at the administrative level and not in court. A fi nal characteristic was the 
involvement of the trade unions in the record keeping of insured persons as state 
institutions. Th e concept of independent unions advocating workers’ rights, as 
known in western democracies, did not exist in the Soviet Union.
Although for the purpose of this study the Soviet era is described as a single 
period, in reality it knew periods of strict centralised control, as well as of 
relatively moderate political liberalisation. In 1985, in order to boost the weak 
economy, Gorbachev started his perestroika, an attempt to restructure the Soviet 
system, coupled with glasnost, a more open attitude towards fl aws of communism 
in the past. A side-eff ect of his policy was a strong rise in nationalism in many 
Soviet states, not least in Estonia, leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 
May 1991 the Supreme Soviet, which was the Estonian Parliament at the time, 
proclaimed the restoration of the independent Republic of Estonia, both de jure 
and de facto. Th is act was promptly followed by broad international recognition, 
leaving Moscow no other choice than accept the sovereignty of Estonia (and the 
other Baltic States) in September 1991.
Aft er the revolution: 1991 onwards
Th e newly elected right wing government, established in September 1992, faced 
the task of rebuilding the democratic republic in all its aspects. Th is was not a 
simple task, all the more since the government consisted of very young members. 
Th e fi rst Prime Minister, Mart Laar, was 32 years old, and many ministers were 
even younger. As Laar pointed out later: ‘Like other young people, we did not 
know what was possible and what was not – so we did impossible things.’7 Yet, 
this government faced the challenge of transforming a centrally planned socialist 
country into a modern democracy with an open market economy. Th e rapid 
introduction of Estonia’s own currency in 1992, combined with large-scale 
privatisation and strict state budget control, marked the beginning of radical 
economic reform.8 In the fi rst fl ush of victory, people expected their living 
standards to rise quickly, and high standards were set. Unlike the Czech Republic, 
where left  and right wing coalitions ruled in succession, Estonia had stable politics 
with the majority of voters embracing neo-liberal ideology. Higher living 
standards and greater individual freedom – values people had been deprived from 
for so many years – were considered top priority. It has been noted that many 
7 Laar 2007, p. 4. He also mentioned in an interview with the Brussels Journal that: ‘I am not an 
economist. I am a practical man. I had read only one book on economics. Th is was Milton 
Friedman’s “Free to choose”’, Laar 2005.
8 Trumm & Ainsaar 2009, pp. 155–157; Saar 2008, p. 425.
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Members of Parliament in these fi rst years of independence had held a position in 
the former Soviet power structure, but this did not aff ect the stable neo-liberal 
sphere in politics, since even the left  side of the political spectrum was (and is) 
rather rightist and strongly supported a free market economy.9 Clearly, Estonia 
was determined to instantly free itself from the legacy of strict state control and 
extreme paternalism of the past and to devote itself to Western capitalism.
As a result of the focus on economic growth, social policy was given less 
attention.10 It was thought that the feasibility of an extensive social security 
system with high-income replacement rates would depend on the success of 
economic reform and investments. ‘First get rich, than get social’ was a generally 
accepted credo in politics. Furthermore, it was presumed that economic growth 
would automatically lead to a reduction in poverty. Th e redistribution of resources 
through the introduction of universal elements in the social security system was 
not thought expedient by the right wing coalition parties. On the contrary, with 
the initiation of an undiff erentiated proportional tax system11 and removal of 
subsidies to former state companies, the government sought to create equal 
opportunities for everybody, leaving the responsibility for developing their 
capacities to the individuals. Th e speed of huge economic, political, and social 
changes, however, led to a decrease in the well-being of a large number of citizens. 
As a consequence, social policy became a somewhat more important issue during 
the late 1990s, but a clear overall view on social reform and an explicit consensus 
on the principles and goals of the entire social security system that had to be 
created, was lacking.12 Instead, measures were taken in the shadow of the 
economic reform process and were directed by confl icting interests between 
social and political actors. For these reasons, the outcomes of social reforms have 
been disappointing for many people, especially for those who have not been able 
to keep up with the rapid changing society. It has been shown that the income 
diff erences in Estonia have risen sharply, with the elder cohort being ‘the losers in 
the process of social transformation’.13 Th e increasing income inequality and very 
low living standard of large groups of citizens have been identifi ed as drawbacks 
of Estonia’s economic success story.14 Growing discontent with the social results 
of the reform process, especially with the very low level of minimum benefi ts, has 
led to increasing public and political debate on these issues.
9 Adam, Kristan, Tomšič 2009, pp. 69–70.
10 Trumm & Ainsaar 2009, pp. 155–157; Saar 2008, pp. 425–426; Trumm 2006, p. 3; Trumm 
2005, pp. 17–22; Bernotas & Guogis 2003, pp. 8–11; Lauristin 2003, pp. 2–3; Toots 2002, p. 2.
11 A proportional tax system, or fl at rate tax, imposes the same percentage rate of taxation on 
everyone, regardless of income.
12 Only regarding pension privatisation was a longstanding but isolated consensus achieved. 
See, for instance: Müller 2006, p. 408.
13 Saar 2008, p. 437.
14 Trumm & Ainsaar 2009; Saar 2008; Bernotas & Guogis 2003; Lauristin 2003.
Part II. Analysis and Comparison
200 Intersentia
4.2.2 INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES ON THE REFORM 
PROCESS
International infl uences verses internal factors
Th e impact of global actors on social policy in the new Republic of Estonia has 
been under scrutiny in several studies, although these studies are mostly focused 
on pension reform only.15 In general, similar to the case of the Czech Republic, 
the infl uence of international organisations is put into perspective by Estonian 
scholars and policy makers.16 Internal factors are highlighted as the main 
steering elements during the reform process, including the inter-war and Soviet 
legacies, demographic factors (such as ageing, declining birth rates, life 
expectancy, and ethnic minorities), the economic situation, labour market 
developments, social changes, and right wing governance. Still, diff erent global 
actors have undeniably marked social reform in Estonia in several respects. Th e 
global fi nancial institutions left  their footprint on the pension system in 
particular, while the ILO and the Council of Europe have played an important 
role in the re-design of the entire social security system, a role that has been 
recognised in academic studies to date.
World Bank and International Monetary Fund
In the above-mentioned studies, it has been found by most authors that the 
World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have determined 
the current pension system in Estonia, as in many other post-communist states. 
During the fi rst years of independence, the government held regular consultations 
with the WB on economic policy and, in the late 1990s, also on some social 
policy issues. Toots recalls in this respect that the Estonian government 
established a Commission on Social Security Reform in 1997 to develop the new 
pension concept. He underlines that two of the fi ve Commission members had 
strong ties with the WB, and one with the CoE.17 Th us, the WB managed to use 
loyal national experts for policy implementation. Not surprisingly, in the 
Commission’s Conceptual Framework of Pension Reform report, some clear 
infl uences of World Bank documents were to be found.18 However, the 
15 Orenstein 2008, pp. 37–39; Leppik 2006, pp. 99–103; Trumm 2006, pp. 2–3; Kulu & Reiljan 
2004; Tavits 2003; Agartan 2004, pp. 6–7; Toots 2002.
16 Leppik 2006, p. 99; Trumm 2006, p. 2; Tavits 2003, p. 655; information obtained by experts. 
Lindeman, Principal Analyst at the OECD and a former Senior Advisor of the WB, has also 
noted in relation to Estonia that ‘the eventual three-pillar reform was a home grown product, 
although advice was occasionally sought from the World Bank and others.’ Lindeman 2004, 
p. 12.
17 Toots 2002, pp. 2–3 (including footnote 2), 7–8.
18 Also: Leppik 2006, p. 99.
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Commission did not copy all the Bank’s guidelines, but included, for example, 
instead of a fl at rate or means tested pension, the income related point system of 
the German pension scheme in its proposals. Moreover, it has been noted that 
the Commission was fundamentally against fi nancial intervention of the World 
Bank, and that the Estonian government had rejected resources as well as 
Swedish expertise off ered by the World Bank to assist in pension reform, because 
any dependency on international organisations was to be avoided.19 Nevertheless, 
a seminar on pension reform policy organised by the WB was held in 1999.20
Simultaneously, from the early 1990s, the government held meetings with the 
IMF, on monetary policy especially.21 Th e IMF arranged stand-by credits in the 
case of unexpected fi nancial defi cits, however Estonia has not, or has only 
incidentally, taken out such credits. In 1997 the IMF – known for its belief in 
private pension arrangements at that time – urged the government to speed up 
with privatisation of the pension system.22 Remarkable indeed, the IMF shift ed 
its position in 2000, in view of the high transition costs that many post-
communist countries were facing. Accordingly, the Estonian government was 
advised to limit the size of the second pension pillar that just had been established 
along the lines of the IMF ideas. Th is put the government in the strange position 
that it had to defend the system to an organisation that had initially contributed 
to its design.
It may be concluded that the WB, and to a lesser extent the IMF, indeed 
infl uenced the set up of the three pillar pension system. At the same time, 
because Estonia had not taken any loans, it was free to adopt one idea and leave 
out another other. It also has to be borne in mind that the American neoliberal 
approach of these organisations closely responded to the rightist political sphere 
and Estonia’s obvious commitment towards free market economy. Th is interplay 
of neoliberal approaches puts the infl uence of the WB into perspective, since the 
receptivity for the World Bank’s input sprang from internal factors, primarily 
the dissociation from the socialist past.
International Labour Organization
Aft er Estonia had restored its membership to the ILO in 1992 as a logical step 
following the renewed association with the United Nations, it was this global 
actor that was consulted fi rst on social reform. Since the involvement of the WB 
and the IMF was initially focused on monetary reform and budget balancing 
19 Tavits 2003, p. 655.
20 World Bank 1999.
21 Leppik 2006, p. 102; Toots 2002, p. 6.
22 Leppik 2006, p. 103.
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only, the ILO was the obvious organisation to apply to with social issues. It is 
true, however, that in the early 1990s social security did not have priority. Th e 
practical support by the ILO and several seminars with ILO experts mainly 
concerned labour reform and tripartism, rather than social security reform. In 
fact, new labour law was heavily based on ILO conventions.23 Cases in point are 
the Trade Unions Act, based on the Freedom of Association Conventions, and 
the Employee Trustee Act, based on ILO C135 and Recommendation 143, both 
on Workers Representatives.
Although social security was not high on the political agenda, the topic was not 
completely overlooked either, which is demonstrated by the fact that Estonia 
celebrated the ILO’s 75th anniversary with an international conference on ‘Social 
Security and Market Economy’ in April 1994.24 Th is conference explicitly 
underlined the importance of a sound social protection system and highlighted 
that aft er 75 years, social security had still remained part of the core ILO 
mandate. Discussions during this conference covered the organisation and 
fi nancing of social protection, tripartism in social security, unemployment 
insurance, and employment problems of vulnerable groups. At the end of the 
conference, an ILO delegate and the Minister of Social Aff airs signed a letter of 
intent on cooperation, which clearly showed Estonia’s open attitude towards the 
ILO, also on social security questions. It has been argued in this respect that ‘[t]
he main role of ILO in Estonian social policy was to strengthen the European 
way of social thinking and to soft en the infl uence of US based monetary 
organisations.’25 Th is may be true in relation to the pension reform, but in other 
areas such as labour law and unemployment insurance the impact of ILO ideas 
was more concrete than that.
European Union and Council of Europe
In the course of the late 1990s, the role of the ILO in Estonia signifi cantly 
decreased. Th is was mainly due to the fact that the political focus shift ed to 
Europe aft er the application to join the European Union (EU) in November 1995. 
However, it must be stressed in this respect that EU interference in the social 
fi eld was limited to non-discrimination and coordination rules and, in a ‘soft er’ 
way, labour policy.26 Although social security was not a topic on the agenda, the 
Copenhagen accession criteria did include the obligation to guarantee human 
rights. In the annual reports on progress towards accession, the EU Commission 
23 Muda 1997; information obtained from experts; as an example, between 1992 and 1996 
Estonia ratifi ed eight labour conventions.
24 ILO 1994.
25 Toots 2002, p. 9.
26 For EU infl uence on labour policy and social policy in general during the accession period, 
see Barr 2004; Muda 1997; Muda 1996.
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monitored which human rights conventions were ratifi ed, and explicitly noted 
each year that the European Social Charter (ESC) – recognised as a human rights 
instrument – had not been ratifi ed.27 Estonia had already become a member of 
the Council of Europe (CoE) in 1993, and had consequently ratifi ed the European 
Convention on Human Rights in 1996, showing its orientation towards Western 
Europe. A next step would be to ratify the ESC, which was heavily advocated by 
the CoE and considered a positive sign in view of EU accession. And, of course, 
since the EC Treaty referred to the ESC, ratifi cation would show a readiness for 
the EU in a social respect. It should be kept in mind, however, that the ESC as 
such was not part of the acquis communautaire, and therefore its ratifi cation 
could not be imposed as a requirement for EU membership. In spite of this, 
political pressure towards ratifi cation was clearly felt.28 As a result, the 
government from then on thought it expedient to concentrate on European 
instruments rather than on ILO standards. In this context, in 2000, the 
government chose to ratify the revised version of the Social Charter (ESC 
(Revised)), requiring compliance with the European Code of Social Security 
(ECSS), instead of with ILO Convention 102.
At the time of ratifi cation of the ESC, it was not evident that the Estonian social 
security system complied with the ECSS. In fact, it was established that the rules 
on unemployment, old age, invalidity, and employment injury were not suffi  cient 
to meet its standards.29 A possibility would have been to exclude Article 12 
(dealing with social security) from ratifi cation in order to avoid getting bound by 
the standards of the ECSS. Although this was considered as an option, it was not 
thought politically feasible.30 As a matter of fact, ratifi cation of the ESC (Revised) 
was made an issue in the elections, especially directed to the older population, 
since pensions would have to be raised in order to comply with Article 12. 
Exclusion of this provision would obviously have turned the older electorate, 
which would benefi t from the increased pensions, against the ruling government. 
In general, the attitude of the government was rather ambiguous in respect of 
social security. On the one hand, as mentioned above, a clear overall plan was 
lacking, but on the other hand, a suffi  cient social security system was found 
necessary in view of EU accession. Th erefore, it was decided to prepare for 
ratifi cation of the ECSS. Because the Code gives clear and concrete legal norms 
for the diff erent social security schemes, it could serve as a benchmark during 
the subsequent reform steps in relation to the whole range of social security 
provisions.31 Accordingly, the unemployment insurance scheme was created in 
order to comply with the ECSS, and the levels of the pensions were also increased 
27 European Commission 1999, p. 12.
28 Schoukens 2007, pp. 74, 90; Trumm 2006, p. 3; ILO 2002; information obtained from experts.
29 ESCR Report (Ee) 2001–2002, p. 195; Leppik 1999.
30 Leppik 2006, p. 100; information obtained from experts.
31 Leppik 2001, pp. 7–9.
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to be able to meet its requirements. Th e creation of an unemployment insurance 
was also stimulated because the absence of such an insurance scheme could be 
problematic in view of the coordination rules of the European Union.32 Another 
specifi c measure that was taken to meet the obligations of the Code was the 
introduction of a fi xed indexation formula for pensions. As a result of these 
changes, the government was able to ratify the ECSS in 2004, including the parts 
on pensions and unemployment. Th e only remaining defi ciency was the absence 
of an employment injury scheme, and therefore Part VI on Employment Injury 
was excluded from ratifi cation.
Considering all this, it may be concluded that the ECSS, and indirectly, ILO 
C102, have signifi cantly, and in a very concrete way, infl uenced the Estonian 
social security reform, whereas the direct EU infl uence in this fi eld was limited. 
On the other hand, the underlying objective to join the EU should be recognised 
as the driving force for ratifi cation of the ESC, which again paved the way for 
acceptance of the Code.
4.2.3 MAIN FEATURES OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
SYSTEM
Social security as a fundamental right
Social rights in Estonia fi nd their legal basis in the Constitution that was adopted 
shortly aft er the re-establishment of the independent Republic of Estonia. Article 
28 of the Constitution reads:33
Everyone has the right to the protection of health.
An Estonian citizen has the right to state assistance in the case of old age, incapacity 
for work, loss of a provider, or need. Th e categories and extent of assistance, and the 
conditions and procedure for the receipt of assistance shall be provided by law.
[…]
Families with many children and persons with disabilities shall be under the special 
care of the state and local governments.
32 Tavits 1998, p. 9.
33 Th e Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, passed by a referendum held on 28 June 1992, 
entered into force 3 July 1992, Art. 28. For comments on the right to the protection of health, 
see Annus & Nõmper 2002.
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It must be recognised that this formulation does not refl ect a strong fundamental 
right to social security. Th e reference to state assistance implies a subsidiary task 
for the government and does not include the right to social insurance.34 On the 
basis of these constitutional rights, fi ve non-contributory schemes have been set 
up, some targeted and some universal: state unemployment allowances, state 
family benefi ts, social benefi ts for disabled people, and state funeral benefi ts. 
Additionally, three insurance schemes have been developed: health care 
insurance, a pension scheme, and an unemployment insurance scheme.35 Estonia 
does not have a separate employment injury scheme, although the establishment 
of such a scheme has been under discussion for quite a number of years.36 In 
sum, minimum income is guaranteed under the subsistence benefi t scheme for 
Estonian residents whose family income aft er payment of fi xed housing expenses 
does not reach the subsistence level established by Parliament.
Health care insurance
Health care insurance covers both benefi ts in kind and in cash: medical care, 
temporary incapacity for work benefi ts and paid maternity leave. In principle, 
the insurance is work-related, the contributions to be paid by employers and self-
employed persons. However, the legislature has pointed out quite a number of 
categories of non-working persons to be covered as well, which makes the overall 
coverage of health insurance almost general. Insured persons have the right to 
choose their own family doctor, but they need to register themselves with this 
doctor, and registration cannot be changed until the next calendar year. In 
general, access to specialists is possible only with referral from the family doctor. 
Furthermore, patients are subject to co-payment for most medical services and 
pharmaceuticals. Cash benefi ts include sick pay on the basis of a medical 
certifi cate issued by the treating doctor, and care benefi ts for persons nursing a 
sick family member for up to 14 days. Next to this, a cash benefi t is provided in 
the case of temporary incapacity for work due to pregnancy or childbirth. Finally, 
under the health insurance scheme, an adoption benefi t is granted.
Pension scheme
Th e pension scheme consists of three pillars, the fi rst pillar comprising a public 
insurance scheme for old age, invalidity and survivors’ pensions. Th e second and 
third pillar cover supplementary private schemes for old age only. Th e fi rst pillar 
pensions primarily include an employment-related pension, and secondly a fl at 
34 See also Leppik and Võrk 2006, p. 33.
35 For an overview of the Estonian social security system in English, see the website of the 
Ministry of Social Aff airs; Trumm 2006, pp. 32–42; Leppik & Kruuda 2003; Pieters 2003, pp. 
44–59; MISSOC (Ee).
36 Nurmela & Karu 2009; Koppel & Aaviksoo 2007; Leppik 1999, p. 1.
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rate national pension that serves as a minimum income for persons who are not 
entitled to a work-related benefi t. Th e work-related pension, however, also 
consists of a fl at rate element, the so-called ‘base amount’, which is supplemented 
with the work-related part. Due to pension reform, the work-related part is 
defi ned in two diff erent ways: until 1998 this component was based on the 
number of service years of the insured person, and since 1998 it has been based 
on the total amount of paid contributions. Th us, up to 1998 each service year 
represents a fi ctitious income that is the same for everyone, while as from 1999, 
the real income serves as a calculation base. Both the national pension and the 
fl at rate base amount, as well as the length of service component, constitute the 
solidarity element in the public pension system, providing redistribution from 
higher-income earners to lower-income earners. With the shift  from a length of 
service part to an insurance component, the solidarity element obviously 
becomes smaller while the diff erentiation of pension amounts increases, all the 
more since there is no maximum pension.37 In principle, all pensions are subject 
to income tax, but the tax exemption for pensions is set at three times the normal 
exemption, which means that the majority of pensions are not taxed in 
practice.38
Unemployment benefi ts
Th e unemployment insurance has existed since 2002 and provides an earnings-
related benefi t in the event of unemployment, with specifi c rules relating to 
insolvency of employers. For unemployed persons who do not qualify for the 
unemployment insurance benefi t, there is the very modest means tested non-
contributory unemployment allowance, designed to provide assistance in the 
case of insuffi  cient economic resources. In fact, this allowance is only slightly 
higher than the subsistence level and constitutes not even one third of the fi xed 
minimum wage.39
Family benefi ts
Th e Estonian State Family Benefi ts Act distinguishes nine diff erent benefi ts, 
namely: childbirth grant, adoption grant, child benefi t, child care benefi t, benefi t 
for a parent raising seven or more children, single parent child benefi t, benefi t 
for a child in guardianship or in foster care, benefi t for the children of conscripts, 
and independent life grant.40 All benefi ts are aimed at supporting families by 
37 Leppik & Võrk 2006, pp. 61–70; Ministry of Social Aff airs (Ee) 2005A, p. 18; Kulu & Reiljan 
2004, pp. 30–31; Raudla & Staehr 2003, p. 81.
38 Leppik & Kruuda 2003, pp. 30, 33.
39 Based on data of 2007.
40 Until 1 January 2009 benefi ts also included a school allowance.
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ensuring partial reimbursement of expenses relating to care, raising and 
education of the children.
Disability benefi ts
Apart from the pension scheme, disability protection is provided under the 
Social Benefi ts for Disabled Persons Act as a form of social assistance, however 
the benefi ts are not income tested. Th e purpose of the seven diff erent benefi ts is 
to reinforce the ability of disabled persons to cope independently, and to support 
social integration and equal opportunities through partial compensation for the 
additional expenses due to the disability.41 Benefi ts include, for example, the 
disabled child allowance, caregivers’ allowance, and rehabilitation allowance.
Social assistance
In conclusion, there is the subsistence benefi t scheme for Estonian residents 
whose income is below the subsistence level established by Parliament. Th e 
amount of the benefi t depends on household composition and is calculated as 
the diff erence between the subsistence level and the disposable income of the 
household.42 Th e benefi t may be refused to a person of working age who does not 
work or study and who has repeatedly refused an off er of suitable work.
4.2.4 ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCING
Administration
Th e Ministry of Social Aff airs is the competent body in the fi eld of social security, 
which also includes health care.43 As a matter of fact, the Ministry as it stands 
now was formed in 1993, through the merging of the former Ministry of Health, 
the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Social Welfare. Consequently, the 
Ministry is responsible for the coordination and supervision of institutions 
that carry out the administration of all branches of social protection, as well 
as for the planning of fi nancial resources necessary to fi nance the diff erent 
benefi t systems. Th ere are three institutions involved in the administration of the 
social protection schemes. Firstly, there is the Social Insurance Board 
(Sotsiaalkindlustusamet), which administers the pension insurance (covering 
old age, invalidity, survivors’, and national pension), family benefi ts, social 
41 Social Benefi ts for Disabled Persons Act, passed on 27 January 1999, entered into force 
1 January 2000, Art. 1 (2); Trumm 2006, p. 38.
42 In 2007 the subsistence minimum was fi xed at EEK 2,341.
43 Leppik & Kruuda 2003, pp. 19–21; 104; website of the Ministry of Social Aff airs.
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benefi ts for disabled persons, and funeral grants. Secondly, the Estonian Health 
Insurance Fund (Eesti Haigekassa) manages the health insurance scheme 
through seven regional branches. Th irdly, the Estonian Unemployment 
Insurance Fund (Eesti Töötukassa) runs the unemployment insurance scheme. 
Its tasks include the registration of jobseekers, the provision of employment 
services to employers and jobseekers, and the payment of state unemployment 
allowances and unemployment insurance benefi ts to the unemployed. Th e latter 
two organisations are autonomous public legal bodies operating in the area of 
responsibility of the Ministry of Social Aff airs. None of the three institutions 
refer on their websites or in their publications to the ECSS. On the website of the 
Ministry, however, the obligations arising from international social security 
agreements are mentioned, such as preparing and participating in international 
cooperation, for example, in the work of the committees of the European Union 
and the Council of Europe, and the reporting obligations on the application of 
the ESC and the ECSS.
Financing
Th e pension and health insurance schemes are primarily fi nanced by 
contributions paid by the employer, the self-employed persons, and, on behalf of 
specifi c categories of non-working persons, by the state.44 Th e contributions 
consist of 33 percent of the employee’s gross wage, to be paid solely by the 
employer or the self-employed, or of a fi xed amount established by the government 
in the event of contributions paid by the state. It must be noted that in Estonia the 
insurance contributions are called ‘social tax’ and collected by the Tax Offi  ce. Th e 
Tax Offi  ce, however, deposits these amounts into the separate insurance funds 
that are kept strictly separate from the state budget, and therefore they are 
actually to be considered as insurance contributions. In this chapter the term 
‘social tax’ will be used according to the Estonian practice. Of the social tax, 20 
percent is allocated to the pension insurance, and 13 percent to the health 
insurance. Certain costs in relation to the pension insurance are paid from the 
state budget, such as the administrative costs and the national pensions. Some 
costs regarding health care that fall outside the scope of the health insurance, 
such as emergency care for uninsured persons, ambulance services, and public 
health programmes, are also fi nanced from the state budget. Unemployment 
insurance is fi nanced from compulsory contributions paid by both employees 
and employers. In conclusion, family benefi ts, state unemployment allowances, 
social benefi ts for disabled persons, and social subsistence benefi ts are fi nanced 
from the state budget. All contributory benefi ts are subject to a non-progressive 
44 Leppik & Kruuda 2003, pp. 22–26, 111–116; MISSOC (Ee), 2007.
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income tax of 21 percent, with an annual basic exemption of EEK 27.000 (2008), 
while the non-contributory benefi ts are not taxed.45
4.2.5 JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SOCIAL SECURITY MATTERS
Disputes on administrative acts are primarily governed by the Administrative 
Procedure Act.46 If a person is dissatisfi ed with an administrative decision, an 
objection shall be fi led with the administrative body that issued the challenged 
decision within thirty days. Subsequently, the applicant (and third persons) may 
fi le an action against the decision of the administrative body with one of the two 
administrative courts.47 However, this action does not prevent the execution or 
issue of the administrative act at stake. Th e second level courts are the so-called 
circuit courts, of which two of the three courts deal with administrative cases. 
Finally, parties and third persons have the right to appeal against a judgment of a 
circuit court to the Supreme Court in case the circuit court has applied a 
provision of substantive law incorrectly or has materially violated a provision of 
court procedure.48
4.3 THE ROLE OF THE SOCIAL PARTNERS
4.3.1 DEVELOPMENT OF THE ESTONIAN SOCIAL 
DIALOGUE
Transition from state unions to trade unions
Similar to the Czech Republic, the role of the trade unions under the Soviet 
regime was to communicate the ideas and wishes of the Communist Party to the 
workers, and, to monitor on behalf of the Party, productivity, behaviour and 
morale at the workplace.49 Additionally, the trade unions were liable to manage 
the social security funds and to pay out the diff erent benefi ts. Because the unions 
were important tools for the Party to implement the communist programmes, 
membership of a union was obligatory, at least in practice. At the end of the 
1980s, infl uenced by Gorbachev’s glasnost, the trade unions started to shake off  
45 Th e exchange rate of the Estonian Kroon on 1 January 2011, when Estonia joined the 
eurozone, was €1.00 to EEK 15.64.
46 Administrative Procedure Act, passed on 6 June 2001, entered into force 1 January 2002. An 
administrative act includes a delay or omission of an act, Art. 72(3).
47 Code of Administrative Court Procedure Act, passed on 25 February 1999, entered into force 
1 January 2000, Art. 3. See also Ministry of Justice 2005; Estonian Institute 2002.
48 Code of Administrative Court Procedure Act, Art. 52.
49 Muda 2009, p. 117; Philips 2006, p. 1; Grosse & Sootla 2005, pp. 9–11; Philips & Eamets 2003.
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their role as representatives and executive organs of the Soviet power. Th ey left  
the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions – the umbrella organisation for 
the branch unions in the Soviet Union – and created the autonomous 
Confederation of Estonian Trade Unions in April 1990. At the founding congress, 
new principles for future activities and an action plan were adopted. Th e main 
aim of the independent trade unions would be to represent and protect the 
interests of workers through tripartite negotiations, active participation in 
employment policy, and through consulting and training their members. Indeed, 
the fi rst national agreement between the new Confederation and the government, 
which dealt with social security, was already signed in February 1991, three 
months before Parliament would proclaim the independence of the Estonian 
Republic.50 Another important action of the newly established Confederation 
was to take the initiative to the government to become a member of the ILO.
Th e transition from state union to trade union from the inside out may seem very 
successful, and in some ways it was. Th e existing unions were not disbanded, but 
obtained their autonomy and renewed their reason for existence. However, the 
reverse side of a transition without a clear breaking point is that the 
implementation of the new paradigms had to be secured by the same persons who 
had previously worked for the Soviet regime and who had been formed by the 
Communist vision on workers’ representation.51 In a country where the vast 
majority of people had turned their backs on everything that reminded them of 
the Soviet past, and where they were not willing to join any movement, the lack 
of a visibly fresh start is likely to have contributed to confusion about the role of 
the trade unions and, for many people, to an attitude of hostility. Two decades 
later, the unions are still associated with the Communist Party and party 
dictation. Moreover, many people are still not willing to commit themselves to 
any movement, let alone to pay contributions. As a result, union density has 
drastically declined from about 90.6 percent in 1991, to 31.6 percent in 1995.52 
Since then, it has decreased steadily, a trend that has been intensifi ed by the recent 
economic crisis. In 2009 union membership amounted to only 7.6 percent.53
Procedures of social dialogue
In spite of this downward trend and the rather weak position of the trade unions, 
social dialogue has still developed aft er the transition period. First of all, annual 
tripartite negotiations are held at a national level on issues such as minimum 
wage, social partnership, job creation, and social security. From 1992 until 2003, 
50 Philips 2006, p. 1.
51 Grosse & Sootla 2005, p. 10.
52 Eamets 2008, p. 62, fi gures relate to union membership as percentage of all employees.
53 Nurmela 2009A.
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sixteen tripartite collective agreements were concluded, most importantly on 
minimum wages.54 From the employers’ side, the only employers’ organisation, 
which covers 32 branch associations and 33 large enterprises, takes part in social 
dialogue. In 2004, the relationship between the government and the social 
partners dampened because of a confl ict about the unemployment insurance 
contributions.55 Since then, it seems that the interest of the government in social 
dialogue has waned, and no national agreements have been concluded since.56 
Th e Regulation of Tripartite Consultations prescribing that ‘the schedule of 
subsequent consultations was settled at the previous consultation and the 
decisions are made on the principle of consensus’ provides no guarantee for 
improvement on this point.57 Th e second and more common form of social 
dialogue takes place through bipartite negotiations, mostly at enterprise level but 
also at national level. Coverage of enterprise agreements is not very high – in the 
private sector around 13 percent of the employees in 2007.58 Accurate overall 
information on collective agreements is lacking, as is a surveillance or inspection 
system. As a result, these agreements are oft en treated as voluntary instruments 
and observance of the agreements is rather facultative.59
Apart from collective agreements, cooperation between the social partners 
takes place in tripartite councils and several boards.60 Two important boards 
in the fi eld of social security, namely, the supervisory boards of the Health 
Insurance Fund and the Unemployment Insurance Fund, are positively valued 
in terms of social dialogue.61 Th e most prominent tripartite council is the 
Social and Economic Council of Estonia, established in 1999 by the Minister of 
Social Aff airs on the basis of a ministerial regulation. It was meant to be an 
expert network for analysing social and employment policy developments and 
consulting the government and social partners on tripartite and employment 
issues.62 However, the impact of the Council has been limited, which is 
refl ected by the fact that the Council does not have any decision-making power, 
its function is not clearly defi ned, and the management is entrusted to an 
offi  cial of the Ministry of Social Aff airs who does not have any political 
54 Kallaste 2003, p. 23.
55 Philips & Eamets 2005.
56 Karu & Nurmela 2008; Karu & Nurmela 2007; information obtained from the Estonian Trade 
Union Confederation (EAKL). In 2008, an agreement was concluded on the new Employment 
Contract Act, but under pressure from the economic recession, the government failed to keep 
this agreement.
57 Philips 2006, p. 6.
58 Eurofound 2008.
59 Nurmela 2009B, p. 4; Nurmela & Karu 2009, p. 2.
60 Kurtyka 2006, pp. 26–27; Kallaste 2003; Rychly & Pritzer 2003.
61 Grosse & Sootla 2005, pp. 18–19.
62 Eamets 2008, pp. 64–65; Philips 2006; Grosse & Sootla 2005, pp. 17–18; Kallaste 2003, pp. 10, 
20.
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infl uence. Moreover, it was reported in 2009 that the Council had not met since 
2004.63
Another tripartite Council particularly relevant for this study is the ILO Council, 
which was actually the fi rst tripartite council in Estonia, already established in 
May 1992, a few months aft er the membership of the ILO had been restored.64 
Th e objective of the Council is to assist the government in fulfi lling the 
obligations following from the ILO membership, for instance, by monitoring and 
discussing ILO documents, principles and conventions, to exchange information 
with the ILO, to assess legislation on conformity with the ratifi ed instruments, 
and to assist with the reporting obligations on the application of conventions, 
including the ESC and ECSS of the Council of Europe. Again, the Council is a 
purely advisory and consultative body, without any competence to take binding 
decisions. Typical of the position of the Council is that in relation to a study on 
tripartite commissions in Estonia, none of the interviewed persons (who all had 
high positions in the sphere of social dialogue) mentioned its existence.65 Also 
typical is the fact that the Council meets on an irregular basis and was not in 
session in 2007 and 2008.66 It seems fair to conclude that the purely informative 
and consultative councils are not very infl uential.
4.3.2 PARTICIPATION RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIAL SECURITY STANDARDS
Considering the ill-founded position of the ILO Council and its weak status in 
practice, it is not surprising that participation of the social partners in obligations 
following from membership of the ILO and the CoE, and from the ratifi ed social 
security instruments, is limited.67 One of the tasks of the Council is to assess the 
possibility and expediency of ratifying newly adopted, as well as longer existing, 
instruments in the fi eld of labour and social security. Without a unanimous 
proposition of the Council, the government will not decide to prepare a bill on 
ratifi cation of the treaty at stake. On the other hand, such a proposition will not 
guarantee positive action of the government. It goes without saying that when 
the Council does not meet for several years, new ratifi cations are not to be 
expected. Secondly, there are the reports on the application of the ILO 
63 Rannanpaa 2009.
64 Philips 2006; Philips & Eamets 2005, p. 2; Kallaste 2003, p. 10.
65 Grosse & Sootla 2005, p. 18.
66 Information obtained from members of the ILO Council in September 2008.
67 Since there is no written information on these issues, this paragraph is exclusively based on 
information obtained from experts (from the Trade Union Confederation, Employers 
Organisation, Ministry of Social Aff airs, Parliamentary Social Committee).
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Conventions and the CoE instruments. Th e government is obliged to distribute 
copies of the reports to the social partners to enable them to express their 
opinions and comments. It is not clear whether this happens systematically, but 
in any case it has been confi rmed that annual reports on the ECSS have been 
received by the social partners. However, they are not subject to discussion 
within the ILO Council, and both the trade union confederation and employers’ 
organisation have reported that they hardly make use of their right to comment 
on the reports. Th e trade unions, because of a constant lack of time caused by a 
shortage of fi nancial resources, and the employers, because application of the 
Code is not really an area of their interest. In general, the ILO convention on 
labour issues, particularly on the right to organise and collective bargaining, is 
more the focus of attention of the social partners than social security instruments. 
In this respect, it is found that the government does not take the comments and 
proposals of the social partners seriously unless it fi ts in with the government’s 
social policy.
4.4 THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY 
STANDARDS WITHIN THE ESTONIAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM
4.4.1 RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
Estonia became a member of the ILO in 1921, at the start of the fi rst period of 
independence. During that period 21 conventions were ratifi ed, all in the fi eld 
of labour law.68 In 1992, shortly aft er restoration of independence, the country 
rejoined the ILO. Subsequently, from 1992 to 1996, eight conventions were 
ratifi ed of which fi ve were core conventions, namely on forced labour, freedom 
of association and the right to collective bargaining, and on equal 
remuneration. Th en, in the period of 2000 to 2007, another eight conventions 
were accepted, including C138 on Minimum Age that involved the ipso jure 
denunciation of four older conventions on minimum age of specifi c groups of 
workers. One convention was denounced in 2007 without ratifi cation of the 
more modern equivalent. Th us, Estonia is currently bound by 32 ILO labour 
conventions, which is not much in relation to other EU Member States.69
As regards the CoE instruments, it has been mentioned above that Estonia 
ratifi ed the ESC (Revised) in 2000, and included in its ratifi cation Article 12 on 
68 ILOLEX; For a comparison of Estonian labour law with ILO conventions, see: Muda 1997; 
Muda 1996.
69 For a ratifi cation chart, see the ILO website.
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social security. Th e choice for the revised Charter was not specifi cally inspired 
by its new rights compared to the ESC of 1964, as Estonia left  aside the most far-
reaching of them – namely the right to protection against poverty and social 
exclusion, and the right to housing – and it also did not accept the collective 
complaints procedure. Rather, it sprang from the idea that the ESC (Revised) 
was a more modern European instrument that would better connect with the 
EU requirements.70 Another argument was that the revised Charter requires the 
social security system to meet the standards of the ECSS instead of ILO C102. 
Th e Code was considered more in line with the European approach towards 
social security, whereas the ILO Convention was found rather outdated. 
Furthermore, in general, the social security conventions were not well-known, 
and it was thought that global rules on social security, to be applied in 
developing countries as well as in European countries, would not suit an 
acceding member of the EU. Apparently the fact that the ECSS is almost a copy 
of ILO C102 could not change this perception.
As a result of foregoing deliberations, the ECSS was signed in the same year the 
ESC (Revised) was ratifi ed. At that time, however, it was established that the 
rules on unemployment, old age, invalidity, and employment injury, were not in 
compliance with the ECSS requirements.71 Although, according to the 
assessment, immediate ratifi cation would have been possible on the basis of the 
minimum number of parts that have to be accepted, the government postponed 
its ratifi cation for two reasons.72 In the fi rst place, it was politically undesirable 
to ratify the ECSS only on the basis of the minimum number of parts in 
consideration of EU accession, as well as in view of the previous election 
promises. Secondly, as a result of the delay, extra reporting obligations on the 
non-accepted parts were avoided. Meanwhile, the government had the time to 
bring the social security system into compliance with the ECSS by introducing a 
fi xed indexation formula (2000/2002), setting up an unemployment insurance 
(2002), annually increasing the pension benefi ts (as of 2002), and by exempting 
pregnant women (from the 12th week of pregnancy) from fees for home visits by 
doctors. As a result, Estonia was ready for a generous ratifi cation of the ECSS in 
2004, with the only exemption being the part on employment injury. Th us, in 
respect of the nine social risks, the government is bound by the following 
standards:
70 Information obtained from experts.
71 See section 2.2.
72 Information obtained from experts.
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Table X. Social security standards ratifi ed by Estonia
Medical care ECSS, Part II
Sickness benefi t ECSS, Part III
Unemployment benefi t ECSS, Part IV
Old-age benefi t ECSS, Part V
Employment injury benefi t –
Family benefi t ECSS, Part VII
Maternity benefi t ECSS, Part VIII
Invalidity benefi t ECSS, Part IX
Survivors’ benefi t ECSS, Part X
As a matter of fact, since Estonia was able to fulfi l the obligations of the ECSS, it 
would have been possible to additionally ratify ILO C102 and possibly also one 
or two social security conventions providing higher standards, such as C130 on 
medical care or C183 on maternity. However, this was not considered expedient. 
It has been stressed in this respect by several parties concerned, that the 
importance of the ILO, as such, is beyond dispute, but that practicalities are the 
main obstacles to the ratifi cation of specifi c instruments. Most importantly, the 
burden of the reporting obligations is found too heavy. Because Estonia is only a 
small country, the personnel capacity of the relevant ministries is not suffi  cient 
to cope with the additional paperwork. As an example, in the early 1990s, when 
Estonia became part of a whole list of UN conventions, the responsible 
departments had proved to be unable to meet the attendant reporting obligations. 
Th e submission of the fi rst report on the Convention of the Right of the Child, 
due in 1993, was only completed in 2002. Th is embarrassing experience has made 
the government more cautious in taking up new international obligations. 
Another critical point that has been expressed in this respect is the outdated 
supervision system, involving many physical documents instead of electronic 
templates, forms and questionnaires that could be fi lled in digitally and 
submitted online.
Estonia has not ratifi ed the additional protocol to the ECSS. In relation to 
Article 12 paragraph 3 ESC, which requires Member States to ‘raise progressively 
the system of social security to a higher level’, ratifi cation of the protocol would 
be a logical next step. However, apart from practical obstacles, it is not thought 
that the government is ready for new international commitments, certainly not if 
this would involve higher standards.73 From other countries in the region, 
73 Information obtained from experts.
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notably Sweden and Finland, politicians have learned that it is very diffi  cult to 
cut down on social security rights if the system becomes too expensive. From a 
political perspective, it is much easier not to establish rights than to take away 
vested rights. In conclusion, it may not be expected that Estonia will become part 
of any other international social security instrument in the near future.
4.4.2 FULFILMENT OF THE OBLIGATION TO REPORT 
ON THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS
From 1995 to 2009 the Estonian government received 77 direct requests from the 
CEACR in reply to its regular reports on the 32 ratifi ed labour conventions (until 
2001, on 29 conventions).74 Partly, these requests dealt with problematic issues in 
relation to the conventions, but for a greater part they were requests for more 
detailed information on specifi c provisions. Furthermore, in 2007 and 2008, 
almost all requests (10 out of 12) contained the observation that the government 
had failed to send in the reports; this had also happened during the 1990s, but 
more incidentally. It appears that the compilation of reports on the application of 
ILO conventions has not been given priority the last few years.
Another striking point is that Estonia seems to face some problems with the 
fulfi lment of the obligation to submit newly adopted instruments to Parliament. 
Since 1994, the CEACR has been commenting on the omission of this point 
almost yearly until 2003, and then again in 2008.75 Th e procedure in Estonia 
following the adoption of a new ILO or CoE instrument is as follows:76 At the 
Ministry of Social Aff airs, the new convention is examined and a position is 
taken on the expediency of ratifi cation. If ratifi cation is not found expedient, the 
Minister of Social Aff airs brings forward their position to the government, and if 
the government agrees with non-ratifi cation, no further action is taken. If the 
Minister fi nds it advisable to ratify, an act on the ratifi cation of the instrument at 
stake is prepared and discussed with the Ministers of Justice and Foreign Aff airs. 
Subsequently, the bill is brought up for approval at a government meeting. Aft er 
adoption, it is sent to Parliament, that gives its consent without discussion. Th us, 
Parliament has a strict formal role in this matter, which is furthermore restricted 
to the situation that the government puts forward an instrument for ratifi cation. 
Crucial actors are the ministers concerned and the government, while the social 
74 For comparison: Hungary has ratifi ed 58 conventions and received 143 direct requests in the 
same period; Greece 63 conventions, 108 direct requests; Czech Republic 61 conventions, 134 
direct requests; Sweden 76 conventions, 137 direct requests; Germany 72 conventions, 108 
direct requests. See ILO website, IOLEX database, universal query form.
75 ILOLEX database, search on ‘Estonia’.
76 Vallikivi 2001, p. 4; Information obtained from experts.
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partners are not systematically asked for their opinions. As a matter of fact, there 
has been a discussion of whether Parliament is indeed the competent body to 
decide on the acceptance of new conventions, or whether the government could 
settle these issues instead. Th e ILO has even been consulted on this assumed 
uncertainty, which, of course, confi rmed that the Parliament is indeed the 
competent body in this matter. In view of this imbroglio, it was mentioned by an 
offi  cial of the Ministry of Social Aff airs during an interview that a new procedure 
on the submission to Parliament of adopted instruments is currently under 
preparation at the Ministry.77
4.4.3 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND LEGISLATIVE 
PRACTICE
In order to fulfi l the obligations stemming from the international instruments, it 
is general practice in Estonia to assess new bills on compliance with the 
international standards before they are presented to Parliament. Usually, the 
explanatory report that is attached to every bill contains a part on international 
obligations. Furthermore, the existing rules, especially those on pensions and 
unemployment benefi ts, are regularly assessed in order to prevent the benefi ts 
from dropping below the requirements of the ECSS. In principle, international 
agreements will only be presented for ratifi cation if the national legislation is in 
accordance with the treaty concerned. In practice, however, it still may happen 
that existing laws appear to be in confl ict with certain international provisions. 
An example of such in the fi eld of labour law is the Collective Labour Dispute 
Resolution Act, in which the right to strike is prohibited for all public servants. 
According to ILO C87, ratifi ed in 1994, only public servants who exercise 
authority in the name of the state may be, under specifi c circumstances, denied 
the right to strike. Th is discrepancy was noted by the CEACR in 1997 and 
subsequently repeated many times.78 In 2007, a complaint on this matter was 
even issued by the trade unions to the Committee of Freedom of Association.79 
Th e government agreed that the rules were too strict, and replied time aft er time 
that a new act on civil servants was under preparation in which the right to strike 
would be brought in line with the international requirements. Indeed, at the 
Ministry of Social Aff airs a draft  was prepared several years ago, but a 
complicating factor is that public servants come within the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Justice. It appears that diff erent interests and opposing opinions by 
the two stakeholders have obstructed the solution of this lingering problem. 
77 For a list of interviewees, see Appendix 2.
78 CEACR: Individual Direct Requests concerning C087 (Estonia) 1997, 1999, 2003, 2004, 2006; 
CEACR: Individual Observations concering C087 (Estonia) 2001, 2007, 2008, 2009.
79 ILO Freedom of Association Case (Estonia) No. 2543.
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Although the continuing negative observations of the supervising ILO 
committees cause political pressure to bring this issue to an end,80 the pressure 
is not strong enough to actually bring about new legislation.
As far as social security laws are concerned, these were assessed thoroughly on 
compliance with the ECSS before the government actually turned to ratifi cation. 
It has been described above that several acts have been changed, for example, the 
levels of the pensions were signifi cantly increased, an indexation system for 
pensions was established, and an unemployment insurance scheme has been 
created. Only aft er the legislation was found in compliance with the ECSS, was 
the instrument submitted to Parliament for ratifi cation.
4.4.4 LEGAL STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
International instruments that are ratifi ed by Parliament are part of the Estonian 
legal order and take precedence over national legislation. Article 123 of the 
Estonian Constitution reads:81
Th e Republic of Estonia shall not enter into international treaties which are in confl ict 
with the Constitution. If laws or other legislation of Estonia are in confl ict with 
international treaties ratifi ed by the Riigikogu, the provisions of the international 
treaty shall apply.
Furthermore, Article 3 of the Constitution sets out that ‘generally recognised 
principles and rules of international law are an inseparable part of the Estonian 
legal system’. On the basis of this provision, even treaties not accepted by Estonia 
but that are subject to a large number of ratifi cations could be applied.82 An 
example of this is a judgment of the Supreme Court (Criminal Review Chamber) 
dating back to 1995, in which the Court noted that the European Convention of 
Human Rights was an inseparable part of the Estonian legal system, while the 
Convention had not been ratifi ed by then.83 Th us, it may be stated that the 
Constitution is rather international law friendly. At the same time, the 
Constitution is less clear about the way treaties are to be applied. Articles 15 and 
152 of the Constitution state that (lower) judges shall not apply any law or other 
legislation that confl icts with the Constitution, and that the Supreme Court is 
competent to declare confl icting rules invalid. However, the Constitution does 
not regulate the possibility for courts not to apply (lower courts) or to quash 
80 Information obtained by experts.
81 Th e Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, passed by a referendum held on 28 June 1992 (RT 
1992, 26, 349).
82 See also Laff ranque 2007, p. 7; Vallikivi 2002.
83 Constitutional judgment No. 1–1–34–95 (21 December 1995).
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(Supreme Court) national laws or regulations if they are in confl ict with a 
binding international rule. Nor does it refer to the applicability of treaties if the 
issue at stake is not covered by national law. Th erefore, to fi nd out what the 
position is of international law and specifi cally of international social security 
standards within the Estonian legal order, it is necessary to observe how they are 
implemented in practice.
4.4.5 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND JUDICIAL 
PRACTICE
A study of the judgments of the Supreme Court shows that both lower courts 
and the Supreme Court make reference to international law in their rulings, as 
well as the parties and other participants in the proceedings.84 For the greater 
part, these references concern the European Convention on Human Rights; the 
ILO Conventions and ESC (Revised) have only been brought up incidentally.85 
Th ere have been no cases in which the ECSS has played a role. However, this is 
not due to reasons of principle, but because of a poor awareness of individual 
rights fl owing from this treaty, not only among citizens in general, but also 
among lawyers. Furthermore, it has been explained in this context that the rules 
on administrative court procedures are extremely strict and complicated, which 
means that in general, people do not easily go to court regarding social security 
issues.86 Th e fact that the ECSS has not been subject to any remark in proceedings 
so far does not mean that no further attention should be paid to its possible 
relevance in judicial practice. Rather, the converse is true, all the more since 
several infringements of the ECSS come to the fore in the following sections in 
which national rules are compared with the international standards. Because the 
Constitution gives precedence to international law in such cases, it is particularly 
relevant to see how this constitutional rule is implemented in practice in relation 
to other international agreements.
First and foremost, the Supreme Court has repeatedly confi rmed that 
international agreements ratifi ed by Parliament are part of the Estonian legal 
order and have priority over Estonian laws or other legislation.87 As mentioned 
above, the Constitution does not contain provisions setting out the competence 
84 A limited number of judgments of the Supreme Court are published in English on its website. 
Apart from those cases, with the kind assistance of Ms K. Aule, other judgments of the Court 
that contain reference to international agreements have been examined. See also Vallikivi 
2001.
85 Examples are: Constitutional Judgments 3–4–1–14–07 (ILO Convention 111), 3–4–1–4–98 
(ILO Convention 108), 3–3–1–48–03 (ILO Convention 135), 3–4–1–7–03 (ESC Revised).
86 Information obtained from experts.
87 For instance: Constitutional Judgments 3–4–1–12–08 para. 21, 3–1–3–13–03 para. 31. 
Vallikivi 2001, footnote 19.
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of the Supreme Court to repeal national rules that are in confl ict with 
international law, nor does it regulate the applicability of treaties if the relevant 
rule does not exist in national law. In practice, however, the Court does establish 
such confl icts and consequently applies the international rule instead of the 
contested national regulation.88 In a case where the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was invoked, the Court explained 
that this Convention is an inseparable part of the Estonian legal order.89 
Consequently, the rights and freedoms expressed in the Convention are also part 
of the legal order, which implies that the guarantee of those rights and freedoms 
is also the duty of courts, according to Article 14 of the Constitution.90
It must be recognised that in the greater part of cases, the international rule has 
been considered next to a constitutional rule and has merely been used to support 
the interpretation of the national law at stake on the basis of the Constitution. 
Th ere have been no cases in which the Court has disregarded a national rule on 
the basis of an international agreement only. To give an example, according to an 
Estonian regulation, alien seafarers had to have a certifi cate of service record on 
Estonian ships to be allowed to work on a ship fl ying an Estonian fl ag, while this 
certifi cate was not necessary for Estonian seafarers. Th is kind of discrimination 
is against Article 1 of the ILO Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention (No. 
108). Th e Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court argued:91
As the referred Regulation of the Government of the Republic is in confl ict with 
Convention No. 108, the implementation of the Regulation is in confl ict with para. 
123 of the Constitution. If Estonian laws or other legislation are in confl ict with 
international agreements ratifi ed by the Riigikogu, then, pursuant to second indent 
of Article 123 of the Constitution, the provisions of the international agreement shall 
apply.
IV
According to Article 12 of the Constitution everyone is equal before the law. Th e 
principle of equality before the law must also be applied to seafarers, referred to in 
the Convention.
Although the reasoning of the judgement is entirely based on ILO C108, the 
Court connected the infringement with the Constitution before it declared the 
Regulation unconstitutional. In another judgement, however, the Supreme Court 
88 For instance: Constitutional Judgment 3–4–1–4–98 (ILO Convention 108), Constitutional 
Judgment 3–4–1–1–96 (Convention on the Rights of the Child).
89 Constitutional Judgment 3–1–3–13–03, para. 16.
90 Art. 14 of the Constitution reads: ‘Th e guarantee of rights and freedoms is the duty of the 
legislative, executive and judicial powers, and of local governments.’
91 Constitutional Judgment 3–4–1–4–98, para. III and IV.
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applied the Social Charter (Revised) in a case concerning the right to medical 
care.92 Th e case was brought to court by an unemployed person who had, up to 
that point, been automatically insured by his wife’s insurance, but who was 
aff ected as a result of an amendment to the Health Insurance Act (eff ective from 
1 January 2003) which meant that dependent spouses were not longer covered by 
the insurance of the breadwinner. Th e Supreme Court referred to diff erent 
provisions of the Social Charter, fi rstly to the 12th and 13th principles set out in 
Part I, which recognise that all workers and their dependants have the right to 
social security, and that anyone without adequate resources has the right to 
social and medical assistance. Th e Court then drew attention to Article 13 
paragraphs 1 and 2, which elaborate on the latter principle. Moreover, Article 12 
paragraph 3 was cited, which obliges the Parties ‘to endeavour to raise 
progressively the system of social security to a higher level’. Th e Court recalled 
in this respect that, on the contrary, since 1 January 2003 entitlement to medical 
care had become stricter by no longer covering spouses of uninsured persons. 
On the basis of these arguments, the Court referred the matter back to the 
administrative court to reconsider whether the person had the fi nancial capacity 
to pay insurance premiums. In this case, the Charter was not used to back up the 
interpretation of the Constitution, but was judged on its own merits. At the same 
time, in spite of its arguments, the Court did not go as far as considering the 
amendment of the Health Insurance Act unconstitutional.
Th e Social Charter has also been used by the Constitutional Review Chamber to 
interpret the Constitution, for instance, to defi ne the concept of need.93 Th e 
Court argued that the Constitution does not specify when a person is needy, and 
therefore, to interpret the Constitution, it is necessary to examine the 
international agreements to which Estonia has acceded. In this case, Articles 13 
(1) and 12 (1) of the Social Charter were assessed, on the basis of which, the Court 
concluded that the amount of assistance ‘must not be in manifest inconformity’ 
with the minimum means of subsistence in the country.
Taking stock of all these cases, it may be concluded that, in principle, it would 
very well be possible to invoke (a provision of) the ECSS before a court, as has 
been done with ILO C108 and C135, and with the European Social Charter. Th e 
courts, and especially the Supreme Court, confi rm the priority status of 
international agreements and incidentally apply treaties instead of national law. 
However, such application of international agreements other than the European 
Convention of Human Rights is rare. In general, íf international law is 
considered, it is in a way to support the interpretation of national legislation or 
to interpret the Constitution itself. Th erefore, in practice it is not likely that the 
92 Constitutional Judgments 3–3–1–65–03, para. III. See also Jõ ks 2005.
93 Constitutional Judgments 3–4–1–7–03, para. 20.
Part II. Analysis and Comparison
222 Intersentia
Court would apply the ECSS directly by passing over a national rule, although 
the Constitution provides for it.
Th e second conclusion that may be drawn relates to a more general problem with 
the application of international law, notably, that judges have a lot of freedom to 
decide whether or not refer to relevant treaties. Considering the limited number 
of cases in which the courts, including the Supreme Court, apply international 
instruments other than EU legislation, it is clear that international agreements 
are not systematically used as sources of law. Th ere is a real risk of courts 
referring only to sources that are supportive of the arguments used in the 
judgments and ignoring sources that point in another direction.
4.4.6 APPRECIATION OF INTERNATIONAL ‘CASE LAW’
Although, similar to the Czech system, the Estonian legal system is basically 
norm-based, it is generally recognised that an interpretation of norms is 
necessary to adapt the legal rules to changes in society.94 Th erefore, judgements 
of the Supreme Court are considered more and more as precedents and are used 
in lower court proceedings. As regards international case law, judgements of the 
European Court of Justice have proved useful tools for the creation of many 
aspects of the legal order as well. On a more ad-hoc basis, judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights of the Council of Europe are also used in 
proceedings of the Supreme Court, and sometimes even recommendations of the 
Council of Europe.95 In a case regarding e-voting, the Court referred to a 
recommendation of the Committee of Ministers on ‘standards of e-voting’ and 
argued:96
Although the Recommendation of the Council of Europe is not a legally binding 
document, it summarises the understanding of the democratic states of Europe […], 
and it is thus an appropriate tool for interpreting the Constitution.
From this judgment it can be concluded that recommendations or resolutions of 
the CoE Committee of Ministers on the ECSS are also potential interpretation 
tools for the Court, although they have not been used to date. It must be noted 
that this kind of soft  law has only been used as one argument for interpreting the 
Constitution, and certainly not as a fundamental argument forming the basis of 
the Court’s decision.
94 Kuusik & Miil 2008, pp. 2–3; Lafranque 2007, p. 6.
95 For example, Constitutional Judgments No. 3–3–1–2–06 and 3–4–1–13–05.
96 Constitutional Judgment No. 3–4–1–13–05, para. 17.





In the early 20th century before World War I, Estonia had a basic decentralised 
system of health care with private hospitals, municipal hospitals for poor people, 
and a limited number of state owned hospitals for mothers with children, 
mentally ill people, and for the treatment of specifi c chronic diseases, such as 
tuberculosis.97 Th e fi rst sickness insurance funds in Estonia were created – under 
Russian rule – by employees of large industrial enterprises in 1913.98 Aft er the 
First World War, when Estonia experienced a period of independence, these 
funds expanded their activities. Nevertheless, the insurance coverage was poor 
when compared to other European countries. Only 18 percent of the population 
was insured in the late 1920s, comprising mainly employees and their family 
members. Th e Russian occupation in 1939 marked a fundamental change in the 
Estonian health care system. Th e communist government abolished the 
insurance funds and introduced the ‘Soviet Semashko health care model’, named 
aft er its architect Nicolai Semashko, the Bolshevik People’s Commissar of Public 
Health of the USSR from 1918 until 1930. Th is model was based on centrally 
planned health care, funded and controlled by the government, providing free 
care on the basis of citizenship rather than on insurance.
Th e next signifi cant health care reform took place aft er the restoration of 
independence in 1991. Prepared even before the struggle for independence had 
been settled, this time the reform aimed at decentralisation and fi nancing 
through compulsory social health insurance for workers. Two reasons were 
pointed out for establishing a Bismarckian type of health insurance system. 
Firstly, a contribution based insurance scheme would ensure a solidly funded 
health care system. Secondly, linking health insurance to work would give people 
incentives to participate in the formal labour market. In the course of the 1990s, 
the connection with labour slackened because of political pressure to include 
categories of non-working persons in health insurance, such as students and 
recipients of certain benefi ts.
Th e health care system covers medical care as well as sickness benefi ts. Benefi ts 
in kind include medical services, pharmaceuticals, and technical aids. Cash 
benefi ts are paid out in the case of temporary incapacity for work, and for a 
97 Ginneken (ed.) 2008, pp. 21–22.
98 Koppel 2008, p. 19–23; Estonian Health Insurance Fund 2007, p. 5.
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limited compensation for pharmaceuticals and dental care.99 To carry out the 
insurance scheme, twenty-two independent public health insurance funds were 
created initially, both in counties and cities. However, to remedy a lack of 
coordination, in 1994 the Central Health Insurance Fund was set up under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Social Aff airs in order to organise health insurance 
through the regional units.100 Other trends of recentralisation were to be seen 
towards the end of the 1990s, resulting in the re-establishment of overall health 
care planning at the national level, under strict control of the Ministry of Social 
Aff airs. At the same time, the Estonian Health Insurance Fund (EHIF), which 
was the strongest and most effi  cient fund with the best administrative capacity, 
was given the status of independent public organisation. As a consequence, the 
EHIF was no longer subordinate to the Ministry, although certain incorporated 
mechanisms ensure that the EHIF follows the national health policy framework. 
Additionally, health care providers became private entities operating under 
private law, which implied a shift  in responsibility for health care performance, 
from the Ministry to the actual providers. It has been noted, however, that along 
with the privatisation of health services, no mechanisms were created to increase 
their public accountability and to ensure that autonomous providers follow 
national policy preferences.101
Legislation
Th e right to the protection of health is primarily secured by Article 28 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Estonia.102 Th e legal basis for the health care 
insurance scheme is set out in the Health Insurance Act 2002 (originally of 
1991),103 the Health Services Organisation Act of 2002 (originally of 1994),104 
and the Health Insurance Fund Act of 2000.105 In the Health Insurance Act rules 
are laid down concerning medical care as well as sickness benefi ts. Regarding 
medical care, it regulates: personal coverage, qualifying conditions, duration of 
coverage, health insurance benefi ts in kind and in cash, lists of provided health 
care services and pharmaceuticals, maximum levels of cost-sharing for insured 
people, relationships between the EHIF and service providers, tax contribution 
rates, etc. Th e Health Services Organisation Act provides for the organisation of, 
and the requirements for, the provision of health services, and the procedures for 
99 For an extensive overview of the system, see Leppik & Kruuda 2003, pp. 104–120; website of 
the Estonian Health Insurance Fund (Haigekassa).
100 Ginneken (ed.) 2008, pp. 33–35.
101 Ginneken (ed.) 2008, p. 35.
102 Th e Constitution of the Republic of Estonia passed by a referendum held on 28 June 1992.
103 Health Insurance Act, passed on 19 June 2002.
104 Health Services Organisation Act, passed on 9 May 2001.
105 Health Insurance Fund Act, passed on 14 June 2000.
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management, fi nancing and supervision of health care. Finally, the Health 
Insurance Fund Act regulates the legal status and functioning of the EHIF.
At the international level, Estonia is bound by the European Code of Social 
Security, Part II on Medical Care and Part VIII on Maternity.
Administration and fi nancing
Th e general administration of health care and health policy falls under the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Social Aff airs.106 Initially, the Ministry of Health 
was the central player in the fi eld of health care. However, in 1993 the Ministry 
of Social Aff airs was created through the merger of three separate ministries: the 
ministries of Health, Social Welfare, and Labour. Consequently, within the 
Ministry of Social Aff airs at present, there are three corresponding policy 
divisions. Th e general responsibility of the Ministry regarding health care 
includes the development and implementation of overall health policy and the 
supervision of health service quality and access. Several health agencies 
subordinate to the Ministry have various administrative tasks relating to health 
care. Additionally, the Ministry and its agencies are responsible for the fi nancing 
and management of some public health services that are not covered by the 
health insurance system, such as ambulance services, emergency care for 
uninsured persons, and public health programmes.107
Th e Estonian Health Insurance Fund – the main purchaser and payer of health 
care services – is governed by a council of fi ft een members: fi ve representatives of 
the state, fi ve representatives of organisations of insured persons, and fi ve 
representatives of employers organisations.108 Th e composition of this council 
meets the requirement of Article 71, sub 1 of the ECSS, which demands the 
involvement of representatives of the persons protected in the management of 
the insurance, where the administration is not entrusted to a government 
department. Th e main functions of EHIF include: contracting health care 
providers and covering the expenses of medical care of insured persons to these 
providers; paying sickness, maternity and care benefi ts in cash to insured 
persons; and paying compensation of pharmaceutical products on the basis of 
prescriptions issued to insured persons.
Th e obligatory health insurance scheme is mainly fi nanced from social health 
insurance contributions in the form of earmarked payroll tax, the so-called 
‘social tax’. However, private sources of fi nancing have increased over the years, 
106 Ginneken 2008, pp. 23–28; Leppik & Kruuda 2003 pp. 104–106; Pieters 2003, pp. 44–45.
107 Ginneken 2008, p. 43.
108 Leppik & Kruuda 2003, pp. 105–106.
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now comprising approximately one quarter of the budget. Th ese private sources 
mainly consist of out-of-pocket payments of households.109 Th e contributions 
are paid by employers and self-employed persons, amounting to 13 percent of the 
employee’s wage. Of all insured persons, 45 percent are active contributors to the 
system. Of the other part, 52 percent are covered without payment, and for 3 
percent of all insured persons, social tax is paid by the state.110 In fact, health 
expenses of non-contributing persons are subsidised by the contributing 
categories. Th is refl ects the principle of solidarity between insured persons, 
which is one of the underlying principles of the insurance system. Th e total 
expenditure on health care as a percentage of GDP was 5 percent in 2006, which 
is well below the EU average of 8.92 percent, and also below the average of the 
new EU members from 2004, which was 6.49 percent.111
4.5.2 MATERIAL SCOPE
According to Article 2 (1) of the Health Insurance Act, health insurance covers 
health care expenses for prevention and treatment of a disease, including 
medication and medical devices. Th is rather vague provision does not specify as 
regards the nature or cause of the disease, nor does it explicitly include pregnancy 
and confi nement. At the same time, it does not exclude specifi c diseases or 
conditions requiring medical care either. In practice, pregnancy and childbirth 
are covered by the insurance. Th erefore, the insurance meets the requirement of 
Article 8 of the ECSS which provides that ‘[t]he contingencies covered shall 
include any morbid condition, whatever its cause, and pregnancy and 
confi nement and their consequences.’
4.5.3 PERSONAL SCOPE
Persons covered
According to the Health Insurance Act, health insurance is derived from the 
payment of social tax. Consequently, insured persons are all employees for whom 
the employer has paid (or has a duty to pay) social tax, and self-employed persons 
109 Ginneken 2008, p. 43; Leppik & Kruuda 2003, p. 111. In 2006, 62.5 percent of total health 
expenditure was fi nanced from insurance contributions, and 23,8 percent from out-of-pocket 
payments. Th e remaining 13.7 percent was fi nanced from general taxes (11.2 percent), private 
health insurance (1.1 percent) and other external sources (1.4 percent).
110 Vask 2007, p. 16.
111 WHO/Europe, European HFA Database 2008.
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who pay social tax themselves.112 In addition, social tax is paid by the state on 
behalf of certain categories of persons, including recipients of child-care 
allowance and caregiver’s allowance, persons registered as unemployed, persons 
raising a child up to 3 years of age, and conscripts in compulsory military 
service.113 Arising from the principle of solidarity, several categories of non-
working persons are considered to be equal to insured persons, without payment 
of social tax. Th ese categories include:
– pregnant women;
– children under 19 years of age;
– persons who receive a state pension granted in Estonia;
– persons with up to fi ve years left  until reaching pensionable age, who are 
maintained by their spouses who are insured persons; and
– students of up to 24 years of age who are enrolled in full-time study.
To determine whether the requirements of the ECSS are met in respect of the 
personal coverage of health insurance, Estonia makes reference to the option 
that not less than 50 percent of all residents must be insured.114 Actually, for 
Estonia this is the only possible option, because the other two possibilities – 
coverage of employees or economically active persons – also require the spouses 
of the insured workers to be covered by the insurance. Th e Estonian social 
security system, however, is based on individual rights and does not recognise 
derived rights.115 In 2008, the population of Estonia amounted to 1,340,415. Th e 
number of insured persons was 1,287,718. With 95.6 percent of the population 
insured, Estonia complies with this provision.116 Not covered are certain 
categories of the inactive population, such as housewives, and persons working 
entirely in the informal economy.117
Individual basis
As mentioned above, every person is insured on the basis of their own right – the 
system is not based on the breadwinner’s model. Th e insurance of an insured 
person does not cover their non-working spouse. Th e only exception is a 
dependent spouse who is within 5 years of their pensionable age; they are 
considered equal to insured persons. Additionally, since 2002 it is possible to 
enter into a voluntary insurance contract with the Health Insurance Fund. 
112 Ginneken 2008, pp. 62–63; Leppik & Kruuda 2003, pp. 26–27, 117–120; ECSS Reports (Ee) 
I-IV, Art. 9; website of the Estonian Health Insurance Fund.
113 ECSS Reports (Ee) I-IV, Art. 9 B; MISSOC (Ee), 2010; Karu & Roosaar 2007.
114 ECSS, Art. 9(c). For an explanation of the diff erent options, see section 2.9.2.
115 ECSS, Art. 9 paras. a and b.
116 ECSS Report (Ee) IV, Art. 9.
117 Eamets 2008, p. 53.
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Eligible for voluntary insurance are persons who have been insured by the EHIF 
for at least 12 months immediately prior to voluntary insurance, and persons 
who are dependent upon an insured person.118
4.5.4 BENEFITS
Range of care
Health services are covered by the insurance if they are included in the list of 
medical services of the Estonian Health Insurance Fund (EHIF) and if the 
provision of a specifi c service is therapeutically justifi ed.119 However, insurance 
covers most medical examinations, medical treatments and the maintenance of 
wellbeing of an insured person. Th e costs are paid by the EHIF to the relevant 
health care institution (which may be state, municipal or private owned) or 
private physician on a contractual basis. Services compensated by the EHIF 
include:120
– out-patient consultations by family doctors and specialists, including home 
visits;
– hospital care, including nursing and pharmaceuticals;
– health examinations and procedures, for in-patients and out-patients;
– pharmaceutical supplies, to a prescribed extent;
– preventive health check-ups; and
– pre-natal care, confi nement care and post-natal care.
Services that are excluded from the list include cosmetic surgery, alternative 
therapy, and certain rehabilitation services.121 Dental care for adults has been 
excluded from the benefi ts package since the introduction of the new Health 
Insurance Act in 2002; only for persons under 19 years of age is it provided free 
of charge.122 Th e insurance covers the costs of adult emergency dental care, 
under the condition that the dental care provider is contracted by the EHIF. 
Furthermore, the insurance partly compensates dental care services to specifi c 
categories of insured persons, such as persons receiving an old-age pension or a 
pension for incapacity to work, insured persons of at least 63 years of age, 
pregnant women, and mothers of children of under one year of age. However, 
118 Ginneken 2008, p. 66; Leppik & Kruuda 2003, p. 118.
119 Health Insurance Act, Art. 29 (1).
120 Leppik & Kruuda 2003, pp. 26, 109–110; ECSS Reports (Ee) I-IV, Art. 10; website of the 
Estonian Health Insurance Fund. For a detailed overview, see Ginneken 2008, pp. 135–178.
121 Leppik & Kruuda 2003, p. 110.
122 Ginneken 2008, pp. 176–177.
Chapter 4.  Estonia
Intersentia 229
the future of these compensations is uncertain because of economic measures 
during the current recession.
Pharmaceuticals
Th e health insurance system covers, to a prescribed extent, pharmaceuticals for 
out-patient treatment which are entered in a list of medicinal products composed 
by the Minister of Social Aff airs.123 Th e list also gives the reference price for each 
medicine. Th e insured person buys the medicine for a discounted price, and 
aft erwards the EHIF compensates the pharmacies the diff erence between the 
reference price and the amount paid by the patient. Th e rate of discount varies 
according to the age and diagnosis of the person. If the price of a drug exceeds its 
reference price, the patient has to pay the diff erence.
Cost-sharing
According to the Health Insurance Act, one of the basic principles for the 
provision of health care is limited cost-sharing by insured persons.124 
Nevertheless, out-of-pocket payments are levied for almost all services. Cost-
sharing requirements for out-patient care are as follows: for home visits by a 
family doctor and ambulatory specialist care, a fee of EEK 50 maximum is 
charged. In view of ratifi cation of the ECSS, as of 2004, pregnant women from 
the 12th week of pregnancy and children of under two years of age are exempt 
from payment of the fee. However, the uninsured fi rst 12 weeks of pregnancy 
were still subject to comments by the supervising committee, as a result of which, 
the law was changed again in July 2009 exempting pregnant women from the 
payment of the fee from the moment pregnancy is medically confi rmed. Visits to 
a family doctor are free of charge for all insured persons. In respect of in-patient 
care, hospitals can charge EEK 25 per day for up to a maximum of 10 days per 
bout of illness, and 15 percent of the cost of nursing care. Intensive care, 
hospitalisation of children (minors), and hospitalisation relating to pregnancy 
and delivery are exempt from the co-payment rules.
Out-patient prescription pharmaceuticals are subject to a co-payment of EEK 50 
per prescription, plus a certain percentage of the price of the drug. Th e standard 
compensation rate by the EHIF is 50 percent, up to a maximum of EEK 200 per 
prescription. For patients suff ering from certain chronic diseases, such as 
hypertension, bronchial asthma, and cardiac insuffi  ciency, the prescription fee is 
123 Leppik & Kruuda 2003, pp. 110; ECSS Reports (Ee) I-IV, Art. 10; website of the Estonian 
Health Insurance Fund.
124 Health Insurance Act, Art. 2 (2).
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EEK 20, and compensation by the EHIF amounts to 75 percent. Prescriptions in 
relation to a number of severe and chronic diseases, such as cancer, mental 
disorders, and Parkinson’s disease, are subject to a compensation rate of 100 
percent. Finally, three categories of patients are entitled to a compensation rate 
of 90 percent instead of 75 percent: children aged between 4 and 16 years, and 
disabled and retired persons. In total, it has been calculated that in 2000, half of 
the pharmaceutical expenditures were paid directly by patients.125
Since the introduction of co-payments in 1995, their proportion of total 
expenditure on health care has increased steadily from 7.5 percent in 1995, to 
23.8 percent in 2006, and is expected to grow further in the coming years.126 
Th ere are several reasons to explain this trend, such as the availability of more 
expensive drugs and an increasing number of diff erent drugs, the growth of the 
private health sector, and the increase in fees.127 Moreover, the government 
raised the Value Added Tax on pharmaceuticals in 2009 as an economic measure 
to balance the public spending in order to be able to fulfi l the Maastricht criteria 
for joining the Euro-zone in 2011.128 Th e impact of rising co-payments has 
resulted in a higher share of health care expenses as a proportion of household 
expenditure. Although the fees may not seem very high, it must be borne in mind 
that the normal fee for a drug prescription or specialist visit of EEK 50 
represented more than 6 percent of the monthly income in the lowest decile in 
2003.129 Surveys show that the average share of co-payments as a proportion of 
total household expenditures has increased from approximately 3 percent in 
2000, to 6 percent in 2006.130 And, for instance, in 1995, 0.3 percent of households 
had health expenditures higher than 40 percent of their budget aft er buying their 
food, while in 2002, it was 1.6 percent of households.131 Th e studies also show 
that the burden of these expenses is increasingly weighing on the shoulders of 
lower-income households, and even more so if these households include persons 
of pensionable age, or disabled or chronically ill persons. It has been concluded 
that this growing out-of-pocket expenditure may hinder health access for low-
income population groups.132
125 Leppik & Kruuda 2003, p. 115.
126 Ginneken 2008, p. 43; according to the WHO Statistical Information System the rates 
amounted to 10.2 percent in 1995, and 24 percent in 2006.
127 Ginneken 2008, pp. 43, 68–73; Leppik & Kruuda 2003, p. 114.
128 Läänelaid & Aaviksoo 2009, p. 2.
129 Habicht & Habicht 2008, p. 244.
130 Ginneken 2008, pp. 200–201.
131 Habicht & Habicht 2008, p. 244.
132 Läänelaid & Aaviksoo 2009, pp. 1, 8; Wendt 2009, pp. 334–335; Ginneken 2008, pp. 191 
(concerning medicines), 176 (concerning dental care), p. 208; Habicht & Habicht 2008, pp. 
259, 262; Leppik & Kruuda 2003, p. 99.
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Duration of the benefi t
Health care is provided to the insured persons during the whole period of illness 
and is not time limited. Uninsured pregnant women who are treated as insured 
persons are covered for medical care until three months aft er the date of 
delivery.
4.5.5 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
Conditional for health insurance is permanent residency or residency on the 
basis of a temporary residence permit. In some cases a waiting period is required, 
consisting of a prescribed period starting at the day of employment.133 Th e period 
depends on the basis of entitlement to health insurance of the person concerned. 
Th e prescribed period for persons working under a contract of employment or 
service for a term exceeding one month, and for public servants as well as for 
self-employed persons, is fourteen days. For persons who are treated as insured 
persons and for whom the state pays social taxes, no waiting period is set.
In fact, a qualifying period of fourteen days of work or payment of social tax is 
set as a condition for insurance for certain categories of insured persons. Th is 
period is prescribed in order to give the employer and the insurance fund time to 
process the insurance application.134 According to the ECSS, it is allowed to 
prescribe a qualifying period necessary to preclude abuse.
4.5.6 COMPARISON WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS135
Matters of compliance
Regarding the material and personal coverage, there are no problems of 
compliance with any of the international standards. Insurance covers any 
condition requiring medical care, whatever its cause, including preventive care. 
Furthermore, with about 96 percent of the population being insured, even the 
stipulations of the ECSS (Revised) are fulfi lled. Pertaining to the range of care, it 
stands out that dental care for adults has been excluded from the package. Th is is 
not a problem in relation to the only ratifi ed instrument, the ECSS, and it also 
complies with the ECSS Protocol that requires only basic dental care for children 
133 ECSS Reports (Ee) I, Art. 11; Leppik & Kruuda 2003, p. 26.
134 Information obtained from experts.
135 For a detailed description of the international norms regarding medical care, see section 2.9.
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to be covered. However, according to the higher standards – i.e. the ECSS 
(Revised) and ILO C130 – dental care for adults must be included to a greater 
extent. Furthermore, ILO C130 and ECSS (Revised) require the provision of 
prosthetic and orthopaedic appliances, which are not covered by Estonian health 
insurance. Since health care is provided without a time limit, the duration of the 
benefi t is in accordance with all relevant standards. Worth mentioning in this 
respect is that an employer is allowed to dismiss an employee aft er a period of 
incapacity for work of four months.136 Since health insurance is derived from the 
payment of contributions by the employer, insurance ends aft er the termination 
of the employment contract. However, as long as the person is registered as 
unemployed with the Unemployment Insurance Fund, the state takes over the 
payment of the insurance contributions and the person continues to be insured 
for health care.
Th e amendment of the Health Insurance Act in 2009, containing the exemption 
of pregnant women for out-of-pocket payments from the moment that the 
pregnancy is medically confi rmed instead of aft er the twelft h week of pregnancy, 
has resolved an existing confl ict with the ECSS. As shown above, the ECSS does 
not allow for cost-sharing in the case of pregnancy.
Problematic issues
In respect of the level of benefi t, a close look should be taken at the rules on cost-
sharing. Th e ECSS gives a rather vague provision on this matter, pointing out 
that ‘the rules concerning such cost-sharing shall be so designed as to avoid 
hardship’.137 During the preparatory process of the fi nal text of ILO C102, a 
maximum share of co-payment of one third was suggested, but no consensus 
was reached. In the ECSS Protocol, the provision about cost-sharing is more 
developed and specifi c, setting the maximum share of out-of-pocket payments at 
25 percent per kind of care – i.e. by general practitioners, hospital care, and 
pharmaceutical supplies. Only for conservative dental care is a co-payment of 
one third allowed. Th e ECSS (Revised), on the other hand, gives a more general 
and fl exible rule again, composed on the basis of ILO C130, requiring the rules 
on cost-sharing not only to avoid hardship, but also not to ‘render medical and 
social protection less eff ective.’138 As shown above, in Estonia the overall 
percentage of out-of-pocket payments in relation to total health expenditure was 
23.8 percent in 2006, and subject to an increasing trend. It has also been noted 
that approximately half of the costs of pharmaceuticals are paid out-of-pocket, 
136 Employment Contract Act, Art. 88 (1).
137 ECSS Art. 10 (2). See section 2.9.3.
138 ECSS (Revised) Art. 10 (2); ILO C130, Art. 17: ‘not to prejudice the eff ectiveness of medical 
and social protection’.
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and that the increasing co-payments may hinder access to medical care for lower-
income groups. Of course, it is hard to point out exactly when these payments 
will cause hardship. Nevertheless, considering these fi gures, an ongoing increase 
of out-of-pocket payments may imply an infringement of the rules of the ECSS 
in the near future, if it is not yet so in relation to pharmaceuticals.
Regarding the qualifying period, there is reason to wonder whether the waiting 
period of two weeks is ‘necessary to preclude abuse’, taking into account the fact 
that it only applies to employees and the self-employed, comprising not even half 
of all insured persons. For all other insured persons, no such waiting period exists. 
It seems fair to question whether such a period is necessary to preclude abuse if it 
does not apply to insured persons as a general rule. Moreover, the period is not 
meant to prevent abuse, but is prescribed for administrative reasons only.
Summary of matters of compliance and problematic issues 
Table XI. Medical care (Ee) compared with the international standards
Estonia is bound by the ECSS
Medical
care




ILO C130 (1969) ECSS Rev. (1990)
Material 
scope
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Personal 
scope
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Benefi t Th e out-of-pocket 
payments may 
cause hardship.
Th e relatively heavy 
fi nancial burden on 
low-income house-
holds is against the 
principle of collec-
tive fi nancing.
Th e out-of-pocket 
payments may 
cause hardship.
Th e relatively 
heavy fi nancial 
burden on low-in-
come households 
is against the 
principle of collec-
tive fi nancing.
Th e out-of-pocket 
payments may 
cause hardship and 
hinder the eff ec-
tiveness of medical 
protection.
Th e relatively heavy 
fi nancial burden on 
low-income house-
holds is against the 
principle of collec-
tive fi nancing.
Th e out-of-pocket 
payments may 
cause hardship and 
hinder the eff ec-
tiveness of medical 
protection.
Th e relatively heavy 
fi nancial burden on 
low-income house-





















period may not be 
necessary to 
preclude abuse.
✓ = compliance of national provisions with the international standards.





Th e legal basis for a sickness benefi t is the Health Insurance Act, covering both 
health care as well as cash benefi ts. Th is act regulates which persons are covered 
by the insurance, what the conditions for entitlement are, which kinds of benefi ts 
there are, and the amount and duration of the benefi ts that are given. Because 
the insurance is compulsory for employees as well as for self-employed persons, 
there is no provision for voluntary insurance.
At the international level, in respect of sickness benefi t Estonia is bound through 
ratifi cation by the European Code of Social Security, Part III.
Administration and fi nancing
As part of the health insurance scheme, the sickness benefi t is administrated by 
the EHIF. One of the tasks of the EHIF is to pay sickness, care, and maternity 
cash benefi ts to insured persons. Sickness benefi ts are fi nanced from the health 
insurance budget, which is mainly funded by earmarked social tax. Expenses for 
sickness benefi ts account for approximately 12 percent (2007) of the EHIF’s 
budget.139 Th e share of sickness benefi t expenses has been steadily increasing 
over the years, mainly due to the growth of the average earnings, as well as the 
number of days of incapacity for work.
4.6.2 MATERIAL SCOPE
A sickness cash benefi t is paid to an insured person in the case of temporary 
incapacity for work, if earnings subject to social tax are not received due to sick 
leave.140 Th e benefi t is paid on the basis of a medical certifi cate for sick leave, 
issued by the treating doctor in the case of disease or injury making the person 
unable to continue to perform his or her professional activity, quarantine, or the 
temporary transfer of a pregnant woman to another job. Since Estonia does not 
have a special employment injury scheme, the insurance also covers the loss of 
income due to occupational diseases and employment injuries.
139 Estonian Health Insurance Fund 2007, pp. 26, 55.
140 Health Insurance Act, Art. 50; ECSS Reports (Ee) I-IV, Art. 14.
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4.6.3 PERSONAL SCOPE
As regards cash benefi ts, the compulsory health insurance scheme covers all 
employees for whom the employer has a duty to pay social tax, as well as all self-
employed persons who pay social tax themselves.141 To determine whether the 
requirements of the ECSS are met in respect of the personal coverage of sickness 
insurance, Estonia refers to the provision that ‘prescribed classes of the 
economically active population, constituting not less the 20 percent of all 
residents’ must be insured.142 According to the EHIF database, in 2008 the 
population of Estonia amounted to 1,340,415, including 639,932 insured 
employees and 18,147 insured self-employed persons. Th erefore, the proportion 
of protected residents amounted to 49.1 percent of the total population.143
4.6.4 BENEFITS
Amount of the benefi t
Sickness benefi ts are periodical payments, calculated per calendar day, usually 
consisting of 70 percent of the average daily income of the insured person, which 
was subject to social tax.144 Until 1 July 2009, the replacement rate was 80 
percent. Th e average daily income is calculated on the basis of the benefi ciary’s 
gross wage in the preceding calendar year. For employees, no ceiling is set for the 
amount of earnings to be taken into account, nor for the amount of the benefi t. 
In the case of self-employed persons, the business income is subject to social tax 
up to a ceiling of 15 times the minimum wage per month, which is also the 
maximum amount taken into account for the calculation of the benefi t.145 Th e 
sickness benefi t is subject to income tax. In 2008, the tax rate was 21 percent, 
with a basic exemption of EEK 2,250 per month.
For assessment of conformity of the level of the benefi t with the requirements of 
the ECSS, Estonia makes reference to the provision that the sickness benefi t plus 
family benefi ts for two children must be the given percentage (45 percent) of the 
average salary of a skilled manual male employee, being the standard benefi ciary, 
plus family benefi ts.146 For the determination of the average salary of a skilled 
141 ECSS Reports (Ee) I-IV, Art. 15; Leppik & Kruuda 2003, p. 27.
142 ECSS, Art. 15(b).
143 ECSS Report (Ee) IV, Art. 15.
144 Health Insurance Act, division 5; MISSOC (Ee), 2010; website of the Ministry of Social 
Aff airs.
145 In 2007, the minimum wage was EEK 3,600; accordingly, the ceiling for self-employed 
persons’ income subject to social tax was EEK 54,000 per month.
146 ECSS Report (Ee) IV, Art. 16; ECSS Art. 16 in connection with Art. 65.
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manual male employee, the option chosen is to take into account 125 percent of 
the average earnings of all the insured persons, which is taken as the reference 
wage.147 
Calculation example148
In 2008, the reference wage (125 percent of the average earnings of all insured persons) was 
EEK 14,715. Child benefi t for two children was EEK 600.
Monthly benefi t: 0.7 × EEK 14,715 = EEK 10,300
Benefi t for 2 children aged 6 to 15 = EEK 600
Sickness benefi t incl. child benefi t = EEK 10,900
Th e reference wage of a skilled worker with a dependent wife and two children, supplemented 
with child benefi t, amounted to EEK 14,715 + EEK 600 = EEK 15,315. Th e ratio between the 
sickness benefi t and the reference wage was EEK 10,900 / EEK 15,315 = 0.712
In conclusion, the replacement rate of sickness benefi t of a standard benefi ciary 
in 2008 (but calculated according to the regulations of 2009), compared to the 
reference wage, amounted to 71.2 percent.
Duration of the benefi t
Th e fi rst three days of sick leave are unpaid. Until 2009, there was only one 
unpaid day, which has been extended as part of the economic measures taken to 
combat the recession.149 Furthermore, under the new legislation, the employer is 
responsible for the sick pay from the fourth until the eighth day, consisting of 70 
percent of the employee’s wage. As from the ninth day of sick leave, the Health 
Insurance Fund takes over the payment of the sickness benefi t. Th e benefi t is 
paid until the end of the leave indicated on the sick leave certifi cate, or until the 
day on which permanent incapacity for work is determined. However, a 
maximum of 182 consecutive calendar days during one illness is set, with a 
maximum of 250 days per calendar year.150 Relevant in this respect is the 
provision in the Employment Contracts Act that an employment contract may 
be terminated by the employer if ‘the employee’s state of health does not allow 
147 ECSS Art. 65 (6) sub c.
148 Th e calculation is based on amounts of 2008, taken from ECSS Report (Ee) IV. However, the 
percentage of the sickness benefi t is based on the amendment of 2009 of the Health Insurance 
Act, namely, 70 percent of previous income. Th erefore, the replacement rate diff ers from the 
rate given in ECSS Report (Ee) IV. Th e exchange rate of the Estonian Kroon on 1 January 
2011, when Estonia joined the eurozone, was €1.00 to EEK 15.64.
149 Läänelaid & Aaviksoo 2009; Nurmela 2009C.
150 ECSS Report (Ee) IV, Art. 18; Health Insurance Act, Arts. 56–57. In the case of tuberculosis, a 
maximum of 240 days per illness is given.
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for the performance of duties over four months.’151 With the termination of the 
contract, entitlement to the sickness benefi t ends. Th us, although under the 
Health Insurance Act the benefi t may be granted for 182 days, in connection 
with the Employment Contracts Act the benefi t this period is shortened to 120 
days. Until 2009, the termination of a contract aft er four months of sickness was 
not common practice. However, this may change in view of economic downturn.
Th e benefi t will not be paid in the following situations: if the illness is caused by 
the intent of the person; if the illness is caused by intoxication by alcohol, drugs 
or toxic substances; if the insured person disregards the treatment prescribed by 
a doctor, as a result of which the recovery is hindered; if the person fails to appear 
at a doctor’s consultation without good reason; and if the person returns to 
work.152
4.6.5 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
Apart from the necessary certifi cate for sick leave, a sickness benefi t for 
employees is subject to the same conditions as count for medical care – i.e. a 
qualifying period of fourteen days. Th is period is prescribed for administrative 
reasons, to give the employers and the insurance fund enough time to process 
the insurance application. Furthermore, a permanent residency or residency on 
the basis of a temporary residence permit is required.
4.6.6 COMPARISON WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS153
Matters of compliance
As for the contingency covered, in principle, the Estonian sickness insurance 
covers any morbid condition involving loss of earnings, which complies with the 
international standards. Th e personal coverage of 49.1 percent of all residents 
also meets the requirements of ECSS (20 percent), ILO C102 (20 percent), the 
ECSS Protocol (30 percent), and ILO C130 (all employees).154 As far as the ECSS 
(Revised) is concerned, Estonia could successfully refer to the option of 
protection of 80 percent of the total economically active population.155 Th e level 
151 Employment Contracts Act of 1 July 2009, Art. 88 (1) 1).
152 ECSS Report (Ee) III, Ar. 18; Health Insurance Act, Art. 60 (1).
153 For a detailed description of the international norms regarding sickness benefi t, see section 
2.10.
154 ECSS, Art. 15; ILO C102, Art. 15; ILO C130, Art. 19; ECSS Protocol, Art. 15.
155 ECSS (Revised), Art. 14.
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of the benefi t with a replacement rate of 71.2 percent is far above the minimum 
standards (45 percent), and even meets the level of the ECSS (Revised) (65 
percent).156 A remarkable feature of Estonian sickness benefi t is the absence of 
any ceiling, where all international standards give room for fi xing a maximum 
benefi t, or for taking into account the previous earnings up to a specifi c 
maximum amount. Moreover, the amount of the benefi t does not vary during 
the course of the contingency. Apart from the sickness benefi t, ILO C130 and the 
ECSS (Revised) provide, under certain circumstances, for a funeral benefi t – 
requirements that Estonia has failed to meet since 2009.157 Th e duration of 182 
days (26 weeks) in each case of illness corresponds with the minimum duration 
set out in the ECSS and ILO C102. It does not comply with the ILO C130, ECSS 
Protocol, and ECSS (Revised), providing for a duration of not less than 52 weeks 
in each case of illness, or, in the two latter instruments, not less than 78 weeks in 
any consecutive period of three years.158 Th e waiting period of three days for 
each case of sickness conforms with the standards, all allowing for a waiting 
period of three days.
Problematic issues
Th ere are four points that deserve a closer look regarding conformity with the 
international standards. Th e fi rst matter has been noted by the CEACR, and 
was included in the Resolution on the application of the ECSS 2008 of the 
Committee of Ministers in the form of a request for additional information, 
and was highlighted again in 2009 and 2010.159 Th e Committee started its 
comment by recalling the provision of the Health Insurance Act that an 
insured person does not receive a benefi t if a doctor states that the illness has 
been caused by intoxication by alcohol, drugs or toxic substances. Th en, it 
considered that, according to Article 14 of the ECSS, a sickness scheme must 
‘cover incapacity for work resulting from any morbid condition, whatever its 
cause.’ Th e Committee concluded that ‘refusal to pay sickness benefi t when the 
morbid condition was caused by intoxication by alcohol, drugs or toxic 
substances would be allowed under Article 68f only where such intoxication 
resulted from the wilful misconduct of the person concerned, whose acts were 
of suffi  cient gravity and of a deliberate nature.’ In its next report, the Estonian 
government replied that there was a decision of the Supreme Court on the same 
matter, and that this particular provision would be upgraded in view of that 
decision and the comment of the Committee. In response to this repeated 
156 ECSS, Art. 16; ILO C102, Art. 16; ILO C130, Art. 22; ECSS (Revised), Art. 15.
157 Estonian State Funeral Benefi ts Act; website of the Ministry of Social Aff airs.
158 ECSS, Art. 18; ILO C102, Art. 18; ILO C130, Art. 26; ECSS Protocol, Art. 18; ECSS (Revised), 
Art. 18.
159 Resolutions CM/ResCSS(2008)5, CM/ResCSS(2009)5, CM/ResCSS(2010)5.
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remark, a draft  amendment was prepared by the Ministry of Social Aff airs in 
2009 to resolve the confl ict.160 However, this draft  was not approved by the 
government and, as a result, Estonian law continues to be in confl ict with the 
Code on this point.
Th e second matter, which has not been referred to by the Committee of Ministers, 
concerns the duration of the benefi t. Firstly, in Estonia, payment of the benefi t is 
limited to 250 days per calendar year. Th is implies that when an insured person 
is the victim of two diff erent diseases or accidents within one calendar year, this 
person may not get a benefi t for the full minimum period in both cases. Th is is 
not in accordance with the ECSS, which allows a sickness benefi t to be limited to 
26 weeks during each bout of illness. Th e same problem has been described 
regarding the Czech Republic, who does not meet the standards of ILO C130 on 
this point.161 Furthermore, there is the problem with the Employment Contracts 
Act that allows employers to dismiss employees aft er four months of sickness. In 
eff ect, this shortens the maximum period of sickness benefi t to 17 weeks (120 
days), and is therefore in confl ict with the ECSS.
Th irdly, since 2009 there has been the issue of employers’ liability for wage 
compensation during fi ve days of sick leave. Th is problem has also been 
mentioned in relation to the Czech Republic, where, recently, a period of fourteen 
days of wage compensation by the employer has been introduced.162 It has been 
explained that there is a tension between employers’ liability for the provision of 
social security benefi ts and the principles on solidarity and state responsibility 
incorporated in the international standards. Th e same remarks are relevant to 
the Estonian case – for example, what happens if the employer is not able to pay 
or simply does not pay? And is the employer allowed to ask questions about the 
health situation of an applicant? If so, the measure will have a negative impact, 
especially on employees suff ering from chronic disorders. Furthermore, it is not 
clear whether this requirement is suffi  ciently backed up by rules that guarantee 
that the sick employee actually receives the amount they are entitled to during 
these fi ve days, and that they will not be subject to discrimination because of 
their poor health.
Finally, with regard to medical care, it can be questioned whether the qualifying 
period of fourteen days is indeed necessary to prevent abuse, since it does not 
apply to all insured persons, and it has been introduced for administrative 
purposes only.
160 Information obtained from experts.
161 See section 3.6.6.
162 See section 3.6.4.
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Summary of matters of compliance and problematic issues
Table XII. Sickness benefi t (Ee) compared with the international standards
Estonia is bound by the ECSS
Sickness
benefi t




ILO C130 (1969) ECSS Rev. (1990)
Material 
scope
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Personal 
scope
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Benefi t: 
amount
From the 4th until 
the 8th day: no 
collective fi nancing; 
no state responsibil-
ity; no participation 
of persons pro-
tected.
From the 4th until 
the 8th day: no 
collective fi nancing; 
no state responsibil-
ity; no participation 
of persons pro-
tected.
From the 4th until 
the 8th day: no 
collective fi nancing; 
no state responsibil-
ity; no participation 
of persons pro-
tected.
Funeral benefi t is 
not granted to the 
insured persons.
From the 4th until 
the 8th day: no 
collective fi nancing; 
no state responsibil-
ity; no participation 
of persons pro-
tected.
Funeral benefi t is 




Dismissal of sick 
employees aft er 4 
months of sick 
leave: termination 
of the benefi t is 
not allowed.
Suspension of the 
benefi t in the case 
of illness caused 
by intoxication is 
not allowed if the 
intoxication does 
not result from 
wilful misconduct.
Benefi t is not 
provided for at 
least 52 weeks in 
each case of 
sickness.
Dismissal of sick 
employees aft er 4 
months of sick 
leave: termination 
of the benefi t is 
not allowed.
Suspension of the 
benefi t in the case 
of illness caused 
by intoxication is 
not allowed if the 
intoxication does 
not result from 
wilful misconduct.
Benefi t is not 
provided for at 
least 52 weeks in 
each case of 
sickness.
Dismissal of sick 
employees aft er 4 
months of sick 
leave: termination 
of the benefi t is 
not allowed.
Suspension of the 
benefi t in the case 
of illness caused 
by intoxication is 
not allowed if the 
intoxication does 
not result from 
wilful misconduct.
Benefi t is not 
provided for at 
least 52 weeks in 
each case of 
sickness.
Dismissal of sick 
employees aft er 4 
months of sick 
leave: termination 
of the benefi t is 
not allowed.
Suspension of the 
benefi t in the case 
of illness caused 
by intoxication is 
not allowed if the 
intoxication does 




Th e 14-day waiting 
period may not be 
necessary to 
preclude abuse.
Th e 14-day waiting 
period may not be 
necessary to 
preclude abuse.
Th e 14-day waiting 
period may not be 
necessary to 
preclude abuse.
Th e 14-day waiting 
period may not be 
necessary to 
preclude abuse.
✓ = compliance national provisions with the international standards.





Given the fact that unemployment was offi  cially non-existent, no protection for 
the unemployed was provided under the Soviet period. Aft er 1991, the transition 
to a new economic system caused a rapidly increasing unemployment rate, from 
0.6 percent in 1990, to 14.2 percent in 2000.163 In response to the emergence of 
the unemployment problem, a state unemployment allowance was introduced in 
1991 by Government Decree. Th e allowance is a fl at rate, income tested benefi t 
funded by the state budget. In addition, an unemployment insurance scheme was 
set up in 2001, operating next to the state benefi t.164 Consequently, social 
protection against the risk of unemployment currently consists of both an 
earnings-related unemployment insurance benefi t that is fi nanced from statutory 
contributions, and a fl at rate income tested state unemployment allowance, 
fi nanced directly from the state budget. Under this two-tier system, the state 
unemployment allowance covers those who have worked for 180 days during the 
previous year, but who are not eligible for an unemployment insurance benefi t 
due to insuffi  cient contribution records, termination of the maximum period of 
insurance benefi t, or a refusal of the off er of a suitable job. Th e rate of the 
allowance is so low, that it merely serves to guarantee a minimum subsistence 
level. In 2007, the average replacement rate of the allowance to average gross 
wages was approximately 9 percent.165 Th e allowance is paid up to 270 calendar 
days maximum. Because of its residual role, the state unemployment allowance 
is commonly labelled unemployment assistance.166
In fact, there is a signifi cant overlap between the unemployment assistance and 
social assistance schemes, despite the diff erent function of each scheme. Many 
recipients of unemployment assistance also receive social assistance, for 
dependent family members or housing costs. Moreover, a considerable number 
of unemployed persons who do not qualify for unemployment assistance are 
recipients of social assistance. A merger of these two assistance schemes has been 
163 Võrk 2007; Leppik & Võrk 2006, p. 25; Paas 2004, p. 39; Leppik & Kruuda 2003, pp. 5–12; 
Data from Statistics Estonia, age group 16 years until pensionable age. Aft er 2000, the 
unemployment rate fell to 4.9 percent in 2007. For the age group 16–64, the percentage was 
13.8 percent in 2000, and 4.8 percent in 2007. It should be noted, however, that ‘[T]he 
registered unemployment is about 3 times lower than the unemployment rate according to 
the Labour Market Survey’, Leppik 2007, p. 1.
164 Vodopivec 2005, p. 619; Leppik & Kruuda 2003, pp. 37–39. Because of the minimum insurance 
record requirements, the fi rst payments were made in 2003.
165 Nurmela 2009D; Võrk 2008, p. 37.
166 Leppik 2007, pp. 1–4; Vodopivec 2005, p. 3; Paas 2004, pp. 38–44; Vroman 2002, p. 2.
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proposed, but no consensus has been reached on this matter. A complicating 
factor is that social assistance is administrated by local municipalities, while 
unemployment assistance is administrated at state level. In spite of extended 
cooperation between the labour market and social services, for the time being, 
these two schemes will continue to function separately.167 For the purpose of 
comparison with the international standards, in the following sections the 
assistance part must be left  aside, since it is a means tested fl at rate allowance 
available for employees only. In principle, a means tested allowance could comply 
with the ECSS, but only if it would cover all residents.168
Legislation
Th e Labour Market Services and Benefi ts Act – in force as of 2006 – regulates 
labour market services and support with the aim to ‘achieve maximum possible 
employment rates among the working population, and to prevent their long-term 
unemployment and exclusion from the labour market.’169 It sets out defi nitions 
of, for instance, ‘unemployed’, ‘jobseeker’ and ‘suitable job’ and the content of 
the labour market services. Moreover, it stipulates the eligibility and payment of 
unemployment assistance, which was previously regulated by the Social 
Protection of the Unemployed Act. Th e legal basis for the unemployment 
insurance benefi t is the Unemployment Insurance Act of 2002.170 Th is act sets 
out rules regarding its personal scope, the insurance premiums, the conditions 
and level of the benefi t, and the unemployment fund.
At the international level Estonia is bound, through ratifi cation, by the European 
Code of Social Security Part IV on unemployment.
Administration and fi nancing
Th e Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund administrates the payment of 
unemployment insurance benefi ts in accordance with the Unemployment 
Insurance Act.171 Th e Fund took up its activities in 2002, however, the payment 
of insurance benefi ts only started in 2003. At the highest level of the Fund is the 
Supervisory Board, composed of six members, two of which are appointed by the 
government, two by the trade unions, and two by the employers’ confederation. 
Th us, the Fund complies with the requirement of participation in the 
management by the persons protected, as prescribed by the ECSS, Article 72. Th e 
167 Leppik 2007, pp. 3–5.
168 ECSS, Art. 21(b).
169 Labour Market Services and Benefi ts Act (RT I 2005, 54, 430), Art. 1 (1). English version is 
available via the website of the Ministry of Social Aff airs.
170 Unemployment Insurance Act (RT I 2001, 59, 359).
171 Website of the Unemployment Insurance Fund (Eesti Töötukassa).
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Fund also provides annual reports with the necessary statistics, as required 
under Article 71.
Unemployment insurance is a compulsory insurance fi nanced by contributions 
from employees and employers. Until June 2009, employees paid 0.6 percent of 
their gross wages, and employers 0.3 percent of the employees’ payroll. However, 
under pressure of the strong economic downturn in that year, accompanied by 
rapidly increasing unemployment fi gures, the contributions were fi rst raised to 2 
percent for employees and 1 percent for employers, and as of August 2009, to 2.8 
percent and 1.4 percent respectively.172 Th ese contributions are withheld from 
the employees’ salaries by the employers.
4.7.2 MATERIAL SCOPE
Defi nition of the contingency
Unemployment insurance provides partial compensation for the loss of income 
to insured persons due to unemployment.173 Th is defi nition excludes newcomers 
to the labour market, which is also expressed by the qualifying period required 
for registration as a jobseeker with the Labour Market Board. According to 
Article 2 of the Labour Market Services and Benefi ts Act,
an unemployed person is a person who is not employed, has been registered as a job-
seeker with a Labour Market Board Department, and is seeking employment. An 
unemployed person is deemed to seek employment if he or she complies with the 
Individual Action Plan, and is ready to accept suitable work and to promptly 
commence work.
Th e Individual Action Plan sets out the knowledge, skills, experience and wishes 
of the person, on the basis of which will be identifi ed which support services they 
need for fi nding a job, and details the job seeking activities the jobseeker should 
undertake. Partial unemployment is not covered, since the unemployed must be 
available for full time work.174 A person who is in full-time study, or who has 
reached the pensionable age, cannot be registered as unemployed.
Suitable employment
During the fi rst twenty weeks aft er registration, a job is deemed suitable if it is 
not ruled out for health reasons, if transportation to work and back does not take 
172 Website of the Unemployment Insurance Fund.
173 Unemployment Insurance Act, Art. 2.
174 MISSOC (Ee), 2008.
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more than two hours a day and 15 percent of the monthly wages, and if it 
corresponds to the person’s earlier work experience and education.175 Th e wages 
must be at least 60 percent of the former average income, subject to social tax, 
but not less than twice the minimum wage. In calculating a person’s average 
income, the fi rst three months out of the six months before the registration of 
the person as unemployed is taken into account.176 Aft er twenty weeks, a suitable 
job is also understood as a fi xed-term or short-term job where the salary, in full-
time employment, is higher than the unemployment insurance benefi t received 
by the person for the same period, but not less than the minimum monthly wage. 
Moreover, the job need not correspond to the education, profession or earlier 
work experience of the unemployed person, and no minimum number of 
working hours is required.
4.7.3 PERSONAL SCOPE
In general, all employees and public servants are covered by the unemployment 
insurance scheme; self-employed persons are not included. To demonstrate 
compliance with the ECSS, Estonia refers to the option that at least 50 percent of 
all employees must be protected. In 2008, 94 percent of the total number of 
employed persons (including the unemployed), were covered.177
4.7.4 BENEFITS
Amount of the benefi t
Th e value of an unemployment benefi t is connected to the insured person’s 
previous income.178 During the fi rst 100 days (14 weeks), the benefi t amounts to 
50 percent of the benefi ciary’s previous average wage per calendar day, falling 
back to 40 percent from the 101st day of unemployment. For the calculation of the 
average wage per calendar day, remuneration (from which unemployment 
insurance premiums have been withheld) over the nine months of employment 
preceding the last three months of employment are taken into account. Th e total 
sum of wage payments during the nine months of employment is divided by 270, 
and the result is the average remuneration per calendar day. Remunerations 
paid over the last three months of employment are not taken into account, nor are 
the payments from which unemployment insurance premiums are not withheld.
175 Ministry of Social Aff airs (Ee) 2005B.
176 Labour Market Services and Benefi ts Act, Art. 12 (3).
177 ECSS Report (Ee) IV, Art. 21.
178 Website of the Unemployment Insurance Fund; MISSOC (Ee), 2010; Leppik 2007, pp. 1–2; 
Kurtyka 2006, pp. 20–22.
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Th e benefi t is subject to a maximum, which is 50 percent or 40 percent, as the 
case may be, of three times the average wage per calendar day of all insured 
persons during the previous calendar year. Th is means that if the previous 
average wage of benefi ciary is more than three times the average wage per 
calendar day in Estonia, the benefi t will be calculated according to the latter. Th e 
minimum benefi t value is the daily rate of unemployment assistance. Th erefore, 
if the benefi t is lower than the daily rate of unemployment assistance, a benefi t 
equal to the daily rate of unemployment assistance is granted, amounting to EEK 
32.90 per day in 2008.
For assessment of conformity of the level of benefi ts with the requirements of the 
ECSS, Estonia makes reference to the provision that the unemployment benefi t 
plus family benefi t for two children must be at least 45 percent of the average 
wage of a standard benefi ciary, being a skilled manual male employee, plus 
family benefi t.179 For the determination of the average wage of a skilled manual 
male employee, the option chosen is to take into account 125 percent of the 
average earnings of all the insured persons, which is the reference wage.180 
Calculation example181
In 2008, the reference wage (125 percent of the average earnings of all insured persons) was 
EEK 14,715. Child benefi t for two children was EEK 600.
Monthly benefi t: 0.5 × EEK 14,715 = EEK 7,358
Benefi t for 2 children aged 6 to 15 = EEK 600
Unemployment benefi t incl. child benefi t = EEK 7,958
Th e reference wage of a skilled worker with a dependent wife and two children supplemented 
with child benefi t amounted to EEK 14,715 + EEK 600 = EEK 15,315. Th e ratio between the 
unemployment benefi t and the reference wage was EEK 7,958 / EEK 15,315 = 0.52.
In conclusion, the gross replacement in 2008 was 52 percent. Because according 
to the ECSS the minimum duration of the benefi t must be 13 weeks, the 
subsequent benefi t of 40 percent of previous income is no longer relevant for 
compliance with the ECSS. It is intriguing that the actual average benefi t paid 
per month during the fi rst 100 days in 2008 was much lower than the outcome of 
this calculation, namely, EEK 3,614.182 Th is can be explained by the fact that 
179 ECSS Report (Ee) III, Art. 22; ECSS Art. 22 in connection with Art. 65.
180 ECSS Art. 65 (6) sub c.
181 Th e calculation is based on amounts of 2008, taken from ECSS Reports (Ee) IV. Th e exchange 
rate of the Estonian Kroon on 1 January 2011, when Estonia joined the eurozone, was €1.00 to 
EEK 15.64.
182 Average in 2007. Website of the Unemployment Insurance Fund.
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many recipients of unemployment insurance benefi t previously received (or 
declared) only minimum wage or only slightly more.
Duration of the benefi t
In respect of the duration of the benefi t, Article 8 of the Unemployment 
Insurance Act reads:
(1) An insured person has the right to receive an unemployment insurance benefi t 
during the whole period when he or she is registered as unemployed, but not 
longer than:
1) 180 calendar days if the insurance period of the insured person is shorter 
than 56 months;
2)  270 calendar days if the insurance period of the insured person is 56–110 
months;
3)  360 calendar days if the insurance period of the insured person is 111 months 
or longer.
If a person becomes unemployed for a second time within 12 months of the 
previous registration as unemployed, the same maximum duration counts. Th us, 
if a person is entitled to receive a benefi t for 180 days, of which they ‘use’ only 
140 days because they fi nd a new job, but becomes unemployed again aft er four 
months, they will then receive a benefi t only for the remaining 40 days. It should 
be noted that until 2012 no one will be entitled to 360 days payment of the 
benefi ts, since the law was adopted only in January 2002. Th e benefi t is paid from 
the eighth day aft er the day of submission of the application for the benefi t, which 
implies a waiting period of seven days.183 In 2007, the average duration of 
unemployment insurance benefi ts was 162 days.
4.7.5 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
Qualifying period
Preconditions for entitlement to the benefi t include residency in one of the EU 
Member States, and registration as unemployed at the Labour Market Board. 
Furthermore, unemployment insurance contributions must have been paid for at 
least 12 months during the two previous years. Persons who have reached the 
pensionable age or who receive a pre-retirement pension do not qualify for 
unemployment benefi t.
183 ECSS Report (Ee) 2005/2006, Art. 24; Unemployment Insurance Act, Art. 11 (5).
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Sanctions
A benefi t is not granted if the person’s last employment was terminated due to a 
breach of duties of employment, a loss of confi dence, an indecent act, or an act of 
corruption.184 Furthermore, registration as unemployed will be terminated if the 
jobseeker, without good reason, refuses suitable employment, or refuses to 
comply with their Individual Action Plan drawn up by the Labour Market 
Board.185
4.7.6 COMPARISON WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS186
Matters of compliance
Th e contingency covered by the unemployment insurance system is full 
unemployment of a person who is ready to accept a suitable job, which is 
basically in line with all relevant international standards. Th e interpretation of 
suitable employment also concurs with these standards, since during the fi rst 
twenty weeks, the health of the individual is taken into account, as well as the 
distance to work, former wages, work experience and education. Th ese are the 
broadly accepted underlying principles of suitable employment in the 
international documents. As regards the personal coverage, Estonian 
unemployment insurance includes almost all employees, therefore it meets the 
requirements of all the relevant international instruments, both ratifi ed and 
unratifi ed.
In relation to the amount of the benefi ts, it has been reported that the 
unemployment benefi t is below the standard given in ILO C102.187 However, this 
observation was based on the unemployment assistance allowance, which was 
shown to be below the subsistence minimum in Estonia.188 It was furthermore 
argued that most unemployed do not receive an insurance benefi t: only 20 
percent of newly registered unemployed people fulfi lled the conditions for such a 
benefi t in 2005, mostly because they had not paid unemployment insurance 
184 Unemployment Insurance Act, Art. 13; ECSS Report (Ee) II, Art. 24; Muda 2009, p. 127.
185 Labour Market Services and Benefi ts Act, Art. 7; ECSS Report (Ee) II, Art. 24.
186 For a detailed description of the international norms regarding unemployment benefi t, see 
section 2.11.
187 Hardy& Butler 2007, pp. 64–65; Karu & Nurmela 2006.
188 It is, indeed, an underlying principle of this convention that a means tested cash benefi t 
should guarantee at least the minimum of subsistence – see section 2.10.3.
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contributions for at least 12 months during the previous 36 months.189 Interesting 
in this respect is that the European Committee of Social Rights has repeatedly 
concluded that the situation in Estonia is in not in conformity with Article 12§1 
of the Revised Charter on the ground that, among other things, the 
unemployment benefi t and the minimum unemployment insurance benefi t are 
manifestly inadequate.190 Th e Committee has argued that the rates are below the 
poverty threshold, even when defi ned as 40 percent of median equivalised 
income and calculated on the basis of the Eurostat ‘at-risk-of-poverty’ threshold. 
Although these arguments are indeed relevant in practice and are certainly 
worth further study, they do not establish a confl ict with ILO C102 or the ECSS. 
As shown above, the replacement rate of insurance benefi t, calculated in 
accordance with the relevant provisions, amounted to 52 percent in 2008, which 
exceeds the 45 percent stipulated by ILO C102, ILO C168 and the ECSS; it even 
meets the ECSS (Revised), which requires 50 percent of previous income. Th e 
fact that many unemployed apparently do not have recourse to the insurance 
benefi t does not cause an infringement of the ECSS, as long as the requirements 
regarding qualifying conditions are met. Another point that deserves our 
attention with regard to the level of benefi t is the gap between the outcome of the 
calculation of the average benefi t according to the ECSS, and the real average 
benefi t according to empirical data. It may be concluded that Estonia complies 
with international standards in this respect, however severe question marks are 
raised as to the eff ectiveness of the benefi t. Th is issue will be further discussed in 
section 6.4.
Regarding the duration of the benefi t, the ECSS gives two options for the 
limitation of the duration, notably 13 weeks within a period of 12 months, or 13 
weeks in each case of suspension of earnings. Th e period of entitlement of 180 
days (minimum) within 12 months under the Estonian law exceeds the 
minimum norm of the ECSS. Additionally, the requirements of the ECSS 
(Protocol) (21 weeks) and ILO C168 (26 weeks) are met. Th e ECSS (Revised) 
requires a benefi t be granted for the duration of 39 weeks. Th e qualifying period 
under the Estonian scheme is not particularly strict, and therefore fi ts the 
indefi nite norm of the conventions not to be longer than necessary to preclude 
abuse. A waiting period of seven days in each case of suspension of earnings is 
the maximum provided for in ILO C102, ECSS, and ILO C168. Under the ECSS 
(Revised), the waiting period may not exceed six days within a period of twelve 
months.
189 Karu & Nurmela 2006, p. 2. According to the Health Insurance Fund: 23 percent in 2007, 
45 percent in 2009, ESCR Report (Ee) 2005–2007, p. 95.
190 ECSR Conclusions (Ee) 2006 and 2009, pp. 18–19.
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One other point worth mentioning is the fact that the unemployment insurance 
contribution is paid by the employees for the greater part: 2.8 percent of their 
gross income, while employers pay 1.4 percent. According to the ECSS, the cost 
of the benefi ts shall be borne collectively in a manner which avoids hardship to 
persons of small means. It is specifi ed that ‘[t]he total of the insurance 
contributions borne by the employees protected shall not exceed 50 percent of 
the total of the fi nancial resources.’191 However, it is furthermore set out that this 
may be calculated by taking all benefi ts together, except family benefi ts and 
employment injury benefi ts. Since the fi nancing of sickness benefi ts and state 
pensions are totally borne by the employers, the greater part to be paid by the 
employees as regards the unemployment scheme will not cause a problem in light 
of the ECSS.
Problematic issues
Th e Committee of Ministers has repeatedly remarked in its conclusions on the 
annual reports on the application of the ECSS by the Estonian government with 
regard to the provision that a benefi t is not paid if the person left  their previous 
work ‘due to a breach of duties of employment, loss of confi dence, an indecent 
act or act of corruption.’192 Th e Committee noted that this provision does not 
conform with the ECSS, since suspension of the unemployment benefi t in those 
cases is allowed only ‘where dismissal resulted from the criminal off ence or 
wilful misconduct committed by the person concerned.’193 Th e government 
replied on this comment in its next report by arguing that it was fully in 
compliance with the ECSS, because the provision at stake is used only in relation 
with disciplinary punishments.194 Furthermore, it stated that if an insured 
person has no right to receive unemployment insurance benefi t, he or she can 
still receive unemployment services and assistance benefi t. Th e Committee was 
not satisfi ed with this answer and repeated that the Estonian legislation is not in 
line with the ECSS because the suspension of a benefi t is allowed only when the 
dismissal can be qualifi ed as wilful, which has to be distinguished from 
blameable.195
191 ECSS, Art. 70 (2).
192 CM/ResCSS(2008, 2009)5; Unemployment Insurance Act, Art. 6 (2) 2).
193 ECSS, Art. 68(e) and (f).
194 ECSS Report (Ee) III, pp. 9–10.
195 CM/ResCSS(2010)5. A similar comment was issued by the CEACR in respect of the British 
unemployment benefi t, see Roberts 2006, p. 65.
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Summary of matters of compliance and problematic issues
Table XIII. Unemployment benefi t (Ee) compared with the international standards








ILO C168 (1988) ECSS Rev. (1990)
Material 
scope
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Personal 
scope
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Benefi t: 
amount
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Benefi t: 
duration
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does not necessar-
ily result from a 





✓ ✓ ✓ ✓




Th e point of departure for Estonia’s pension reform was the Soviet legacy that 
involved a pay-as-you-go, non-contributory pension system, fi nanced from the 
state budget and covering all employees.196 Th e statutory retirement age was 60 
years for men and 55 years for women, with a lower age for persons with 
disabilities and prescribed occupations. Th e replacement rate of previous 
earnings was relatively high, ranging from 50 percent for higher income workers, 
196 Aidukaite 2006, p. 260; Leppik & Võrk 2006, pp. 29–30; Raudla & Staehr 2003, p. 69.
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to 100 percent for workers with a lower income. Although eligibility for old-age 
pension was based on employment, everybody was entitled to the benefi t, since 
unemployment was practically non-existent. Besides, the few people who did not 
work received a fl at rate social assistance pension. Th e pensions were linked to 
previous wages, but diff erentials were limited because wages were generally at 
the same level.
In 1990, in light of oncoming independence, the Estonian government made 
preparations for a radical overhaul of the Soviet pension system, eager to shake 
off  the Soviet heritage as quickly and as completely as possible. When the new 
Pension Act was draft ed, even before independence was a fact, the Prime 
Minister specifi cally ordered ‘that no paragraph of the new pension law should 
be a copy of the text of the Soviet Law.’197 Th is new act fi rstly aimed to separate 
the Estonian pension system from the Soviet system, and secondly to increase 
pensions, both in relation to the level of the benefi ts and the coverage, which was 
broadened to include all residents. It set out a defi ned benefi t pension scheme, 
fi nanced by contributions, providing benefi ts which were related to the minimum 
wage, as well as to previous earnings, with the minimum level set at 85 percent of 
the minimum wage. Before the Act was adopted,198 the government had already 
introduced a social tax of 20 percent of gross payroll to be paid by employers, 
and had taken measures to isolate the Social Fund from Soviet Union fi nances. 
As a matter of fact, because of the economic downgrade during the transition 
period, in addition to insuffi  cient fi nancial calculation regarding the new scheme, 
the new Pension Act turned out to be unaff ordable and was therefore short-
lived.199 Within one year of its adoption, the Act was suspended and replaced by 
a resolution setting out fl at rate state allowances, linked to the minimum wage, 
entailing a substantial benefi t reduction. Although this was intended to be a 
temporary rescue measure with the sole purpose of dealing with the economic 
crisis, the initial Pension Act was never reintroduced.
Th e fi rst democratically elected government took another step in pension reform 
by adopting the State Allowances Act of 1993. Th is act regulated a gradual 
increase of the pensionable age to 65 for men and 60 for women by 2003,200 and a 
qualifi cation period of 15 years of service, both for men and women. Th e benefi ts 
remained basically fl at rate, with an additional link to the number of service 
years, and were adjusted according to the revenues from the fi xed contribution 
197 Leppik & Võrk 2006, p. 31.
198 Pension Act, adopted 15 April 1991.
199 Leppik & Võrk 2006, p. 32.
200 Leppik & Võrk 2006, pp. 34–35. An attempt to equalise the pensionable age of men and 
women at 65 had been frustrated at that time by female politicians.
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rate of 20 percent of the employer’s payroll.201 Th is act was, again, considered to 
be a temporary arrangement for the duration of economic transition, as the 
government intended to reintroduce an earnings related pension within a few 
years, but it held out for seven years. During these years, it was subject to various 
changes, such as the uncoupling of the benefi ts from the minimum wage, and 
the new possibility for working pensioners to receive full pension benefi ts in 
addition to their income from work.
Meanwhile, the government had appointed a Social Security Reform Commission 
in 1997, and had assigned it the task of preparing a solid model for pension 
reform.202 Within one month, the policy paper ‘Conceptual Framework for 
Pension Reform’ had been produced, and shortly aft erwards was approved by the 
government. Th e paper described the existing problems of the pension scheme 
and gave objectives for a new system, but, fi rst and foremost, it suggested that 
before draft ing new legislation, a political agreement should be reached on the 
basic choices set out in the paper. Th e Reform Commission considered such a 
fundamental agreement at the political level of major importance, in view of the 
great number of pension reform proposals that had already been developed by 
that time without receiving suffi  cient political backup. Anticipating this 
agreement, that was not reached until 2001, but still following the main strategy 
of the framework paper, the State Pension Insurance Act was adopted in 1998 
and completely implemented by 2000. In fact, the adoption of the Act was the 
fi rst mature step regarding pension reform, which has been carried out largely 
according to the framework paper, notwithstanding several political changes.
By and large, the Commission had depicted in its paper a three pillar pension 
system:
– 1st pillar: a state-managed compulsory pay-as-you-go pension scheme, 
fi nanced from social tax paid by the employer, granting benefi ts consisting of 
a fl at rate basic amount, a service period related component and an insurance 
related component;
– 2nd pillar: a privately managed compulsory pension scheme, funded by 
contributions of employees and topped up on the cost of the 1st pillar 
scheme;
– 3rd pillar: a privately managed voluntary pension scheme, in the form of 
insurances or pension funds off ered by insurance companies.
201 Th e contributions were not linked to individual employees; the employer had simply to pay 
20 percent of the total payroll, covering salaries of all their employees.
202 Leppik & Võrk 2006, pp. 48–49; Müller 2006, p. 405; NataliB 2004; Raudla & Staehr 2003, pp. 
70–72.
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Th e political agreement retained this framework, to the extent that the second 
pillar would be voluntary, while participation would be promoted by attractive 
switching conditions from the fi rst (partly) to the second pillar. However, under 
pressure (especially) from the Trade Unions on the one hand, and fi nancial 
institutions on the other, the coalition government fi nally agreed to compulsory 
participation in the second pillar for all new entrants to the labour market.203
In brief, for the fi rst pillar, the changes have resulted in a pensionable age of 65 
years for both men and women,204 and entitlement to the benefi t on the basis of 
social tax paid instead of years of service.205 Furthermore, the pensions are 
calculated on a fl at rate base, with a supplement depending on the amount of 
social tax paid during the entire career. Th e fl at rate amount represents a 
solidarity element in the system, providing redistribution from higher income 
groups to lower income earners. Th e Pension Insurance Act also provides for a 
so-called ‘national pension’, granted to persons who do not meet the required 
qualifi cation period, the amount of which is fi xed by Parliament.
Th e second pillar, supplementary to the state pension, is, as mentioned before, 
obligatory for new entrants on the labour market, or more specifi cally, for people 
who were born in 1983 or later; for those born before 1983, participation is 
voluntary.206 Th e scheme became operational in 2002, starting with the 
collection of contributions for the new individual savings accounts, and the fi rst 
pensions were paid out in 2009. As a characteristic of a defi ned contribution 
system, the amount of the ultimate pension depends on the value of the 
accumulated contributions a person paid into their individual savings account 
plus the rate of return from the investment, minus management fees. Th e pension 
must be paid out, as a general rule, in the form of monthly annuities; only if the 
monthly amount is less than one quarter of the national pension (i.e. the 
minimum fi rst pillar benefi t), or exceeds it by three times, may a programmed 
withdrawal take place. Assessment on whether the second pillar may be taken 
into account to meet the requirements of the ECSS is carried out in the last part 
of this section.
Th e voluntary third pillar pension provides the participant with an addition to 
fi rst and second pillar pensions, and aims to maintain a better living standard at 
pensionable age.207 It has been estimated that the fi rst and second pillar pensions 
together will, on average, account for about half of a person’s former income 
203 Leppik & Võrk 2006, pp. 53–57; Müller 2006, pp. 404–407; Raudla & Staehr 2003, p. 74.
204 To be gradually obtained in 2026.
205 Leppik & Võrk 2006, p. 69; website of the Ministry of Social Aff airs.
206 Leppik & Võrk 2006, pp. 70–82; Raudla & Staehr 2003, pp. 73–75; website of the Ministry of 
Social Aff airs.
207 Leppik & Võrk 2006, pp. 120–121; website of the Pensionikeskus (Pensionfund).
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from work. According to research, however, a person’s pension should be 65–70 
percent of their previous income in order to maintain the established life 
standard. Th e government’s advice, therefore, is to make use of all three pension 
pillars to be able to maintain that standard, and favourable tax treatment 
accommodates this objective. However, in 2007 only 18 percent of all employed 
persons had concluded a pension contract with an insurance company or with a 
voluntary pension fund.208 Participation is not subject to a minimum age, 
although tax advantages apply only from 55 years of age. Th e savings may also be 
used in the case of total and permanent incapacity for work.
Legislation
Th e main act in the fi eld of fi rst pillar old-age pensions is the State Pension 
Insurance Act, which also comprises invalidity and survivors’ pensions, as well 
as the national pension.209 Th is act covers the defi nition of the state pension, the 
personal coverage, the organisation of the insurance, procedural matters, the 
qualifying conditions and procedure for entitlement, and rules for calculation 
and payment of the pension. In addition to this act, the Social Tax Act regulates 
the social taxes to be paid by the employers and the state. Th e activities of the 
second pillar pension funds are regulated by the Funded Pensions Act,210 while 
the third pillar pensions are governed by the Investment Funds Act.211
At the international level, Estonia has ratifi ed Part V concerning old age of the 
European Code of Social Security.
Administration and fi nancing
Th e administration of the state pension system is carried out by the Estonian 
National Social Insurance Board (ENSIB), established in 1993 as a government 
agency under the Ministry of Social Aff airs.212 Th e main tasks of the ENSIB 
include the organisation and co-ordination of granting and payment of the state 
pensions, family benefi ts, social benefi ts and funeral grants. Data on all insured 
persons, including the social taxes paid on their behalf, are fi led in the State 
Pension Insurance Registry. Communication with insured persons and 
benefi ciaries is organised through four regional Pension Offi  ces with local offi  ces 
in the diff erent counties and some cities. Within the Ministry, the Social Security 
Department is responsible for pension policy developments.
208 Tali 2007, p. 31.
209 State Pension Insurance Act, passed on 26 June 1998, entered into force 1 April 2000 (RT I 
1998, 64/65, 1009; consolidated text RT I 2001, 9, 42).
210 Funded Pension Act, adopted 12 September 2001, entered into force 1 October 2001.
211 Investment Funds Act, adopted 14 April 2004, entered into force 1 May 2004.
212 Natali 2004B; Leppik & Kruuda 2003, p. 20; Pieters 2003, pp. 44–45; website of the Estonian 
Social Insurance Board.
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Th e fi rst pillar pension scheme is fi nanced mainly through social taxes, of which 
20 percent is allocated for the state pension insurance.213 Social tax, which 
amounts to 33 percent of gross payroll in total (20 percent for pension insurance 
and 13 percent for health insurance), is paid by the employers and by the self-
employed. Additionally, the state pays social tax on behalf of persons who receive 
unemployment benefi t, persons raising a child of up to 3 years of age, and some 
other categories of non-active persons who are considered equal to insured 
persons. Th e cost of national pensions and pension supplements, as well as the 
administrative costs, are paid out of the general state budget. Furthermore, the 
state budget also covers any defi cit of the pension insurance budget, in case the 
social tax revenues do not meet the cost of pensions.
As far as the fi nancing of the second pillar pension is concerned, in 2001 the 
coalition agreed on the adoption of the so-called ‘carve out and top up’ approach, 
which means that from the social tax earmarked for pension insurance, 16 
percent continues to fi nance the fi rst pillar, and 4 percent is allocated to the 
second pillar, while an additional contribution to the second pillar of 2 percent is 
levied on insured employees.214 Estonia is the only CEE country that has included 
this top up component in its fi nancing strategy, which was considered necessary 
as an incentive to join the second pillar pension and, therefore, to increase the 
income level of pensioners. In fact, if an employee joins the second pillar and 
pays a contribution of 2 percent of their gross wage to their individual account, 
the state adds 4 percent out of the social tax that is paid by the employer as 
contribution to the state pension insurance. As a consequence, participation in 
the second pillar is, partly, at the cost of fi rst pillar benefi ts.215
Th e participant themselves must choose one of the eighteen privately managed 
pension funds (in 2008), which are classifi ed into three categories of investment 
strategy: lower-risk funds, which may invest only in fi xed-interest instruments, 
medium-risk funds, and higher-risk funds, allowed to invest up to 50 percent of 
assets in equities. Each fund management company, mandatorily affi  liated with 
a bank or an insurance company, is obliged to off er a lower-risk fund, but in 
addition, higher-risk funds may be created. In practice, seven high-risk funds 
and seven lower-risk funds, supplemented with four medium-risk funds, have 
been established.216 Th e operational costs of the fund management companies 
are covered by management fees, the maximum rate of which are determined 
annually by the Minister of Finance, and which generally diff ers from 1.5 to 2.0 
percent of the market value of the assets. Th e investment risks burden the 
213 MISSOC (Ee), 2008; Ministry of Social Aff airs (Ee) 2005A, p. 9; Leppik & Kruuda 2003, p. 22; 
website of the Ministry of Social Aff airs.
214 Leppik & Võrk 2006, pp. 55, 72–74; Müller 2006, p. 406;.
215 For the consequences of the transfer costs, see also: Raudla & Staehr 2003, p. 78.
216 For the actual situation, see the website of the Pension Fund (Pensionikeskus).
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individual participant, since there are no guarantees on absolute or relative rate 
of return.217 Th e only guarantee the insured person enjoys is against breaches by 
the fund managers, such as violation of investment rules, for which the 
management company must pay contributions to a guarantee fund. To assert the 
interests of second pillar participants, the Financial Inspectorate has been 
assigned the task of supervising the pension funds.218 Th e insured person can 
switch between funds at the start of every calendar year, however, the paid 
contributions are not redirected to the newly chosen fund, as a result of which, 
during a worker’s career it is possible to accumulate contributions in diff erent 
funds. It has been calculated that in 2050 more than two thirds of the average 
old-age pension will consist of second pillar benefi t.219
Th e transfer of 4 percent of social tax from the fi rst to the second pillar on behalf 
of second pillar participants causes a considerable gap in the fi nancing of the 
pay-as-you-go fi rst pillar pension system, even more so since the state pensions 
will not be less for persons who participate in the second pillar.220 Th is gap is 
supposed to be fi lled by the surplus social tax revenues generated in recent years, 
and the stabilisation reserve.221 However, these resources will run dry in the not 
too distant future and a long-term strategy for fi nancing these transition costs is 
still lacking.222 Th e recent economic recession has intensifi ed the problem.223 To 
reduce the fi nancial burden of the public pension system, the government 
adopted a temporary measure in April 2009 that suspended the 4 percent state 
contributions from June 2009 until December 2010. In 2011, the state will resume 
contributing 2 percent, in 2012 the initial 4 percent will be contributed again, 
and as of 2013, the contribution gap will be gradually repaired through extra 
state contributions.
4.8.2 MATERIAL SCOPE
Since 2001 the pensionable age for men has been 63 years; for women the 
pensionable age is being gradually increased, and will be equal to that of men by 
217 Leppik & Võrk 2006, pp. 83–85; Raudla & Staehr 2003, pp. 55–76; website of the Ministry of 
Social Aff airs. In 2003 67 percent of all participants opted for high-risk funds; of the younger 
participants, born aft er 1981, 85 percent joined high-risk funds: Raudla & Staehr 2003, p. 77.
218 Th e Financial Inspectorate, established in 2002, is an independent legal authority for the 
inspection of banks, insurance and security companies.
219 Raudla & Staehr 2003, p. 80.
220 Estimates vary from 0.4 percent to 1.0 percent of the GDP annually, depending on the 2nd 
pillar participation rate: Fultz 2006, p. 9; Leppik 2006, p. 76; Paas 2004, p. 37; Pieters 2003, 
p. 59.
221 Ministry of Social Aff airs (Ee) 2005A, p. 9; Pieters 2003, p. 59.
222 Leppik & Võrk 2006, pp. 118–120.
223 Estonia.eu 2009.
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2016.224 Following the trend within Europe and under pressure of the economic 
crises, in December 2009 the Estonian government sent a draft  law to the 
Parliament that sought to raise the retirement age to 65 years by 2026. Th is law 
was adopted in April 2010. Th e state pension is granted irrespective of 
engagement in any gainful activity by the pensioner. Th e Estonian law also 
provides for early retirement up to three years prior to the general retirement 
age, however, resulting in a permanently reduced old-age pension.225 An early 
retirement old-age pension will not be granted as long as the applicant is 
employed. Additionally, for some categories of persons ‘an old-age pension under 
favourable conditions’ is available, which means that they can apply for a pension 
three or fi ve years before reaching the prescribed pensionable age, depending on 
the specifi c category.226 Eligible are, for example, parents who have raised three 
or more children and who meet specifi c conditions, and persons who participated 
in the cleanup of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station. Lastly, 
so-called ‘superannuated pensions’ – also with advantageous conditions – are 
granted to workers in occupations which involve a loss or reduction of 
professional capacity for work before reaching pensionable age, such as police 
offi  cers, emergency service workers, employees of penal institutions, and some 
mining and excavation workers.
4.8.3 PERSONAL SCOPE
Insured for a state pension are persons who, pursuant to the Social Tax Act, pay 
the pension insurance part of social tax, or for whom the social tax must be 
paid.227 Consequently, all employees and self-employed persons are insured, as 
well as persons treated as insured persons, and persons for whom the state pays 
the social tax, including recipients of a child care allowance, caregiver’s 
allowance, parental benefi t, unemployment benefi t, or conscripts in compulsory 
military service.228 In its reports on the application of the ECSS, Estonia refers to 
the option that classes of the economically active population must be covered, 
constituting not less than 20 percent of all residents. On 31 December 2008, 
Estonia had 639,932 employees and 18,147 self-employed persons, while the 
population fi gure was 1,340,415. Th is implies that 49.1 percent of the total 
population was covered by the state pension insurance.229
224 State Pension Insurance Act, Art. 7; ECSS Report (Ee) III, Art. 26.
225 Leppik & Kruuda 2003, p. 33; ECSS Report (Ee) III, Art. 26.
226 State Pension Insurance Act, Art. 9.
227 State Pension Insurance Act, Art. 3; ECSS Report (Ee) I, Art. 27.
228 Th e state pays social tax for ca 15 percent of all insured persons. It should be noted, however, 
that the amount of social tax paid by the state is relatively small, and ensures an annual 
pension insurance coeffi  cient of only 0.1, which is 10 percent of the coeffi  cient of a person 
earning an average wage; Ministry of Social Aff airs (Ee) 2005A, p. 18.
229 ECSS Report (Ee) IV, Art. 27.
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4.8.4 BENEFITS
Amount of the benefi t
Th e old-age pension may consist of three diff erent parts:230
– Th e basic amount, fi xed by Parliament upon passage of the state budget, 
pursuant to the State Pension Insurance Act;
– Th e length of service part, taking into account periods of work until 
31.12.1998, multiplied by the annual insurance coeffi  cient (the value of one 
year of service) determined by the government; and
– Th e insurance component, taking into account insurance contributions as of 
31.12.1998. Th is component is based on a personal coeffi  cient, calculated by 
dividing the total amount of social tax that has been paid on behalf of the 
insured person by the average amount of social tax paid in the given calendar 
year. Consequently, the amount of social tax paid on the average wage in the 
course of one year will give a coeffi  cient of 1.0. Th is ‘personal coeffi  cient is 
provided annually by the ENSIB, and the sum of these personal coeffi  cients, 
multiplied by the insurance coeffi  cient determined by the government,231 
defi nes the insurance component.232
According to the State Pension Insurance Act, the old-age pension shall not be 
less than the national pension rate, which thus serves as the minimum guarantee 
for old-age pension.233 Th us, for persons who stopped working before 31 December 
1998, the pension is the sum of the fi rst two components only, whereas persons 
who started working aft er this date, receive a pension amounting to the sum of 
the fi rst and third components. In the course of the next four decades, the length 
of service part will gradually disappear, until all persons who worked before 1999 
have reached the pensionable age. Th e amount of the pension exceeding a certain 
amount is subject to income tax; in 2008 the exemption for pensioners amounted 
to EEK 5,250, and 21 percent income tax was levied on the exceeding part.
For the calculation of the old-age pension according to the ECSS, Estonia makes 
reference to the option that the benefi t must amount to 40 percent of the average 
wage of an ordinary adult male labourer in manufacturing.234 In its reports on 
the application of the ECSS, the government takes, for its calculation, the basic 
230 ECSS Report (Ee) IV, Art. 28; website of the Estonian Social Insurance Board; Leppik & 
Kruuda 2003, p. 32.
231 Th is is the same coeffi  cient as used for the length of service component.
232 It has been calculated that in 2002, 72 percent of the insured persons had an average personal 
coeffi  cient of less than 1.0: Raudla & Staehr 2003, p. 82.
233 State Pension Insurance Act, Art. 12 (2).
234 Pursuant to ECSS Arts. 28 (a) and 66.
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amount and the length of service components only. It must be recognised that 
this does not refl ect the actual situation, because since 1999 the pensions have 
partly been based on insurance years as well. Th e following calculation example 
is based on service years only according to the calculation of the government, 
while in section 4.8.6, both service years until 1998 and insurance years from 
1999 will be taken into account.
Calculation example235
Th e average net salary of the standard benefi ciary (an unskilled adult male labourer in 
manufacturing) in 2007 was EEK 6,194, which is the reference wage.
Th e fi rst component of the old-age pension, the basic amount, was EEK 1,374.
For the calculation of the second component, the monetary value of one year of service (annual 
factor) was fi xed at EEK 54.43, and the personal coeffi  cient is set at 1 for all service years. Th e 
pension according to the ECSS is based on a qualifying period of 30 years of service, thus the 
total amount of the length of service component was 30 × EEK 54.43 × 1 = EEK 1,633.
Th us, the old-age pension of a standard benefi ciary in 2007 amounted to: EEK 1,374 + 
EEK 1,633 = EEK 3,007 per month.
Th e ratio between the old-age pension and the reference wage was EEK 3,007 / EEK 6,194 = 
0.485 percent.
Because the ECSS considers the standard benefi ciary to be a man with a dependent wife of 
pensionable age, the Estonian government in its reports adds the amount of the national 
pension for the wife to the calculated pension.
Th e national pension, which is at the same time the minimum old-age pension, amounted to 
EEK 1,573 in 2007.
Th us, the total old-age pension of a standard benefi ciary was: EEK 3,007 + EEK 1,573 = 
EEK 4,580, which represents 73.9 percent of the reference wage.
In conclusion, according to the Estonian government, the replacement rate of the 
old-age pension of a standard benefi ciary compared to reference wage, amounted 
to 73.9 percent in 2007.
Duration of the benefi t
Old-age pension is granted throughout the contingency, until the death of the 
benefi ciary. Th ere is one exception: payment is suspended during imprisonment 
and preventive custody. However, if the pensioner has dependents, part of the 
pension will be paid according to the number of dependents.236
235 Th e government in its report on 2007/2008 (ECSS Report (Ee) IV) used, for its calculations, 
data on diff erent time bases, which is not in conformity with ECSS, Article 66. In this 
calculation example this is corrected: the average wage of a male labourer in manufacturing 
in 2007 is taken into account (source: ECSS Report (Ee) IV), as well as the basic amount, the 
annual factor, and the national pension of April 2007 (sources: ECSS Report II; website of the 
Estonian Social Insurance Board). Th e exchange rate of the Estonian Kroon on 1 January 
2011, when Estonia joined the eurozone, was € 1.00 to EEK 15.64.
236 Pension Insurance Act, Art. 46; in the case of one dependant, 25 percent of the pension will 
be paid, in the case of two dependants, 50 percent, and in the case of three or more 
dependants, 75 percent.
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Adjustment to the cost of living
From April 2002, the periodical old-age pension were annually indexed.237 Th e 
initial method of indexation, mainly based on the consumer price index, resulted 
in an increase in pensions that was slower than the signifi cant increase in wages, 
which created, of course, a lower replacement rate.238 As of April 2008, the value of 
the index has been changed, now depending for 80 percent on the yearly increase 
in social tax contributions and 20 percent on the consumer price index.239
4.8.5 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
Th e minimum qualifying period for entitlement to old-age pension is a period of 
15 years of pensionable service in Estonia, which stands for both length of service 
years calculated until 31 December 1998 and insurance years calculated from 
1 January 1999.240 As regards the length of service, all gainful activities subject 
to social tax are taken into account, as well as certain equalised periods, 
including periods of: military service, registration as unemployed, higher or 
vocational education, caring for a disabled person or child, and caring for a child 
of up to three years of age. Th e insurance period comprises years in which the 
person has earned at least 12 times the monthly minimum wage, or years in 
which social tax has been paid by the state.241
4.8.6 COMPARISON WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS242
Matters of compliance
Th e newly fi xed retirement age of 65 years is in accordance with the relevant 
international instruments, ratifi ed or unratifi ed. Additionally, Estonia has 
certain advantageous retirement rules for some occupations that are considered 
unhealthy or arduous, which complies with the requirements of ILO C128.243 
237 ECSS Report (Ee) III, Art. 28.
238 For example: in 2007 the consumer price index increased by 6.6 percent, while the receipt of 
the pension insurance amount of social tax, refl ecting the rise of wages, increased by 
25.34 percent.
239 ECSS Report (Ee) III, Art. 28.
240 ECSS Report (Ee) I, Art. 29; Pension Insurance Act, Arts. 7, 28–30; Raudla & Staehr 2003, 
p. 73.
241 Largely similar to the equalised periods as regards service years.
242 For a detailed description of the international norms regarding old-age benefi t, see section 
2.12.
243 ILO C128, Art. 15 (3); for an in-depth study of Convention 128, see Korda (forthcoming), 
dissertation.
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Th e personal scope of the fi rst pillar pension system is also suffi  cient, covering all 
employees and self-employed persons, as well as certain non-active categories. 
ILO C128 and the ECSS (Revised) – neither of which have been ratifi ed by 
Estonia – represent the highest international norm in this respect, requiring 75 
and 80 percent of the economically active population to be covered respectively.
As regards the level of the benefi t, the replacement rate for a standard benefi ciary 
with a dependent spouse of 73.9 percent – as calculated by the government – 
amply meets the international standards, even those laid down in ILO C128 and 
the ECSS (Revised). As a rule, to comply with the requirements of the 
conventions, the benefi t must be at least the fi xed percentage of the gross wage of 
the standard benefi ciary. Estonia, similar to the Czech Republic, takes the net 
wage as point of reference, which results in a higher replacement rate.244 For the 
Czech Republic, this was accepted by the CEACR because pensions are only 
taxed from an amount exceeding the amount of the pension of the standard 
benefi ciary, and, additionally, the state pays for the pensioner’s health insurance. 
For Estonia, this matter has not been subject to an observation by the CEACR or 
the Committee of Ministers, but the situation is largely similar to that of the 
Czech Republic. Th erefore, it does not seem to be in confl ict with the international 
rules. However, in several other respects the calculations made by the government 
are questionable, and therefore certain remarks will be made as regards the level 
of the benefi t in the next section.
Since the benefi t is granted until the death of the benefi ciary, the duration of the 
benefi t is in compliance with all relevant standards. Th e Committee of Ministers 
– in its resolution on the application of the ECSS – requested additional 
information concerning the suspension of payment of the state pension during 
imprisonment of the benefi ciary, specifi cally regarding which portion of the 
pension is granted to the dependants.245 Th is question was asked in view of 
Article 68 (b) of the ECSS, which demands ‘a portion of the benefi t being granted 
to the dependants of the benefi ciary.’ Considering the specifi c rules on this 
subject given by the Pension Insurance Act, this matter does not seem to imply a 
confl ict with the ECSS requirements.246 Finally, as regards the qualifying 
conditions, the qualifi cation period of 15 years of service or insurance meets the 
requirements of all the international standards.
Considering all this, it could be concluded that Estonia generously fulfi ls the 
international obligations as regards the state old-age pension. Th is is, however, in 
244 See, for example, Ministry of Social Aff airs (Ee) 2005A, p. 15; Leppik 2006, p. 109.
245 Resolution CM/ResCSS(2008)5; Resolution CM/ResCSS(2009)5.
246 See Pension Insurance Act, Art. 46: In the case of one dependant, 25 percent of the pension 
will be paid, in the case of two dependants, 50 percent, and in the case of three or more 
dependants, 75 percent.
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contrast with several observations concerning the living conditions of pensioners 
(for example, 39 percent of them were considered to be at risk of poverty in 
2007).247 Another case in point is the fact that the average old-age pension in 
2007 amounted to EEK 3,129, which is only 75 percent of the calculated pension 
of the standard benefi ciary, and 27.6 percent of the average wage. In addition to 
this, in several studies, the replacement rate of the pension in connection with 
the ECSS standard has been assessed taking into account the average wage of a 
single standard benefi ciary, thus without adding the national pension of the 
spouse.248 It has also been argued that, in the long run, the state pension will 
most likely drop below the required ECSS level.249 Furthermore, according to 
the Committee of Social Rights that supervises the application of the Social 
Charter, Estonia does not comply with Article 12 paragraph 1 of the Charter that 
requires the government ‘to establish or maintain a system of social security.’250 
Th e Committee found, among others, that the minimum old-age pension is 
manifestly inadequate. All these remarks call for a critical assessment of the 
calculations in the Estonian reports, which will be done in the next section. 
Furthermore, apparently compliance with the ECSS does not automatically mean 
that social protection is suffi  ciently guaranteed. Th is important observation will 
be further discussed in section 6.4.
Problematic issues
Clearly, several questions are to be raised with regard to the government’s 
calculation of the replacement rate of old-age pensions. One point that deserves a 
closer look is the national pension for the dependent spouse that is included in 
the calculation. Th e Committee of Ministers asked in its resolution of 2009 
whether the national pension is actually being paid to dependent spouses.251 Th is 
question is relevant, because the amount may only be taken into account if it is 
paid unconditionally to all dependent spouses of insured pensioners. Th e 
government did not respond to this request in its next report, but in fact, the 
national pension in Estonia is subject to a qualifying period of 5 years of 
residence. Th is means that it is not in accordance with the ECSS to add the 
national pension into the calculation of the benefi t of a standard benefi ciary to 
the pension. As a result, the replacement rate in 2007 was much lower than the 
government stated in its report.
247 Statistics Estonia. For the age group of 16–64 years, the ‘at-risk-of-poverty’ rate was 
15.1 percent. Th e ‘at risk of poverty’ threshold is 60 percent of the median equivalised yearly 
disposable income. Equivalised disposable income takes into account the number of 
household members.
248 Fultz 2006, p. 9; Leppik 2006, p. 100; Raudla & Staehr 2003, p. 80; Ministry of Social Aff airs 
(Ee) 2005A, p. 16.
249 Information obtained by interviews.
250 ESCR Conclusions (Ee) 2009, pp. 18–19.
251 Resolution CM/ResCSS(2009) 5.
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Another point that is worth questioning and that was also mentioned by the 
Committee of Ministers is the fact that the government takes into account the 
basic amount and the length of service component only, and thus leaves aside the 
insurance component.252 Th is does not represent the actual situation, since the 
insurance component has played an increasing role in the course of the years, 
and will steadily decrease the replacement rate of the pension. For persons who 
reached the pensionable age in 2007, the insurance component covers 8 years – 
the years from 1999 until 2007. For the amount of the insurance part, the 
‘personal coeffi  cient’ is a determining factor. Th e annual personal coeffi  cient is 
based on the ratio of the average earnings of the insured person in question in 
one calendar year, compared to the average wage of all insured persons in that 
same year. Because the labourer in manufactory, taken as the standard 
benefi ciary, earns less than the average of all insured persons, their personal 
coeffi  cient is smaller than 1. In fact, in 2007 the personal coeffi  cient of the 
standard benefi ciary was 0.67.253 In relation to the service years, which are the 
years until 1999, the personal coeffi  cient for all insured persons is 1, since it is 
based on the average wage only. Inevitably, the more insurance years instead of 
service years that are taken into account for the standard benefi ciary, the lower 
the resulting amount of the total old-age pension.
Calculation example254
Th e average net salary of the standard benefi ciary in 2007 was EEK 6,194, which is the reference 
wage.
Th e fi rst component of the old-age pension, the basic amount, was EEK 1,374.
For the calculation of the second component, the monetary value of one year of service or 
insurance was fi xed at EEK 54.43, and the personal coeffi  cient was 1. Retiring in 2007, the 
benefi ciary had 22 service years to be taken into account (1977–1998): 22 × EEK 54.43 × 1 = 
EEK 1,197.
Th e third component, consisting of the insurance years as of 1999, comprised 8 years (1999–
2007) and the personal coeffi  cient of the standard benefi ciary was 0.67. Th us the amount of the 
third component is: 8 × EEK 54.43 × 0.67 = EEK 292.
Th e total amount of the pension is: EEK 1,374 + EEK 1,197 + EEK 292 = EEK 2,863.
Th e ratio between the old-age pension and the reference wage was EEK 2,863 / EEK 6,194 = 
0.462 percent.
Although a replacement rate of 46 percent still meets the requirements of the 
ECSS, the calculation clearly shows that the pensions will decrease drastically 
when they are based on insurance years instead of service years. Th e implication 
will be that the replacement rate will drop below the level required under the 
ECSS if no measures are taken.
252 Resolutions CM/ResCSS(2008)5, CM/ResCSS(2009)5; CM/ResCSS(2010)5.
253 Gross wage of the standard benefi ciary, EEK 7,574 (ECSS Report (Ee) IV), divided by the 
average gross wage, which was EEK 11,336 (website of the Estonian Statistics).
254 Data based on ECSS Reports (Ee) III and IV and Estonian Statistics.
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Th e last point that needs to be mentioned deals with the requirement that the 
wage and the benefi t are calculated from the same point in time.255 However, for 
the calculations in the reports, the government consistently takes the average 
wage of one year earlier than the year of the benefi ts (basic amount and the value 
of one year of service). For example, the average wage of the unskilled worker of 
2006 was compared with the benefi t of 2007. Th is incorrect comparison gives a 
higher result than when all the amounts are taken from 2006, as has been done 
in the calculation above. As a result, the government gave a replacement rate of 
79.4 percent in its report in 2007 (including the national pension for the spouse), 
instead of 73.9 percent.
Privately managed 2nd pillar pension scheme
Although at the present time the fi rst pillar pension fulfi ls the international 
standards, the converse will be true in future when insurance years with the 
accompanying personal coeffi  cient will determine the level of the benefi t instead 
of the service years. Th en, the question will arise as to whether the second pillar 
pensions may be taken into account to prove compliance with the ECSS. It would 
therefore be useful to examine the compatibility of this private pension scheme 
with the international standards, all the more because Estonia is not the only EU 
country in which pensions in the form of savings accounts have become 
increasingly important.256 In fact, this issue is closely connected with the global 
trend towards the privatisation of social security.
Relevant for compliance of any social security scheme with the ILO and CoE 
instruments are the provisions concerning the fi nancing and administration of 
the benefi ts, which are of the same kind in all conventions.257 Taking the ECSS 
as a basis, the fi rst relevant provision is that the cost of the benefi ts, including the 
administration thereof, ‘shall be borne collectively by way of insurance 
contributions or taxation or both in a manner which avoids hardship to persons 
of small means.’258 It is fair to question whether the Estonian second pillar 
individual savings accounts are collectively fi nanced, as the idea of individual 
savings accounts does not concur with the insurance principle of risk pooling. It 
must be kept in mind in this respect, that two thirds of the money deposited into 
the accounts comes from the state pension budget, which is funded by employers’ 
contributions. Furthermore, because the contributions are set as a percentage of 
255 ECSS, Art. 66 (2).
256 See, for instance, Orenstein 2008.
257 Th ese principles on solidarity and state responsibility have been expained in section 2.5.
258 ECSS Art. 70 (1). Th e total share of insurance contributions paid by the employee shall not 
exceed 50 percent of the total of the fi nancial recourses allocated to the protection of 
employees (and their wives and children), ECSS Art. 70 (2).
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gross wages, persons with a minimum income only pay a small amount. From 
this perspective, the scheme may be considered as collectively fi nanced and also 
to avoid hardship. At the same time, the question might remain as to whether 
the contributions can be called ‘insurance contributions’, since they are, in fact, 
payments deposited into the savings accounts of individual employees. However, 
the Committee of Experts that supervises the application of the conventions has 
not voiced any objections to the design as such of similar pension schemes 
consisting of individual savings accounts in other countries.259 Rather than on 
the design of the system, emphasis has instead been placed on the rule that the 
method of fi nancing shall not impose hardship on persons with lesser means.260
Th e second provision that must be respected in relation to the fi nancing of 
benefi ts is that ‘[t]he Contracting Party concerned shall accept general 
responsibility for the due provision of the benefi ts provided in compliance with 
this Code.’261 It has been made clear by the Labour Offi  ce that general 
responsibility ‘would not necessarily bind the Member to meet any defi cit 
occurring in the agency administering a scheme […], but it would oblige it to 
take measures to ensure that the benefi ts are duly provided.’262 Examples of such 
measures would be that the Member could grant a subsidy to meet the defi cit, 
but it could also secure the provision of benefi ts by arranging a loan or by raising 
the rates of contributions; the latter only being allowed on the basis of an 
actuarial report on the fi nancial equilibrium of the scheme concerned. As shown 
above, the Estonian government does not accept any responsibility for the 
provision of the pensions. Th e only measure that has been taken is to prescribe a 
mandatory participation of the asset management companies in the Guarantee 
Fund to protect, to a certain extent, the second pillar participants from breaches 
by the fund managers. Th ese cannot be considered as palatable measures in the 
light of the ECSS. Th e actual pension amounts to be paid aft er the agreed age of 
the employee is reached largely depend on the fi nancial market. An economic 
recession, such as the recent one, can seriously reduce the saved amount, which 
can even result in a negative number.
Furthermore, the ECSS sets out certain principles in the matter of administration 
of the benefi ts, namely, that where the administration is not entrusted to the 
government, ‘representatives of the persons protected shall participate in the 
management, or be associated therewith in a consultative capacity,’ and that the 
259 For instance, with regard to Mexico and Peru, which both have similar schemes, the 
Committee has raised questions concerning the amount of benefi t and the participation of 
insured persons, but not regarding the creation of savings accounts as such.
260 CEACR: Individual Direct Request concerning C102 (Portugal) 2007; CEACR: Individual 
Direct Request concerning C102 (France) 2007.
261 ECSS Art. 70 (3).
262 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, p. 231. See also section 2.5.
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government ‘shall accept general responsibility for the proper administration of 
the institutions and services.’263 Looking at the situation in Estonia, none of 
these principles are satisfi ed in reference to the private asset funds that administer 
the Estonian employees’ pension savings accounts, since neither the persons 
protected, nor the state, are involved in the management and administration of 
the funds.
Taking stock of these fi ndings, it may be concluded that the Estonian second 
pillar pension scheme cannot be counted for the fulfi lment of the ECSS 
standards. At the same time, in section 2.5 it has been asserted that a private 
scheme is not beyond the reach of the international standards, as long as the 
prescribed norms are met and the principles on solidarity and state responsibility 
are respected. In view of the growing importance of private pension schemes in 
many countries, this issue will be further discussed in section 6.2.3.
Summary of matters of compliance and problematic issues
Table XIV. Old-age benefi t (Ee) compared with the international standards
Estonia is bound by the ECSS 
Pension
benefi t




ILO C128 (1967) ECSS Rev. (1990)
Material 
scope
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Personal 
scope
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Benefi t: 
amount
Measures have to 
be taken to pre-
vent the pensions 
from falling below 
40 percent.
Measures have to 
be taken to pre-
vent the pensions 
from falling below 
45 percent.
Measures have to 
be taken to pre-
vent the pensions 
from falling below 
45 percent.
Replacement rate 




✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Qualifying 
periods
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
✓ = compliance of national provisions with the international standards.
263 ECSS Art. 71 (1) and (2).
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4.9 EMPLOYMENT INJURY BENEFIT
4.9.1 INTRODUCTION
General introduction
Th e Estonian social security system does not contain a separate scheme for 
employment injuries. At the time of writing, medical care, sickness benefi ts, 
incapacity for work pensions, and survivors’ pensions in the event of work 
accidents and occupational diseases are provided according to the general 
schemes, as described in the particular sections. In addition, the employer 
responsible is required to pay compensation for health damage and other 
expenses to the victim or to their dependant family members under civil law.264 
According to the current rules, the purpose of compensation for damage is to 
place the injured person in a situation as similar as possible to that in which they 
would have been if no damage had been caused. In general, compensation is paid 
according to an agreement between the liable employer and the aggrieved person. 
If the extent of the damage cannot be established, the amount of compensation 
shall be determined by the court. Employers have the option of taking out 
insurance against these costs, but this is not oft en done because the premiums 
are subject to unfavourable tax rules.265 If the employer is insolvent or liquidated 
and there is no legal successor, the obligation to compensate the damage is taken 
over by the State through the Social Insurance Board. Th is board also pays 
compensation for damage caused to the health of previous employees of former 
collectives that were reorganised during the agricultural reform aft er 1992, 
irrespective of a possible legal successor.266
It is expected that in the near future a compulsory work accident and 
occupational disease insurance will be established.267 As a matter of fact, the 
expediency of such insurance has been subject to political debate since 1994, and 
was eventually included in the Coalition Programme for 2007–2011.268 Th e 
European Social Charter has been mentioned as the legal basis for the 
insurance.269 Th e proposed insurance scheme in which the employer will pay for 
the premiums is, above all, meant to improve the prevention of occupational 
accidents and diseases through the improvement of working conditions. 
264 ECSS Report (Ee) on unratifi ed parts, Art. 32; ECSS Report (Ee) I, Art. 32; Leppik & Kruuda 
2003, p. 35.
265 Koppel & Aaviksoo 2007, p. 3.
266 ECSS Report (Ee) on unratifi ed parts, Art. 32.
267 Koppel & Aaviksoo 2007, p. 1.
268 Estonian Government 2007, p. 7.
269 Koppel & Aaviksoo 2007, p. 3.
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Furthermore, it aims to protect the employees’ income levels aft er the occurrence 
of a work accident or occupational disease, and to ensure equal rights and benefi t 
for these employees. It appears that a general consensus about implementing the 
scheme has been reached, both in society and the political arena, but there are 
still diff ering political views on whether the insurance system should be 
implemented publicly or privately.270 Another sticking point is the coverage of 
employees who already are suff ering from a work accident or occupational 
disease, since introducing a retrospective eff ect of the new system could be quite 
costly. Furthermore, the employers, who are cautiously supporting the insurance 
concept, argue that together with the implementation of an insurance scheme, 
the health insurance tax should be decreased by 1 or 2 percent. Th is idea, 
however, is not being endorsed by politicians and trade unions. So far, no draft  
has been developed as a basis for further discussion; it remains to be seen 
whether the government will succeed in implementing the intended employment 
injury insurance within its period of offi  ce, and whether the recent economic 
recession has not thwarted this plan.
Th e lack of a separate employment injury insurance does not automatically imply 
that Estonia does not meet the requirements of this part of the ECSS. Its 
obligations can also be fulfi lled through the general provisions on health care 
and pensions. Th erefore, in the following, it will be assessed whether the Health 
Insurance Act and the State Pension Insurance Act meet the standards of the 
ECSS in respect of employment injury.
Legislation
Medical services and sickness benefi ts are paid pursuant to the Health Insurance 
Act, and pensions for incapacity for work and survivors’ pensions, in accordance 
with the State Pension Insurance Act. Th e employers’ obligation with regards to 
compensation for cases that took place before 1 July 2002, is set out in the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act in relation to the Government Regulation 
No. 172.271 For accidents that took place (or occupational diseases that occurred) 
aft er that date, the Law of Obligations Act of 2002 applies.272
At the international level, Estonia has not ratifi ed any instrument on employment 
injury. Part VI of the ECSS, dealing with employment injury, is the only part 
that has been excluded from ratifi cation.
270 Koppel & Aaviksoo 2007, p. 4.
271 Government Regulation No. 172 of June 10, 1992: ‘Temporary Procedure for Compensating 
for Damage Caused to Employees of Businesses, Institutions and Organisations by Injury in 
Performance of Duties or Other Health Damage’.
272 ECSS Report (Ee) on unratifi ed parts, Art. 32.
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4.9.2 MATERIAL SCOPE
Since social protection in the case of employment injury is covered by the general 
health insurance and pension scheme, the material scope of these schemes are 
relevant. Th is means that any morbid condition, incapacity for work, invalidity, 
and loss of support because of the death of the breadwinner, whether or not as a 
result of an employment injury or occupational disease, are covered. Th e 
defi nitions are specifi ed in the corresponding sections.
4.9.3 PERSONAL SCOPE
For this particular risk, the ECSS requires the exclusive protection of prescribed 
classes of employees, constituting at least 50 percent of all employees, and, in 
respect of survivors’ benefi t, also their wives and children. Since in Estonia 
health insurance as well as pension insurance is coupled with the payment of 
social tax, in principle all employees are covered by the general health insurance 
and pension scheme. However, as a rule, the wives of ensured employees are not 
covered for survivors’ benefi t.
4.9.4 BENEFITS
Medical care
In the event of a work accident or occupational disease, the Estonian general 
health insurance compensates for treatment, including medication and medical 
devices, as described in section 4.5.4 on medical care.273 Victims of employment 
injury are not exempt from the rules on cost-sharing. Th e costs for the medical 
services that are not covered by the insurance may (partly) be compensated by 
the liable employer, according to Article 130 of the Law of Obligations Act: ‘the 
obligated person shall compensate the aggrieved person for expenses arising 
from such damage or injury, including expenses arising from the increased needs 
of the aggrieved person.’
Incapacity for work benefi t
According to the ECSS, an employment injury benefi t, either for temporary or 
permanent incapacity for work, must be at least 50 percent of the reference wage. 
In Estonia, the normal sickness benefi t consists of 70 percent of the average daily 
income of the insured person, but in the event of employment injury, the benefi t 
273 Section 4.5.4.
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is set at 100 percent of the previous income.274 Since the family benefi t that has to 
be taken into account is similar during work and in addition to a benefi t, the 
replacement rate in case of temporary incapacity for work is 100 percent.
If total or partial incapacity for work is likely to be permanent, a pension is paid 
in accordance with the pension scheme as described in section 4.12.4 on 
invalidity benefi t. Th e replacement rate of an invalidity benefi t has been 
calculated at 50.4 percent of the reference wage.275 On top of this, the employer 
at fault has to pay a compensation ‘for damage arising from a decrease in income 
or deterioration of the future economic potential of the aggrieved person.’276
Survivors’ pension
In the event of death of an employee caused by a work accident or occupational 
disease, the normal rules for survivors’ pensions apply. As shown in section 
4.13.4, the replacement rate of survivors’ benefi t, in relation to the average net 
wage of an unskilled worker, is 53.1 percent.
In addition, the Law of Obligations Act provides: ‘If a person whose death is 
caused bears, at the time of his or her death, an obligation arising from law to 
maintain another person, the person obligated to compensate for the damage 
shall pay the person reasonable monetary compensation corresponding to the 
maintenance payments which the deceased person would have paid to the person 
during the deceased person’s presumed life-span.’277 Th e damage is compensated 
through periodical payments, unless the nature of the damage makes it 
reasonable for the compensation to be paid as a lump sum.
Duration of the benefi t
In accordance with the ECSS, medical care, sickness, invalidity, and survivors’ 
benefi ts relating to employment injury or occupational disease, are to be paid 
throughout the contingency. Th e Estonian pension in the event of permanent 
incapacity for work, however, is transferred into an old-age pension when the 
benefi ciary reaches pensionable age. Under the ECSS this is allowed in the event 
of ‘normal’ invalidity, but not in the event of employment injury, because of the 
lower minimum required replacement of the old-age pension (40 percent) 
compared to the employment injury benefi t (50 percent).278
274 Health Insurance Act, Art. 54 (1); ECSS Report (Ee) I, Art. 36.
275 Section 4.12.4; rate of the year 2007.
276 Law of Obligations Act, Art. 130.
277 Law of Obligations Act, Art. 129.
278 ECSS, Art. 38; Schedule to Part XI of the ECSS.
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4.9.5 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
In its reports on the application of the ECSS, the government has stated that 
medical care and sickness benefi ts are provided without any qualifying period.279 
However, as shown in the corresponding sections, a qualifying period of fourteen 
days of insurance is prescribed. In respect of permanent incapacity for work and 
survivors’ pensions, the Pension Insurance Act has special provisions for 
employment injury that waive the generally required qualifying periods.280
4.9.6 COMPARISON WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS281
Reasons for non-ratifi cation
With regard to health care insurance, there are three problems in the event of 
employment injury. In the fi rst place, not all medical services required by the 
ECSS are covered by the insurance, such as dental care for adults, nursing care at 
home, convalescent homes, and the provision and maintenance of prostheses. 
Secondly, the rules on co-payment by insured persons for home visits by a family 
doctor, in-patient care, and prescription pharmaceuticals, are in confl ict with the 
ECSS, which does not allow any cost-sharing in the case of employment injury. 
Finally, under the ECSS, the only permitted qualifying condition for benefi ts in 
relation to employment injury is that the person protected was employed on the 
territory of Estonia at the time of the accident or the contraction of the disease.282 
Th us, no qualifying periods of insurance or employment are allowed.
As far as loss of income due to temporary or permanent incapacity for work is 
concerned, the personal coverage and the amount of the Estonian sickness 
benefi t are in compliance with all international standards on employment injury. 
Th e amount of the permanent incapacity for work pension represented a 
replacement rate of 53.1 percent in 2007, and therefore just satisfi ed the minimum 
standards of the ECSS of 50 percent. Th e ECSS Protocol and the ECSS (Revised), 
as well as ILO C121, set out higher percentages, and are thus not met by the 
Estonian scheme. Th e duration of the invalidity pension is problematic because 
it is transferred into an old-age pension when the recipient reaches the 
pensionable age, which is not provided for in the international standards. Th e 
279 ECSS Report (Ee) on unratifi ed parts; ECSS Report I, Art. 37.
280 State Pension Insurance Act, Art. 15(2).
281 For a detailed description of the international norms regarding employment injury benefi t, 
see section 2.13.
282 ECSS Art. 37.
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fourteen days qualifying period for the sickness benefi t is not, just as for medical 
care, in conformity with the ECSS. For the invalidity pension, the qualifying 
periods do not apply in the case of employment injury, which complies with the 
international standards.
As regards the survivors’ pension in the event of employment injury, the material 
scope of is in line with the international standards. With regard to the personal 
coverage, there is a confl ict because Estonia does not recognise derived rights, 
which means that the wives of insured persons are not insured if they do not 
have insurance in their own right. Th is issue will be further discussed in section 
4.13.6 on survivors’ benefi ts. Th e replacement rate of the Estonian survivors’ 
pension – also 53.1 percent of the reference wage – meets the standards of the 
ECSS (40 percent), the ECSS Protocol (45 percent), and, narrowly, that of ILO 
C121 (50 percent); only the requirement of the ECSS (Revised) (65 percent) is not 
met. Th e pension is paid as long as the applicant qualifi es as a survivor in the 
sense of the State Pension Act – and the Act does not require the deceased person 
to have fulfi lled a qualifying period – which complies both with the ECSS, as 
well as the higher standards.
Th en an important question may be raised as to whether the obligation of the 
employer to supplement the benefi ts to a level that the damage is compensated 
can contribute to the fulfi lment of the international requirements. Estonia has 
not ratifi ed Part VI of the ECSS, mainly because it was considered that ‘there is 
no separate occupational accident and occupation disease insurance system and 
the own contributions of the injured person cannot be excluded with regard to 
the medical care specifi ed in Article 34.’283 Apparently, the Estonian government 
assumed that the legal obligation of the employer to supplement the insurance 
system was beyond the reach of the ECSS. Th e reasons for this assumption were 
not given in the report, but were probably related to the common provisions of 
the ECSS, which require the benefi ts to be collectively fi nanced by way of 
insurance or taxation, and the Member States to accept general responsibility for 
the due provision of the benefi ts.284 Still, it is useful to have a closer look at 
employers’ liability, since it touches the issue of privatisation of social security – 
an increasing trend in many European countries. Th e issue of privatisation has 
been dealt with in relation to the obligation for employers to continue the 
payment of wages during the fi rst period of illness of the employee (sections 3.6.6 
and 4.6.6), and in relation to the Estonian private pension scheme (section 4.8.6). 
A more general discussion on this matter will take place in section 6.2.3.
283 ECSS Report (Ee) on unratifi ed parts, p. 6.
284 ECSS, Art. 70 (1) and (3). Th ese provisions are considered as general principles, and copied 
from ILO C102 in all the relevant instruments. See section 2.5.





Estonia’s family benefi t scheme is designed to ensure for families with children 
the partial compensation of expenses relating to the care, raising and education 
of children.285 Th e scheme recognises nine types of family benefi ts: childbirth 
allowance, child allowance, child care allowance, single parent’s child allowance, 
conscript’s child allowance, foster care allowance, start in independent life 
allowance, adoption allowance, and parent’s allowance for families with seven or 
more children.286 Furthermore, tax incentives are off ered to families with 
children in two diff erent ways: deduction from income of the costs for education 
of the children, and a general deduction for every child up to the age of 17, 
starting from the second child in the family.
Th e allowances are subdivided into monthly, single, quarterly and yearly benefi ts. 
Th e Committee of Ministers noted that only the periodical (monthly) benefi ts 
that are paid throughout the contingency are relevant in respect of the application 
of the ECSS, which are the child allowance, the single parent’s child allowance, 
and the foster care allowance only.287 Th erefore, in the following, only these 
three allowances are considered and joined together in the term ‘child allowance’. 
Th e tax incentives are not taken into account, although they are valid throughout 
the contingency, because they are not periodical payments as such, and the ECSS 
does not provide explicitly for tax advantages.
Legislation
Th e family benefi t scheme is regulated by the State Family Benefi ts Act that came 
into force in January 2002. Th e Act sets out, among other things, the purpose of 
the family benefi ts, the personal scope, the diff erent kinds of benefi ts, the 
application procedure, and the method of calculation and payment of the 
benefi ts.
At the international level, Estonia is bound by the ECSS, Part VII on Family 
Benefi t.
285 State Family Benefi t Act, Art. 1 (1).
286 Website of the Ministry of Social Aff airs; website of the Social Insurance Board; Trumm 2006, 
pp. 36–38; Leppik & Kruuda 2003, pp. 35–37; ECSS Reports (Ee) I and IV, Art. 40. Until 2009, 
a school allowance was also granted.
287 Resolution CM/ResCSS(2008)5.
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Administration and fi nancing
Th e administration of family benefi ts is entrusted to the Social Insurance Board. 
Th e benefi ts are fi nanced from the state budget.
4.10.2 MATERIAL SCOPE
For every child, a child allowance is paid from birth up to the age of 16. If the 
child is enrolled in a basic school, upper secondary school or vocational school, 
is in full-time study or, for medical reasons, in another form of study, entitlement 
to the benefi t continues up to the age of 19. Th e allowance is then paid until the 
end of the school year.
4.10.3 PERSONAL SCOPE
According to the State Family Benefi ts Act, all permanent residents of Estonia, 
including family members and children who do not live in the family due to a 
period of study abroad, and aliens residing in Estonia with a temporary residence 
permit, have the right to receive family benefi ts.288 Th e benefi ts are paid 
irrespective of employment of the parents or their fi nancial situation.
In respect of the personal scope, the ECSS does not include the option of coverage 
of all residents.289 Th erefore, Estonia refers to the option that ‘prescribed classes 
of the economically active population, constituting not less than 20 percent of all 
residents’ must be covered.290 Th is results in quite an aff ected calculation in 
which the government takes the total number of male residents in the 
economically active age group (15–64 years of age) as a starting point. Th en, the 
percentage of this group in relation to all residents is calculated. Th e outcome of 
this sum, in 2008, was that 32.7 percent of the total population was protected. 
Although this percentage meets the ECSS requirement, at this point a defect in 
the specifi c ECSS provision comes to the surface, because, in fact all residents are 
covered, but that cannot be proved on the basis of the calculation options 
provided for in the ECSS.
288 State Family Benefi ts Act, Art. 2.
289 For more information about the absence of this option, see section 2.14.2.
290 ECSS, Art. 41(b); ECSS Report (Ee) I and II, Art. 41.
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4.10.4 BENEFITS
Amount of the benefi t
Th e Estonian family benefi ts are calculated on the basis of the ‘child allowance 
rate’, established by Parliament for each budgetary year, and amounting to EEK 
150 in 2007.291 A new child allowance rate may not be less than the rate in force. 
Th e child allowance for the fi rst and second children in a family is twice the child 
allowance rate, and for the third and consequent children in a family, it is six 
times the child allowance rate. Th e single parent’s child allowance is twice the 
allowance rate, and the foster care allowance is six times the child allowance rate 
for each child. Th ere is no limitation on the number of children as regards the 
benefi ts.
For the purpose of comparison with the conventions, the amount of child benefi t 
must be assessed at a general level and not, as with other benefi ts, in relation to a 
standard benefi ciary. To meet the standard of the ECSS, the total expenditure on 
child benefi t has to be equal to, or more than, 1.5 percent of the gross salary of an 
unskilled worker, multiplied by the total number of (protected) children. In its 
reports, the Estonian government counted the total expenditure on all family 
benefi ts.292 However, as mentioned above, the Committee of Ministers made 
clear that for compliance with the ECSS, only the child allowance, the single 
parent’s child allowance, and the foster care allowance can be taken into account. 
If only these three benefi ts are taken into account, the following calculation can 
be made.
Calculation example293
In 2007, the expenditure on the three child allowances amounted to EEK 1,195,483,000.
Th e average gross salary of an unskilled worker in 2007 was EEK 7,574.
Th e number of dependent children of all residents in 2007 was 216,292.
Th e total monthly expenditure, divided by the number of children and the average salary, gives 
a percentage of the average salary of an unskilled worker:
1,195,483,000 (expenditure) / 12 (months) / 216,292 (children) / 7,574 (salary) = 0.061.
In conclusion, the total value of child benefi ts represented 6.1 percent of the 
average gross wage of an unskilled labourer, multiplied by the total number of 
dependent children of all residents in 2007.
291 State Family Act, Art. 4 (2); ECSS Reports (Ee) I and III, Art. 42. Of the family benefi ts, only 
the child care allowance has a separate calculation base.
292 ECSS Reports (Ee) I, II, III, Art. 44.
293 Estonian Statistics; Amount of the salary and number of children are taken from ECSS Report 
(Ee) III. Th e exchange rate of the Estonian Kroon on 1 January 2011, when Estonia joined the 
eurozone, was €1.00 to EEK 15.64.
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Duration of the benefi t
Since the child allowances are paid at least to the age of 16, they are paid 
throughout the contingency.
4.10.5 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
Th e only qualifying condition is residency in the territory of Estonia.294 No 
qualifi cation period is required, and the right to a child allowance does not 
depend on employment or participation in the pension scheme or health 
insurance system.
4.10.6 COMPARISON WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS295
Matters of compliance
Th e defi nition of family benefi t in the Estonian legislation corresponds with the 
ECSS and subsequent standards that specify the contingency as ‘responsibility 
for the maintenance of children as prescribed.’296 Th e personal coverage includes 
all residents, without a means test, which amply fulfi ls the international 
standards. Th e technical problem of calculation of the coverage under the ECSS 
seems to indicate a lack of fl exibility of the international instrument, all the more 
since the option of coverage of all residents has been included in both ILO C102 
and the ECSS (Revised). Th e absence of this option in the ECSS is problematic 
not only for Estonia, but also for many other European countries that have family 
benefi ts based on residence rather than on economic activity or employment.297 
On the other hand, it has been discussed in section 2.14.2 that the provision of a 
means tested family benefi t was controversial, while the option of coverage of all 
residents in ILO C102 and the ECSS always goes together with the possibility of a 
means test. Th is issue is solved in the ECSS (Revised), which provides for the 
option of coverage of all residents, either with or without a means test.
Th e total cost of child allowances, representing 6.1 percent of the average wage of 
an unskilled labourer in accordance with the prescribed rules, meets the 
294 State Family Benefi ts Act, Art. 2.
295 For a detailed description of the international norms regarding family benefi t benefi t, see 
section 2.14.
296 ECSS, Art. 40, ECSS (Revised), Art. 45.
297 See also Nickless 2003, p. 92.
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requirements of the ECSS and the Protocol on this point, which both set out a 
minimum percentage of 1.5 percent, as well as of the ECSS (Revised), which 
prescribes a percentage of 3 percent. Residency as the only qualifying condition 
also complies with the ECSS, including the Revised, which allow six months of 
residence as a qualifying term.
Summary of matters of compliance and problematic issues
Table XV. Family benefi t (Ee) compared with the international standards
Estonia is bound by the ECSS 
Family
benefi t







Material scope ✓ ✓ ✓
Personal scope ✓ ✓ ✓
Benefi t: amount ✓ ✓ ✓
Benefi t: duration ✓ ✓ ✓
Qualifying periods ✓ ✓ ✓
Common principles ✓ ✓ ✓




Under the Estonian legislation, maternity benefi ts comprise medical care in 
relation to pregnancy and childbirth, and cash benefi ts during maternity leave, 
both according to the general health care system. Th erefore, this section should 
be read in connection with the section on medical care and sickness. On top of 
that, there is the parental benefi t which is paid to one of the parents aft er the 
expiration of the maternity benefi t, and which is based on the parent’s previous 
earnings (100 percent of previous earnings). Together the maternity benefi t and 
the parental benefi t are paid for a period of 455 days.298 Furthermore, wage 
compensation for temporary transfer to another job is provided until the start of 
maternity leave. In the following, the compensatory benefi ts and parental benefi ts 
298 Website of the Ministry of Social Aff airs; Eamets 2008.
Part II. Analysis and Comparison
278 Intersentia
are left  out of consideration, since these are, as a matter of fact, surplus to the 
maternity protection provided in the conventions.
Legislation
Th ere is no specifi c act for social protection in the event of pregnancy and 
confi nement. Medical care and cash benefi ts are both regulated by the general 
Health Insurance Act.
Administration and fi nancing
As part of the health insurance scheme, the benefi ts are administered by the 
Estonian Health Insurance Fund. Th e fund is fi nanced through health care 
contributions (social tax), amounting to 13 percent of an employee’s payroll.299
4.11.2 MATERIAL SCOPE
According to the Health Insurance Act, the insured event in respect of maternity 
is ‘the pregnancy and maternity leave of the insured person.’300 Th e leave is 
granted on the basis of a certifi cate for maternity leave, issued by a doctor. 
Medical care in relation to pregnancy and delivery is not separately mentioned 
in the Health Insurance Act, but it is covered by the general health care system.
4.11.3 PERSONAL SCOPE
For compliance with the ECSS, Estonia refers to the option of coverage of all 
women in prescribed classes of the economically active population, the classes of 
which should constitute not less than 20 percent of all residents, and, for medical 
care, also the wives of men in these classes.301 In fact, in Estonia all female 
employees, as well as self-employed women, are covered by the health insurance 
that provides for medical care as well as cash benefi ts.302 Th e economically active 
population amounted to 50.2 percent of the total population in 2007. Th e wives 
of insured employees or self-employed persons are not covered if they are not 
individually insured. Th e Health Insurance Act, however, does provide for 
medical care of several groups of non-working women, such as parents of 
disabled children receiving a child care benefi t, women raising children of up to 
299 For more information, see section 4.5.1.
300 Health Insurance Act, Art. 51 (2).
301 ECSS, Art. 48(b); ECSS Report (Ee) I, Art. 48.
302 See section 4.6 on sickness benefi t.
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3 years of age, and pregnant women who are not otherwise insured. For these 
categories of persons, the state pays social tax or they are considered to be equal 
to insured persons.303 Previously, uninsured pregnant women were only covered 
for medical care from the twelft h week of pregnancy, but since an amendment of 
the Health Insurance Act in July 2009, they are covered from the moment of 
medical confi rmation of pregnancy.
4.11.4 BENEFITS
Medical care
Th e health insurance pays for medical services if the services are entered in the 
list of medical services of the health insurance fund and the provision thereof is 
therapeutically justifi ed.304 Th e list of medical services is part of a Government 
Regulation and includes pre-natal care, obstetrical care, post-natal care, and 
hospital care, as prescribed by the ECSS.305 As for the provision of services, no 
distinction is made between general morbid conditions or a birth-related need 
for care. Since 2009, pregnant women have been exempt from the fi xed out-of-
pocket payments for medical services and medicines.
Benefi t in cash
Th e rate of a maternity benefi t is 100 percent of the insured woman’s gross 
earnings in the preceding calendar year, calculated on the basis of the average 
daily income for which social tax was paid.306 Similar to the sickness benefi t, no 
maximum limit is given for the amount of the benefi t, or for earnings to be taken 
into account for the calculation of the benefi t. For employees, a minimum benefi t 
is fi xed, which is based on the minimum monthly wage.
For assessment of the conformity of the level of the benefi ts with the requirements 
of the ECSS, Estonia makes reference to the provision that the maternity benefi t 
must be at least 45 percent of the average salary of a standard benefi ciary – a 
skilled manual male employee.307 For the determination of the average salary of 
a skilled manual male employee, Estonia has availed of the option to take into 
account 125 percent of the average earnings of all the insured persons,308 which 
303 Health Insurance Act, Art. 5.
304 Health Insurance Act, Art. 29(1).
305 ECSS, Art. 49; ECSS Report (Ee) I, Art. 49. For more details, see section 4.5 on medical care.
306 Health Insurance Act, Arts. 54 and 55; ECSS Report (Ee) IV, Art. 50.
307 ECSS Report (Ee) IV, Art. 50; ECSS Art. 50 in connection with Art. 65.
308 ECSS Art. 65 (6) sub c.
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was EEK 14,715 per month in 2007.309 Since the gross replacement rate of the 
standard benefi ciary’s benefi t was 100 percent, in 2007 the benefi t amounted to 
EEK 14,715. Th e total amount of the benefi t for the entire duration of maternity 
leave is paid as a lump sum at the beginning of the leave.
Duration of the benefi t
Maternity benefi t is paid from the date of issue of the certifi cate for maternity 
leave, without a waiting period. Th e benefi t is paid out for the duration of the 
maternity leave, which is 140 calendar days.310 Medical care in relation to 
pregnancy, childbirth and their consequences is not subject to any time limit.
4.11.5 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
For employees and self-employed women a qualifying period of 14 days is set, 
both for medical care and for cash benefi ts.311 Furthermore, for cash benefi ts, a 
leave certifi cate issued by a doctor is required.
4.11.6 COMPARISON WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS312
Matters of compliance
With regard to maternity, the Estonian system provides for medical care in the 
events of pregnancy and childbirth, including hospitalisation. Furthermore, cash 
allowances are paid to substitute for the loss of income due to these events, which 
is in keeping with the conventions. ILO C102 and the ECSS prescribe the 
contingency covered to include pregnancy and confi nement and their 
consequences, and suspension of earnings, as defi ned by national laws or 
regulations. Neither the Protocol on the ECSS and the ECSS (Revised), nor ILO 
C103 and ILO C183, add other elements to the Material scope; on this point, 
therefore, the system complies with all instruments.
Th e personal scope of the health insurance, covering all economically active 
women, is also in accordance with the minimum, as well as with the higher, 
norms. Th ere is one point worth mentioning in this respect. As regards the 
309 ECSS Report (Ee) IV, Art. 50.
310 Health Insurance Act, Art. 58; ECSS Report (Ee) I, Art. 52.
311 See sections 4.5.5 and 4.6.5.
312 For a detailed description of the international norms regarding maternity benefi t, see section 
2.15.
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personal scope of medical care, the ECSS demands the wives of the prescribed 
classes of economically active population to be included.313 Th e Estonian law 
does not recognise such derived rights, insurance is based on individual 
insurance only. However, as mentioned above, certain categories of non-working 
persons are considered equal to insured persons, including pregnant women. 
Until July 2009, this was limited to pregnant women from the twelft h week of 
pregnancy, which implied that women who were not individually insured and 
not considered equal to insured persons were not entitled to medical care during 
the fi rst twelve weeks of their pregnancy. Th e Committee of Ministers in its 
Resolutions until 2008 repeatedly pointed out that:314
Article 52 of the Code requires medical care to be provided throughout the 
contingency, which begins the moment the pregnancy is medically determined. Th is 
usually happens long before the 12th week, and from that moment onwards prenatal 
medical care provided to protected women should be free of charge without any cost-
sharing on the benefi ciary’s part.
In response to this repeated comment, the Estonian government amended the 
Health Insurance Act on this point. As a consequence, since July 2009 all pregnant 
women have been insured for medical care from the date of medical confi rmation 
of pregnancy. Although the fact remains that, strictly speaking, the wives of 
insured persons are not covered by their husbands’ insurances, the amendment 
has brought the Estonian law in line with the ECSS in practice.315 Th e amendment 
also solved another confl ict with the ECSS, namely, the out-of-pocket payments 
for home visits by a family doctor and ambulatory specialist care until the 12th 
week of pregnancy, and also for prescribed pharmaceuticals. Since July 2009, 
pregnant women have been exempted from the rules on co-payment.
Th e amount of the maternity cash benefi ts, representing a replacement rate of 
100 percent for a standard benefi ciary, fulfi ls all international standards, varying 
from 45 percent in the ECSS, to two thirds of the previous income in ILO C183. 
Th e duration of the cash benefi t of at least 20 weeks (140 days) is also more than 
suffi  cient compared to the conventions, since the longest given period, in both 
the ECSS (Revised) and ILO C183, is 14 weeks.
Problematic issues
Th ere is one issue concerning maternity benefi t, which is the fact that the 
total cash benefi t for 140 days is paid as a lump sum at the start of maternity 
313 ECSS Art. 48.
314 Resolution CM/ResCSS(2008)5.
315 Th e tension between the concept of derived rights in the international standards and 
individualisation of social security rights as a trend in many countries will be further 
discussed in section 6.2.2.
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leave.316 According to all international standards, the benefi t must be a periodical 
payment. Although this issue constitutes a clear confl ict, it has not been noted by 
the Committee of Ministers. Th e reason for this may be that neither in the Health 
Insurance Act, nor in the annual reports of the government, is this way of 
payment mentioned, and it appears to be a practice with which everybody is 
content.
Summary of matters of compliance and problematic issues
Table XVI. Maternity benefi t (Ee) compared with the international standards
Estonia is bound by the ECSS
Maternity
benefi t




ILO C183 ECSS Rev. (1990)
Material 
scope
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Personal 
scope
No derived right 
to medical care for 
the wives of 
insured persons.
No derived right 
to medical care for 
the wives of 
insured persons.
✓ No derived right 
to medical care for 





Maternity benefi t 
is paid out as a 
lump sum instead 
of as periodical 
payments.
Maternity benefi t 
is paid out as a 
lump sum instead 
of as periodical 
payments.
✓ Maternity benefi t 
is paid out as a 
lump sum instead 




✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Qualifying 
periods
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Common 
principles
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓




Under Socialist rule, protection against the risk of invalidity was regulated for all 
employed persons as well as for the agricultural sector, comprising all members 
of a kolkhoz.317 Th e Soviet perception of invalidity was largely limited to a strict 
316 Information obtained from experts.
317 Fulz 2002, pp. 14–16; Leppik 2002, pp. 93–98.
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medical condition to be determined by a medical expert commission, not taking 
into consideration a person’s inability to function and to cope with the 
requirements of a job as such. Sharp distinctions were made between disabled 
people on the basis of the cause of invalidity: war veterans and victims of work 
accidents were in a far more favourable position than those with congenital 
disabilities, who were generally put in state institutions or kept out of sight in 
their homes. Invalidity pensions were granted according to three degrees of 
invalidity: total incapacity for work with a need for permanent care, total 
incapacity for work without a need for permanent care, and partial incapacity for 
work. Disabled children were categorised into a separate group. Eligibility for the 
invalidity pension was subject to a qualifi cation period depending on age and 
gender, varying from 1 year of service for a woman of 20 years of age, and 15 
service years for a man over 60 years of age. Th e amount of the pension depended 
on the degree of invalidity, the former wage, and the cause of the invalidity. In 
practice, the maximum pension for a person classifi ed as coming under the fi rst 
category, whose invalidity was caused by a general illness, corresponded to 60–70 
percent of the average wage, while the minimum pension for partial invalidity 
was 10 percent of the average wage.
In the new Pension Act that came into force in April 1991, even before 
independence was declared offi  cially, the qualifying period for an invalidity 
pension was abolished and coverage was extended to all residents.318 Th e benefi ts 
depended partly on previous earnings and on the minimum wage, and were 
paid regardless of earnings from work, while the categorisation as regards the 
degree of incapacity for work was maintained. However, the Act turned out to 
be unaff ordable and existed for only seven months, to be replaced by a resolution 
of the Supreme Council setting the pensions at a fl at rate. In 1995 a reform of 
the disability scheme was initiated, infl uenced by the growth of organisations of 
civil society, including organisations for the disabled. Th e fi rst step was the 
adoption of the Act on Social Welfare, in which open, community-based care 
and rehabilitation was emphasised, and which was draft ed in the light of, among 
other things, the European Social Charter. With the State Pension Insurance 
Act of 1998 (in force as of 2000), a contribution-related incapacity for work 
pension was introduced, with – harking back to the Soviet legacy – a 
qualifi cation period depending on the age of the person. Persons of working age 
who do not fulfi l the qualifying period are eligible for the national pension. 
Furthermore, the classifi cation of invalidity into three categories has been 
changed into a classifi cation of the degree of work incapacity into percentages; 
total work incapacity corresponds to 100 percent, and partial work incapacity 
may vary between 40 percent and 90 percent, in steps of 10 percentage points. 
Th e introduction of the term ‘work incapacity’ in the new Act intended to 
318 Leppik 2002, pp. 100–129.
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reshape and modernise the old paradigm of invalidity into a more open 
defi nition that would not only take into account medical facts, but also the 
extent to which the person is active in their social context. At the same time 
however, this intention was stymied by the fact that the assessment of the degree 
of incapacity was still performed by medical experts and based on medical 
criteria only.
In addition to the incapacity for work pension according to the State Insurance 
Pension Act, the Social Benefi ts for Disabled Persons Act, in force as of 2001, 
gives right to several other benefi ts, such as a disabled child allowance, study 
allowance, rehabilitation allowance, and transport allowance. In this act, the 
term ‘disability’ is used, referring to the interaction between the person and 
their environment, and thus aiming more at integration and rehabilitation. It 
has been noticed that the concepts of both ‘work incapacity’ and ‘invalidity’ are 
focused on the inabilities of the person concerned, instead of following the 
developing international trend of especially taking into account the remaining 
abilities and functioning of the person.319 For comparison with the international 
standards, the allowances on the basis of the Social Benefi ts for Disabled Persons 
will not be assessed, since these are granted only to specifi c persons in specifi c 
situations.
Legislation
In the case of invalidity, income protection is regulated by the State Insurance 
Pension Act. Th is act sets out the persons protected, the qualifying conditions, 
the diff erent degrees of incapacity for work, the procedure of examination by 
medical experts, and the calculation of the invalidity pension.
At the international level, Estonia is bound by Part IX on Invalidity Benefi t of 
the European Code of Social Security.
Administration and fi nancing
As part of the pension insurance scheme, it is suffi  cient at this point to refer the 
reader to the section on old-age pensions. It should be noted, however, that the 
fi nancing of national pensions, for persons with permanent work incapacity but 
lacking the required insurance period, and pensions for disabled children, are 
paid from the general state budget. Th us, since these benefi ts are not fi nanced 
from earmarked social contributions, they do not come under the social 
insurance scheme.320
319 Leppik 2002, pp. 141–142.
320 Leppik 2002, p. 122.
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4.12.2 MATERIAL SCOPE
An Estonian incapacity for work pension is available to persons between the age 
of 16 and the retirement age who are permanently incapacitated for work by at 
least 40 percent.321 Total incapacity for work implies an incapacity of 100 percent, 
which means that the person is unable to earn any income in order to support 
themselves as a result of a serious functional impairment caused by an illness or 
injury.322 A person with a partial incapacity for work is a person who is able to 
work, but who, due to a functional impairment caused by illness or injury, is not 
able to perform suitable work to the extent required by the general national 
standard of working time, which is 40 hours per week.323 Th e extent of partial 
permanent incapacity may vary between 40 percent and 90 percent, as 
determined by a medical expert or an expert committee.
4.12.3 PERSONAL SCOPE
Th e personal coverage corresponds with the coverage of the old-age benefi t. 
Overall, all economically active persons are insured, either employed or self-
employed, which implies a coverage of 49.1 percent of all residents.
4.12.4 BENEFITS
Amount of the benefi t
To calculate the incapacity for work benefi t, the higher of the following two 
amounts is used as a calculation base:324
– the amount of an old-age pension calculated according to the person’s actual 
pensionable length of service (until 31.12.1998) and pension insurance 
coeffi  cients (aft er 31.12.1998);
– the amount of an old-age pension for a person with 30 years of pensionable 
length of service.
Th e amount of incapacity for work pension is the percentage corresponding to 
the declared percentage of loss of capacity to work of the calculation base, 
however it has to be at least the national pension rate. Th us, the (imaginary) 
321 State Pension Insurance Act, Art. 14; ECSS Report (Ee) I, Art. 54; Leppik & Kruuda 2003, pp. 
28–29.
322 State Pension Insurance Act, Art. 14 (2).
323 State Pension Insurance Act, Art. 14 (3).
324 State Pension Insurance Act, Art. 18; ECSS Report (Ee) I; Leppik & Kruuda 2003, p. 29.
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amount of old-age pension for the applicant at the moment of application is 
compared to the amount of old-age pension for a person with 30 years of 
pensionable service. Additionally, the higher of the two amounts is multiplied by 
the incapacity for work percentage, whereas the national pension rate serves as 
the minimum amount. Consequently, a person who is declared 100 percent 
incapacitated for work will receive a pension that is equal to, or higher than, the 
old-age pension of a person who has completed thirty service years, the 
calculation of which is shown in section 4.8.4 on old-age pension.
Calculation example325
Th e sample calculation of the incapacity for work pension for a standard benefi ciary (an 
ordinary male labourer in manufacturing) in 2007, is based on the following data:
Th e average net wage of an ordinary male labourer in manufacturing was EEK 6,194
Th e old-age pension of a standard benefi ciary amounted to EEK 3007326
Family benefi t for two children was EEK 600, irrespective of income
Th e national pension rate was EEK 1,573
Th e incapacity for work pension of a standard benefi ciary (man with dependent wife and two 
children) who was 100 percent incapacitated amounted to: (3007 + 600) / (6,194 + 600) = 0.531 
of his previous net wage.
Th e pension of a standard benefi ciary who was declared 40 percent incapacitated, and fulfi lled 
the necessary qualifi cation period, amounted to EEK (3007 × 0.4) + 600 = EEK 1,803, which 
represented a replacement rate of 26.5 percent. 
In conclusion, in 2007, the replacement rate of an incapacity for work pension for 
the standard benefi ciary who was 100 percent incapacitated was 53.1 percent.
Duration of the benefi t
Incapacity for work pensions are paid throughout the contingency, however, if 
the person reaches the retirement age, the pension is transferred into an old-age 
pension. A person may be declared permanently incapacitated for work for a 
period of six months, one year, two years, or fi ve years; aft er the established 
period, a re-examination can take place.327
Adjustment to the cost of living
Th e benefi ts are regularly adjusted in the same way as the old-age benefi ts.
325 Data taken from ECSS Reports (Ee) III and IV. Th e exchange rate of the Estonian Kroon on 
1 January 2011, when Estonia joined the eurozone, was €1.00 to EEK 15.64.
326 For the calculations of the old-age pension, see section 4.8.4.
327 State Pension Insurance Act, Arts. 16 (7) and 17 (3).
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4.12.5 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
Residents of Estonia between the age of 16 and the retirement age, who are 
declared permanently incapacitated for work by at least 40 percent, and who have 
completed the required qualifying period, are entitled to a work incapacity 
benefi t.328 Th e qualifying period may include the service years up to 1999, as well 
as the insurance years from 1999 onwards (calculated in the same way as is the 
case with the old-age pension requirements), and depends on the age of the 
applicant. For persons from 16 to 20 years of age, no qualifying period is 
required; from 21 to 23 years of age, one year of service should be completed; 
from 24 to 26 years of age, two service years, and so on, up to a qualifying period 
of 15 service years at the age of 63 years.329
4.12.6 COMPARISON WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS330
Matters of compliance
Th e personal scope of the invalidity pension system is amply suffi  cient, covering 
49.1 percent of all residents, where only 20 percent is required by the ECSS. 
Additionally, the obligations of the ECSS Protocol (30 percent), ILO C128 (75 
percent of the whole economically active population) and ESCC Revised (80 
percent of the whole economically active population) are satisfi ed. As regards the 
amount of the invalidity benefi t, the calculations show that the benefi t of a 
standard benefi ciary – a man with a dependent wife and two children – amounted 
to 53.1 percent of the reference wage in 2007, provided that this benefi ciary was 
100 percent unable to perform gainful activity. Th is percentage meets the 
standard of the ECSS, and, narrowly, of the ECSS Protocol and ILO C128 (both 
50 percent), but is below the stipulation of the ECSS (Revised) (65 percent).
Since the benefi t is granted throughout the contingency, or until eligibility for an 
old-age pension, the duration of the benefi t complies with all the relevant 
standards in this respect. Th e same goes for the qualifi cation period of 15 service 
or insurance years as a maximum. Typical of the Estonian system is the 
diff erentiation in qualifying periods depending on the age of the applicant. Since 
the treaties do not contain a fl exibility clause making it possible to take into 
account, for instance, the average qualifying period, the maximum requirement 
has to be taken as a perspective, which is still suffi  cient according to all standards.
328 State Pension Insurance Act, Art. 14 (1); ECSS Report (Ee) I.
329 State Pension Insurance Act, Art. 15 (1); ECSS Report (Ee) I.
330 For a detailed description of the international norms regarding invalidity benefi t, see section 
2.16.
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Problematic issues
At fi rst sight, the defi nition of invalidity in the Estonian legislation seems in line 
with the ECSS, since it covers permanent incapacity for work of at least 40 
percent, while the ECSS allows the Member States to prescribe to which extent 
incapacity for work is covered. Estonia makes a distinction between total 
incapacity, which covers incapacity for work of 100 percent, and partial incapacity, 
covering incapacity for work of between 40 and 90 percent. In the ECSS, a 
distinction is made between partial and total incapacity in respect of employment 
injury, but not regarding ‘general’ invalidity. For this contingency, the prescribed 
benefi t must be provided in the case of incapacity for work to a prescribed extent. 
At this point, however, it should be recalled that the Labour Offi  ce has explained 
that payment of the benefi t in respect of total incapacity alone does not satisfy the 
requirements of ILO C102 and the ECSS.331 It has been made clear that the 
prescribed (full) benefi t should also be provided in the event of incapacity for 
work at a rate of less than 100 percent. In the Czech Republic, for example, total 
incapacity is incapacity of 70 to 100 percent, and additionally, a reduced benefi t is 
granted in the case of partial incapacity. In Estonia, a full benefi t is granted in 
cases of 100 percent incapacity only. In the case of incapacity for work of 40 to 90 
percent, a lower benefi t is granted, corresponding to the degree of incapacity. In 
consideration of all this, the Estonian provision in the event of total incapacity 
for work appears to be too limited. On the other hand, the granting of a pro-rata 
benefi t in the case of incapacity for work of only 40 percent is more than the 
international standards require. However, the structure of the ECSS does not 
allow counterbalancing an infringement at one point with a surplus at another. 
Only in exceptional cases may the Committee of Ministers (and/or the CEACR) 
help by way of an interpretation that allows such an exchange.332
As a result of the above, the amount of the benefi t might also involve a confl ict 
with the ECSS. Th e replacement rate of 53.1 percent refers, as has been shown 
above, to an incapacity for work of 100 percent. If an incapacity degree of 70 
percent were taken as a reference, the replacement rate would be 39.8 percent, 
which is just below the international minimum standards. It could be argued, 
however, that considering the discretion given to the Member States, a degree of 
reduced capacity of 75 percent would be permissible; in that case, Estonia would, 
currently, just provide suffi  ciently high benefi ts, representing 42 percent of the 
331 See section 2.16.1.
332 For example, resolution CSS(97)5 concerning Germany that prescribed a qualifying period of 
35 years, but acknowledged additional, hypothetic, periods, namely, periods between the 
occurrence of the contingency and the sixtieth birthday of the insured person. Th e Committee 
agreed with the exceeding of the maximum qualifying period, taking into consideration the 
additional periods, and the fact that in practice, all persons belonging to the classes of 
protected employees were entitled to the benefi t. See also Nickless 2003, p. 102.
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wage of an unskilled labourer. Nevertheless, in the long-term, taking into 
consideration the probable decrease in old-age pensions, a problem will emerge 
with regard to the level of the invalidity pension.
Summary of matters of compliance and problematic issues
Table XVII. Invalidity benefi t (Ee) compared with the international standards
Estonia is bound by the ECSS
Invalidity
benefi t




ILO C128 (1967) ECSS Rev. (1990)
Material 
scope
Provision of the 
benefi t only in the 
case of total 
incapacity for 
work is not 
suffi  cient.
Provision of the 
benefi t only in the 
case of total 
incapacity for 
work is not 
suffi  cient.
Provision of the 
benefi t only in the 
case of total inca-
pacity for work is 
not suffi  cient.
Provision of the 
benefi t only in the 
case of total inca-
pacity for work is 
not suffi  cient.
Personal 
scope
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Benefi t: 
amount
✓ Replacement rate 
is less than 50 
percent in the case 
of incapacity for 
work of 90 percent 
or less.
Replacement rate 
is less than 50 
percent in the case 
of incapacity for 
work of 90 percent 
or less.
Replacement rate 




✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Qualifying 
periods
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Common 
principles
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓




On the death of a breadwinner, survivors’ benefi t is provided to the children and 
the widow(er). In fact, the death of a ‘breadwinner’ is not always the correct term 
in this context, because entitlement to the benefi t does not depend on whether 
the benefi ciaries were actually maintained by the deceased or not.333 Additionally, 
333 State Pension Insurance Act, Art. 20 (1).
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brothers, sisters, parents, grandchildren, divorced spouses, stepchildren, foster 
children, stepparents, and foster parents of a breadwinner may have the right to 
a benefi t, subject to specifi c conditions.334 Since the international standards only 
impose an obligation to provide a benefi t to the widow and children of the 
deceased, the other family members and the conditions for entitlement are not 
taken into account in the following comparison.
Legislation
Income protection in the case of death of the breadwinner is regulated by the 
State Insurance Pension Act. Th is act sets out the persons protected, the 
qualifying conditions, and the calculation of the survivors’ pension. Th e right to 
a survivors’ pension is related to the rules concerning the maintenance of a 
spouse set out in the Family Law Act.335
At the international level, Estonia is bound by Part X on Survivors’ Benefi t of the 
European Code of Social Security.
Administration and fi nancing
As the survivors’ benefi t is part of the pensions insurance scheme, reference is 
made at this point to the section on old-age pension.
4.13.2 MATERIAL SCOPE
Th e contingency covers the death of a provider, upon the understanding that 
entitlement to a survivors’ benefi t for the provider’s children, parents and 
widow(er) does not depend on whether they were actually maintained by the 
provider or not. Th e Estonian law does not make a distinction between a widow 
and a widower, nor does it distinguish between whether the deceased parent was 
the father or the mother of the child. A widow(er) must have been legally married 
to the deceased; the Estonian legal system does not recognise cohabitation. 
Entitled to a survivors’ benefi t is the widow(er) who is:336
– not working and pregnant (from the twelft h week of pregnancy);
– not working and raising the deceased person’s child, who is under 3 years of 
age;
334 State Pension Insurance Act, Arts. 20, paras 2 and 3. Th ese rights are mirror images of the 
duty of maintenance of these family members, as set out in the Family Law Act, Art. 21.
335 Family Law Act, passed on 12 October 1994 and entered into force 1 January 1995: RT I 1994, 
75, 1326.
336 State Pension Insurance Act, Art. 20; ECSS Report (Ee) I, Art. 60.
Chapter 4.  Estonia
Intersentia 291
– permanently incapacitated for work or of pensionable age, and whose 
marriage to the deceased person lasted at least one year.
Entitlement to a survivors’ pension is suspended if the widow(er) is employed.337 
Furthermore, in the event of remarriage of the widow(er), entitlement to the 
pension ends aft er twelve months of remarriage.338
A child for the purpose of the benefi t is a child under 18 years of age (under 24 
years of age they are a full-time student), or a child who is older, but declared 
permanently incapacitated for work before the age of 18 (24) years.339
4.13.3 PERSONAL SCOPE
Th e personal coverage corresponds with the coverage of the old-age benefi t. By 
and large, the spouses and children of all economically active persons, either 




To calculate the survivors’ benefi t, the higher of the following two amounts is 
used as a calculation base:340
– the amount of the deceased person’s old-age pension calculated according to 
the person’s actual pensionable length of service (until 31.12.1998) and 
pension insurance coeffi  cients (aft er 31.12.1998);
– the amount of an old-age pension for a person with 30 years of pensionable 
length of service.
Similar to the old-age and invalidity pension, the national pension rate serves as 
the minimum calculation base. Th e fi nal amount of the benefi t depends on the 
number of eligible family members: if one family member (spouse or child) is 
entitled, the pension amounts to 50 percent of the calculation base; in the case of 
337 State Pension Insurance Act, Art. 43 (1).
338 State Pension Insurance Act, Art. 41 (3).
339 State Pension Insurance Act, Art. 20 (2) 1).
340 State Pension Insurance Act, Art. 21 (1); ECSS Report (Ee) IV, Art. 62; Leppik & Kruuda 2003, 
pp. 34–35.
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two family members, 80 percent; and in case of three or more family members, 
the benefi t is 100 percent of the calculation base.
Th us, the (imaginary) amount of old-age pension for the deceased provider of 
the widow(er) or child at the moment of application is compared with the amount 
of an old-age pension for a person with 30 years of pensionable service. 
Additionally, the higher of the two amounts is multiplied by the applicable 
percentage. Consequently, a standard benefi ciary – a widow(er) with two children 
– receives a pension that is at least equal to the old-age pension of a person who 
has completed thirty service years. Because the calculation of the benefi t is 
similar to that of an incapacity for work benefi t (in the event of 100 percent 
incapacitation), it is suffi  cient at this point to refer the reader to the calculation 
example for an invalidity benefi t in section 4.12.4, which shows a replacement 
rate of 53.1 percent in relation to the average net wage of an unskilled worker.341
Orphan’s pension
Th e survivors’ benefi t for one child amounts to 50 percent of the calculation base. 
A child that loses both their parents, has the right to receive two survivors’ 
pensions or national pensions, or a survivors’ pension, as well as a national 
pension concurrently, depending on the qualifying periods of the parents.342
Duration of the benefi t
Th e survivors’ pension is paid monthly, and is granted during the period in 
which the benefi ciary meets the criteria for eligibility as described in the material 
scope section, thus throughout the contingency.
Adjustment to the cost of living
Th e benefi ts are being regularly adjusted in the same way as the old-age benefi ts.
4.13.5 QUALIFYING CONDITIONS
Entitled to a survivors’ pension are family members of a deceased person who 
had satisfi ed, by the date of their death, the qualifying period that would have 
been necessary for entitlement to an old-age pension or an incapacity for work 
341 ECSS Report (Ee) IV, Art. 62. As is the case in respect of old age and invalidity, Estonia makes 
reference to ECSS Art. 62(a) and Art. 66, taking the average wage of an ordinary adult male 
labourer (plus family allowances) as a basis.
342 State Pension Insurance Act, Art. 41 (4).
Chapter 4.  Estonia
Intersentia 293
pension. Th us, the qualifying period may diff er from 1 year to 15 years, according 
to the age at which the provider died.343
If the deceased person did not satisfy the necessary qualifying period, survivors 
have the right to a national pension, under the condition that the breadwinner 
resided in Estonia at least one year prior to their death.344
4.13.6 COMPARISON WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS345
Matters of compliance
Th e personal scope of the survivors’ pension insurance – covering 49.1 percent of 
all residents – is amply suffi  cient according to all international standards, which 
are similar to the standards relating to invalidity. As regards the amount of the 
benefi t, the calculations show that the benefi t of a standard benefi ciary – a spouse 
with two dependent children – amounted to 53.1 percent of the average salary of 
an unskilled worker in 2007. Th is percentage meets the standard of the ECSS, 
and, narrowly, of the ECSS Protocol and ILO C128 (both 50 percent), but is below 
the stipulation of the ECSS (Revised) (65 percent).
Since the benefi t is granted throughout the contingency, the duration of the 
benefi t is in compliance with all relevant standards in this respect. Th e same 
counts for the qualifi cation period of 15 service or insurance years as a 
maximum.
Problematic issues
As regards the material scope, the Estonian insurance system provides for a 
survivors’ benefi t in the event of the death of a spouse or parent, which 
corresponds with the international provisions. However, on the interpretation of 
the term ‘widow’ in order to be eligible for a survivors’ benefi t, the Committee of 
Ministers in its Resolution of 2008 made a request to explain:346
[W]hat social protection is available to a widow who is manifestly incapable of self-
support because of her advanced age and the virtual impossibility of fi nding 
employment aft er many years of dependence on her husband, as well as to a younger 
343 State Pension Insurance Act, Art. 20 (4). For more detailed information, see the sections on 
old age and invalidity.
344 Leppik & Kruuda 2003, p. 34.
345 For a detailed description of the international norms regarding survivors’ benefi t, see section 
2.17.
346 CM/ResCSS(2008)5, p. 2 point V.
Part II. Analysis and Comparison
294 Intersentia
widow who was also dependent on her late husband and is caring for at least one 
dependent child older than 3 years of age.’
Th e ECSS leaves it to the countries to decide the meaning of a widow being 
‘incapable of self-support.’347 However, the discretionary power is not unlimited. 
It was explained by the Labour Offi  ce at the adoption of Convention 102, that the 
conditions to qualify for a benefi t may, for instance, be the care of dependent 
children, age or invalidity of the widow, or some other condition that would prove 
that the widow is incapable of self-support.348 Th e above-mentioned question 
mark expressed by the CEACR and the Committee of Ministers follows from this 
interpretation, and makes clear that the supervising committees give careful 
consideration to the given discretion in this respect.349 It remains to be seen what 
measures Estonia will take, if any, to do justice to this interpretation, since a broad 
explanation of incapability of self-support is in confl ict with the far-reaching 
individualisation of social security rights. Th e tension between individualised 
social security rights and the conventions does not only exist in Estonia, but also 
in other countries. Th erefore, this issue will be further discussed in section 6.2.2.
Summary of matters of compliance and problematic issues
Table XVIII. Survivors’ benefi t (Ee) compared with the international standards
Estonia is bound by the ECSS
Survivors’
benefi t




ILO C128 (1967) ECSS Rev. (1990)
Material 
scope
Th e defi nition of a 
‘widow incapable 
of self-support’ is 
too strict.
Th e defi nition of a 
‘widow incapable 
of self-support’ is 
too strict.
Th e defi nition of a 
‘widow incapable 
of self-support’ is 
too strict.
Th e defi nition of a 
‘widow incapable 




✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Benefi t: 
amount
✓ ✓ ✓ Replacement rate 




✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Qualifying 
periods
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Common 
principles
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
✓ = compliance of national provisions with the international standards.
347 ECSS Art. 60.
348 ILO Report V (a)(2) 1952, pp. 130–131; 216–217. See also section 2.17.1.
349 See also: Nickless 2003, p. 107.
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4.14 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Aft er the collapse of the Soviet regime in 1991, the Estonian government started 
to radically reform its economy. Th e new free market economy was expected to 
give the people what they had been deprived of under the rule of Moscow: wealth 
and individual freedom. Changes in social security took place in the shadow of 
economic reform, and the protection against social risks was not on the political 
priority list. Th e strong desire to take part in the European Union gave rise to an 
increasing attention to international human rights instruments, including the 
European Social Charter. Aft er having ratifi ed the revised version of the Social 
Charter in 2000, the next step would be the acceptance of the European Code of 
Social Security. In order to meet the standards of the Code, the diff erent parts of 
the social security system were compared with the standards of this instrument 
and several adjustments were made, such as an increase in pensions, the 
introduction of a fi xed indexation formula for pensions, and the creation of an 
unemployment insurance scheme. As a result, Estonia was able to undertake a 
generous ratifi cation of the Code in 2004, only leaving aside the part on 
employment injury. In accordance with the Estonian Constitution, the European 
Code is part of the Estonian legal order and takes precedence over national law. 
However, although several ILO Conventions as well as the Social Charter have 
been invoked before court, the European Code has not played a role in court 
proceedings so far.
In the meantime, renewed membership of the ILO in 1991 formed the basis for a 
rather wavering development in social dialogue. Th e fi rst established tripartite 
council was the ILO Council, with the task of assisting the government in 
fulfi lling the obligations following from ILO membership. More tripartite 
councils and boards have been created subsequently, thus substantiating the 
unique ILO principle of tripartism in social policy. However, the road from state 
paternalism to real social dialogue appears to be heavy going. Th e actual 
infl uence of the social partners is limited, and consultation of the workers’ 
representatives by the government is oft en overlooked.
Comparison of the Estonian social security provisions with the standards given 
in the European Code of Social Security shows that Estonia, by and large, 
complies with these standards.350 In fact, the personal coverage of the diff erent 
schemes in relation to most of the ratifi ed parts – namely, all employees and self-
employed persons – exceeds the standards of the Code and complies even with 
the higher standards of the third generation ILO Conventions and/or the 
Protocol to the Code and the Revised Code. Th ere is one exception, namely, in 
relation to maternity benefi t. According to the international standards, the wives 
350 For a summery, see Appendix 1.
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of insured spouses should come under their spouse’s insurance for medical care. 
However, because all pregnant women have been considered equal to insured 
persons since 2009, this confl ict has been resolved in practice.
On the whole, the material scope also complies with the standards of the Code, 
as well as with the relevant higher norms, although there are a few issues in this 
respect. Firstly, as regards invalidity benefi ts, only total incapacity for work (100 
percent) gives right to a full invalidity pension, whereas the Code prescribes that 
such a pension must also be provided in the case of incapacity for work to a lesser 
extent, to be prescribed by national regulations. Secondly, the defi nition of 
‘widow’ for eligibility for a survivors’ pension has been found to be too strict by 
the supervising Committee of Ministers.
In respect of the level of the benefi t, there are several issues in relation to the 
European Code. One case in point is the regulation on out-of-pocket payments 
for medical care. According to the Code, cost-sharing is allowed only if the 
fi nancial burden does not cause hardship, and it is totally prohibited for 
pregnancy related care. It has been shown in the Estonian case that health 
expenditure accounts for an increasing proportion of household expenditure, 
especially aff ecting low-income households that include pensioners and disabled 
or chronically ill persons. It is questionable, therefore, whether these rules on 
cost-sharing are in line with the Code. Th e obligation for pregnant women 
during the fi rst twelve weeks of pregnancy to pay fees for home visits by a family 
doctor and ambulatory specialist care, which was in confl ict with the Code, was 
repealed in 2009 in response of critical comments by the Committee of Ministers 
on this point. Another point of particular interest in respect of the level of 
benefi ts is the amount of the old-age pension. Although the replacement rate as 
set by the Code was still met in 2007, it has been made clear that it will steadily 
decrease and that it will drop below the minimum standard in future if no 
measures are taken.
As regards the duration of the benefi ts, the Estonian provisions are all in line with 
the Code, and in most cases, also with higher standards. Th e same counts for the 
qualifying conditions, although the qualifying period of fourteen days for health 
insurance, introduced for administrative reasons, is questionable. For 
employment injury and occupational diseases there are no specifi c provisions, 
and therefore Estonia has not (yet) accepted Part VI of the European Code.
PART III
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this evaluative part, conclusions will be drawn and discussed in order to 
provide an answer to the main research question:
(a) What is the eff ect of international standards on social security legislation in 
the Czech Republic and Estonia, and what application problems arise?
(b) What do these application problems mean for the eff ectiveness of
the international standards?
In Chapter 5, the eff ect of international standards on national social security 
legislation will be reviewed on the basis of the two country studies, providing 
answers to the fi rst part of the research question. Th e diff erent functions of the 
standards during the development of the social security systems will be examined 
and discussed, and the observed problems in relation to ratifi cation and 
application of the standards will be pointed out.
In Chapter 6, the second part of the research question will be answered. How do 
the application problems at the national level refl ect on the international 
standards? In other words, what are the implications of the research results for 
the eff ectiveness and adequacy of the standards? For this purpose, the results 
will be put in a broader perspective and discussed against the background of 




THE EFFECT OF THE STANDARDS
 ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION
– Conclusions and Discussions (a) –
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Th is chapter will provide an answer to the fi rst part of the main research 
question: ‘What is the eff ect of international standards on social security 
legislation in the Czech Republic and Estonia, and what application problems 
arise?’ On the basis of the country studies, the eff ect of the conventions on social 
security legislation will be assessed from three diff erent angles.
First, the eff ect of the standards will be examined from the perspective of their 
functions (section 5.2). Th e functions of the international standards, or, in other 
words, the various ways in which the standards (can) work, determine their eff ect 
on national social security to a great extent. In fact, the more the diff erent 
functions are employed or manifest, the greater the infl uence of the norms. To 
put it the other way around, if the norms do not work at all, if they do not have 
any function, they do not have any eff ect either. Th erefore, an examination of the 
diff erent ways the international standards have worked during the various stages 
of the reform processes in the two countries will clarify the eff ect of the standards 
on the development of national social security law. Apart from providing clarity, 
a clear typifi cation of the diff erent functions of the standards may also provide 
guidance to governments for using the conventions in future.
Secondly, the eff ect of the standards will be viewed from the perspective of 
ratifi cation of social security conventions by ILO Member States. Obviously, fi rst 
and foremost the eff ect of the standards depends on whether or not they are 
ratifi ed. Conventions that are not ratifi ed do not directly infl uence national 
legislation in most cases. Consequently, a determination of obstacles to 
ratifi cation is of crucial importance. Th e observed obstacles to ratifi cation of 
social security conventions in the two countries will therefore be listed and 
briefl y discussed (section 5.3).
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Th irdly, the eff ect of the standards will be assessed with regard to the observed 
application problems (section 5.4). Th e country studies have revealed several 
confl icts and problematic issues pertaining to the application of the conventions. 
Similar to the obstacles to ratifi cation, these problems touch on the limitations of 
their eff ectiveness at the national level, and are thus worth a closer investigation.
Finally, a brief summary of the observed eff ect of international standards on 
national social security legislation in both countries will be provided (section 
5.5).
5.2 THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS ON NATIONAL SOCIAL 
SECURITY
5.2.1 INTRODUCTION
From the country studies, it appears that the social security instruments of the 
ILO and the Council of Europe have had an infl uence on the development of the 
social security systems in both countries. It has been made clear that both 
countries meet the minimum international standards for the greater part, and 
that this would have been less so if these standards had not been ratifi ed. It is 
also true, however, that the concrete eff ects of international standards on national 
social security legislation are oft en diffi  cult to determine. An important reason 
for this is that the standards have their impact in diff erent ways and at diff erent 
stages of the development of social security systems. Th e country studies disclose 
the various functions the international standards have served during the reform 
processes, and they show that specifi c functions have become apparent or 
operational at diff erent moments.1 An identifi cation of these diff erent functions 
contributes to a better insight into the concrete eff ects of the international 
standards on national legislation.
In general, international social security standards have diff erent functions that 
all serve their one overarching goal: the promotion of social protection. Well-
known functions are, for example, that they create a common minimum level of 
social security for all contracting parties, that they serve as a model or guide for 
national social security schemes, and that they prevent social security from 
falling below the level of the accepted standards.2 In this section, the functions 
1 Th e term ‘function’ must be read in the sense of ‘the way in which something works or 
operates’.
2 See, for instance, ILO 2008, p. vii; Kulke 2007, p. 127; Villars 1979, pp. 343–354; Kulke & 
López Morales 2007, pp. 91–92; Bartolomei de la Cruz, Von Potobsky, Swepston 1996, pp. 
25–26; Deakin 2005, p. 47. See also section 1.1.2.
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of the conventions that have come to the fore in the country studies and the 
analysis of ILO Convention 102, both evident and less obvious, will be identifi ed, 
described and discussed.
As mentioned in section 5.1, the purpose of scrutinising these functions is 
twofold. First, a clear identifi cation of the diff erent functions illuminates their 
role during the reform processes in the Czech Republic and Estonia at the 
diff erent stages of development of their social security systems. Secondly, it 
contributes to knowledge about, and insight into, the potential value of 
international standards for the development of national social security systems 
in general. It must be acknowledged in this respect that specifi c functions can be 
better deployed if they are clearly identifi ed. Aft er the presentation of a defi nition 
for each function (section 5.2.2), they will subsequently be examined and 
discussed in light of the two country studies (sections 5.2.3 to 5.2.7). Th ereaft er, 
the fi ndings on the functionality of the international standards in diff erent 
situations will be summarised (section 5.2.8).
5.2.2 TERMING THE FUNCTIONS
On the basis of the research, fi ve functions can be identifi ed, namely, the 
benchmark, preserving, counterbalancing, bridging, and harmonising functions. 
Although each function has specifi c features, they are closely connected to each 
other and sometimes they may even overlap. It will be shown that these functions 
were apparent or operational at diff erent development phases of the social 
security systems. Sometimes they were also only latent or potentially present, 
depending on specifi c situations and national characteristics. Most functions 
may seem obvious, as such, for an international legal instrument setting out 
minimum standards. Still, for effi  cient use of the instruments, it is important to 
defi ne these functions and to recognise their possible eff ects in diff erent 
situations. Th e observed functions of the conventions in relation to the reforms 
of the social security systems in the Czech Republic and Estonia are the 
following:
1. Benchmark function: Th e international standards serve, usually before their 
ratifi cation, as a guide for states at the creation or reconstruction of (parts of) 
their social security systems in order to reach the prescribed norms.
2. Preserving function: Once ratifi ed, the international standards serve as a fi xed 
minimum level of social security that has to be continuously respected by the 
legislature, executive bodies and the judiciary. Established rights cannot be 
curtailed to a level below the international norms.
3. Counterbalancing function: Th e international standards require solidarity, to 
a certain extent, and state responsibility for the administration and provision 
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of the benefi ts in accordance with the prescribed common principles.3 As 
such, they serve as a counterbalance to political policy that is aimed at 
reducing state responsibility and shift ing social risks from the public to the 
private sphere.
4. Bridging function: Th e principles on solidarity and state responsibility, as 
incorporated in the international standards, serve as a bridge between 
privatisation and solidarity. Where the privatisation of social security 
provisions takes place, compliance with these principles safeguards solidarity 
and state responsibility to a minimum extent, and thus creates a compromise 
between individual and collective responsibility for social risks.
5. Harmonising function: Th is traditional function of the international 
standards implies harmonisation of the social security systems of all 
contracting parties in the sense that they share the same fl oor for social 
security.
Going back to the introductory chapter of this study, it can be observed that the 
benchmark and the harmonising functions were recognised and intended at the 
creation of the standards.4 Th e preserving function was not explicitly mentioned, 
but is a logical consequence of the acceptance of the standards. Th e 
counterbalancing and bridging functions were not relevant at that time, since 
they relate especially to neoliberal views involving a ‘small’ government and 
individual responsibility for social risks. As such, they can be regarded as new 
functions of the standards, relevant in a changed society.
5.2.3 BENCHMARK FUNCTION
An important outcome of the study is that the European Code of Social Security 
(European Code) – and implicitly, ILO Convention 102 – has served as a 
benchmark for the reform and creation of the diff erent social security schemes, 
especially in Estonia.5 When, aft er a period of rigorous economic reforms, it was 
fi nally recognised that the social security system would also have to be 
reconsidered, the existing Estonian provisions at the time were compared with 
the European Code. Th e outcome of the comparison was that the Estonian social 
security system exceeded the requirements of the Code in fi ve branches, namely, 
medical care, sickness benefi t, family benefi t, maternity benefi t, and survivors’ 
benefi t. Th e level of old-age pension was equal to the norm given in the Code, 
but was expected to fall below this norm shortly aft erwards because of rising 
3 For a description of the principles on solidarity and state responsibility in the context of the 
social security instruments, see section 2.5.
4 See section 1.1.2.
5 See sections 3.2.2 and 4.2.2.
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wages and insuffi  cient pension adjustment rules. It was established that benefi ts 
in respect of invalidity, unemployment and employment injury were too low. 
Moreover, with regard to unemployment and employment injury, other criteria 
were also not satisfi ed, since specifi c schemes for these contingencies did not 
exist. To prepare for ratifi cation, the discrepancies were addressed by taking the 
standards of the European Code as a benchmark. First of all, in order to be able 
to meet the part on unemployment, an unemployment insurance scheme was 
created that fulfi lled the prescribed criteria. Secondly, the old-age and invalidity 
pensions were raised and an annual indexation was established in accordance 
with the Code. Lastly, several proposals for an employment injury scheme were 
produced, but none were actually adopted, because of strong opposition from 
employers. All this resulted in the ratifi cation of eight of the nine parts of the 
European Code in 2004. In 2009, the benchmark function became visible again, 
when a remaining defi ciency concerning health care for women during the fi rst 
twelve weeks of pregnancy was rectifi ed through an amendment to the Health 
Insurance Act in response to comments of the supervising committee on the 
application of the Code.
In the Czech Republic the international instruments have not been used as 
explicitly for social security reform as in Estonia. Although they were certainly 
taken into account aft er ratifi cation in 1990, the proposed national provisions 
regarding most branches exceeded the international norms and therefore their 
benchmark function was less relevant. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind 
that the Czech Republic was not so devoted to the Western European free market 
economy as Estonia. Accordingly, the wish to become a part of the European 
Union was not as strong as in Estonia, and therefore compliance with the 
European standards as considered to be exemplifi ed in the European Code was 
not an aim as such. Nevertheless, the international instruments have played a 
role in the subsequent reform steps, but because these reforms were mainly 
aimed at retrenchment, this will be discussed in relation to the preserving 
function in section 5.2.4.
It can be concluded that the benchmark function of the international standards 
becomes operational especially in relation to the creation or reconstruction of 
social security schemes. It has proved to be valuable for a country with a poor 
point of departure in terms of social security. In such a situation, the standards 
can serve as a concrete goal to be reached. Th e legal instruments provide clear 
examples for protection against the nine classic social risks and prescribe 
minimum norms for the formulation of a legislative framework for the necessary 
schemes. As such, this function of the social security conventions may be explicitly 
deployed by future EU Member States with a low level of social protection for the 
design of a social security system that fi ts in with the European context.
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5.2.4 PRESERVING FUNCTION
When national social security rules are specifi ed and enacted in accordance with 
the international norms and the standards concerned are ratifi ed, their relevance 
does not end. Th en, they no longer serve as a goal to be reached, but they 
subsequently serve as a fi xed minimum level of social security – a fl oor that has 
to be continuously respected by the legislature, executive bodies and the 
judiciary. What is more, regular reports to the supervising committees have to 
be provided to prove that this minimum level is met, not only in the short, but 
also in the long run. In times of economic downturn especially, when 
governments cut down on public expenses, this preserving function becomes 
prominent. In the Czech Republic, this fl oor is provided by the norms of ILO 
Conventions 102, 130, and 128 (for old-age pensions), and the European Code. 
When the government ratifi ed the ILO conventions in 1993, the norms were 
considered low and easy to meet. Nevertheless, in 2004 the Czech pensions fell 
below the given norms due to the fact that the annual adjustment of the pensions 
did not match the sharp increase of wages. In order to bring the law into 
compliance again with ILO Convention 128, measures had to be taken, and were 
taken indeed, to increase the pensions and solve the emergent inconsistency. 
Another example is the increase in 2010 of the qualifying insurance period for 
entitlement to old-age pension. It was the political wish to fi x the period at 35 
years, however, that would be in confl ict with ILO Conventions 102 and 128 and 
the European Code. In view of these international obligations, the qualifying 
period was set at 30 years of insurance or 35 years if non-contributory periods 
are included, such as years of military service or caring for a child of under four 
years of age.6
In Estonia, as a response to the economic recession, in 2008 and 2009 several 
economic measures were taken that aff ected diff erent benefi ts. For example, the 
pensionable age was raised to 65, and sickness benefi t was reduced from 80 to 70 
percent of previous wages. So far, the preserving function of the European Code 
has been eff ective, since no measures have been taken that have caused a confl ict 
with the Code.
It must be said that, in general, it is very diffi  cult to point out exactly in which 
cases the international standards have prevented or infl uenced certain economic 
measures, because a measure that has not been taken cannot be assessed. It 
requires specifi c inside information to get to know the underlying political 
reasons, which are, however, seldom made explicit. Nevertheless, sometimes the 
preserving role of the conventions can be recognised from the fact that certain 
norms are kept at a level just above the international standards. Examples are the 
6 See section 3.4.4.
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old-age pension and the sickness benefi ts in the Czech Republic, as well as the 
old-age pension in Estonia, that have long been kept just slightly above the 
applicable minimum standards. While economic measures were taken at other 
points, such as a lengthy freeze on the reduction limit of the Czech sickness 
benefi ts, the required replacement rates of the benefi ts were usually maintained. 
In this respect, for the eff ectiveness of the preserving function, it is important 
that in both countries all bills in connection with social security legislation have 
to be assessed, and generally are assessed, on their compliance with the relevant 
international instruments before submission to Parliament.
It must be acknowledged that the international standards do not prevent the 
erosion of established rights in all cases. For example, since 2008 in the Czech 
Republic, the replacement rate of the old-age pension has fallen below the norms 
of the ratifi ed ILO Convention 128, and even just below the minimum standards. 
In this particular case, the preserving function of the international standards 
has, to date, failed. It remains to be seen how the government will respond to the 
comments of the supervising committees that inevitably will be given in the next 
observations and resolutions.
Overall, it can be concluded that the preserving function is a constant feature of 
the international standards that becomes operational immediately aft er their 
ratifi cation. Governments are compelled to keep legislation in line with the given 
norms and to assess the levels of the benefi ts. Th e supervision procedures that 
require regular reports on the application of the standards are eff ective 
instruments in this respect because they require continuous evaluation. In 
relation to economic measures especially, the standards call for attention to the 
internationally accepted minimum norms, and constitute a serious obstacle to a 
free fall of social protection. At the same time, it cannot be denied that the social 
security instruments are in between soft  and hard law. Although they are binding 
legal instruments, hard sanctions cannot be imposed to enforce compliance. 
Moreover, governments are free to denounce their ratifi cation when they feel too 
restricted in their austerity policies.7 In this respect, an ageing population, in 
combination with the recent economic crisis, can be considered a true litmus test 
for the preserving function of the conventions. Time will show whether this 
function holds out in relation to, for example, the Czech and Estonian pensions.
5.2.5 COUNTERBALANCING FUNCTION
Both in the Czech Republic and Estonia, the ideas of the ILO and the Council of 
Europe about solidarity based social security, as well as the legal instruments 
7 Th is soft  character of the conventions is subject to further discussion in section 6.3.
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that give substance to these ideas, have counterbalanced neoliberal policy aiming 
at a reduction of state responsibility and a shift ing of social risks from public to 
private responsibility. Th is counterbalancing function has been most operational 
in Estonia, where neoliberal governments have ruled in succession since 
independence, and where the market economy was expected to bring wealth and 
happiness.8 Under the infl uence of the World Bank and the IMF, a three-pillar 
pension system was designed and emphasis was put on the importance of the 
compulsory private pillar. At the same time, Estonia had a strong ambition to 
join the European Union, which brought about pressure regarding the ratifi cation 
of the European Social Charter and the European Code of Social Security. As a 
result of the government’s commitment to these instruments, the prescribed 
standards were taken into account while determining the size of the diff erent 
pillars. Accordingly, the public (fi rst) pillar was designed in such a way that the 
internationally accepted minimum level of an old-age pension was met, in spite 
of the political inclination towards the private pillars. Moreover, in spite of the 
neoliberal preference for residual benefi ts, the political choice was made to follow 
in the footsteps of the Council of Europe (and implicitly of the ILO), by explicitly 
setting up a social security system in accordance with its standards, not aiming 
at creating a mere safety net, but also at income replacement during the 
occurrence of social risks.9 Th us, the acceptance of the standards has 
counterbalanced the political trend towards a diminishing role of the state in 
social security.
As a member of the ILO from its outset, the Czech Republic had previous 
experience with social insurance, and social policy of the fi rst government was 
initially in line with the ILO ideology.10 Th e World Bank was consulted in 
relation to monetary questions, but was kept at a distance in relation to social 
policy areas. As a matter of fact, the retreat of the state from the fi eld of social 
security by the privatisation of provisions, or by the creation of mainly residual 
schemes, was not under discussion. Nevertheless, the latest recession, on top of 
the burning problem of an ageing population, has caused more political interest 
in diminishing state responsibility, for instance, by strengthening the 
supplementary private pension scheme, imposing out-of-pocket payments for 
medical services, and introducing an income test for family benefi ts. In this 
respect, the international standards as guardians of solidarity and state 
responsibility may serve a counterbalancing function aft er all, since they call for 
political attention to be paid to the solidarity aspect of social security, and to 
state responsibility for the due provision of the benefi ts as prescribed. Private 
schemes that are not implemented in line with the international standards can 
8 See sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.
9 See, for instance, Ministry of Social Aff airs (Ee) 2000; Leppik & Võrk 2006, pp. 19–38.
10 See section 3.2.2.
Chapter 5. Th e Eff ect of the Standards on National Legislation 
Intersentia 307
provide additional social protection, but cannot be counted for the fulfi lment of 
the international obligations.
In general, it can be concluded that the counterbalancing function of the social 
security instruments becomes operational specifi cally in case of policy decisions 
to be taken in a political climate with a tendency to shift  responsibility for social 
risks from the state to individuals, for instance, through the privatisation of 
(elements of) social security schemes. Moreover, the standards serve a balancing 
function in periods of economic downturn when strong economic measures are 
prepared to restrict public social security expenditure. Th ey require policy 
makers to take into account the solidarity aspect of social security next to 
economic considerations. It must be recognised that, contrary to the preserving 
function, this function is more political than legal, and therefore highly 
dependent on the attitude towards international obligations of the incumbent 
government.
5.2.6 BRIDGING FUNCTION
Inextricably bound up with the counterbalancing function, is the bridging 
function. Both functions closely relate to the common principles on solidarity 
and state responsibility, as discussed in section 2.5. Th e bridging function can be 
explained best on the basis of the Estonian private pension scheme. It is oft en 
taken for granted that a private scheme does not comply with the conventions. 
Indeed, the assessment of the Estonian pension scheme in section 4.8.6 seems to 
confi rm this assumption. At the same time, the study makes apparent the 
possibility for such schemes to meet the international obligations, in spite of their 
private character. It has been discussed that this can be achieved by implementing 
the private scheme in question with due regard to the principles on solidarity 
and state responsibility incorporated in the international standards. Compliance 
with these principles brings together two diff ering concepts: privatisation and 
solidarity. If the principles are respected, advantage can be taken of the 
stimulating features of the free market economy, while at the same time, a 
minimum degree of solidarity and state responsibility is guaranteed and the 
negative eff ects of competition for vulnerable groups in society remain limited. 
Th e role of the principles on solidarity and state responsibility in relation to 
privatisation will be further discussed in section 6.2.3.
In short, the bridging function of the international standards can become 
operational in relation to the privatisation of (elements of) social security 
schemes. Th e prescribed common principles are useful guidelines for the 
implementation of a private scheme to guarantee solidarity and state 
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responsibility, at least to a certain extent. Th e application of these principles in 
relation to a private scheme creates a compromise between individual and 
collective responsibility for social risks. In essence, they bridge the gap between 
solidarity-based social security on the one hand and the free market economy on 
the other. Th rough observance of the prescribed principles, individual 
responsibility for income replacement during the occurrence of a social risk will 
be accompanied by legal safeguards that confi ne the negative eff ects of the free 
market, such as excessively low, or even negative, pension remittances, and 
limited or no access to health care for lower-income groups.
5.2.7 HARMONISING FUNCTION
Th e establishment of a national fl oor for social security through ratifi cation of 
international standards does not only imply a conservation of national social 
protection, it also means harmonisation of the social security systems of all 
contracting parties, in the sense that they all share the same fl oor; they all have 
to provide at least the given minimum level of social protection. Within the 
context of the European Union, it must be kept in mind that the European 
Commission is not allowed to propose any harmonisation in the fi eld of social 
security. At the same time, the Lisbon Treaty does refer, in its social paragraph, 
to the European Social Charter, which, in turn, refers to the minimum norms of 
ILO Convention 102 or the European Code. Th is reference is rather ambivalent. 
On the one hand, Member States do not accept social security standards as part 
of the EU acquis, but on the other, they do accept such standards at a broader 
international level. Th is paradox can be explained in light of EU enlargement 
that was envisaged at the time of the establishment of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
Th e reference to the Social Charter, and implicitly to ILO Convention 102, was 
seen as a measure to prevent social dumping.11 Accordingly, the accession states 
were pushed to ratify this instrument.12
In spite of its ambivalence, the country studies of Estonia and the Czech Republic 
confi rm the value of the reference to the Social Charter. Aft er all, it has been 
established that the intention to join the European Union was the direct reason 
for the ratifi cation of the Social Charter, which subsequently led to the acceptance 
of the European Code.13 In the Czech Republic, the Code only slightly led to 
11 See, for instance, Leppik 1999, p. 7.
12 See also Ginneken 2003, p. 6. Van Ginneken states that ILO Convention 102 ‘is some sort of 
passport for acceding countries to the EU.’ Vaughan-Whitehead 2003, p. 162. Vaughan 
criticises the omission of European institutions to propose an alternative approach to the 
World Bank policy in the CEE region during the fi rst years of reforms.
13 See sections 3.2.2 and 4.2.2.
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higher standards, because several ILO conventions were in force already, but in 
Estonia, the link between the EU acquis and the Social Charter resulted in a 
serious upgrade of national social protection to at least the international 
minimum before the country entered the European Union. Th is resulted in a 
smaller gap between social protection in the new and old Member States.
Th us, it can be concluded that acceptance of the international standards has a 
harmonising eff ect on social security systems within the European Union, in the 
sense that they provide a minimum level of social protection to be complied with 
by all contracting parties. A common social protection fl oor contributes to the 
European single market as a level playing fi eld. Th is seems all the more relevant 
in light of the severe cuts in social expenditure to combat the economic downturn 
in all EU Member States and in view of future EU accessions.
5.2.8 THE FIVE FUNCTIONS: A REVIEW
Th e description of the fi ve observed functions of the international standards in 
the Czech Republic and Estonia shows that each function plays a role at diff erent 
times and in diff erent situations. Some of the functions are especially, and 
sometimes even exclusively, relevant in relation to the creation or extension of a 
social security system. Th is is particularly true for the benchmark function, as 
seen in the Estonian case, where the European Code has been used as an example 
for the design of the diff erent schemes. With a poorly developed system as a point 
of departure, lacking important provisions such as unemployment insurance 
and adequate old-age pensions, the Code could serve as a practical goal to be 
reached. Th e international standards also give guidance at a later stage of 
development, notably, in case necessary provisions appear to be missing, as 
recently seen in relation to pregnancy related health care in Estonia.
During the (re)construction of a system, also the counterbalancing function is 
specifi cally relevant, preventing an excessively dominant role for the market in 
social protection. In Estonia, the call for attention to solidarity and state 
responsibility following from the obligations of the European Code has certainly 
tempered the political focus on individual responsibility for social risks and the 
privatisation of provisions, and it has led to a larger role of the state. For example, 
the fact that the size of the Estonian public pension pillar was made large enough 
to comply with the international standards can be attributed to the European 
Code as a counterbalance to the neoliberal political preference at that time. Th is 
counterbalancing function may be as relevant in relation to retrenchment 
policies, when commitment to the international standards compensate the 
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tendency towards the privatisation of social security provisions as a means of 
cutting public expenses.
Th e bridging function can be called upon to implement private provisions in 
such a way that the benefi ts of a free market can be enjoyed, while at the same 
time, the state retains its fi nal responsibility by setting a strict (legal) framework 
that limits the negative eff ects of competition for the most vulnerable groups in 
society. Th is function was not deployed in relation to the Estonian private 
pension scheme, which has resulted in a problem fulfi lling the obligations of 
the conventions. For the Czech Republic, who has severe problems with the 
level of pensions, the bridging function could contribute to the solution of 
existing confl icts if the private pension scheme would be implemented in 
accordance with the common principles incorporated in the international 
instruments. Because if implemented in such a way, the private scheme can be 
taken into account for the fulfi lment of the ILO Convention 128 and the 
European Code.
Th e preserving function becomes operational once a certain instrument has been 
ratifi ed. From then, it serves as a pebble in the shoe of the government, in the 
sense that the given standards provide for a minimum level of social protection 
that has to be continuously taken into account. Th is function is especially 
relevant in view of expenditure cuts, as it compels governments to respect the 
lower limit. For the Czech Republic, where social security was initially rather 
generous, but subsequently subject to severe economic measures, this function 
was (and still is) the most relevant of all functions.
Th e last function, the harmonising function, is of a diff erent kind since it does 
not relate to one specifi c national situation. Instead, it concerns harmonisation 
between diff erent countries. Because ILO Convention 102 and/or the European 
Code, with their inherent concept of a solidarity based social security system and 
their fi xed legal fl oor for social protection, have been accepted by almost all EU 
Member States, they bring about harmonisation within the European Union in 
practice, whether intended or not. It has been brought to light in this study that 
the European Commission has put great pressure upon the accession states to 
accept the Social Charter and the European Code. Although this underhand 
policy is rather random and paradoxical to the claim of national autonomy in 
this fi eld, it has been eff ective in terms of the promotion of communal minimum 
norms for social security at the EU level.
It is worth mentioning, in this respect, that the use of international instruments 
for the creation of a harmonised level of social protection has been envisaged 
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since the birth of the European Economic Community (EEC).14 An ILO group 
of experts that studied the impact of the EEC on social protection (1956), 
considered that an alternative to legislative power in the social fi eld would be to 
ensure international instruments for the protection of social rights. In their 
report, which was infl uential to the Treaty of Rome, the experts referred to the 
draft  European Social Charter and several ILO conventions, and suggested 
general acceptance by European countries of such standards. On diff erent 
occasions in later stages of the development of the European Union, this idea was 
reconsidered, but not accepted as yet.15 Th is underlines the ambiguous character 
of the claim of national autonomy in the fi eld of social security. It would 
contribute to transparency if a clear standpoint were taken, for example, by 
accepting the minimum social security standards at the EU level, which would 
be practically feasible, as demonstrated by the inclusion of the ILO Maritime 
Labour Convention (2006) into the EU acquis in 2009.16 Th en, the harmonising 
function of the international standards could be openly emphasised so as to 
provide a useful tool for social policy, especially in relation to the economic 
downturn and to forthcoming EU accessions. From the perspective of the 
international standards, it would imply a boost in terms of recognition and 
reputation of social security standards, which may have a positive eff ect on social 
protection inside as well as outside the European Union.
Th e study clearly shows that the diff erent functions are apparent and operational 
in diff erent situations and stages of development of the social security system 
concerned. It can also be concluded that the eff ect of the functions largely 
depends on national politics, especially on how serious the international 
obligations are taken. In principle, all functions automatically follow from the 
acceptance of the standards – they are just diff erent ways in which the 
international instruments work. However, these diff erent ways must be 
acknowledged and deployed to become operational and eff ective. If political will 
to apply the standards is absent, the implicit functions will be without eff ect. For 
example, the Czech or Estonian government may choose to let the pensions drop 
below the minimum level, and thus to ignore the preserving function of the 
standards. However, such a breach of international obligations is a desirable 
scenario for neither of the countries. Th e foregoing typifi cation and analysis of 
the diff erent functions can contribute to the practicability, and subsequently to 
the eff ectiveness, of the international standards.
14 Schutter 2005, pp. 111–112.
15 Schutter 2005, pp. 116–120.
16 Council Directive 2009/13/EC of 16 February 2009 implementing the Agreement concluded 
by the European Community Shipowners’ Associations (ECSA) and the European Transport 
Workers’ Federation (ETF) on the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006, and amending 
Directive 1999/63/EC.
Part III. Conclusions and Discussions
312 Intersentia
5.3 OBSTACLES TO RATIFICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
5.3.1 INTRODUCTION
Th e possible eff ect of international social security standards in a specifi c country 
is not only determined by the reach of their functions, or by their (in)adequate 
application; it depends fi rst and foremost on their being ratifi ed or not. As the 
country studies show, not all social security instruments are ratifi ed by the Czech 
Republic and Estonia. On the contrary, Estonia has only ratifi ed the European 
Code and none of the higher ILO conventions, while the Czech Republic has 
additionally ratifi ed two of the eight higher standards.17 From the perspective of 
national social protection, it would be an improvement if more higher norms 
were accepted.
Ratifi cation of standards is also of great signifi cance from the international point 
of view, since conventions with a low ratifi cation rate do not have as much 
persuasive power as those who enjoy a higher number of ratifi cations. Th us, 
identifi cation of specifi c obstacles to ratifi cation in diff erent countries is 
important in view of the promotion of the standards in national situations, as 
well as in view of the image and status of the social security standards within the 
global community. In this light, the ILO has conducted an inquiry among its 
Member States in order to obtain information on the obstacles and diffi  culties 
encountered that might prevent or delay ratifi cation of these conventions.18 Th e 
most prominent obstacles following from this inquiry are: (a) Non-conformity of 
national legislation; (b) diff erent societal values and political obstacles; (c) lack of 
fi nancial resources; (d) lack of administrative and statistical capacity; and (e) lack 
of knowledge about the Conventions.19 Th is section seeks to add to the ILO 
investigation by examining to what extent these fi ndings apply also to the Czech 
Republic and Estonia, or whether the study may have disclosed other reasons. 
First, the diff erent obstacles in both countries will be described. In the fi nal 
paragraph it will be reviewed how the fi ndings from the cases of the Czech 
Republic and Estonia relate to the fi ndings of the ILO inquiry.
5.3.2 LACK OF KNOWLEDGE
First of all, during the research it became apparent that the social security 
conventions are very poorly known both in political circles and the ministries. 
17 ILO Conventions 130 and 128.
18 ILO 2001C. For an in-depth study on obstacles for ratifi cation, see Korda (forthcoming), 
dissertation.
19 ILO 2008, pp. 37–39.
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For example, in the Czech Republic, in the department of the Ministry of Health, 
where legislation is assessed on compliance with international law, there was 
hardly any knowledge about the fact that the ILO conventions and the European 
Code contain parts on medical care. And in Estonia, even the interviewed 
member of the Social Committee of Parliament – the body that should prepare, 
among others, the submission of newly adopted ILO conventions – was not aware 
of the content of the social security conventions. Only a few experts at the 
Ministries of Social Aff airs, notably those who are, in fact, assigned to assess 
national law in view of international obligations and to compose the regular 
reports on the application of the instruments, were familiar with the specifi c ILO 
conventions, and, slightly more common, with the European Code. As a result, 
the social security treaties are hardly ever publically discussed, and only 
exceptionally subject to a political debate. In both countries, only the European 
Social Charter was made subject to political debate at the time that it was put 
forward for ratifi cation.
5.3.3 LEVEL OF THE BENEFITS
In respect of the material content of the social security systems in both countries, 
several confl icts with the international standards have become apparent. Th e 
most far-reaching confl icts do not relate to the personal coverage of the scheme 
or to the conditions for eligibility; it is the level of the benefi ts that constitutes 
the weakest part in comparison with the international standards. Th e amounts 
of the old-age pensions (both countries) especially, but also the unemployment 
benefi ts (Estonia) are not, or are only narrowly, suffi  cient to ratify any higher 
standard. Th is means that acceptance of higher standards for these risks would 
involve an increase in the benefi ts, which obviously constitutes an obstacle.
5.3.4 RELUCTANCE TOWARDS NEW INTERNATIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS
Th e country studies have additionally made clear that both Estonia and the 
Czech Republic comply with higher international standards than those that are 
actually ratifi ed in respect of some social security branches, such as maternity 
and family benefi ts.20 Furthermore, Estonia has not ratifi ed any of the ILO 
conventions, although it is obvious that Convention 102 could easily be ratifi ed 
in the wake of the European Code. Th ese observations raise the question of why 
those standards are not ratifi ed as well, since the norms are considered to be met. 
It has been recognised in this respect that the governments in both countries are 
20 For an overview, see Appendix 1.
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reluctant towards new international commitments in the fi eld of social security. 
Especially in the current period of economic restraint, politicians want to avoid 
new demarcations for possible economic measures in the future. For example, 
the Estonian government is not considering the ratifi cation of the Protocol to the 
European Code, and in the Czech Republic, ratifi cation of ILO C168 is not 
proposed, although ratifi cation of these instruments may be possible on the basis 
of legislation in force to date. In fact, it is the preserving function of the 
international standards that deters the governments from taking up new 
obligations. Furthermore, because of the unfamiliarity with the international 
social security standards in general, including trade unions, lawyers and scholars, 
there is no pressure from society to accept higher international norms. Th erefore, 
from the political perspective, nothing can be gained from putting the social 
security treaties on the political agenda.
5.3.5 ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN
Another specifi ed reason for reserve is the administrative burden that the 
ratifi cation of conventions brings about. In Estonia it was stated several times 
during the research that this is considered the main obstruction to the ratifi cation 
of ILO Convention 102. It was argued that for a small country like Estonia, the 
reporting obligations are relatively heavy because this has to be done by a very 
limited number of staff . It was also mentioned in this respect that the reporting 
method is very outdated, in the sense that the questionnaires cannot be fi lled in 
electronically, but that everything has to be prepared in hard copy. Of course 
these things may play a role, but the administrative burden could be put into 
perspective, because for the four-yearly reporting cycle regarding Convention 
102, it would be suffi  cient to refer to the annual reports of the European Code, 
which are assessed by the same Committee. Nevertheless, for other instruments 
this argument holds out. Th e fact that the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) frequently has to 
remind the governments – also the Czech government – to submit their reports 
supports the complaint on the administrative burden. Th e practical remark 
about the outdated reporting method certainly deserves the attention of the ILO 
Offi  ce.
5.3.6 OUTDATED TERMINOLOGY AND DIFFERING 
POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS
Th ere are two points that have been mentioned repeatedly in both countries in 
connection with the ILO conventions that, in fact, are inconsistent. One is that 
the ILO conventions are outdated on several aspects. Cases in point are the 
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determination of a standard benefi ciary as a male worker with a dependent wife 
and two children, and the conventions are sometimes found to leave too little 
room for modern tools, such as privatisation or tax returns. At the same time, on 
several occasions the European Code of Social Security has been pointed out as 
more modern than the ILO conventions and more geared toward the European 
situation. For that reason, the CoE instruments were found more important than 
the ILO conventions. Obviously, this is a mere matter of image that is not based 
on real facts, since the European Code is a copy of Convention 102. However, 
this misconception points out that, in principle, acceptance of regional 
instruments may be more attractive or logical for countries than global treaties. 
Th is, as such, is an observation that is worth being kept in mind.
5.3.7 SUPERFLUOUSNESS OF CONVENTION 102 NEXT TO 
THE EUROPEAN CODE
Th e last argument I came across was that once the European Code is ratifi ed, 
ILO Convention 102 becomes superfl uous. Th is position certainly plays a role in 
Estonia. Looking purely at the normative value of the instruments, this point of 
view makes sense because both instruments duplicate each other. Still, there is 
more to it than that. Since its formation, the ILO has worked on its contribution 
to world peace, as put into words in the preamble of the Constitution: ‘Whereas 
universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social 
justice.’ In view of the creation of social justice, a whole range of labour and 
social security standards have been developed over almost a century, and the 
major contribution of the ILO to social justice is widely recognised. Crucial in 
this was the participation of the current 183 Member States. Without nations 
adopting as well as ratifying the developed standards, the Organisation could 
never have had so much impact worldwide as it actually did and still does. 
However justifi ed certain points of criticism or concern may be, a withdrawal 
from active participation should be avoided. Unless, of course, the idea were 
supported that the ILO has played its part, an idea that has not been expressed in 
the studied countries.
5.3.8 RECAPITULATION OF THE OBSTACLES
Th e reasons for non-ratifi cation encountered in the studied countries actually 
confi rm four of the fi ve obstacles identifi ed by the ILO, namely, lack of 
knowledge, diff erent societal values and political obstacles, lack of administrative 
capacity, and non-conformity of national legislation. Lack of fi nancial resources 
was mentioned explicitly in neither of the countries. It is true that in Estonia I 
frequently heard the slogan ‘fi rst get rich, then get social’ in relation to the 
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conventions, but that is rather a matter of political priority than of fi nancial 
capacity. Th e issue that ILO standards are being ousted by the European Code 
(which is the case in Estonia) is not, as such, recognised by the ILO. In an analysis 
of the present state and practice of social security standards, the ILO refers to the 
European Code, but merely to point out the worldwide relevance of ILO 
Convention 102 as a model for regional instruments.21 Of course, the value of 
Convention 102 as the key reference for the defi nition of the right to social 
security is worth being emphasised, but apparently the development of regional 
instruments on the basis of Convention 102 can aff ect willingness to ratify the 
ILO counterpart. In the case of Estonia, this does not actually aff ect social 
protection at the national level, but it does not contribute to the credibility and 
persuasiveness of the ILO Convention.
5.4 APPLICATION PROBLEMS
5.4.1 INTRODUCTION
Aft er ratifi cation, application of international standards is closely connected to 
the legal status of the instruments. It has been described in the previous chapters 
that the social security conventions are binding instruments taking precedence 
over national law in both the Czech Republic and Estonia.22 As such, the 
legislative, executive and judicial bodies have to act and decide in conformity 
with these instruments. Th e country studies show that in general, the government 
and the legislature take them into account indeed, and that both countries 
comply with the ratifi ed standards for the greater part. Th is outcome is no 
accident given the facts that, in principle, international agreements will not be 
ratifi ed unless national legislation is in line with the requirements, and that in 
both countries, new bills are generally assessed on compliance with the 
international obligations. In fact, during the past two decades, the diff erent 
functions of the conventions – as discussed in section 5.2 – have led to social 
security legislation that is generally in line with their prescribed norms. Still, on 
some points the international standards have not served their functions well. For 
example, certain standards were overlooked or ignored when the European Code 
was taken as a benchmark for the Estonian social security schemes, and at the 
creation of the private pension scheme the bridging function of the Code was not 
deployed. Moreover, the recent economic recession in combination with an 
ageing population has put the preserving function of the standards under great 
pressure in both countries. In some cases economic measures have been taken 
that constitute new confl icts with the ratifi ed standards.
21 ILO 2008, pp. 15–16.
22 See sections 3.4.3 and 4.4.3.
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In the table of Appendix 1, a systematic overview is provided of the norms 
prescribed in the diff erent instruments and the actual situation in both countries 
described. It shows on which aspects of the nine social risks the two countries 
comply with the international standards, and on which points problems arise, or 
may arise, with the application of the ratifi ed instruments. It also indicates where 
higher standards than those that are currently ratifi ed are met, in view of possible 
future ratifi cations. In the following sections, the observed application problems 
are listed and briefl y reviewed.
5.4.2 PROBLEMATIC ISSUES: MATERIAL SCOPE
In most cases, the contingencies are defi ned in accordance with the defi nitions 
given in the ratifi ed instruments, both in the Czech Republic and Estonia. In the 
country studies three issues have been identifi ed in which the covered risks are 
defi ned too strictly. Firstly, the interpretation of ‘suitable employment’ in the 
Czech legislation is found not to be in compliance with the unemployment part 
of the international standards, since the qualifi cations, skills and previous 
experience of a jobseeker do not have to be taken into account during the fi rst 
three months of unemployment.23 According to the Czech law, an unemployment 
benefi t can be suspended if a jobseeker does not accept a job off ered by a labour 
offi  ce, unless the job does not correspond to the jobseeker’s state of health. Th is 
strict interpretation of a suitable job refl ects a trend within the European Union, 
and is connected to the EU active labour market policies to get as many people as 
possible involved in the labour market. Because this is not an isolated Czech 
issue but also an issue in other countries, it will be further discussed in section 
6.2.4.
Th e second issue deals with the defi nition of the term ‘widow’ in relation to the 
Estonian survivors’ pension.24 Th e Committee of Ministers has questioned the 
strict interpretation of a widow incapable of self-support that limits the scope of 
the pension to widows who are not working and pregnant, permanently 
incapacitated for work, or not working and raising the deceased person’s child of 
under 3 years of age. Although the international instruments give discretionary 
power to the governments as to the determination of incapability of self-support, 
the Estonian law appears to be too strict.25 Th is friction is closely related to the 
individual approach of social security rights. Where the conventions take the 
breadwinner model as a starting point, the Estonian social security system is 
built on individualised rights. Th e recognition of a ‘dependent wife’ is not 
23 See sections 2.11.1, 3.7.2 and 3.7.6.
24 See sections 4.13.2 and 4.13.6.
25 See section 2.17.1.
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included in any of the insurance schemes. Th e survivors’ pension is an exception 
in this respect, but the strict interpretation of the incapability of self-support of a 
widow refl ects the individual approach. Since the breadwinner model – as 
incorporated in the international instruments – is in confl ict with an 
individualisation of social security rights in many countries, and the model has 
oft en been subject to criticism, this friction will be further elaborated on in 
section 6.2.2.
Th e third issue concerns the defi nition of the Estonian invalidity benefi t. 
According to the Pension Insurance Act, only 100 percent incapacity for work 
gives right to a full invalidity pension.26 However, it has been explained in this 
respect that the invalidity benefi t that meets the prescribed replacement rate has 
to be provided also in the event of incapacity for work of less than 100 percent.27 
At the same time, the Estonian law provides for a pro-rata benefi t in the case of 
partial incapacity for work of between 40 and 90 percent, which is not required 
by the European Code. Although it could be argued that this compensates for 
the excessively strict requirements for a full invalidity pension, it must be 
recognised that the legal structure of the Code does not permit the 
counterbalancing of a confl ict at one point with a surplus at another.
5.4.3 PERSONAL SCOPE
Th e personal coverage exceeds the ratifi ed norms regarding all social security 
schemes in both countries. Th ere are only two problematic points in this respect. 
First, in both countries the wives of insured persons are not insured for 
pregnancy related medical care on the basis of their husbands’ insurance.28 Th is 
friction has only minor consequences in practice, since all women residing in the 
Czech Republic and all pregnant women in Estonia are insured for medical care. 
Still, the problem is worth a closer look because it refers again to the discrepancy 
between the oft en criticised breadwinner model in the international instruments 
and the individualisation of social security rights as a trend in many countries.29 
Th e second problematic issue concerns the Czech family benefi ts.30 Th e insurance 
covers families whose incomes exceed a prescribed amount, whereas the 
European Code does not allow for a means test. In view of the fact that more and 
more countries choose means tested child benefi ts, it is questionable whether 
this is a defensible limitation of the fl exibility of the standards. Th is will be 
further examined in section 6.2.5.
26 See sections 4.12.2 and 4.12.6.
27 See section 2.16.1.
28 See sections 2.15.2, 3.11.3, 3.11.6, 4.11.3, 4.11.6.
29 For a further discussion, see section 6.2.2.
30 See sections 2.14.2, 3.10.3 and 3.10.6.
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5.4.4 LEVEL OF THE BENEFIT
Several issues pertaining to the level of benefi ts have come to the fore in both 
country studies. Th e most fl agrant violation of the international standards 
concerns the old-age pensions in the Czech Republic.31 As a result of economic 
measures, the pensions fell below the norms of ILO Convention 128, and even of 
the European Code, in 2008. An obligatory supplemental private pension scheme 
is under consideration, but as yet the subsequent governments have not been able 
to realise this intention. In Estonia, the level of the pension is still in line with 
the European Code, but because of the method of calculation, the replacement 
rate will steadily decrease and fall below the prescribed norm.32 Th e well 
developed, private second pillar pension scheme is not implemented in line with 
the common principles on solidarity and state responsibility, as incorporated in 
the European Code, and therefore it cannot be counted for the fulfi lment of its 
standards.33 Inevitably, measures will have to be taken to prevent violation of the 
international standards on this point in the not too distant future. In view of the 
European wide tendency towards private pension schemes in combination with 
a retrenchment of the public schemes, this issue will be further examined in 
section 6.2.3.
Another problem found in both countries concerns the charge of out-of-pocket 
payments for medical services. In the Czech Republic, where so-called ‘patient 
fees’ were introduced in 2008, this is problematic in relation to pregnancy related 
care.34 According to all international standards, medical care in the event of 
pregnancy and child birth has to be free of charge for all insured women. 
According to the Czech legislation, pregnant women are not exempt from these 
patient fees for several services, such as for hospital care, doctors’ visits, and 
emergency services. In Estonia the same confl ict existed, but this was resolved in 
2009 in response to repeated critical remarks of the Committee of Ministers.35 
In spite of this, the study shows that the out-of-pocket payments in Estonia may 
constitute another problem. It has been noted that these payments have risen 
over the years, and that the burden of these expenses is increasingly falling on 
the shoulders of the lower-income groups, hindering their access to medical care. 
It is questionable whether such rules on cost-sharing can be considered to avoid 
hardship, as prescribed by the international standards.36 Th e increase in out-of-
pocket payments for medical care is closely related to the trend towards a shift  
31 See sections 3.8.4 and 3.8.6.
32 See sections 4.8.4 and 4.8.6.
33 See section 2.5.
34 See sections 2.9.3, 2.15.3, 3.11.4 and 3.11.6.
35 See sections 4.11.4 and 4.11.6.
36 See section 4.5.6.
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from public to private responsibility for social risks that is also visible in other 
countries. Th erefore, this issue will briefl y be reconsidered in section 6.2.3.
Th e last point to be mentioned here concerns the Estonian maternity benefi t. Th e 
total benefi t for (at least) 140 days is paid out as a lump sum, whereas it is a basic 
assumption in all international standards that the benefi ts should be provided 
through periodical (monthly) payments.
5.4.5 DURATION OF THE BENEFIT
Diff erent types of confl icts have been noted in the country studies regarding the 
duration of sickness and unemployment benefi ts. In the Czech Republic, both 
benefi ts are not provided for the required number of weeks in each case of 
occurrence of the risks, which may cause a confl ict in the event of several spells 
of loss of earnings in succession with only short intervals in between.37 In 
Estonia, the sickness and unemployment benefi ts are in confl ict with the rules 
concerning suspension of benefi ts, as prescribed in the European Code.38 
According to these rules, a benefi t may be suspended if the contingency has been 
caused by the wilful misconduct of the person concerned. Th e Estonian sickness 
benefi t, however, is not granted if the illness is caused by intoxication by alcohol, 
drugs or toxic substances, and the unemployment benefi t is not paid if the person 
left  their previous work due to, among other things, a breach of duties. Th e 
Committee of Ministers has made critical remarks on both rules, arguing that 
the suspension of a benefi t is allowed only when the intoxication or dismissal 
can be qualifi ed as wilful, which has to be distinguished from blameable.
Another friction as to the duration of benefi ts deals with the Estonian sickness 
benefi t.39 Although, according to the Unemployment Insurance Act, the benefi t 
is paid for 26 weeks of sick leave, which meets the requirements of the European 
Code, the Employment Contract Act allows employers to dismiss sick employees 
aft er four months of incapacity for work. Dismissal implies stoppage of the 
sickness benefi t. Th us, sickness insurance does not guarantee a benefi t for the 
minimum required duration of 26 weeks, which is in confl ict with the Code.
Th e last issue to be mentioned in this respect concerns the employers’ liability for 
the payment of sick employees during the fi rst period of sick leave, in the Czech 
Republic during the fi rst two weeks, and in Estonia from the fourth to the eighth 
37 See sections 3.6.4, 3.6.6 and 3.7.4, 3.7.6.
38 See sections 4.6.4, 4.6.6 and 4.7.4, 4.7.6.
39 See sections 4.6.4. and 4.6.6.
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day.40 Th e introduction of such employers’ liability fi ts in with the trend towards 
a smaller state and an increase in the individualisation of responsibility for social 
risks. Th e question arises however as to whether the measure is in line with the 
common principles on solidarity and state responsibility prescribed by the 
international instruments. Because this question touches on the broader issue of 
privatisation, it will be discussed in section 6.2.3.
5.4.6 QUALIFYING PERIODS
Before the recent economic crisis, the qualifying periods for almost all benefi ts 
easily met the international standards. Only one confl ict was pointed out by the 
Committee of Ministers, namely, that the Czech law requires one year of 
residence in order to qualify for family benefi ts, where the European Code allows 
the requirement of six months of residence. As part of a package of economic 
measures in view of the economic crisis and an ageing population, the Czech 
government extended the qualifying requirements for old-age pensions in 2010. 
Th is has caused a new confl ict with the conventions, because a reduced pension 
is only granted aft er the completion of 20 years of insurance, whereas the 
European Code and ILO Convention 128 provide for a reduced pension aft er 15 
years of contribution or employment.41
5.4.7 CONCLUSIONS ON THE APPLICATION PROBLEMS
Th e observed application problems diff er in terms of practical impact and origin. 
Some confl icts with the international standards have a major practical impact 
for the benefi ciaries, for example, the low old-age pensions, the extensive out-of-
pocket payments for medical care, or the loss of sickness benefi t aft er dismissal 
during sick leave. Other confl icts may have less impact on the actual social 
protection of insured persons, such as the requirement of one year of residence 
for entitlement to family benefi t instead of six months, and the absence of a 
derived right to medical care for the wives of insured persons. Yet, none of the 
confl icts involve a mere technical problem without any impact. In all cases it 
would contribute to the actual social protection of the insured persons, or to a 
broader coverage of the scheme involved, if the problematic issues were brought 
in line with the international standards.
Examining the underlying reasons for the diff erent application problems, it 
appears that the observed issues can be classifi ed into three categories. Th e fi rst 
40 See sections 3.6.4, 3.6.6 and 4.6.4, 4.6.6.
41 See sections 3.8.5, 3.8.6.
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cluster of problems can be traced back to economic reasons. Th ey all emerged in 
the course of time as a result of economic measures. Th e second category involves 
issues that relate to changed societal perceptions since the formulation of the 
standards in the mid-twentieth century. Th e entrance of women into the labour 
market, the individualisation of social rights, and an increasing emphasis on 
self-responsibility for social risks are cases in point. Th e third category contains 
issues that cannot be connected (on the basis of this study) to an underlying 
reason and/or have a rather technical nature.
Table XIX. Underlying reasons for the observed application problems 
Economic reasons Changed perceptions Unclear / technical reasons
Excessively low old-age 
pension (Cz, Ee)
Cost-sharing for medical care 
(Cz, Ee)
Means tested family benefi t 
(Cz)
Dismissal during sick leave 
(Ee)
Excessively long qualifying 
period for entitlement to 
reduced pension (Cz)
Employers’ liability for 
sickness benefi t (Cz, Ee)
Excessively strict 
interpretation of ‘widow’ (Ee)
Excessively strict 
interpretation of ‘suitable 
employment’ (Cz)
No recognition of derived 
rights (Cz, Ee)
Excessively strict suspension 
rules (Ee)
Cost-sharing for medical care 
(Cz, Ee)
Employers’ liability for 
sickness benefi t (Cz, Ee)
Excessively strict 
interpretation of total 
incapacity for work (Ee)
Lump sum maternity benefi t 
(Ee)
Benefi t per calendar year 
instead of in each instance of 
sickness or unemployment 
(Cz)
Excessively long qualifying 
period for entitlement of 
family benefi t (Cz)
Th e underlying cause of some problematic measures, notably, concerning cost-
sharing and employers’ liability, can clearly be traced back to changed perceptions, 
especially to a shift  from public to individual responsibility, but are also explained 
by economic reasons. Th erefore, they are present in both clusters. Th e clustering 
shows that an economic downturn hampers the eff ect of the conventions on 
national legislation. None of the issues in the fi rst cluster existed when ILO 
Convention 102 and/or the European Code were ratifi ed, but later emerged as a 
result of a package of economic measures taken over the course of time. Th us, it 
can be concluded that an economic recession puts severe pressure on the 
preserving function of the conventions. Most issues in the second cluster (except 
the last two) already existed before the ratifi cation of the conventions. Here, the 
benchmark function of the conventions has fallen short, most importantly, 
because of a lack of clarity of certain norms through accessible and unambiguous 
interpretations of the supervising bodies. Th e issues in the last category have 
minor practical consequences for insured persons and rather seem to be 
overlooked by the legislature. Th e implications of the various application problems 
for the eff ectiveness of the conventions will be further discussed in Chapter 6.
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5.5 CONCLUSIONS
Th e international standards served diff erent functions during the diff erent stages 
of the social reform processes in the two countries. Th ey served as a benchmark 
for the reform and creation of the diff erent social security schemes, especially in 
Estonia. Aft er ratifi cation, they had a preserving function by providing a fi xed 
minimum level of social security to be respected by the legislature, the executive 
bodies, and the judiciary. Th e international standards, with their inherent 
principles on solidarity and state responsibility, also counterbalanced neoliberal 
policy aiming at a reduction of state responsibility and a shift ing of social risks 
from public to private responsibility. Th e very same principles may serve as a 
bridge between private social security provisions, such as private pension 
schemes, and the ideal of solidarity based insurance schemes. Implementation of 
a private scheme along the lines of the prescribed principles on solidarity and 
state responsibility creates a compromise between individual and collective 
responsibility for social risks. Finally, the establishment of a national fl oor for 
social security through ratifi cation of the international standards implies 
harmonisation of the social security systems of all contracting parties – they all 
share the same fl oor. Th e eff ect of the diff erent functions largely depends on 
national politics, most importantly, on how serious the international obligations 
are taken. In both countries, the international standards have well served their 
diff erent functions during the diff erent stages of social reform, but they have not 
been eff ective in all cases.
As a matter of fact, the existence of several points of non-compliance with the 
international standards points towards a weak functioning of the standards at 
diff erent points. For example, in spite of their preserving function, the Czech 
government allowed the pensions to drop below the required level, and 
notwithstanding their benchmark function, the Estonian legislature was 
excessively strict in its defi nition of a widow to be entitled to a survivors’ benefi t. 
What is more, it has been noted that the preserving function even obstructs 
possible ratifi cation of higher standards. Th e counterbalancing function has not 
prevented a rise in out-of-pocket payments for medical services, the introduction 
of employers’ liability for sick pay, or an increasing role for private pensions at 
the cost of public schemes. Th e bridging function has not resulted in a private 
pension scheme in Estonia that can be counted for the fulfi lment of the 
international standards. In conclusion, all those confl icts together erode the 
harmonising function of the standards. Moreover, the established obstacles to 
ratifi cation of social security standards stand in the way of their application.
Does this lead to the conclusion, aft er all, that the standards are obsolete, and 
that the eff ect of the international standards on national legislation is trivial and 
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not worth recognition? Certainly not. It still holds that the standards have 
worked well on many points, with a higher level of social security as a result. 
Although the international instruments may not be perfect and may indeed have 
their shortcomings, the country studies show that they have contributed to social 
protection in both the Czech Republic and Estonia. Th rough their diff erent 
functions, they have impacted on national social security legislation in various 
ways, not the least by providing an internationally accepted minimum level of 
social security to be reached and maintained.
In view of the future, it can be stated that the promotion of the international 
standards within the context of the European Union would not only advance 
national social security legislation, but would also strengthen a common fl oor 
for social security, which is particularly relevant in view of the economic 
downturn and future EU accessions. Promotion of the standards would include 
addressing the obstacles to ratifi cation and solving the observed application 
problems. Paying systematic attention to the norms at the EU level and putting 
pressure on Member States to respect the norms, not only before, but also aft er 
EU accession, would seem to be a prerequisite in this respect.
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CHAPTER 6
THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
UNDER REVIEW
– Conclusions and Discussions (b) –
6.1 INTRODUCTION
While investigating the application of the conventions and their impact on 
national social protection, it appeared that their functions have not been eff ective 
in all cases. As recalled in the previous section, during the study several confl icts 
between national provisions and the international standards came to the fore. 
Many of these problematic issues relate to points of criticism as refl ected in the 
introductory chapter of this book.1 Critics have found that the social security 
conventions do not keep up with new developments in social security because 
their language and concepts are out of date, sometimes even discriminatory, and 
not tailored to post-industrial society. Another point of criticism is that they do 
not have legal power. Furthermore, the conventions are found to prescribe 
excessively low benefi ts to be relevant in the European Union, and are found not 
to contribute to social protection for all.
Indeed, the concept of a male breadwinner, for example, does not concur with 
the insurance schemes in both the Czech Republic and Estonia, where men and 
women are insured on an individual basis. Also, other concepts such as ‘suitable 
employment’ and ‘widow’ turn out to be diffi  cult to interpret and apply in the 
context of current developments, and the study discloses a tension between the 
international standards and the privatisation of social security provisions. And, 
of course, there is the problem that in spite of the ratifi cation of the standards, 
matters of non-compliance exist and persist. Other problems relate to the 
question of whether the actual provisions indeed contribute to the standards of 
living for everyone.
In this chapter, these problematic issues will be discussed in the context of global 
and/or European developments in the fi eld of social security, and will be reviewed 
1 Section 1.1.4.
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in light of the objectives of, and controversy regarding, the international 
standards. By relating the application problems in the two countries to topical 
developments and the above-mentioned criticism, the discussions seek to 
contribute to the forming of an opinion on the usefulness of international social 
security standards for the evolution of welfare states sixty years aft er the creation 
of the fl agship Convention 102. In fact, the discussions deal with the last part of 
the research problem: What do the observed application problems mean for the 
eff ectiveness of the conventions in the EU context? Th e following three sections 
will subsequently deal with the questions of whether the international standards 
are still suitable for application in present day welfare states (section 6.2), whether 
they are eff ective legal instruments (section 6.3), and whether they indeed 
contribute to social protection for everyone (section 6.4). In the last section, some 
conclusions will be drawn on the eff ectiveness of the conventions.
6.2 DO THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS KEEP 
UP WITH NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SOCIAL 
SECURITY?
6.2.1 INTRODUCTION
In the interviews with national experts in both the Czech Republic and Estonia, it 
was asserted several times that the international instruments are outdated at 
certain points, and doubts were expressed as to the applicability of the standards 
in view of modern developments and techniques in social security. Th at the Czech 
Republic and Estonia are no exceptions in this respect is clearly demonstrated by 
a report discussed at the ILO Conference of 2001 (celebrating the 50th anniversary 
of Convention 102) entitled ‘Social Security: Issues, Challenges and Prospects.’2 
As a result of the Conference, a resolution was adopted under the name ‘Social 
Security: Standards for the XXIst Century.’3 Th e Member States recognised that 
social security systems are facing multiple, fundamental challenges relating to 
globalisation, unemployment, population ageing, new fi nancing techniques, and 
atypical employment relations, among others. A discussion subsequently ensued 
on the role of the conventions in addressing these challenges.4 Th is section aims 
to contribute to this discussion on the basis of the two country studies, and to 
seek answers as to the suitability of the conventions for the development of social 
security systems at the present time.
2 ILO 2001B; see also Pennings & Schulte 2006; Langford 2007; Maydell and Nußberger 1996.
3 ILO 2002.
4 ILO 2008.
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Looking at the list of confl icts between the national provisions and the 
international standards, it is striking that many of the problems relate to new 
developments indeed. Some problems follow from the individualisation that 
takes place in all aspects of society, and also in the fi eld of social security, while 
the conventions take the male breadwinner as a starting point. Th ese issues will 
be discussed in the following section. Section 6.2.3 will deal with the identifi ed 
confl icts that are connected with the global tendency towards the privatisation 
of social security provisions, or, in other words, with the shift  from public to 
private responsibility for social risks. In section 6.2.4 a refl ection will be made on 
the tension between the international standards and present day labour market 
policy, developed under pressure of rising unemployment rates. Some 
consequences of the high level of fl exibility envisaged by the international 
standards exactly in order to avoid application problems will be discussed in 
section 6.2.5. Finally, in section 6.2.6, conclusions will be drawn on the durability 
and adaptability of international social security standards.
6.2.2 THE MALE BREADWINNER MODEL VERSUS 
INDIVIDUALISED SOCIAL SECURITY
Th e male breadwinner: an outdated concept
It has been discussed in Chapter 2 that ILO Convention 102 takes the male 
breadwinner model as a starting point.5 Th is particular characteristic of the 
international standards is oft en mentioned to illustrate the idea that they have 
become outdated, and is indicated by several countries as constituting one of the 
main obstacles to ratifi cation.6 In the Czech Republic and Estonia this is also 
considered to be a drawback of the instruments. It is true of course, that this 
concept, which stems from the 1950s, no longer corresponds to the current socio-
economic reality in many post-industrial countries, including the EU Member 
States. Th e labour force participation of women has increased considerably since 
the adoption of Convention 102 and, consequently, entitlement to social security 
provisions has become more and more individualised. On some points, from our 
present day perception, this male breadwinner model can even be deemed to be 
discriminatory, for instance, in the case of the restriction on the payment of 
survivors’ benefi ts to widows instead of to spouses, either female or male.
Th e problem with this out-of-date concept was acknowledged by the ILO in the 
2001 Resolution, which referred to the increased participation of women in the 
5 Section 2.2.3. Th is concept is also used in the higher standards with the exceptions of 
Conventions 168 (1988) and Convention 183 (2000).
6 ILO 2008, p. 38; Nußberger 2007, p. 110.
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labour force and the changing roles of men and women. It was expressly stated 
that ‘social security and social services should be designed on the basis of 
equality of men and women’.7 However, it must be recognised that modernisation 
of the conventions, although considered necessary, seems an unfeasible task for 
the time being.8 Th erefore, it is worthwhile examining this controversy more 
closely and to see whether it actually hampers the application of the standards, 
or gives cause to specifi c fl aws in social protection. First, the male breadwinner 
as a standard benefi ciary will be discussed, then the discriminatory eff ect of the 
male breadwinner in relation to survivors’ benefi t will be examined, and fi nally 
the assumption of derived rights as a consequence of the breadwinner model will 
be reconsidered in light of the current individualisation of social rights.
Th e male breadwinner as a standard benefi ciary
In our Western society, fewer and fewer women are fi nancially dependent on 
their husbands. Men and women have a shared responsibility for the household 
income in most cases. Although it is still true that, in general, women earn a 
smaller part of the income than men, the idea of women being housewives and 
caring for the children creates an image of impracticability, at least in relation to 
Western societies. Inevitably, the predominance of the notion of the man as the 
sole breadwinner in the mid-twentieth century – as refl ected in Convention 102 
– has made way for the two-earner model. Obviously, the designation of the male 
breadwinner with a dependent wife and two children as a standard benefi ciary 
does not connect to this reality, but does that make it obsolete by defi nition? Th e 
function of the standard benefi ciary in the conventions is to provide a fi xed point 
of departure for the calculation of the benefi ts. It makes it possible for the 
Member States and the supervising bodies to compare the benefi ts provided in 
the countries with the given norms, taking the same elements as a basis. From 
the perspective of a fair comparison, it is not so important who is taken as a 
standard, but, fi rst and foremost, that a standard is prescribed. In view of the 
level of social protection, the choice of a male breadwinner as a standard is 
logical, since the average wages of men are higher than those of women, even 
aft er the revolutionary rise of women in the labour market.9
More problematic in this respect is the inclusion of two children in the defi nition 
of the standard benefi ciary. For comparison of the benefi t actually provided and 
the given norm, child allowances for two children have to be added to both the 
reference wage (of the male breadwinner) and the calculated benefi t. Because the 
benefi t is, of course, lower than the reference wage, child allowances make up a 
7 ILO 2001A, p. 3 (point 9).
8 Pennings 2007A, p. 140–141.
9 See also Pennings & Schulte 2006, pp. 46–47.
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greater part of the benefi t than of the wage. Th us, the higher the child allowance, 
the lower the actual replacement rate of the benefi t itself needs to be to obtain 
the same result. In the last decade, the real average childbirth per woman in the 
European Union has been around 1.5.10 Th e inclusion of child allowance for two 
children in the calculation of a standard benefi ciary’s benefi t does not refl ect the 
current situation, and gives a result that is higher than what the average benefi t 
actually is. For example, the replacement rate for a Czech standard benefi ciary 
with two children who receives a sickness benefi t is 59.9 percent, and if child 
allowance for 1.5 children were to be calculated, this would be 59.5 percent. At 
this point, the out-dated interpretation of a standard benefi ciary has a (slightly) 
eroding eff ect on the norms.
Discriminatory eff ect of the male breadwinner concept on survivors’ benefi t
Th e concept of the male breadwinner is not exclusively used in relation to the 
calculation of the benefi ts. It is also refl ected in the parts on survivors’ benefi t in 
Convention 102 and the European Code, which provide for a benefi t for widows, 
and not for widowers.11 Of course, Member States are free to provide widowers’ 
pensions as well, but the fact that the conventions do not include widowers in 
their defi nition does not refl ect present ideas. What is more, nowadays such 
distinction between men and women as regards entitlement to a benefi t is 
considered discriminatory. Equal treatment of men and women is recognised as 
a fundamental right, and has been taken up in human rights instruments, such 
as the International Convention for the Protection of Political and Civil Rights 
(1966). In this Convention the principle of equality extends to the fi eld of social 
security. Th e restriction in Convention 102 of survivors’ benefi ts to widows only 
is clearly not in line with this principle.
Notwithstanding this confl ict, the provision does not cause discrimination in 
practice, because governments are additionally bound by anti-discrimination 
rules in human rights instruments. For example, in the Netherlands until 1988 
only widows were entitled to a survivors’ benefi t. On the basis of Article 26 of the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the Dutch Central 
Appeal Court decided then that the Survivors Act was discriminatory. 
Subsequently, a new act was adopted under which widowers were also entitled to 
the benefi t.12 Th is example illustrates that the discriminatory eff ect of the out-of-
date male breadwinner idea of the conventions is corrected by other (human 
rights) treaties. In addition, within the European Union, equal treatment of men 
10 Eurostat 2008, fertility statistics ’00-‘05.
11 See section 2.17.1.
12 For more information on this issue, see PenningsB 2006, pp. 91–92.
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and women in matters of social security is also regulated.13 Accordingly, in the 
Czech and Estonian social security legislation, the principle of equal treatment 
has been taken into account. In both countries, survivors’ benefi ts are granted to 
both widows and widowers. It must be acknowledged though, that the 
discriminatory nature of the provision as such, certainly does not contribute to 
the popularity of the ILO conventions, which are oft en considered obsolete 
because of this male breadwinner concept.
Derived rights as a consequence of the breadwinner model
Another aspect of the confl ict between the assumption of the male breadwinner 
as incorporated into the international standards and our modern societies, 
concerns derived social security rights as a consequence of the breadwinner 
model. Indeed, in both countries social security rights are ascribed on an 
individual basis only. Th e idea of entitlement of a person to certain benefi ts on 
the basis of their spouse’s insurance is not included in either of the schemes, 
except, due to the nature of the risk, in relation to survivors’ benefi t. In contrast, 
Convention 102 provides for derived rights for wives of protected (male) 
breadwinners in relation to several benefi ts. To be precise, this is the case not 
only in relation to survivors’ benefi t,14 but also to maternity protection15 and 
health insurance, although, with regard to the latter, an alternative option of 
coverage of at least 50 percent of all residents has been left  open as well.16
Th is alternative option is used by the Czech Republic and Estonia to prove 
compliance with the ratifi ed standards in relation to health care. However, in 
relation to maternity protection, the international instruments do not provide 
for this alternative. Th is means that the wives of insured persons who are not 
insured individually must still be covered for medical care, based on their 
derived rights. Th is refl ects the special focus on maternity protection of the ILO 
from its outset. Both in the Czech Republic and Estonia, women are insured on 
the basis of their individual rights, in the Czech Republic on the basis of 
13 Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security.
14 According to Art. 61, the persons protected shall comprise the ‘wives and the children of 
breadwinners’ in prescribed classes of employees or of the economically active population, 
constituting, respectively, 50 percent of all employees or 20 percent of all residents.
15 According to Art. 48, for maternity medical benefi t the persons protected shall comprise all 
women in prescribed classes of employees or of the economically active population, 
constituting, respectively, 50 percent of all employees or 20 percent of all residents, and ‘also 
the wives of men in these classes’.
16 According to Art. 9, the persons protected shall comprise prescribed classes of employees or 
of the economically active population, constituting, respectively, 50 percent of all employees 
or 20 percent of all residents, ‘also the wives of men in these classes’, or prescribed classes of 
residents, constituting not less than 50 percent of all residents.
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residency, and in Estonia on the basis of contributions. Consequently, strictly 
taken, the personal coverage of health insurance in relation to childbirth is not 
in line with the international obligations. In practice, however, this constitutes 
only a marginal problem, because in both countries almost all women are 
actually insured.17 Only a small coverage gap may exist in the Czech Republic, 
namely, for the wives of employees who are not permanent residents but who 
work for an employer with permanent residence in the country.18 In Estonia, the 
non-acceptance of derived rights regarding maternity protection caused a 
defi ciency until 2009.19 Th is confl ict with the international standards was solved 
by providing all pregnant women with an individual right to health care on the 
basis of a doctor’s certifi cate.
As such, the idea of extra protection for women in relation to pregnancy and 
childbirth is generally supported, as shown by the rather recent adoption of a 
new elaborate Convention on this matter.20 However, the Czech and Estonian 
cases raises the question of whether extensive protection has to be reached by 
way of derived rights per se. It has been pointed out that the health insurance (in 
relation to childbirth) covers about 96 percent of all residents in Estonia, and 
almost 100 percent in the Czech Republic, which is much more than required by 
the Code. Th e group of women that are not covered is much smaller than the 
group that would not be insured if health insurance covered 50 percent of all 
employees, including their wives, which, however, would be in line with the 
Code. It would have added to the fl exibility of the standards if another option for 
coverage was given in respect of maternity protection, as was done in relation to 
health care. It is interesting to see that the European Code (Revised) additionally 
provides for an individual entitlement to pregnancy related health care for all 
economically active women. One cannot deny that the obligation of ensuring 
derived rights will become more and more problematic in view of the general 
tendency towards the individualisation of social security rights.
A similar problem appears in relation to survivors’ benefi ts. Th e benefi t for a 
widow under the international standards is based on the insurance of the 
deceased breadwinner. Th e term ‘breadwinner’ implies that entitlement is not 
unconditional. Th e conditions are incorporated in the defi nition of the risk as 
‘the loss of support’, and are further explained by the addition that the 
entitlement of the widow is made conditional ‘on her being presumed incapable 
of self-support.’21 It is left  to the countries to decide on the meaning of the widow 
17 See sections 3.11.6 and 4.11.6.
18 Within the framework of the European Union, this situation falls under the scope of the 
Regulation No. 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems.
19 See section 4.11.6.
20 Convention 183 on Maternity Protection, 2000.
21 Convention 102, Art. 60. See 2.17.1.
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being incapable of self-support, but it has been made clear by the ILO that the 
discretionary power is not without limits.
In Estonia, the Pension Insurance Act provides for a survivors’ benefi t if the 
surviving spouse (widow or widower) is permanently incapacitated for work, is 
of pensionable age, is unemployed and more than 12 weeks pregnant, or is 
unemployed and raising a child of the deceased of under three years of age.22 Th e 
Committee of Ministers, following the comments of the CEACR, has questioned 
the Estonian interpretation of incapability of self-support, indicating that social 
protection should also be available to a widow who is unable to support herself 
because of her advanced age and the impossibility of fi nding a suitable job aft er 
many years of dependency on her husband, and to a younger widow who cares 
for a dependent child who is older than three years of age.23 In short, the 
Committee has found the Estonian interpretation of the term widow, in relation 
to entitlement to a survivors’ benefi t, too strict. In the Czech Republic, the 
interpretation is a bit wider, also including a spouse caring for a disabled child, 
parent or parent-in-law, and for a dependent child who is older than three years. 
Furthermore, a surviving spouse who has reached the retirement age for men, 
minus four years, is granted a pension. Although these rules meet the objections 
of the Committee with regard to the Estonian situation to a certain extent, in the 
Czech Republic the question also remains as to whether a woman who has always 
been dependent on her husband, and who becomes a widow at the age of, for 
instance, 50 years, will be able to support herself.
Th e rather strict conditions for survivors’ pension in the two countries refl ect the 
generally accepted idea nowadays that each person is responsible for their own 
life. In fact, the concept of a survivors’ benefi t for a spouse as such, does not exactly 
coincide with the individualisation of social security rights, since it concerns a 
derived right by defi nition. It is understandable, therefore, that when such benefi t 
is nevertheless provided, the conditions are made more stringent, especially in 
countries where individualisation is a standard in many aspects of society. In this 
light, it can be seen that the observations of the Committee of Ministers more or 
less equilibrate the development towards individualisation by protecting persons 
who have not been able to keep pace with the changing society and to take part in 
the labour market, and thus, who do not qualify for social security benefi ts of their 
own account. Such protection may be all the more relevant in countries where a 
suffi  cient safety net is not available, such as in Estonia. At the same time, the 
requirement of ensuring derived rights in relation to both maternity protection 
and survivors’ pension may become more and more problematic in view of the 
apparently irreversible individualisation of our present society.
22 See section 4.13.6.
23 CM/ResCSS(2008)5, p. 2 point V.
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6.2.3 THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS VERSUS 
PRIVATISATION
Tension between solidarity and the free market
One of the topical issues in the fi eld of social security worldwide is privatisation.24 
In many countries, private old-age pension schemes have been introduced, 
employers have been made responsible for the payment of their sick employees, 
and the share of out-of-pocket payments for medical services is growing. Th is is 
also true for the two countries under review. Th e comparison of private elements 
in their social security systems with the international standards has revealed, 
without exception, certain tensions. What is more, these tensions oft en stand for 
fl aws in social protection. For example, it has been shown that the gradual 
(partial) replacement of public pensions in Estonia by the private scheme risks 
insuffi  cient income level in old age.25 It has also been pointed out that the shift  
from state responsibility for sickness benefi t to employers’ liability in both 
countries may bring about discrimination against employees who do not enjoy 
good health.26 Furthermore, the study shows that the charging of extensive out-
of-pocket fees for medical services in Estonia can cause hardship for the most 
vulnerable groups in society, and may hinder access to health care.27
Th ese concrete examples from the country studies make clear that the 
marketisation of social security provisions calls for caution. Although 
privatisation measures as described above are generally accepted and considered 
necessary in times of economic pressure and in view of population ageing, they 
should not be taken at the expense of the most vulnerable groups. To protect 
these vulnerable groups, a set of principles on solidarity and state responsibility 
has been incorporated into ILO Convention 102 and the subsequent social 
security instruments. Aft er all, it is precisely the unemployed, the sick, the 
elderly, and the young who are most in need of social protection, and for whom 
social security has been developed in the fi rst place. Th e conventions are indeed 
the instruments to secure a minimum level of social protection, necessary not 
only in times of industrialisation, but just as much in our post industrial service 
society of today, which relies heavily on the free market economy. For the well 
educated who enjoy good health, physically and mentally, it is not so diffi  cult to 
put aside some money for a pension individually and voluntarily, but the converse 
is true for people in poor health or with little education. For them, the 
24 In the context of this study, privatisation must be understood as ‘any measure through which 
responsibility for the provision of benefi ts is transferred from the public to the private sphere 
and/or through which the benefi ts (partly) depend on market forces’.
25 See section 4.8.6.
26 See sections 3.6.6 and 4.6.6.
27 See section 4.5.6.
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privatisation of social security provisions easily brings about a decline in social 
protection. Unsurprisingly, the privatisation of (parts of) social security schemes 
causes tension with the international standards at a fundamental level.
Th e principles on solidarity and state responsibility as a bridge between 
privatisation and solidarity
In spite of the established tension, the international standards do not rule out 
private social security provisions. In fact, ILO Convention 102 is designed so as 
to leave fl exibility to Member States with regard to the organisation of their 
social security systems.28 Th is high degree of fl exibility has become all the more 
important in view of modern techniques and new preferences, such as 
privatisation, that were not yet employed in the industrial period in which the 
Convention was developed. Th rough several fl exibility clauses and the 
incorporation of the principles on solidarity and state responsibility, the use of 
other types of social security schemes than the Bismarckian insurance model 
predominant at that time has been anticipated. Th e principles include fi nancial 
solidarity, general responsibility of the state for the provision of predictable 
benefi ts, and the representation of diff erent stakeholders in the management of 
the scheme concerned.29 Indeed, as explained in section 5.2.6 identifying the 
bridging function of the conventions, the coexistence within a social security 
system of public as well as private schemes can be in conformity with the 
international standards, as long as the common principles are observed. By 
implementing private provisions in accordance with these rules, solidarity will 
be maintained at least to a minimum extent. While free-market forces are 
contrary to solidarity in essence, the acceptance of the common principles builds 
a bridge between these two poles. On the one hand, private schemes can take 
advantage of competition and relieve the public budget, while on the other, the 
common principles on solidarity and state responsibility safeguard the eff ective 
protection of insured persons and limit the negative eff ects of the free-market 
economy on the fi nal individual remittances. To examine the bridge function of 
the common principles more closely in practice, in the following sections the 
private elements in the social security systems of the Czech Republic and Estonia 
will be reviewed as actual examples.
Private pensions and the common principles on solidarity and state responsibility
It has been shown that in the not too distant future, the Estonian public pension 
pillar will no longer be able to fulfi l the international obligations on its own, and 
that the Czech pensions fell below the required level in 2008. Th is makes the 
28 See section 2.4.
29 For an explanation of the principles on solidarity and state responsibility, see section 2.5.
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question of whether private schemes can also be taken into account for the 
fulfi lment of the international standards urgent. Th e assessment of the Estonian 
private scheme on its compliance with the international standards had a negative 
result, because the scheme has not been implemented along the lines of the 
common principles.30 Two main problems have been pointed out in this respect. 
First, the persons protected are not involved in the management of the funds, 
which is required if the scheme is not administered by the state. Secondly, the 
government does not take responsibility for the provision of the benefi ts, for 
instance, by setting out a minimum remittance or investment rate.
A comment of the ILO Committee of Experts on the Peruvian private pension 
scheme that is also based on individual savings accounts, similar to the Estonian 
scheme, may shed light on this issue that is of importance for other countries as 
well. Th e Committee of Experts recalled in its comment that the rate of pensions 
provided by the private system could not be determined in advance, since it 
depended on the capital accumulated in the individual accounts, and particularly 
on the earnings from these accounts.31 Additionally, the Committee requested to 
know what measures the government had taken with a view to preserving the 
rights of insured persons where the return on investments would be negative. 
Th e government replied that an act had been adopted regulating a minimum 
level of profi tability, thus guaranteeing a minimum return. In response, the 
Committee asked for actuarial studies on the fi nancial balance of the public and 
private funds. Th is response seems to imply that the government may have 
fulfi lled its obligation if the actuarial studies showed that the public and private 
schemes together guaranteed the required pensions (40 percent of the reference 
wage to a person who has completed 30 years of contribution). Th e Committee 
noted in this respect that the average profi tability from all private funds would 
not necessarily guarantee a real return capable of providing eff ective protection 
for insured persons. In other words, a calculation of future pensions on the basis 
of average investment rates would not be suffi  cient.
Th is discussion makes clear that a government takes responsibility for the due 
provisions of the benefi ts in accordance with the conventions if the insurance 
funds are obliged by law to guarantee a minimum investment rate, and if it is 
established through actuarial studies that this minimum investment rate yields 
the prescribed amount aft er 30 insurance years. In Estonia, there has been no 
regulation in this respect, nor is there any form of representation of insured 
persons. As a result, Estonia has to keep its public pensions at the level provided 
by the European Code, and cannot take into account the additional private 
pensions.
30 See section 4.8.6.
31 CEACR: Individual Observation concerning C102 (Peru) 2007.
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For the Czech Republic, where discussions on the supplemental private scheme 
are currently ongoing, it would be a challenge to see whether the new 
supplementary scheme could be implemented in a way that is in line with these 
fundamental principles. Th is would imply the creation of a scheme that leaves 
room for the trend of making people more responsible for their own lives and for 
the advantages of competition and other market forces on the one hand, but that 
meets the principles on solidarity and state responsibility, on the other. Such 
implementation would relieve the pressure on the public schemes to meet the 
ratifi ed norms of ILO Convention 128 and the European Code, while, at the 
same time, preventing pensions from falling below the given level. Th us, 
compliance with the common principles makes it possible to combine two 
clashing phenomena: privatisation, and solidarity based social security.
Employers’ liability and the principles on solidarity and state responsibility
Another private element in social security recently introduced in both countries 
is the liability of employers for the payment of their sick employees during the 
fi rst period of their sick leave. In Estonia, it covers the fi rst fi ve days, and in the 
Czech Republic, the fourth until the fourteenth day of sick leave.32 Compliance 
of these measures with the international standards depends, again, on whether 
they are implemented in accordance with the common principles on solidarity 
and state responsibility. For example, does the government safeguard the actual 
provision of the payments? Are the employers legally obliged to take up insurance 
for this risk? Is possible discrimination of employees with a history of medical 
problems suffi  ciently prevented (in theory as well as in practice)? In what way are 
the diff erent interests represented in the management?
To gain better insight into this issue, it is useful to take a look at other countries 
where employers are responsible for the payment of sickness benefi ts and the 
reactions on this form of privatisation of the supervising committees. For 
example, in the Netherlands, the employer is responsible for the payment of 
sickness benefi t in the form of the continuation of wages for a period of 104 
weeks, and in Germany, during the initial period of six weeks. Th e Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe has repeatedly criticised the Dutch system as 
not being in line with the common principles. Accordingly, it questioned the 
government about:33
[T]he possible negative eff ects of the reforms making employers liable under certain 
conditions for the payment of the sickness and disability benefi ts, which could result 
in particular in the abandonment of the participatory management of the social 
32 See sections 3.6.4 and 4.6.4.
33 Resolution CSS(2000)2 on the application of the ECSS t/m Resolution CSS(2007)11.
Chapter 6. Th e International Standards under Review
Intersentia 337
security schemes and the risk of discrimination against workers with a history of 
medical problems[.]
At the same time, the German rule has not elicited any comments. From this, it 
could be concluded that the international standards do not allow for long periods 
of employer responsibility, but that the idea as such is not rejected in principle.34 
However, it must be noted that the committees in their comments on the Dutch 
system never actually referred to the length of the period.35 Another important 
diff erence between the Dutch and the German systems is that in Germany, small 
employers are obligatorily insured for the risk, which may limit discrimination 
against those with poor health. Considering the Committee’s concern about 
discrimination, this aspect seems to come fi rst, together with the requirement of 
participatory management.
Th e discussion makes clear that when the common principles on solidarity and 
state responsibility are not respected, a problem will emerge with the application 
of the conventions. For the Czech and Estonian governments, this implies that 
accompanying measures are necessary, which guarantee that benefi ts will be 
granted without discrimination, and which provide a strong role for trade unions 
and adequate participation of the representatives of the persons protected. 
Perhaps it would help to study more thoroughly the implementation of the 
German employers’ liability, since that could give useful ‘best practice’ 
information. It would, however, be of particular value if the supervising 
committees would provide a framework for proper implementation of this form 
of privatisation, all the more so since it appears to have become a trend in many 
countries.
Cost-sharing for medical care and the principles on solidarity and state 
responsibility
In both countries, the shift  from collective towards individual responsibility also 
concerns out-of-pocket-payments in relation to medical care. Although cost-
sharing for medical care is allowed under the conventions, it is also stipulated 
that the rules concerning cost-sharing may not cause hardship.36 In fact, the 
general principle of fi nancial solidarity that applies to all benefi ts is explicitly 
stressed in relation to medical care, which refl ects the importance of accessible 
and aff ordable health care. Both countries impose out-of-pocket payments for 
34 Th is is also the conclusion in Nickless 2003, p. 124. Nickless adds: ‘contracting parties will 
have to wait for further decisions of the Committee of Ministers before they can establish 
what is an acceptable period of continued payment of wages during sickness.’
35 My colleague B. Hofman is working on a study of the Dutch system in relation to the 
international standards.
36 See section 2.9.3.
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medical services, such as doctors visits, hospital stays, and medicines. In the 
Czech Republic, modest patient fees are primarily levied to infl uence the 
behaviour of health care users – for instance, to reduce the number of doctors 
visits and the excessive use of medication.37 Financial reasons are only secondary. 
It is diff erent in Estonia, where out-of-pocket payments are an important means 
of fi nancing health care, constituting almost a quarter of total health expenditure 
and subject to an upward trend.38 In relation to this matter, it has been noted 
that the burden of out-of-pocket payments is increasingly falling on the shoulders 
of lower-income households, especially if these households include pensioners or 
persons with a health condition, and that it may hinder health access for these 
lower-income groups. As an example, the normal co-payment for a specialist 
visit represents more than 6 percent of the monthly income of a person in the 
lowest docile of income categories.39 In spite of the fact that the condition that 
cost-sharing may not cause hardship is very vague, it cannot be denied that the 
Estonian rules are at least problematic in view of the principle of fi nancial 
solidarity.40
As shown before, another problem regarding cost-sharing exists in the Czech 
Republic, namely, in relation to maternity protection. According to the 
conventions, as a matter of principle, cost-sharing may not be required for 
medical care concerning pregnancy and delivery.41 Th is has been repeatedly and 
unambiguously confi rmed by the CEACR to diff erent countries.42 In the Czech 
legislation, several exemptions to the general rules on co-payment for pregnancy 
related care are made, but for some services the normal rules apply. To meet the 
international standards, the exemptions should be extended to all situations 
involving pregnancy related care. In Estonia the same confl ict existed until 2009, 
when the law was changed in order to meet the requirements of the European 
Code.
37 See section 3.5.4.
38 See section 4.5.4.
39 Habicht & Habicht 2008, p. 244.
40 Th e CEACR has made the following statement in this respect in relation to the Northern 
countries: ‘Th e preparatory work throws no light on what may be regarded as constituting 
hardship in this connection. […] At the same time, the fact that there is provision to meet any 
hardship suff ered by persons of limited means by the intervention of public assistance would 
undoubtedly be pertinent to any conclusion on the question whether the requirements of the 
Convention were fully met.’ ILC: Interpretation of a decision concerning C102 (Northern 
Committee for Social Policy) 1962.
41 See sections 2.9.3 and 2.15.3.
42 For example, CEACR: Individual Direct Request concerning C102, (Netherlands) 1989; ILC: 
Interpretation of a decision concerning C102 (Northern Committee for Social Policy) 1962; 
CEACR: Individual Direct Request concerning C102 (Italy) 1990.
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Privatisation: possible but complicated
Th e fact that, under conditions, private social security provisions may also be 
taken into account for the fulfi lment of the international standards extends their 
applicability. At the same time, it must be recognised that the option of private 
social security is only a second best alternative from the perspective of the 
international standards. For all contingencies, the given rules are, fi rst and 
foremost, tailored to public insurance schemes based on either employment or 
residency, or to tax based schemes with or without means testing, into which the 
principles on solidarity and state responsibility are automatically incorporated. 
Th e need for fl exibility in order to make it possible for more countries to ratify 
the standards and to anticipate to new developments in social security, has meant 
that private schemes, and even voluntary (private) schemes, are not excluded 
from the scope of the conventions. Especially given the current period of 
economic constraint and the strong belief in the competitive power of the market 
economy, this fl exibility proves its value: where the public schemes are not 
suffi  cient (any longer) to fulfi l the international obligations, private provisions 
can be taken into account, providing that the principles on solidarity and state 
responsibility are respected. In fact, the international standards accommodate a 
compromise between privatisation and solidarity, which can be particularly 
valuable in a neoliberal political climate bringing about a diminution of state 
responsibility for social risks. In spite of this, the confl icting natures of 
privatisation and solidarity do not make it easy to capitalise on this. Th e 
necessary role of the state as the ultimate guarantor of the benefi ts (in whatever 
way) and the required participation of persons protected in the management of 
the scheme concerned do not fi t very well with the concept of privatisation. 
Although possible, the design of a private scheme that meets the requirements of 
the international standards is a complicated matter that needs careful 
consideration.
6.2.4 SUITABLE EMPLOYMENT VERSUS EU ACTIVE 
LABOUR MARKET POLICY
Another observed tension with the international standards concerns the concept 
of a suitable job in the Czech Republic.43 According to Convention 102 and the 
European Code, the contingency to be covered by an unemployment benefi t is 
defi ned as suspension of earnings due to inability to obtain suitable employment. 
In relation to the concept of suitable employment, the Committee of Ministers 
supervising the application of the European Code has questioned its defi nition 
in the Czech Employment Act. Although the Code does not provide for an 
43 See sections 3.7.2 and 3.7.6.
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explanation of the term ‘suitable’ in this context, the preparatory documents of 
Convention 102, and several direct requests of the CEACR, shed light on this 
matter.44 Th e documents make clear that at least during the fi rst 13 weeks of 
unemployment, jobs should be off ered with due regard to the skills, qualifi cations, 
acquired experience and length of service of the jobseeker. In contrast to this 
interpretation, the Czech law does not take into account all these features, but 
only requires the jobseeker’s state of health to be in accordance with the job. 
Although it has been stated at the Ministry of Social Aff airs that the Czech 
Labour Offi  ces do consider the qualifi cations and experience of the person 
concerned in practice, the law gives room for deviation and for the development 
of a more restrictive policy.
Since the restriction of unemployment benefi ts is a topical issue in many 
countries, it is good to put the Czech case into a broader context. In view of 
fi nancial challenges, an ageing population, and the advent of neoliberal policy, 
pro-active employment strategies have been developed within the European 
Union.45 In line with these strategies, EU Member States have broadly adopted 
activation policies, including the ‘Work First’ model, based on the idea that any 
job is better than none to improve the sustainability of their social security 
systems. As a result, entitlement to unemployment benefi ts has been made more 
and more conditional upon the willingness to work, even regardless of skills, 
qualifi cations, professional experience or personal circumstance.46 In a way, this 
policy changes the risks and burden of an unstable labour market with high 
unemployment rates from a collective risk to a risk of the individual jobseeker 
for the greater part. What is more, there is a tension between this work-fi rst 
approach and the right to work as laid down in human rights instruments, such 
as the Universal Declaration of Human rights, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the European Social Charter, which 
include the right of everyone to decide freely to accept or choose work.47 Th e 
European Committee of Social Rights has made several critical comments in 
relation to the suspension or withdrawal of a benefi t aft er the refusal of a job by 
the benefi ciary on the basis of both Article 1 (the right to work) and Article 12 
(the right to social security) of the Social Charter.48 For instance, it has been 
concluded that an obligation to accept any reasonable job from the occurrence of 
44 See sections 2.11.1 and 3.7.6.
45 See, for instance, Jobs, Jobs, Jobs, Creating More Employment in Europe, Report of the 
Employment Taskforce Chaired by Wim Kok, November 2003.
46 An exponent of such policy is the ‘work fi rst’ model as applied in the USA and also in the UK, 
assuming that any job is a good job, and that the best way to succeed in the labour market is 
to join it; see, for instance, Bruttel & Sol 2006.
47 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 23 para.1; ICESCR, Art. 6; CESCR 2005, para. 
6; ESC, Art. 1 (2). See also Vandenhole 2006, p. 8.
48 For instance, concerning Denmark (ESC Conclusions 2004), Belgium (ESC Conclusions 
2004), Czech Republic (ESC Conclusions 2004), Norway (ESCR Conclusions 2006) and 
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unemployment does ‘undermine the adequate coverage of the unemployment 
risk for which every worker has contributed during his working activity.’49 It 
appears that the comments of the Committee of Ministers on the Czech 
regulations follow this approach.
At the same time, the freedom to work must be considered in light of the 
principles of proportionality and necessity. Th is implies that the right to freely 
accept or choose work is not an absolute right, but that it cannot go hand in hand 
with unreasonable limitations.50 It must be stressed that neither the European 
Committee of Social Rights, nor the ILO Committee of Experts, oppose active 
employment strategies as such. In fact, the ILO has developed active labour 
market policies as well, with the objective of removing disincentives to job 
creation and job seeking.51 However, the conventions draw the boundaries of 
these policies by prescribing an initial period of at least 13 weeks, during which 
the jobseeker is not obliged to accept any unsuitable job. If the job off ered does 
not accord with the skills, qualifi cations, acquired experience and length of 
service of the jobseeker, the jobseeker may decline the off er without losing the 
right to unemployment benefi t. Th ese boundaries should be respected while 
giving eff ect to active labour market policies. Th at this does not necessarily 
hinder employment participation, may be demonstrated by the Estonian case, 
where the law is in accordance with the European Code on this point, and where, 
at the same time, the employment rate was among the highest ten countries 
within the European Union in 2007 (before the economic recession).52 Th e fact 
that the Estonian defi nition of suitable employment is neatly connected to the 
ILO vision can be explained by the strong infl uence of the ILO on Estonian 
labour law in the 1990s and the benchmark function of the Code as discussed 
above.
6.2.5 FLEXIBILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS: 
A COMPROMISE
ILO conventions are meant to be accepted and applied all around the globe. 
Th erefore, they have to be designed in such a way that they are within reach of 
developed as well as developing countries. Moreover, they have to withstand the 
test of time and changing social values. Considering the facts that countries such 
Cyprus (ESCR Conclusions 2004). See also CEACR: Individual Direct Request concerning 
C102 (Denmark) 2005.
49 ESCR Conclusions (Denmark) 2006, under Art. 12.
50 See also Ashiakbor 2005.
51 ILO Committee on Employment and Social Policy, Geneva, March 2003, Doc. GB.286/
ESP/1(Rev.).
52 Eurostat, Employment Rates.
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as Peru and Brazil, as well as Denmark and Japan, have ratifi ed Convention 102, 
and that almost 60 years aft er its adoption still new ratifi cations take place, it 
may be concluded that the objective of designing a fl exible instrument has been 
achieved, at least for the most part. Th is achievement is even more remarkable 
since Convention 102 contains concrete norms for a wide range of social security 
benefi ts. Although a set of strict legal norms with a high degree of fl exibility 
seems self-contradictory, in this Convention these two features are indeed 
combined.
Th e norms are fl exible in multiple respect.53 In the fi rst place, a state that ratifi es 
the convention has to accept the general parts, but is not obliged to include all 
nine social security branches in its ratifi cation. Ratifi cation of other branches 
may take place at a later stage, according to the socio-economic situation in the 
country in question. Th e Czech Republic and Estonia have used this fl exible 
feature by leaving aside the part on employment injury benefi t that could be met 
in neither of the countries. Th e Convention also provides for fl exibility with 
regard to the type of schemes, since the given norms can be reached through 
universal schemes, social insurance schemes with earnings-related or fl at rate 
components, or both, through social assistance schemes, or even through private 
and voluntary schemes. Th is has made it possible for the Czech Republic and 
Estonia to ratify the standards on the basis of Bismarckian type of insurance 
schemes (for example, the pension schemes), as well as universal schemes (for 
example, the Czech health care scheme). Additionally, as discussed in section 
6.2.3, it is possible to include private pension schemes and other private elements. 
Furthermore, the levels of the benefi ts are fi xed at a percentage of national average 
wages, which, of course, vary by country. Th is makes it possible for countries 
with lower gross domestic income, such as Estonia and the Czech Republic, to 
meet the fi xed level of benefi ts as much as the richer EU Member States.
Th en, there is a choice regarding the personal coverage of the schemes. For most 
branches, a Member can choose to protect 50 percent of all employees, or 
economically active persons constituting at least 20 percent of all residents, or all 
residents whose means do not exceed prescribed limits. Since in both countries 
employees as well as self-employed persons are covered by several insurance 
schemes, these diff erent options are indeed used. In relation to maternity and 
family benefi ts, the fl exibility has been shown to fall short: the last option of 
coverage of all residents is left  out, which constitutes a problem with the 
application of these parts of the conventions.54 It can be argued that leaving out 
53 See section 2.4.
54 See sections 2.14.2 and 2.15.2; For a discussion of the problems with the part on maternity 
benefi ts, see section 6.2.2 concerning derived rights in both countries; for family benefi ts see 
section 3.10.5 concerning the income related child benefi t in the Czech Republic.
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this option is not just an omission, but is based on the idea that the application of 
a means test does not coincide with the need and nature of the particular risk. A 
means test in relation to family benefi t, as applied in the Czech Republic benefi t, 
demonstrates the value of this underlying argument, since even the Czech 
‘standard benefi ciary’ does not qualify for child benefi t. Th is way, the benefi t may 
overshoot its purpose. In any case, it has been established that the child benefi t 
in the Czech Republic and health insurance in both countries do not connect 
with the two available options for personal coverage, as provided in the 
conventions.
Another form of fl exibility is the absence of defi nitions concerning frequently 
used vague concepts, such as a ‘qualifying period as may be considered necessary 
to preclude abuse’, ‘suitable employment’, benefi ts shall be ‘borne collectively […] 
in a manner which avoids hardship to persons of small means’, or ‘the Member 
shall accept general responsibility for the due provision of the benefi ts.’ As 
discussed in Chapter 2, for many norms, no consensus could be reached because 
of the diff ering opinions and practices in the countries involved with the draft ing 
of Convention 102. All these undefi ned terms give great discretionary power at 
the national level, which obviously adds to the fl exibility of the instrument, 
because changing customs and values can be refl ected in the interpretation of 
the norms. At the same time, there is also a risk that the actual norms are watered 
down by their vagueness. Th e country studies make the reality of this risk 
apparent at several points. For example, the Estonian defi nition of the term 
‘widow’ for the purpose of survivors’ benefi t has been questioned by the 
supervising committee, and the interpretation of ‘suitable employment’ in the 
Czech Republic has been deemed too strict. Furthermore, it is hard to assess 
when there is an instance of hardship. For example, it is diffi  cult to establish 
whether the out-of-pocket payments for medical care in Estonia do actually 
cause hardship, although it aff ects access to health care for low-income 
households. In these cases, the vagueness of the international provisions detracts 
from eff ective protection. It is up to the supervising bodies to monitor the proper 
application of the provisions at stake and give substance to the undefi ned 
norms.55
Taking all this into account, it can be concluded that in Convention 102 a certain 
balance has been struck between the provision of concrete norms on the one 
hand, and the creation of suffi  cient fl exibility on the other. At some point, the 
fl exibility may water down the eff ectiveness of the norms, however less fl exibility 
would bring about (even) fewer ratifi cations. At the same time, greater fl exibility 
with wider options and more undefi ned terms would imply (even) less eff ective 
standards.
55 See section 6.3.3.
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6.2.6 CONCLUSIONS
Aft er the foregoing discussions on the diff erent problems with the international 
standards in relation to modern developments in social security, an answer 
should be formulated as to their durability and adaptability. It has become clear 
that the conventions are outdated at specifi c points indeed. Th e male breadwinner 
concept is not in tune with our current socio-economic reality, and has a 
discriminatory side-eff ect in relation to survivors’ benefi ts. Th e assumption of a 
standard benefi ciary having two children is also not in line with the current 
situation, resulting in slightly lower benefi ts than intended by the standards. 
Additionally, the requirement of derived rights in relation to several benefi ts is 
problematic in view of the general tendency towards the individualisation of 
social security rights. Th e study shows that most of these points do not cause 
(signifi cant) application problems in practice. In fact, abandoning the male 
breadwinner concept in relation to the calculation of benefi ts would bring about 
lower minimum benefi ts. Th e most important problem is that the outdated 
concepts damage the credibility and popularity of the international standards.
It must be kept in mind, however, that the male breadwinner model is only 
problematic in the developed countries, with a high participation of women in 
the (formal) labour market and low birth rates. In developing countries and 
emerging economies this model is still relevant as it contributes to the protection 
of women, and therefore also of children. Since women and children are most 
oft en exposed to poverty in less developed countries, they need better protection. 
Deleting the breadwinner model in the international standards would involve 
less social protection for those vulnerable groups worldwide.
As regards the widespread privatisation measures, it has been established that 
the international standards leave room for such methods of fi nancing. Th e fact 
that the standards set out restrictions regarding the shift  from public to private 
responsibility for the provision of the benefi ts does not relate to their (in)
adaptability to modern developments, but rather to the principles on solidarity 
and state responsibility, upon which the standards are based. It could be 
questioned, of course, whether these principles are still a prerequisite for social 
security. However, this is a fundamental question that does not apply more to the 
present time than it did 60 years ago when Convention 102 was adopted. On the 
contrary, in view of the free market economy and increasing diff erences between 
rich and poor, and considering the ageing population within the European 
Union, solidarity and state responsibility may even have gained in importance 
when it comes to social protection of those who are not able to deal with the hard 
rules of the free market.
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Th e diff erent fl exibility clauses in the conventions not only make it possible for 
them to be applied in diff erent types of welfare states (for example, in terms of 
Esping Andersen,56 either conservative or liberal), but they also leave room for 
diff erent stages of development of social security systems. Th e use of certain open 
norms and the discretionary power given to the Member States provide for 
fl exibility with regard to the interpretation of the norms, in which new trends 
may be refl ected. It is the task of the supervising committees to monitor this 
process and to prevent vague norms from losing value.
Th us, on the basis of the country studies, it can be concluded that the 
international standards retain their applicability in a changing society with new 
developments in the fi eld of social security. Furthermore, they are still suitable to 
contribute to the protection against vulnerability and contingency, not only by 
setting out minimum norms, but also by safeguarding a minimum extent of 
solidarity and redistribution. At the same time, it must be recognised that the 
use of certain outdated concepts causes some application problems, slightly 
erodes the norms at one point, and certainly does not contribute to the popularity 
of the conventions in the developed world.
6.3 ARE INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY 
STANDARDS EFFECTIVE LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS?
6.3.1 INTRODUCTION
Th ere is no doubt that ratifi ed ILO social security conventions, as well as the 
European Code of Social Security, are hard legal instruments, imposing legally 
binding obligations on Member States. At the same time, their soft  character 
cannot be denied either. Aft er all, the creation and content of international law 
basically rests on ‘the consent to be bound.’57 Participation is voluntary, and 
observance of the social security conventions cannot be enforced in the end, due 
to the absence of a (functioning) court and to the possibility of denouncing 
ratifi cations. Hepple paraphrases this controversy by referring to social rights as 
‘paper tigers, fi erce in appearance but missing in tooth and claw.’58 In the 
following sections, it will be discussed whether tooth and claw are indeed 
missing from the international (section 6.3.2), as well as the national (section 
6.3.3), perspective. In section 6.3.4 the legal power of the treaties will then be 
assessed.
56 Esping Anderson 1990.
57 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Arts. 9–18.
58 Hepple 2002, p. 238.
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6.3.2 THE SOFT LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
Th e fi rst feature responsible for the soft  character of binding international social 
security instruments is the absence of a court and consequently the lack of hard 
sanctions in cases of infringement.59 Th e supervising committees may express 
their ‘deep concern’ aft er many years of inconsistency, but that is as far as they 
actually go. It is exactly this soft  way of sanctioning that creates the image of 
paper tigers. Th is has to be put into perspective though, since the application of, 
and compliance with, international law is a complicated matter in general, and 
the enforcement of social rights in particular.60 For example, a sanction imposed 
by the European Court of Human Rights does not always eff ectively solve the 
problem either, as it can take many years before the state concerned takes proper 
action. More importantly however, this study shows that the international 
standards are taken seriously even without the threat of sanctions. Aft er 
ratifi cation, in both countries the instruments are treated as binding law, and 
their legal power has not been up for discussion. In the Czech Republic, this has 
been underlined, for example, by instantly repairing the gap between the norm 
of Convention 128 and the actual level of the pensions in 2004, and in Estonia by 
extending health insurance to pregnant women from the moment the pregnancy 
is established in 2009. At the same time, there are issues that have not been solved 
even aft er several requests of the supervising committee, such as the excessively 
strict interpretation of the term ‘widow’ in Estonia. In these cases, the supervising 
committee cannot do more than to refer repeatedly to these issues and request 
the government to take appropriate action.
Th e absence of a court has also consequences for the interpretation of the 
standards. Where a court provides case law as a basis for interpretation, the 
supervising committees of the ILO and the Council of Europe do not have such a 
clear competence at this point.61 Th eir conclusions do not refer to previous 
conclusions or formulate general rules, but apply to the specifi c case under review 
only. It must be added in this respect that the CEACR sometimes formulates an 
‘interpretation’, in which it expresses its opinion on issues of general interest. Yet, 
these interpretations are hardly known or used, at least in the two studied 
countries. As such, due to their limited competence, the supervising committees 
59 As mentioned in section 2.8, according to the ILO Constitution, disputes can be brought 
before the International Court of Justice of Th e Hague, but this possibility is not called upon 
in practice.
60 For a discussion on the supervision and enforcement of international social security 
standards, see Korda & Pennings 2008; Dijkhoff  & Pennings 2007, pp. 151–155; Gomez 
Heredero 2007, pp. 56–58; Hepple 2002, pp. 238–257.
61 Korda & Pennings 2008, pp. 137–139; For an in-depth study on interpretation matters, see 
Pennings 2007A.
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only play a modest role in the clarifi cation of vague terms or ambiguous 
provision. Th is lack of authoritative interpretations at the international level can 
certainly be considered a drawback of the supervision procedure. How, for 
instance, should the Estonian government know the exact meaning and scope of 
‘a widow being capable of self-support’, or ‘so designed as to avoid hardship’? 
Th ere is no binding case law to turn to, which makes it diffi  cult to implement the 
standards in a correct way on the one hand and easy to water down their 
protecting value on the other.
Th e second soft  feature is the possibility of denouncing a treaty, or parts of it, 
every fi ve (CoE) or ten (ILO) years aft er it has entered into force for the country 
concerned. Th is means that a commitment towards standards is not necessarily 
forever. In the case of a changing situation or policy, if a government fi nds the 
treaty obligations too burdensome, it can free itself from its commitment. Still, it 
must be acknowledged that states do not easily withdraw from international 
obligations in view of the loss of face involved. In fact, none of the normative 
social security instruments of the ILO and the Council of Europe have ever been 
annulled by any state, and so far, only once has a state denounced a single part of 
such a treaty.62
Th e positive side of missing teeth, which may even counteract its drawbacks, 
must not be overlooked. Th is concerns the underlying idea of ‘consent to be 
bound.’ Th e facts that no hard sanctions are to be feared and that there is always 
the escape of denunciation, make it easier for states to take on commitments. 
Why are EU Member States, to date, unwilling to incorporate minimum social 
security standards into the EU acquis, while, at the same time, accepting the 
standards of the ILO and Council of Europe? Precisely because of the looser tie 
and the emergency exit of denunciation. Simultaneously, if a state voluntarily 
accepts certain standards, it will also be inclined to accept the observations of 
the supervising bodies. Th e two country studies can be considered exemplary on 
this point, as they show that the comments are taken seriously, and that 
established frictions have been solved in most cases so far.
62 Th e Netherlands denounced Part VI of the European Code of Social Security in 2009. 
Simultaneously, it ratifi ed the Revised European Code, obviously to show its good intentions. 
Th is act did not have any direct consequences since the Revised Code needs another 
ratifi cation to become eff ective. It must be noted that non-normative social security 
conventions have been subject to more denunciations, namely, Convention 48 on Maintenance 
of Migrants’ Pension Rights (1935) has been denounced by four countries (among which is 
the Netherlands), and Convention 118 on Equality of Treatment (Social Security) (1962) was 
denounced by the Netherlands in 2004. Whether denunciation of treaties is considered 
necessary also depends on whether national courts ascribe direct eff ect to international 
provisions.
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6.3.3 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS IN THE NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
Binding legal instruments with limited impact
Th e actual eff ect of an international legal instrument does not only depend on 
how it is used by policy makers, but also on its status within the national legal 
order. An instrument that is not recognised as a binding source of law within the 
country will be used as a permissive guideline only. According to the 
constitutions of both the Czech Republic and Estonia, international agreements 
accepted by Parliament are part of the national legal order and take precedence 
over national law.63 In both countries, ILO conventions and the treaties of the 
Council of Europe are subject to approval by Parliament for their ratifi cation, 
and are therefore binding instruments with a higher rank than national 
legislation. Accordingly, the public bodies, either legislative or executive, have to 
act in conformity with these instruments, and judges have the power as well as 
the obligation to assess their application and to take them into account in their 
opinions and decisions.
Indeed, ILO conventions and Council of Europe instruments are used in court 
proceedings in both countries, however this concerns treaties other than those 
on social security. Neither the social security conventions of the ILO, nor the 
European Code of Social Security, have been subject to any attention in actual 
cases in the two countries.64 Th is can be explained fi rstly by the fact that people 
do not easily go to court for social security disputes. In the Czech Republic this 
is mainly due to distrust in judiciary in general, and in Estonia to the extremely 
formal requirements involved in taking a social security matter to court and the 
related high costs. Secondly, the European Code and the ILO social security 
conventions are not well known, either by judges, or by other lawyers.65 
Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that the transition from socialism to 
democracy meant that an independent judiciary had to be built up from scratch, 
and that knowledge of, and experience with, international law was totally absent. 
It may be expected that judicial practice on this point may change over time, 
under pressure of globalisation.
Comparing judicial practice in the two countries, it becomes clear that the Czech 
judiciary is much more burdened with the socialist legacy of textual positivism 
63 See sections 3.4.3 and 4.4.3.
64 See sections 3.4.5 and 4.4.5.
65 Virginia Leary thoroughly examined this issue thirty years ago, and raised the problem that 
provisions of ratifi ed conventions which have the force of law in a national system oft en 
remain unknown to judges, administrators, and individuals, Leary 1982, pp. 137–149, 168. 
From the country studies is appears that the situation has not changed a lot since.
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and formalism than is the case in Estonia. Th is has as a consequence that Czech 
judges generally stick to domestic law for their decisions, rather than also 
considering applicable international law.66 At the same time, the Constitutional 
Court tries to change the guarding attitude of lawyers towards all sources of law 
other than written domestic law, and makes use of international law more oft en. 
It is typical of Estonia, who has shaken off  the Soviet legacy as much as possible, 
that judges are more open-minded towards new ways of judicial construction 
and interpretation of law. However, in Estonia international law is also not being 
used systematically, but almost exclusively to substantiate arguments that are 
primarily based on the Constitution. Th is selective approach means that 
international law is not taken into consideration if it could generate opposing or 
undesired arguments. Furthermore, if international law is taken into account, it 
mostly concerns a human rights treaty, such as the European Convention of 
Human Rights or the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Th e position of international ‘case law’
Considering the cautious approach towards international instruments as national 
sources of law in the Czech Republic, it is not surprising that the case law of 
international courts and decisions of supervising bodies are considered with 
even more aversion. As a matter of fact, only the Constitutional Court 
occasionally takes into account case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
in its preparation of judgments, but this practice is criticised by lawyers in 
general, and is not copied by the lower courts.67 Th e indisposition towards 
decisions of an international court fi nds even more expression when it comes to 
the opinions of the supervising bodies of the ILO and the Council of Europe, 
operating outside the framework of an institutionalised court. Indeed, it was 
shown that in a case concerning the right to strike in which the complaint was 
partially based on decisions of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, 
the Constitutional Court argued that although these positions may be used by 
the Court as an inspiration for comparative argumentation, they can ‘in no way 
be a referential norm.’ A bit less averse is the attitude of the Estonian Supreme 
Court, who regularly uses judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 
and on rare occasions, also opinions of other supervising bodies. For instance, 
the Court referred to a recommendation of the Committee of Ministers 
recognising that although it is not a legally binding document, it is an appropriate 
tool for interpreting the Constitution.68
66 Th is does not include legislation of the European Union, which holds a diff erent position 
within the legal order and which is more accepted and well-known.
67 See section 3.4.6.
68 See section 4.4.6.
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Direct applicability of the international standards
So far, the social security instruments have never been invoked before a court in 
either of the two countries, but this is not a matter of principle. As a matter of 
fact, in both countries the constitutional framework gives room for direct 
applicability. Th e question may be raised as to whether it would be desirable for 
citizens to invoke the social security conventions before courts. Th is matter can 
be viewed from diff erent perspectives. First of all, it must be acknowledged that 
such practice would certainly strengthen the legal power of these instruments. 
Of course, fi rst, some obstacles need to be overcome by a national judge in such a 
case, namely, the issue of whether or not the invoked provision must be attributed 
direct eff ect and if so, the provision must be correctly interpreted.69 However, if 
these obstacles were tackled, the application of the instrument in a specifi c case 
(by the national court in last instance) could have a substantial impact on social 
security in practice. For example, a pregnant woman in the Czech Republic who 
has to pay a fi xed fee during her pregnancy-related stay in hospital could go to 
court on the basis of the European Code, which prohibits cost-sharing for 
medical care in the case of pregnancy and confi nement. If, in the end, the 
Constitutional Court ascribed direct eff ect to the invoked provision and decided 
that levying such fees is in confl ict with the Code, the government would be 
compelled to abolish the fees and bring the national law in compliance with the 
international instrument. Th is would do justice to the special focus on maternity 
protection in several treaties. Moreover, it would demonstrate the hard legal 
character of the European Code and make the government more alert to the 
observance of international obligations in the fi eld of social security.
Yet, there is another side to this, which already has been touched upon in the 
previous section, and that can be explained best on the basis of an example from 
the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, the European Code, as well as ILO social 
security conventions, have been invoked before court several times.70 In one 
case, the court, aft er awarding direct eff ect to the provision at stake, found that 
the Dutch law was in confl ict with Part VI of the Code.71 Th e government was 
compelled by this decision to bring the law in accordance with the Code. 
However, the measure that was taken did not involve a change in national law, 
but resulted in the denunciation of Part VI of the European Code in 2009. Th is 
is, of course, not an appropriate outcome of the invocation of an international 
69 For more information on this issue, see Dijkhoff  & Pennings 2007, pp. 166–172.
70 Pennings 2006B; Pennings 2007A.
71 Central Appeals Court (Netherlands) 8 September 2006 concerning the issue of cost-sharing 
in relation to the European Code of Social Security Part VI on Employment Injury. For a 
detailed discussion of this case, see De Vries 2007, pp. 93–96; Gomez Heredero 2007, pp. 61; 
Pennings 2007B, pp. 19–20. For an English translation of the case, see Pennings 2007A, pp. 
253–258.
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provision, and it confi rms their weakness in legal terms as discussed in section 
6.3.2. In fact, neither at the international, nor at the national level can these 
instruments eventually be considered hard law.
6.3.4 CONCLUSIONS
What can be concluded as regards the alleged toothlessness of international 
social security standards? At least, I think it is fair to put this issue into 
perspective. Th e soft  character follows from the nature of international law, 
existing merely by the grace of the consent of the contracting parties to be bound. 
Willingness to take part in an agreement brings about willingness to observe the 
standards and to take into account the outcomes of a supervision procedure. 
Only in exceptional cases do states withdraw from their obligations. At the same 
time, the soft  character of the treaties has a great advantage, namely, that it does 
entice governments to take on international commitments. When it comes to the 
legal eff ectiveness of the standards through national courts, there is much to 
gain. Although in the studied countries the treaties are binding law and take 
precedence over national law, as yet none of the social security instruments have 
been invoked before a court, and judges have a guarded attitude towards 
international law in general.
All in all, from a legal point of view the conventions are rather weak indeed. 
Infringements of the standards remain unsanctioned at the international level 
and national courts are, as yet, reluctant to accept the consequences from the legal 
status of the instruments. However, it is precisely this soft  legal character that 
makes them strong from the policy perspective. Where social security standards 
are barred from the EU acquis, they are accepted at the international level.
6.4 DO THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
CONTRIBUTE TO SOCIAL PROTECTION 
FOR ALL?
6.4.1 INTRODUCTION
One of the points of criticism, as refl ected in section 1.1.4, is that the social 
security conventions, in contrast with their objective, do not contribute to social 
security protection for everyone. Th is criticism has two dimensions. First, it 
questions whether the benefi ts as defi ned by the conventions provide a suffi  cient 
level of social protection, or, in other words, whether they indeed contribute to a 
rise in standards of living. Secondly, it refl ects doubts on whether the conventions 
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lead to protection for everyone, which is connected, not to the level of the 
benefi ts, but to the personal scope of the standards. In the following two sections, 
these diff erent dimensions will be examined on the basis of the country studies. 
Th en, in section 6.4.4, the role of the European Social Charter in this respect will 
be discussed, and in section 6.4.5 some conclusions will be drawn on the question 
of whether the conventions contribute to social security protection for all.
6.4.2 THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND THE 
RAISING OF STANDARDS OF LIVING
In the country studies several diffi  culties with the international standards have 
become visible in relation to the level of the benefi ts. Th is is not very surprising, 
considering that due to the transition from a centrally planned to a free-market 
economy all post-socialist states had to overcome major economic challenges. 
Even where the Czech government initially considered the standards rather low 
compared to the specifi ed benefi ts, in the course of the years some benefi ts 
approached or even surpassed the danger zone of the minimum norms, in 
particular, the old-age pensions.72 At the same time, it has been established that 
owing to the benchmark and preserving functions of the international standards, 
the benefi ts in the two countries meet the required standards for most 
contingencies, and that the levels of several benefi ts would have been lower if the 
international standards had not been ratifi ed.
An important question relating to the level of the benefi ts is whether compliance 
with the social security conventions guarantees a suffi  cient level of social 
protection.73 It seems relevant in this respect to look at the ‘at-risk-of-poverty’ 
rates of the two studied countries, since one would expect that compliance with 
the standards would protect against poverty. However, statistics show that the 
Czech Republic scored the lowest ‘at-risk-of-poverty’ rate within the European 
Union in 2008, also among the elderly, while Estonia belonged to the group of 
countries with the highest poverty rates,74 in spite of the fact that the benefi ts in 
Estonia met the requirements of the European Code, while in the Czech Republic 
the old-age pensions fell just below the prescribed level. Th is indicates that a 
direct link between poverty and (non)compliance with the international 
minimum standards cannot be assumed, at least not in all cases. Th e reason for 
the high poverty rate in Estonia can be found in the rate of inequality of income 
distribution in Estonia, while in the Czech Republic this is again the lowest 
72 See section 3.8.6.
73 Lamarche points out in this respect that social security is one way to provide social protection 
and that the need for social protection is answered by all kinds of mechanisms managed by a 
variety of public and private actors. Lamarche 2002, pp. 129–130.
74 Eurostat News Release 10/2010, 18 January 2010, ‘Living conditions in 2008’.
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within the EU.75 Th e Estonian case proves that compliance with the principle of 
solidarity and state responsibility as incorporated in the international standards, 
is no guarantee for income distribution to the extent that it results in a relatively 
low poverty rate. Th us, it may indeed be questioned whether the social security 
conventions are proper instruments combating poverty, or, to put it in the words 
of the Declaration of Philadelphia, to ‘achieve the raising of standards of living’ 
and to ‘provide a basic income to all in need of such protection.’76
6.4.3 THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND SOCIAL 
SECURITY PROTECTION FOR EVERYONE
Th e fact that a high poverty rate can go together with a proper application of the 
international standards rather follows from the norms for personal coverage of 
the schemes. According to the conventions, if an insurance scheme is based on 
employment, only 50 percent of all employees have to be covered, or 20 percent 
of all residents. Th is means that the part of the population not covered can fall 
into poverty without confl icting with the international standards. Both in the 
Czech Republic and Estonia, most insurance schemes cover all employees and 
self-employed persons. Persons who are (or were) not economically active cannot 
rely on the protection provided by the conventions. For them, it is dependent on 
other factors whether or not they fall into poverty, such as the support of family 
members, community provisions, and the social safety net provided by the 
government.
Here, the normative approach of the conventions takes its toll. Th ese instruments 
defi ne the specifi c legal obligations of the committed States necessary in order to 
realise the right to social security. Such ‘perfect obligations’ are necessary to 
make the prescribed right a reality, therefore they need to be fully realisable in 
practice. Th e fact that the social security standards have to be fully achievable 
requires a compromise: the norms must be low enough so as to be within reach 
of all interested states. As a consequence, the value of the international standards 
as perfect legal obligations to be fully realised has a disadvantage at the same 
time, namely, that they have to be low enough to be practicable. Th e human 
rights approach, on the other hand, is less curtailed by a demand for practicability. 
Th is approach starts from a generally addressed claim to social security for 
everyone that does not necessarily have to be fully realised.77 Rather, the claim 
holds an ethical statement that draws attention to the need for fulfi lment of the 
75 Eurostat table ‘Inequality of income distribution’.
76 Annex to the Constitution of the ILO: Declaration of Philadelphia III (a) and (f).
77 For a discussion of these two approaches, see Sen 1999; Langford 2007, pp. 32–33; Bartolomei 
de la Cruz, Potobsky, Swepston 1994, pp. 127–129.
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right to social security, and allows for an ambitious goal to be progressively 
realised. In fact, this approach is also incorporated into the ILO Income Security 
Recommendation No. 67, a precursor of ILO Convention 102.78
Th e limitations of the normative approach, resulting in the so-called ‘coverage 
gap’, has also been acknowledged by the ILO.79 As a response to this gap, it 
launched the ‘Global Campaign on Social Security and Coverage for all’ in 2003. 
Furthermore, the possibility of developing a new Convention to complement the 
existing social security instruments has been explored. Th is Convention would 
have the character of a human rights instrument, not containing concrete 
norms, but providing for a universal right to a basic benefi t package for 
everyone.80 Furthermore, it would be designed in such way as to serve as a tool 
for the progressive application of Convention 102. For the European region, 
however, a useful instrument that already serves such a complementing role is 
the European Social Charter. Its complementary function is threefold, fi rst, in 
relation to the personal coverage, secondly, in relation the level of the benefi ts, 
and thirdly, in relation to a progressive fulfi lment of the universal right to social 
security.
6.4.4 THE COMPLEMENTARY FUNCTION OF THE 
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER
Contrary to Convention 102, in the Social Charter social security and social 
assistance are dealt with separately. Where, under Convention 102, social 
assistance can be used as a form of social security, Article 13 of the Charter 
provides for adequate social assistance as a safety net for ‘any person who is 
without adequate resources and who is unable to secure such resources either by 
his own eff orts or from other sources, in particular by benefi ts under a social 
security scheme.’ In this way, the protection gap under the social security 
instruments is fi lled by the Social Charter.
Th e second way the Charter complements the social security instruments relates 
to the level of the benefi ts. Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Charter obliges 
countries ‘to establish or maintain a system of social security.’ Th e Committee of 
Social Rights has explained in relation to the Estonian case, that this paragraph 
implies:81
78 See section 2.1.1.
79 ILO 2001B, pp. 26–27; ILO 2008, pp. 19–22; Bartolomei de la Cruz 1996, p. 192.
80 ILO 2008, p. 47; Korda (forthcoming), dissertation. As yet, the creation of such a new 
instrument does not appear to be feasible.
81 ESCR Conclusion (Ee) 2006.
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[T]hat social security benefi ts are adequate, which means that […] their level should 
be fi xed such as to amount to reasonable proportion of the previous income and it 
should never fall below the poverty threshold defi ned as 50 percent of median 
equivalised income and as calculated on the basis of the Eurostat at-risk-of-poverty 
threshold value.
Th e diff erence with the European Code and ILO Convention 102 is that the 
Charter links the benefi ts to what is considered the poverty threshold. Th us, 
under the Charter, social security benefi ts must always be subject to a minimum 
level. Moreover, if benefi ts are, nevertheless, below this level, adequate social 
assistance must be available. Th is is complementary to the Code and Convention 
102, providing for social security benefi ts at a fi xed percentage of previous 
income, irrespective their actual level and without the additional condition of a 
safety net.
Th en there is the third complementary function to be mentioned, which is 
phrased in Article 12 paragraph 3, containing an obligation on the Member 
States to ‘endeavour to raise progressively the system of social security to a higher 
level.’ Indeed, this goes further than the preserving function of the normative 
instruments. States not only have to make sure that the prescribed norms 
regarding the diff erent social security branches are continuously met, but they 
also have to work on the extension of their systems – for instance, through 
ratifi cation of the Protocol to the European Code, or the strengthening of the 
safety net. Sticking to the minimum norms is not suffi  cient in view of the Social 
Charter; a progressive fulfi lment of the human right to social security for all 
must be pursued.
Coming back to the Czech Republic and Estonia, it was established above that 
the level of benefi ts is in line with the standards of the European Code for the 
most part. At the same time, it is true that the Committee of Social Rights 
supervising the Social Charter has concluded in relation to both countries that 
the levels of their minimum pensions and unemployment benefi ts are ‘manifestly 
inadequate.’82 In addition, regarding the right to social assistance, the 
Committee has concluded that the minimum benefi ts are inadequate for single 
persons.83 Th e combination of the two instruments with their specifi c 
approaches (normative and universal) that are simultaneously valid, means that 
the governments are being urged to work on the creation and maintenance of a 
social security system providing for income replacement at a prescribed level in 
times of loss of income due to social risks, and at the same time, to provide for 
social assistance as a safety net at a level above the poverty threshold. 
82 ESCR Conclusions (Ee) 2009, Art. 12 (1); ESC Conclusions (Cz) 2009, Art. 12 (1).
83 ESCR Conclusions (Ee) 2009, Art. 13; ESC Conclusions (Cz) 2009, Art. 13.
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Additionally, the Social Charter presses states not to settle for the achieved social 
security provisions, but to continuously develop the system towards a higher 
level of social protection.
6.4.5 CONCLUSIONS
Th e case studies show that the social security conventions have contributed to 
social protection as a result of the diff erent functions they serve. At the same 
time, it has been found that a social security system in compliance with the 
conventions does not necessarily prevent a substantial number of citizens being 
left  unprotected against contingency and vulnerability. Th is is inherent in the 
normative approach of the conventions that involve concrete legal norms to be 
applied in full by countries at diff erent stages of development, and that are not 
focused on objectives to be attained in future. Th e human rights approach, on 
the other hand, involves a commitment towards the realisation of social security 
for everyone. Th is universal approach does not entail a perfect obligation, but a 
general address that draws attention to the right in view of its fulfi lment. A 
combination of these two approaches is necessary to achieve an adequate level of 
social protection to everyone, guaranteeing replacement income as well as 
ensuring a minimum income for everybody through redistribution of wealth. 
For the progressive development of social security in the European region, the 
social security instruments give normative substance to the human right of 
social security on the one hand, and the Social Charter fi lls the gaps that are 
inherent in the normative approach, on the other. Recognition of the 
interdependence of concrete legal norms as set out in the European Code and 
ILO Convention 102 and the human rights approach of the Social Charter is of 
major importance for the fulfi lment of the right to social security for everyone as 
proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
6.5 CONCLUSIONS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
Th e issue this book seeks to address is, at the end of the day, whether the social 
security conventions are eff ective instruments to promote social security at the 
national level. What can be concluded about the eff ectiveness of the conventions? 
Do they, 60 years aft er their creation, still achieve the intended results of:84
– clarity about the substance of the right to social security,
– guidance in the development of national social security systems,
84 See section 1.2.2.
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– promotion of a level playing fi eld in respect of labour costs, and
– in the end, by all these means, promotion of the right to social security for 
everyone?
Or do the observed application problems confi rm that the critics have a point 
and that the standards are weak and obsolete, at least within the European 
context?85 To come to the answer, the four objectives will be subsequently 
reviewed.
Clarity about the substance of the right to social security
Th e study shows that the defi nitions of the diff erent contingencies and the 
prescribed protection during the occurrence of these social risks have proved to 
be time resistant and still applicable. In fact, the social security systems in both 
countries largely coincide with the nine social risks dealt with in ILO Convention 
102 and the European Code, which indicates a general consensus about the 
substance of the right to social security. Moreover, in both countries it was felt 
that a social security system that complied with the Code was a prerequisite to 
fi tting in with the developed European welfare states. Applying the international 
standards, at some points unclear terms and concepts appeared to be subject to 
interpretation problems, which may water down the protecting value of the 
standards at stake. Cases in point are, for example, the terms ‘to avoid hardship’ 
or ‘suitable employment’. Th e use of undefi ned terms in the conventions has been 
found to be a downside of their high fl exibility. Th e supervising committees 
sometimes give a better insight into the meaning of such vague terms through 
their comments and requests. However, the role of the committees in this respect 
is open to improvement in terms of authority, clarity, generality, and publicity.
Guidance in the development of national social security systems
It has been demonstrated by the country studies that the international standards 
are still used as a template for the creation and design of social security systems. 
Th e guiding role of the conventions has been confi rmed by the diff erent functions 
they have served during diff erent stages of development of the systems, as 
discussed in section 5.2. Th e supervision procedures are important instruments 
in this respect, fi rstly because governments are compelled to continuously take 
the international standards into account, and secondly because the supervising 
committees give some guidance on particular issues through their critical 
comments. Th e various fl exibility clauses incorporated into the standards have 
contributed to their guiding capacity in both countries, since they provide 
directions in relation to universal as well as occupational insurance schemes, and 
85 For the points of criticism, see section 1.1.4.
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earnings related as well as fl at rate benefi ts. Th e study has nevertheless disclosed 
that the fl exibility clauses regarding the prescribed personal scope of maternity 
and family benefi t seem to fall short for at least one of the countries. Although 
there may be fundamental reasons behind this, it hampers the application of the 
standards in practice and thus detracts from their steering role.
It has further been described that the conventions give guidance regarding the 
privatisation of social security schemes by providing a set of common principles 
on solidarity and state responsibility to be complied with. However, to date these 
guiding principles have not been followed by either of the countries in relation to 
the private pension scheme, despite the fact that this would solve the problem of 
the pensions falling below the international minimum level.
Th e international standards are based on certain concepts that are considered 
outdated and not refl ecting the current socio-economic reality in developed 
countries, which hampers their guiding role. Th is is particularly so in relation to 
the idea of a male breadwinner and the phenomenon of derived rights for the 
wives of insured men. It has been discussed that these concepts still apply to less 
developed countries and, moreover, that they do not involve an erosion of social 
protection, rather on the contrary, but they do aff ect the popularity and 
accessibility of the international standards.
Promotion of a level playing fi eld in respect of labour costs
Regarding the question of whether the conventions create a level playing fi eld 
indeed, some remarks can be made on the basis of the two country studies. It has 
been shown that since ratifi cation of the diff erent social security conventions, 
both countries have kept their social security systems largely in line with the 
prescribed norms. Additionally, it has been demonstrated that if the countries 
had not accepted the international standards, their social security provisions 
would have been less protective at several points, and their systems would have 
shown larger mutual diff erences in terms of the number of schemes, as well as in 
the levels of benefi ts. Th us, the study confi rms the converging role of the 
international standards and a harmonisation of the social security fl oor.
At the same time, a critical remark can be made concerning the soft  legal 
character of the standards. Th e established minimum fl oor for social security at 
the national level is not as strong as might be necessary or desirable. Although 
the conventions are part of the national legal orders and take precedence over 
national legislation, it has been discussed that in practice there are several escape 
routes allowing countries to pass over the international obligations. In the fi rst 
place, non-compliancy remains unsanctioned, and secondly, ratifi cations can be 
denounced. On the other hand, it has been emphasised that international law is 
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dependent on the consent of contracting parties to be bound by that law, and that 
only in exceptional cases do countries revoke their ratifi cations. Furthermore, in 
spite of the absence of legal sanctions, countries generally comply with the 
accepted standards in order to avoid loss of face in the international arena. In 
fact, it has been indicated that the soft  character of the international standards 
makes them more attractive from a political point of view.
Promotion of the right to social security for everyone
Taking all this in consideration, it can be affi  rmed that the international social 
security standards contribute to social security for everyone, by setting out a 
clear legal framework for national social security systems and by providing a 
defi ned minimum level of protection, the observance of which is continuously 
monitored by the international organisations. In spite of the observed application 
problems, the cases of the Czech Republic and Estonia show that social protection 
has improved on several points because of the commitment to the standards on 
the one hand, and that this commitment has prevented a decline of social 
security provisions, on the other. At the same time, it has been recognised that in 
spite of compliance with the international standards, poverty rates can be high 
because the norms leave room for large sections of the population not being 
covered by the diff erent social security schemes. To combat this coverage gap, 
commitment to the European Social Charter prescribing a progressive fulfi lment 
of the right to social security is additionally necessary.
Imperfect, but eff ective
It has to be concluded that the answer to the last part of the research question, 
namely, what the observed application problems mean for the eff ectiveness of the 
international standards, might not be so straightforward as one would wish, 
since there are diff erent sides to it. For sure, the study has provided proof that in 
present times the international standards indeed contribute to social security, 
both through pushing for more protection, and by preventing a regression. In 
this respect, the two studied cases can be considered exemplary, not only for 
future EU accession states starting from a poor point of departure in a social 
respect, but also for old Member States with more developed social security 
systems that are facing cuts in public expenditure. At the same time, in the study 
several weak points of the conventions have been identifi ed that confi rm stated 
points of criticism and hamper the application of the standards and thus, their 
eff ectiveness.
In the end, the value one would attach to the social security conventions highly 
depends on one’s expectations and perspective. Th e international standards are 
not the one and only answer to insuffi  cient social protection; their application as 
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such does not prevent high poverty rates, and commitment to the norms does 
not make international competition on labour costs disappear like snow in 
summer. What the present treatise shows is that the conventions, in spite of their 
shortcomings at diff erent points, can play, and do play, a part in the development 
of national social security systems and in the establishment of a common social 
security fl oor. Th ey may not be perfect, but they do contribute to national social 
security, and there is a broad consensus on the minimum standards they provide. 
From this perspective, I dare to conclude that despite the observed application 
problems, the conventions are eff ective instruments for promoting the 





Th e Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, was the fi rst 
international instrument recognising the right to social security as a human 
right. Over the course of time, the content of the right evolved, resulting in the 
adoption by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) of Convention 102 on 
Minimum Standards of Social Security in 1952. Th is Convention defi nes the nine 
social risks that were generally accepted at the time. It sets out standards for 
medical care, sickness benefi t, unemployment benefi t, old-age benefi t, 
employment injury benefi t, family benefi t, maternity benefi t, invalidity benefi t, 
and survivors’ benefi t. With the international social security standards, the ILO 
had the objective of promoting the right to social security for everyone, through:
– defi ning the right to social security;
– guiding nations in the creation or reconstruction of their social security 
systems;
– providing a basis for higher standards; and
– preventing (international) commercial competition on the account of 
workers.
ILO Convention 102 is generally considered the fl agship convention pertaining 
to social security. With the adoption of this instrument, the ILO switched from 
its former way of standard setting, focussing on the insurance of specifi c 
categories of workers in specifi c fi elds of industry, to a method that aimed at 
social security for all. Furthermore, on the basis of Convention 102, new 
instruments providing higher standards have been developed, both by the ILO, 
and by the Council of Europe.
Within the context of the European Union, the right to social security is not 
regulated; the design of the national social security systems is left  to the Member 
States, including the determination of the range of risks covered and the level of 
the benefi ts. Yet, in the Treaty of Amsterdam reference was made to the European 
Social Charter, and implicitly to ILO Convention 102, a reference now included 
in the Lisbon Treaty. Th e underlying idea was to provide a guideline for accession 
countries for their social policy and social security legislation. At the same time, 
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the international standards are subject to criticism at various levels. For example, 
they are argued to be out-of-date, lacking the fl exibility needed for adapting 
social security systems to changed economic and societal conditions, not tailored 
to the post-industrial society, discriminatory, prescribing benefi ts that are too 
low for the European context, lacking legal power, and not contributing to social 
protection for all. Th ese contradictory messages highlight the need for in-depth 
research on international social security standards within the context of the 
European Union. Th is book meets this need by providing a systematic study of 
the application of the international social security standards and their eff ect on 
social security legislation in two EU Member States that have been rethinking 
and reconstructing their social security systems over the past two decades. 
Furthermore, with a review of the research results against the background of 
current trends in social security, the study seeks to contribute to the discussion 
about the international social security standards and their possible value for the 
promotion of social security in the EU context.
Th e central question of this study is the following: (a) What is the eff ect of 
international standards on social security legislation in the Czech Republic and 
Estonia, what application problems arise, and (b) what do these problems mean 
for the eff ectiveness of the international standards? Situated within the fi eld of 
social security law, the question implies legal research in two directions. Th e fi rst 
part of the question addresses social security legislation at the national level, 
namely, how the law relates to, and is infl uenced by, international standards. Th e 
eff ect of international standards is assessed on the basis of a comparison of 
national social security law with the international standards. On the basis of the 
fi ndings from the country studies, the second part of the research question 
involves a review of the international social security standards themselves, in 
terms of whether they are suitable and adequate to meet their objectives in 
present day European countries.
Th e structure of the book is as follows. First, in Chapter 2, an analysis of the 
international social security standards is provided to make clear their content 
and meaning. Th e following chapters contain the country studies of the Czech 
Republic and Estonia. Both chapters start with a description of the developments 
in social security aft er the establishment of the new republics, with a focus on 
international infl uences, followed by a systematic comparison of social security 
legislation with the standards as elaborated in Chapter 2. In Chapter 5, 
conclusions are drawn and reviewed from diff erent perspectives on the eff ect of 
international standards on the national social security systems. Finally, Chapter 
6 comprises conclusions and discussions on the applicability and adequacy of the 
international standards in the two countries.
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INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY STANDARDS
ILO Convention 102 is analysed as a starting point for the assessment of national 
legislation. Th e ILO principle of tripartism is one of the important concepts that 
are incorporated into the Convention. Other general features are the diff erent 
fl exibility clauses and the formulation of a set of common principles on solidarity 
and state responsibility that extents to all benefi ts. Furthermore, for each risk, 
the Convention prescribes concrete rules in relation to the material scope, the 
personal scope, the nature, level, and duration of the benefi t, and the qualifying 
conditions. An elaborate supervision system for all ILO instruments, including 
the social security conventions, is fi rmly anchored in the ILO Constitution.
With regard to the material scope, the defi nitions of the nine contingencies are 
generally clear and unambiguous, although at some points they leave room for 
interpretation at the national level. Some terms are especially vague, such as 
‘suitable employment’ or ‘a widow presumed to be incapable of self-support’, 
which makes it diffi  cult to determine the exact scope of the risk concerned.
Th e Convention provides for diff erent options in relation to the personal scope of 
social security schemes, which makes it applicable to countries with diff ering 
welfare system designs. For countries with systems that are based on the 
Bismarckian insurance concept, the option of coverage of categories of employees 
is most expedient, while states with social democratic welfare models may prefer 
the option of coverage of categories of the economically active population, or of 
all residents. Th e possibility in relation to most risks of covering all residents 
subject to a means test is especially useful for liberal welfare states providing 
universal means tested benefi ts as a last resort, when all other resources have 
been exhausted. Although the Convention fi rst and foremost refl ects the 
insurance methods applied in the 1950s, the given options for personal coverage 
are fl exible enough to be applied in the present time as well.
Th e Convention also gives diff erent options regarding the calculation of benefi ts 
in order to assess compliance with the prescribed norms. Th e norms consist of a 
fi xed percentage of wages, which makes them attainable for highly, as well as less 
developed, countries. Th e benefi ts are calculated on the basis of the average wage 
of a ‘standard benefi ciary’, defi ned, in respect of most risks, as a male worker 
with a dependent wife and two children. Th e calculation method varies according 
to the type of scheme, for example, an income related, fl at rate, or universal 
scheme. It must be noted that the diff erent methods of calculation and the 
determination of the wage of a standard benefi ciary are very complex, and 
diffi  cult to perform in practice. However, for a uniform application of the norms, 
and for the supervising bodies to compare the benefi ts provided in the countries 
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with the given norms, a fi xed, but at the same time fl exible, calculation method 
is necessary. Th e duration of the diff erent benefi ts is formulated as ‘throughout 
the contingency’, but may oft en be limited to a prescribed number of days, weeks, 
months, or years, depending on the nature of the risk. Several fl exibility clauses 
have been inserted at this point as well, allowing for a fi xed duration per calendar 
year, or per instance of occurrence of the risk.
Th e qualifying conditions are diff erent for each risk. In general, for short-term 
risks, such as sickness and unemployment, a period of contribution, employment 
or residence may be prescribed that is no longer than necessary to prevent abuse. 
Th e determination of the exact length of such a period is left  to the national 
legislature, and the Convention does not provide much guidance on this point. 
For the long-term risks, for example, old age or invalidity, the Convention sets 
out specifi c maximum periods that may not be exceeded.
THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Th e Velvet Revolution in 1989 marked the end of the Soviet system in 
Czechoslovakia, and the beginning of serious economic and social reforms by 
the socio-liberal federal government. Aft er the split of the Czechoslovakian 
federation in 1993, the initially developed Scenario of Social Reform became 
overshadowed by the political focus on economic progress. Th e reform of the 
social security system turned out to be a slow and lengthy process, not only 
because of economic restraint, but, most importantly, because of the weak 
coalition structure of the subsequent Czech governments and a series of minority 
cabinets. Th e reform steps that were taken were motivated by internal factors, 
such as historical background, demographic changes, and economic and political 
realities for the greater part, but were also infl uenced by international 
organisations.
Th e international infl uence on social security reform mainly came from the ILO, 
the Council of Europe and, at a later stage, the European Union. First of all, 
shortly aft er regaining independence, the federal government strengthened the 
ties with the ILO. Th e ILO was consulted about the Scenario of Social Reform, 
and three social security conventions were ratifi ed (C102, C128, and C130). At 
that point, it was established that the proposed social security benefi ts would 
exceed the standards of the ILO conventions. Some years later, in view of EU 
accession and under pressure from the European Commission to ratify the 
human rights instruments of the Council of Europe, the Czech government 
accepted the Social Charter, which was followed by the ratifi cation of the 
European Code of Social Security in 2004. Over the years, legislation has been 
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kept in line with the Code and the relevant ILO conventions to a large extent. 
When, in 2004, the amount of the pensions dropped below the level set by ILO 
Convention 128, measures were taken to restore compliance within one year. 
Apart from that, in principle, all bills aff ecting social security provisions are 
examined with regard to inconsistencies with the international standards.
In accordance with the Constitution of the Czech Republic, international treaties 
are part of the Czech legal order and take precedence over national law. However, 
there is a lack of clarity about the status of many treaties, which puts the ILO 
social security conventions and the European Code in an unclear position. Th is 
may have contributed to the fact that they have yet to be invoked before a court, 
and that these instruments are hardly used in court proceedings, either as a legal 
basis for complaint, or as a tool for interpretation of national legislation.
Th e comparison of the Czech social security provisions with the accepted 
international standards shows that the Czech Republic complies with these 
standards in most respects. However, several confl icts have been observed as 
well. In respect of the material scope of the diff erent social security schemes, 
there is one problematic issue, namely, concerning unemployment benefi t. It has 
been highlighted by the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations that the interpretation of ‘suitable 
employment’ may be too strict, since the Czech legislation does not take into 
account the qualifi cations and skills of a jobseeker, or the length of their previous 
employment when off ering a job, not even during the fi rst three months of 
unemployment.
Th e personal scope of the diff erent schemes stands out as particularly generous. 
On this point, the Czech regulations generally meet not only the ratifi ed 
standards, but also the higher standards that are not ratifi ed. Still, two remarks 
can be made. Th e fi rst remark is that under the Czech legislation persons are 
insured on an individual basis. Th is sometimes causes a tension with the 
breadwinner concept of the conventions, because in respect of certain risks, it is 
required that the wives of insured persons are covered by their spouseś  
insurance. Th e second remark concerns family benefi ts. Th e European Code 
does not leave room for a means test in relation to family benefi ts, whereas Czech 
child benefi t is only granted to families with an income up to 2.4 times the 
subsistence level. Th us, in spite of the broad personal scope of the schemes in 
general, some confl icts with the international standards still remain.
With regard to the level of the benefi t, the comparison shows several confl icts, 
some of which emerged as a result of economic measures taken in 2009 and 2010. 
Th e old-age pension no longer meets the level of Convention 128, and has even 
fallen below the minimum level of the European Code. Sickness benefi t and child 
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benefi t are just above the level of the ratifi ed instruments, and, in general, the 
level of all benefi ts shows a downward trend. Furthermore, the introduction of 
patient fees for medical services in 2008 has caused a confl ict in relation to 
medical care in the case of pregnancy and childbirth, since under the international 
standards, cost-sharing in the case of maternity medical care is not allowed.
Th e duration of the diff erent benefi ts is largely in line with the ratifi ed standards 
and, in most cases, also with one or more higher standards. However, in two 
cases a minor confl ict with the ratifi ed conventions has come to the fore. Firstly, 
sickness benefi t is granted for a maximum period of one year, which is precisely 
the period required by Convention 130. Under the Czech scheme, if a new case of 
incapacity for work occurs within one year of the fi rst day of the previous sick 
leave, the maximum period of one year for sickness benefi t includes both periods 
of sick leave, whereas Convention 130 requires the benefi t to be paid for one year 
in each case of sickness. A similar problem is mentioned in relation to 
unemployment benefi t, which must be paid for a period of 13 weeks within a 
period of 12 months, according to the Code. In the Czech Republic the benefi t is 
limited to fi ve months within three years, except in the case of an unbroken 
period of employment of at least six months, in which case a new right arises.
Finally, as regards the qualifying conditions required under the Czech social 
security schemes, two confl icts with the international standards have come to the 
fore. First, since the amendments of the Pension Insurance Act of 2010, a reduced 
pension is granted only aft er the completion of 20 years of insurance, whereas 
both the Code and Convention 128 provide for such benefi t to be granted aft er 15 
years of contribution or employment. Secondly, for entitlement to a family 
benefi t, a qualifying period of one year of residence is required for foreigners. 
However, under the Code, only six months of residence may be required.
ESTONIA
Aft er the collapse of the Soviet regime in 1991, the Estonian government 
embarked upon radical economic reform. Th e new free market economy was 
expected to give the people what they had been deprived of under the rule of 
Moscow: wealth and individual freedom. Changes in social security took place 
in the shadow of economic reform, and the protection against social risks was 
not a political priority. Th e strong desire to take part in the European Union led 
to a greater focus on international human rights instruments, including the 
European Social Charter. Aft er having ratifi ed the revised version of the Social 
Charter in 2000, the next step would be the acceptance of the European Code of 
Social Security. In order to meet the standards of the Code, the diff erent parts of 
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the social security system were compared with the standards of this instrument, 
and several adjustments were made, such as an increase in pensions, the 
introduction of a fi xed indexation formula for pensions, and the creation of an 
unemployment insurance scheme. As a result, Estonia was able to undertake a 
generous ratifi cation of the Code in 2004, only leaving aside the part on 
employment injury. None of the ILO social security conventions have been 
accepted. In accordance with the Estonian Constitution, the European Code is 
part of the Estonian legal order and takes precedence over national law. However, 
although several ILO Conventions on labour law, as well as the Social Charter, 
have been invoked before court, the European Code has not played a role in court 
proceedings to date.
Th e comparison of the Estonian social security provisions with the standards 
given in the European Code of Social Security shows that Estonia, by and large, 
complies with these standards. Still, several defi ciencies have come to the fore as 
well. Th ere are a few issues regarding the material scope of the diff erent schemes. 
Firstly, as regards invalidity benefi ts, only total incapacity for work (100 percent) 
gives right to a full invalidity pension, whereas the Code prescribes that such a 
pension must also be provided in the case of incapacity for work to a lesser 
extent, to be prescribed by national regulations. Secondly, the defi nition of 
‘widow’ for eligibility for a survivors’ pension has been found to be too strict by 
the supervising Committee of Ministers.
Th e personal coverage of the diff erent schemes in relation to most of the ratifi ed 
parts – namely, all employees and self-employed persons – exceeds the standards 
of the Code, and complies even with the higher standards of ILO standards, and/
or the Protocol to the Code and the Revised Code. Th ere is one exception, 
namely, in relation to maternity benefi t. According to the international standards, 
the wives of insured spouses should come under their spouse’s insurance for 
medical care, while in Estonia everyone is individually insured. However, 
because all pregnant women have been considered equal to insured persons since 
2009, this confl ict has been resolved in practice.
In respect of the level of the benefi t, there are several issues in relation to the 
European Code. A case in point is the regulation on out-of-pocket payments for 
medical care. According to the Code, cost-sharing is allowed, only if the fi nancial 
burden does not cause hardship, and it is totally prohibited for pregnancy related 
care. It has been shown in the Estonian case that health expenditure accounts for 
an increasing proportion of out-of-pocket payments, which especially aff ects 
low-income households that include pensioners and disabled or chronically ill 
persons. It is questionable, therefore, whether these rules on cost-sharing are in 
line with the Code. Th e obligation for pregnant women, during the fi rst twelve 
weeks of pregnancy, to pay fees for home visits by a family doctor and ambulatory 
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specialist care, which was in confl ict with the Code, was repealed in 2009 in 
response to critical comments by the Committee of Ministers on this point. 
Another point of particular interest in respect of the level of benefi ts is the 
amount of the old-age pension. Although the replacement rate as set by the Code 
was still met in 2007, it has been made clear that it will steadily decrease due to 
the calculation method, and that it will drop below the minimum standard in 
future if no measures are taken.
As regards the duration of the benefi ts, the Estonian provisions are all in line with 
the Code, and, in most cases, also with higher standards. Th e same counts for 
the qualifying conditions, although the qualifying period of fourteen days for 
health insurance, introduced for administrative reasons, is questionable.
THE EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION
Th e country studies show that the international standards have infl uenced the 
social reform processes in both countries in various ways. In fact, during the 
diff erent stages of the reform processes, the standards served diff erent functions. 
Th ey served as a benchmark for the reform and creation of the diff erent social 
security schemes, especially in Estonia. Aft er ratifi cation, they had a preserving 
function, by providing a fi xed minimum level of social security to be respected 
by the legislature, the executive bodies, and the judiciary. Th e international 
standards, with their inherent principles on solidarity and state responsibility, 
also counterbalanced (and may still counterbalance) neoliberal policy aiming at a 
reduction in state responsibility and a shift ing of social risks from public to 
private responsibility. Th e very same principles may serve as a bridge between 
private social security provisions, such as private pension schemes and the ideal 
of solidarity based insurance schemes. Implementation of a private scheme along 
the lines of the prescribed principles on solidarity and state responsibility creates 
a compromise between individual and collective responsibility for social risks. 
Finally, the establishment of a national fl oor for social security, through the 
ratifi cation of the international standards, implies harmonisation of the social 
security systems of all contracting parties – they all share the same fl oor. Th e 
eff ect of the diff erent functions largely depends on national politics, most 
importantly, on how seriously the international obligations are taken.
Th e eff ect of international standards is not only determined by the reach of their 
functions, but it depends fi rst and foremost on their being ratifi ed or not. Several 
obstacles to ratifi cation have come to the fore in both countries: lack of 
knowledge, the level of the benefi ts not being attained, reluctance towards new 
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international obligations, administrative burdens, outdated terminology and 
diff ering political perceptions, and the superfl uousness of Convention 102 next 
to the European Code.
Furthermore, several confl icts of national legislation with the international 
standards have been established. Apparently, on these points the standards have 
not served their functions well, or they are diffi  cult to apply. Th e problematic 
issues are categorised into three clusters. Th e fi rst category of problems can be 
traced back to economic reasons; they emerged over the course of time as a result 
of economic measures. Th e second category involves issues that relate to changed 
societal perceptions since the formulation of the standards in the mid-twentieth 
century. Th e entrance of women into the labour market, the individualisation of 
social rights, and an increasing emphasis on self-responsibility for social risks are 
cases in point. Th e third category contains issues that cannot be connected (on the 
basis of this study) to a specifi c underlying reason, and/or have a technical nature.
Some conclusions on the eff ect of the international standards on national social 
security legislation can be drawn. First, the existing ratifi cation obstacles and 
application problems show that the diff erent functions of the standards fall short 
in some cases. Nevertheless, the country studies show that they still have 
contributed to social protection in both the Czech Republic and Estonia. Th rough 
their diff erent functions, they have impacted on national social security 
legislation in various ways, not least by providing an internationally accepted 
minimum level of social security to be reached and maintained.
In view of the future, it can be concluded that the promotion of the international 
standards within the context of the European Union would not only advance 
national social security legislation, but would also strengthen a common fl oor 
for social security. Th is is particularly relevant in the light of the economic 
downturn and future EU accessions. Promotion of the standards would include 
addressing the obstacles to ratifi cation and solving the observed application 
problems. Paying systematic attention to the norms at the EU level and putting 
pressure on Member States to respect the norms, not only before, but also aft er 
EU accession, would seem to be a prerequisite in this respect.
THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS UNDER 
REVIEW
As shown above, in the two studied countries the international standards are 
being properly applied at many points, and have contributed, and still contribute, 
to social protection. It has also been shown, however, that their functions fall 
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short on certain points, due to various reasons. Several of the observed 
problematic issues relate to the voiced criticism against the international social 
security standards as mentioned in the introduction. Th is prompts a review of 
the international standards in light of the noted controversy, and an assessment 
of whether their objectives are still met, 60 years aft er their creation.
One frequently voiced criticism is that the conventions are outdated and that 
they do not keep up with new developments in social security. Th e country 
studies confi rm that they are indeed out-of-date on specifi c points. Th e male 
breadwinner concept, the standard benefi ciary having two children, and the 
requirements of derived rights for the wives of insured men, do not concur with 
the socio-economic reality of our present day European welfare states. Th ese 
outdated concepts detract from the credibility and popularity of the standards. 
Yet, it must be borne in mind that the conventions are global instruments, and 
that the situation is diff erent in many less developed countries. Moreover, even 
in EU Member states, the wages of men are higher than those of women; taking 
the wage of men as a basis for the calculation of benefi ts stands for better 
protection.
In relation to new developments with regard to the design of social security 
schemes, the study shows that the international standards are fl exible enough to 
be applied in diff erent types of welfare states. Furthermore, they leave room for 
new methods of fi nancing, such as privatisation, while, at the same time, 
safeguarding solidarity and state responsibility to a certain extent. However, the 
implementation of a private scheme in accordance with the international 
standards needs careful consideration and is not easy to accomplish. In fact, they 
have not been used by either of the countries in respect of the privatisation of 
their pension schemes, despite the fact that this would solve the problem of the 
pensions falling below the prescribed minimum level.
As regards the alleged lack of legal power of the international social security 
instruments, several remarks can be made. First, the standards are legally 
binding and part of the national legal order aft er their ratifi cation in both 
countries. Still, in spite of the legal obligation, is has been shown that the 
standards are not respected in all cases, Th is indicates that, from a legal point of 
view, the conventions are rather week indeed. Although the conventions are part 
of the national legal orders and take precedence over national legislation, there 
are several escape routes, allowing countries to get out of the international 
obligations. In the fi rst place, non-compliancy remains unsanctioned, secondly, 
ratifi cations can be denounced, and, thirdly, national judges have, thus far, been 
reluctant to use the standards in court procedures. At the same time, it has been 
found that only in exceptional cases do countries revoke their ratifi cations. 
Furthermore, in spite of the absence of legal sanctions, countries generally 
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comply with the accepted standards in order to avoid loss of face in the 
international arena. In fact, it has been indicated that it is precisely the soft  legal 
character that makes the standards strong from a political perspective.
Th e criticism that the international standards do not achieve social protection 
for all touches, fi rst and foremost, on the prescribed personal scope. According 
to the conventions, if an insurance scheme is based on employment, only 50 
percent of all employees have to be covered, or 20 percent of all resident. Th is 
means that the part of the population not covered can fall into poverty without 
confl icting with the international standards. Th is coverage gap is inherent in the 
normative approach of the instruments. Th is approach involves concrete legal 
norms to be applied in full by countries at diff erent stages of development, and 
does not focused on objectives to be attained in future. It is, rather, the human 
rights approach that involves a commitment towards the realisation of social 
security for everyone. Such a universal approach does not entail a perfect 
obligation, but it generally addresses the right to social protection. A combination 
of these two approaches is necessary to achieve social protection for everyone, 
guaranteeing replacement income, as well as ensuring a minimum income for 
everybody through redistribution of wealth. For the progressive development of 
social security in the European region, the conventions give normative substance 
to the human right of social security on the one hand, and it is the Social Charter 
that fi lls the gaps that are inherent in the normative approach, on the other.
Clear-cut conclusions on the eff ectiveness of the international standards are not 
easy to draw. Do they still achieve their intended objectives, 60 years aft er their 
creation? With regard to the clarity of the substance of the right to social security 
they should provide, the country studies show that the defi nition of the diff erent 
risks have proved to be time resistant and, indeed, still applicable. Not only do 
both social security systems largely coincide with the prescribed nine social 
risks, it was also felt that a system that complied with Convention 102 and the 
European Code was a prerequisite to fi tting in with the developed European 
welfare states. Th e frequent use of undefi ned terms in the conventions is 
considered a downside of their high fl exibility, and the role of the supervising 
committees, in this respect, is open to improvement in terms of authority, clarity, 
generality, and publicity.
Regarding the objective of the international standards to provide guidance in the 
development of national social security systems, it can be concluded that they 
still serve their function. It has been demonstrated by the country studies that 
the standards are still fi t to be used as a template for the creation and design of 
social security systems. It has further been described that they give guidance 
regarding the privatisation of social security provisions, by setting out principles 
on solidarity and state responsibility. It must be recognised, however, that these 
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directions do not seem very practicable. On some other points, the guiding 
function of the international standards is not found to be satisfactory, because 
certain concepts are used that do not refl ect the current socio-economic reality 
in developed countries. Th is is particularly so in relation to the idea of a male 
breadwinner and the phenomenon of derived rights for the wives of insured men. 
It has been discussed that these concepts still may apply to less developed 
countries and, moreover, that they do not involve an erosion of social protection, 
rather, on the contrary. Still, the use of outdated concepts does aff ect the 
popularity and accessibility of the international standards.
Regarding the question of whether, indeed, the conventions create a level playing 
fi eld, it has been shown that since ratifi cation of the diff erent social security 
conventions, both countries have kept their social security systems largely in line 
with the minimum prescribed norms. What is more, if the countries had not 
accepted the international standards, their social security provisions would have 
been less protective on several points, and their systems would have shown larger 
mutual diff erences in terms of the number of schemes, as well as in the levels of 
benefi ts. Th us, the study confi rms the converging role of the international 
standards and a harmonisation of the social security fl oor. At the same time, a 
critical remark can be made concerning the soft  legal character of the standards. 
Th e established minimum fl oor for social security at the national level is not as 
strong as might be necessary, or desirable.
In conclusion, the study has provided proof that the international social security 
standards contribute to social security for everyone, by setting out a clear legal 
framework for national social security systems, and by providing a defi ned 
minimum level of protection, the observance of which is continuously monitored 
by the international organisations. In fact, they both push for more protection, 
and prevent regression. In this respect, the two studied cases can be considered 
exemplary, not only for future EU accession states starting from a poor point of 
departure in a social respect, but also for old Member States with more developed 
social security systems, that are facing cuts in public expenditure.
At the same time, in the study several weak points of the conventions have been 
identifi ed that confi rm stated points of criticism and hamper the application of the 
standards and thus, their eff ectiveness. It must be recognised that the international 
standards are not the one and only answer to insuffi  cient social protection; their 
application, as such, does not prevent high poverty rates, and commitment to the 
norms does not make international competition on labour costs disappear like 
snow in summer. Th e present treatise shows, however, that the conventions, in 
spite of their shortcomings on diff erent points, can play, and do play, a part in the 
development of national social security systems and in the establishment of a 
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CZECH REPUBLIC
Koldinská, Kristina – Senior lecturer at the Charles University Faculty of Law, 
Department of Labour Law and Social Law.
Kühn, Zdeněk – Judge at the Supreme Administrative Court; Associate Professor (human 
rights) at Charles University, Faculty of Law.
Machová, Kateřina – Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs, legal offi  cial (CoE matters).
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Samek, Vít – Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions, Head of the Legal 
Department.
Tröster, Petr – Professor at Charles University Faculty of Law, Department of Labour Law 
and Social Law.
Wolfova, Aneta – Ministry of Health, legal offi  cial.
ESTONIA
Aule, Kristi – Adviser to the Constitutional Chamber, Supreme Court of Estonia.
Kaadu, Tiit – Ministry of Social Aff airs, previously delegate of the Ministry at the annual 
ILO Conferences.
Kõiv, Tõnis – Member of the Parliament of Estonia, member of the Social Aff airs 
Committee.
Leppik, Lauri – Professor of Social Policy at Tallinn University, Faculty of Social Sciences; 
Member of the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR); Previously Advisor 
at the Social Insurance Board and the Ministry of Social Aff airs.
Mälksoo, Lauri – Professor of International Law at University of Tartu; Adviser to the 
Chancellor of Justice of the Republic of Estonia.
Nettan, Agneta, Ministry of Social Aff airs, Head of Financial Policy and Coordination, 
Social Security Department (written consultation).
Taliga, Harri – President of the Estonian Trade Union Confederation (EAKL).
Tammeleth, Tiia – Legal Secreatry of the Estonian Trade Union Confederation (EAKL).




APPENDIX 3. TEXT OF ILO C102, SOCIAL SECURITY 
(MINIMUM STANDARDS) CONVENTION, 1952
PREAMBLE
Th e General Conference of the International Labour Organisation,
Having been convened at Geneva by the Governing Body of the International Labour 
Offi  ce, and having met in its Th irty-fi ft h Session on 4 June 1952, and
Having decided upon the adoption of certain proposals with regard to minimum 
standards of social security, which are included in the fi ft h item on the agenda of the 
session, and
Having determined that these proposals shall take the form of an international 
Convention,
adopts this twenty-eighth day of June of the year one thousand nine hundred and fi ft y-
two the following Convention, which may be cited as the Social Security (Minimum 
Standards) Convention, 1952:
PART I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1
1. In this Convention--
(a) the term prescribed means determined by or in virtue of national laws or 
regulations;
(b) the term residence means ordinary residence in the territory of the Member and 
the term resident means a person ordinarily resident in the territory of the 
Member;
(c) the term wife means a wife who is maintained by her husband;
(d) the term widow means a woman who was maintained by her husband at the 
time of his death;
(e) the term child means a child under school-leaving age or under 15 years of age, 
as may be prescribed;
(f) the term qualifying period means a period of contribution, or a period of 
employment, or a period of residence, or any combination thereof, as may be 
prescribed.
2. In Articles 10, 34 and 49 the term benefi t means either direct benefi t in the form of 
care or indirect benefi t consisting of a reimbursement of the expenses borne by the 
person concerned.
Article 2
Each Member for which this Convention is in force–




(ii) at least three of Parts II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX and X, including at least one 
of Parts IV, V, VI, IX and X;
(iii) the relevant provisions of Parts XI, XII and XIII; and
(iv) Part XIV; and
(b) shall specify in its ratifi cation in respect of which of Parts II to X it accepts the 
obligations of the Convention.
Article 3
1. A Member whose economy and medical facilities are insuffi  ciently developed may, if 
and for so long as the competent authority considers necessary, avail itself, by a 
declaration appended to its ratifi cation, of the temporary exceptions provided for in 
the following Articles: 9 (d); 12 (2); 15 (d); 18 (2); 21 (c); 27 (d); 33 (b); 34 (3); 41 (d); 48 
(c); 55 (d); and 61 (d).
2. Each Member which has made a declaration under paragraph 1 of this Article shall 
include in the annual report upon the application of this Convention submitted 
under Article 22 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation a 
statement, in respect of each exception of which it avails itself--
(a) that its reason for doing so subsists; or
(b) that it renounces its right to avail itself of the exception in question as from a 
stated date.
Article 4
1. Each Member which has ratifi ed this Convention may subsequently notify the 
Director-General of the International Labour Offi  ce that it accepts the obligations of 
the Convention in respect of one or more of Parts II to X not already specifi ed in its 
ratifi cation.
2. Th e undertakings referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be deemed to be an 
integral part of the ratifi cation and to have the force of ratifi cation as from the date of 
notifi cation.
Article 5
Where, for the purpose of compliance with any of the Parts II to X of this Convention 
which are to be covered by its ratifi cation, a Member is required to protect prescribed 
classes of persons constituting not less than a specifi ed percentage of employees or 
residents, the Member shall satisfy itself, before undertaking to comply with any such 
Part, that the relevant percentage is attained.
Article 6
For the purpose of compliance with Parts II, III, IV, V, VIII (in so far as it relates to 
medical care), IX or X of this Convention, a Member may take account of protection 
Appendices
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eff ected by means of insurance which, although not made compulsory by national laws 
or regulations for the persons to be protected–
(a) is supervised by the public authorities or administered, in accordance with prescribed 
standards, by joint operation of employers and workers;
(b) covers a substantial part of the persons whose earnings do not exceed those of the 
skilled manual male employee; and
(c) complies, in conjunction with other forms of protection, where appropriate, with the 
relevant provisions of the Convention.
PART II. MEDICAL CARE
Article 7
Each Member for which this Part of this Convention is in force shall secure to the persons 
protected the provision of benefi t in respect of a condition requiring medical care of a 
preventive or curative nature in accordance with the following Articles of this Part.
Article 8
Th e contingencies covered shall include any morbid condition, whatever its cause, and 
pregnancy and confi nement and their consequences.
Article 9
Th e persons protected shall comprise–
(a) prescribed classes of employees, constituting not less than 50 per cent. of all 
employees, and also their wives and children; or
(b) prescribed classes of economically active population, constituting not less than 20 
per cent. of all residents, and also their wives and children; or
(c) prescribed classes of residents, constituting not less than 50 per cent. of all residents; 
or
(d) where a declaration made in virtue of Article 3 is in force, prescribed classes of 
employees constituting not less than 50 per cent. of all employees in industrial 
workplaces employing 20 persons or more, and also their wives and children.
Article 10
1. Th e benefi t shall include at least–
(a) in case of a morbid condition–
(i) general practitioner care, including domiciliary visiting;
(ii) specialist care at hospitals for in-patients and out-patients, and such 
specialist care as may be available outside hospitals;
(iii) the essential pharmaceutical supplies as prescribed by medical or other 
qualifi ed practitioners; and
(iv) hospitalisation where necessary; and
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(b) in case of pregnancy and confi nement and their consequences–
(i) pre-natal, confi nement and post-natal care either by medical practitioners 
or by qualifi ed midwives; and
(ii) hospitalisation where necessary.
2. Th e benefi ciary or his breadwinner may be required to share in the cost of the medical 
care the benefi ciary receives in respect of a morbid condition; the rules concerning 
such cost-sharing shall be so designed as to avoid hardship.
3. Th e benefi t provided in accordance with this Article shall be aff orded with a view to 
maintaining, restoring or improving the health of the person protected and his ability 
to work and to attend to his personal needs.
4. Th e institutions or Government departments administering the benefi t shall, by such 
means as may be deemed appropriate, encourage the persons protected to avail 
themselves of the general health services placed at their disposal by the public 
authorities or by other bodies recognised by the public authorities.
Article 11
Th e benefi t specifi ed in Article 10 shall, in a contingency covered, be secured at least to a 
person protected who has completed, or whose breadwinner has completed, such 
qualifying period as may be considered necessary to preclude abuse.
Article 12
1. Th e benefi t specifi ed in Article 10 shall be granted throughout the contingency 
covered, except that, in case of a morbid condition, its duration may be limited to 26 
weeks in each case, but benefi t shall not be suspended while a sickness benefi t 
continues to be paid, and provision shall be made to enable the limit to be extended 
for prescribed diseases recognised as entailing prolonged care.
2. Where a declaration made in virtue of Article 3 is in force, the duration of the benefi t 
may be limited to 13 weeks in each case.
PART III. SICKNESS BENEFIT
Article 13
Each Member for which this Part of this Convention is in force shall secure to the persons 
protected the provision of sickness benefi t in accordance with the following Articles of 
this Part.
Article 14
Th e contingency covered shall include incapacity for work resulting from a morbid 





Th e persons protected shall comprise–
(a) prescribed classes of employees, constituting not less than 50 per cent. of all 
employees; or
(b) prescribed classes of the economically active population, constituting not less than 
20 per cent. of all residents; or
(c) all residents whose means during the contingency do not exceed limits prescribed in 
such a manner as to comply with the requirements of Article 67; or
(d) where a declaration made in virtue of Article 3 is in force, prescribed classes of 
employees, constituting not less than 50 per cent. of all employees in industrial 
workplaces employing 20 persons or more.
Article 16
1. Where classes of employees or classes of the economically active population are 
protected, the benefi t shall be a periodical payment calculated in such a manner as to 
comply either with the requirements of Article 65 or with the requirements of Article 
66.
2. Where all residents whose means during the contingency do not exceed prescribed 
limits are protected, the benefi t shall be a periodical payment calculated in such a 
manner as to comply with the requirements of Article 67.
Article 17
Th e benefi t specifi ed in Article 16 shall, in a contingency covered, be secured at least to a 
person protected who has completed such qualifying period as may be considered 
necessary to preclude abuse.
Article 18
1. Th e benefi t specifi ed in Article 16 shall be granted throughout the contingency, 
except that the benefi t may be limited to 26 weeks in each case of sickness, in which 
event it need not be paid for the fi rst three days of suspension of earnings.
2. Where a declaration made in virtue of Article 3 is in force, the duration of the benefi t 
may be limited--
(a) to such period that the total number of days for which the sickness benefi t is 
granted in any year is not less than ten times the average number of persons 
protected in that year; or
(b) to 13 weeks in each case of sickness, in which event it need not be paid for the 
fi rst three days of suspension of earnings.
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PART IV. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT
Article 19
Each Member for which this Part of this Convention is in force shall secure to the persons 
protected the provision of unemployment benefi t in accordance with the following 
Articles of this Part.
Article 20
Th e contingency covered shall include suspension of earnings, as defi ned by national laws 
or regulations, due to inability to obtain suitable employment in the case of a person 
protected who is capable of, and available for, work.
Article 21
Th e persons protected shall comprise–
(a) prescribed classes of employees, constituting not less than 50 per cent. of all 
employees; or
(b) all residents whose means during the contingency do not exceed limits prescribed in 
such a manner as to comply with the requirements of Article 67; or
(c) where a declaration made in virtue of Article 3 is in force, prescribed classes of 
employees, constituting not less than 50 per cent. of all employees in industrial 
workplaces employing 20 persons or more.
Article 22
1. Where classes of employees are protected, the benefi t shall be a periodical payment 
calculated in such manner as to comply either with the requirements of Article 65 or 
with the requirements of Article 66.
2. Where all residents whose means during the contingency do not exceed prescribed 
limits are protected, the benefi t shall be a periodical payment calculated in such a 
manner as to comply with the requirements of Article 67.
Article 23
Th e benefi t specifi ed in Article 22 shall, in a contingency covered, be secured at least to a 
person protected who has completed such qualifying period as may be considered 
necessary to preclude abuse.
Article 24
1. Th e benefi t specifi ed in Article 22 shall be granted throughout the contingency, 
except that its duration may be limited–
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(a) where classes of employees are protected, to 13 weeks within a period of 12 
months, or
(b) where all residents whose means during the contingency do not exceed 
prescribed limits are protected, to 26 weeks within a period of 12 months.
2. Where national laws or regulations provide that the duration of the benefi t shall vary 
with the length of the contribution period and/or the benefi t previously received 
within a prescribed period, the provisions of subparagraph (a) of paragraph 1 shall be 
deemed to be fulfi lled if the average duration of benefi t is at least 13 weeks within a 
period of 12 months.
3. Th e benefi t need not be paid for a waiting period of the fi rst seven days in each case of 
suspension of earnings, counting days of unemployment before and aft er temporary 
employment lasting not more than a prescribed period as part of the same case of 
suspension of earnings.
4. In the case of seasonal workers the duration of the benefi t and the waiting period 
may be adapted to their conditions of employment.
PART V. OLD-AGE BENEFIT
Article 25
Each Member for which this Part of this Convention is in force shall secure to the persons 
protected the provision of old-age benefi t in accordance with the following Articles of 
this Part.
Article 26
1. Th e contingency covered shall be survival beyond a prescribed age.
2. Th e prescribed age shall be not more than 65 years or such higher age as may be fi xed 
by the competent authority with due regard to the working ability of elderly persons 
in the country concerned.
3. National laws or regulations may provide that the benefi t of a person otherwise 
entitled to it may be suspended if such person is engaged in any prescribed gainful 
activity or that the benefi t, if contributory, may be reduced where the earnings of the 
benefi ciary exceed a prescribed amount and, if non-contributory, may be reduced 
where the earnings of the benefi ciary or his other means or the two taken together 
exceed a prescribed amount.
Article 27
Th e persons protected shall comprise–
(a) prescribed classes of employees, constituting not less than 50 per cent. of all 
employees; or
(b) prescribed classes of the economically active population, constituting not less than 
20 per cent. of all residents; or
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(c) all residents whose means during the contingency do not exceed limits prescribed in 
such a manner as to comply with the requirements of Article 67; or
(d) where a declaration made in virtue of Article 3 is in force, prescribed classes of 
employees, constituting not less than 50 per cent. of all employees in industrial 
workplaces employing 20 persons or more.
Article 28
Th e benefi t shall be a periodical payment calculated as follows:
(a) where classes of employees or classes of the economically active population are 
protected, in such a manner as to comply either with the requirements of Article 65 
or with the requirements of Article 66;
(b) where all residents whose means during the contingency do not exceed prescribed 
limits are protected, in such a manner as to comply with the requirements of Article 
67.
Article 29
1. Th e benefi t specifi ed in Article 28 shall, in a contingency covered, be secured at 
least–
(a) to a person protected who has completed, prior to the contingency, in 
accordance with prescribed rules, a qualifying period which may be 30 years of 
contribution or employment, or 20 years of residence; or
(b) where, in principle, all economically active persons are protected, to a person 
protected who has completed a prescribed qualifying period of contribution 
and in respect of whom, while he was of working age, the prescribed yearly 
average number of contributions has been paid.
2. Where the benefi t referred to in paragraph 1 is conditional upon a minimum period 
of contribution or employment, a reduced benefi t shall be secured at least--
(a) to a person protected who has completed, prior to the contingency, in 
accordance with prescribed rules, a qualifying period of 15 years of contribution 
or employment; or
(b) where, in principle, all economically active persons are protected, to a person 
protected who has completed a prescribed qualifying period of contribution 
and in respect of whom, while he was of working age, half the yearly average 
number of contributions prescribed in accordance with subparagraph (b) of 
paragraph 1 of this Article has been paid.
3. Th e requirements of paragraph 1 of this Article shall be deemed to be satisfi ed where 
a benefi t calculated in conformity with the requirements of Part XI but at a percentage 
of ten points lower than shown in the Schedule appended to that Part for the standard 
benefi ciary concerned is secured at least to a person protected who has completed, in 
accordance with prescribed rules, ten years of contribution or employment, or fi ve 
years of residence.
4. A proportional reduction of the percentage indicated in the Schedule appended to 
Part XI may be eff ected where the qualifying period for the benefi t corresponding to 
the reduced percentage exceeds ten years of contribution or employment but is less 
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than 30 years of contribution or employment; if such qualifying period exceeds 15 
years, a reduced benefi t shall be payable in conformity with paragraph 2 of this 
Article.
5. Where the benefi t referred to in paragraphs 1, 3 or 4 of this Article is conditional 
upon a minimum period of contribution or employment, a reduced benefi t shall be 
payable under prescribed conditions to a person protected who, by reason only of his 
advanced age when the provisions concerned in the application of this Part come into 
force, has not satisfi ed the conditions prescribed in accordance with paragraph 2 of 
this Article, unless a benefi t in conformity with the provisions of paragraphs 1, 3 or 4 
of this Article is secured to such person at an age higher than the normal age.
Article 30
Th e benefi ts specifi ed in Articles 28 and 29 shall be granted throughout the contingency.
PART VI. EMPLOYMENT INJURY BENEFIT
Article 31
Each Member for which this Part of this Convention is in force shall secure to the persons 
protected the provision of employment injury benefi t in accordance with the following 
Articles of this Part.
Article 32
Th e contingencies covered shall include the following where due to accident or a 
prescribed disease resulting from employment:
(a) a morbid condition;
(b) incapacity for work resulting from such a condition and involving suspension of 
earnings, as defi ned by national laws or regulations;
(c) total loss of earning capacity or partial loss thereof in excess of a prescribed degree, 
likely to be permanent, or corresponding loss of faculty; and
(d) the loss of support suff ered by the widow or child as the result of the death of the 
breadwinner; in the case of a widow, the right to benefi t may be made conditional on 
her being presumed, in accordance with national laws or regulations, to be incapable 
of self-support.
Article 33
Th e persons protected shall comprise–
(a) prescribed classes of employees, constituting not less than 50 per cent. of all 




(b) where a declaration made in virtue of Article 3 is in force, prescribed classes of 
employees, constituting not less than 50 per cent. of all employees in industrial 
workplaces employing 20 persons or more, and, for benefi t in respect of death of the 
breadwinner, also their wives and children.
Article 34
1. In respect of a morbid condition, the benefi t shall be medical care as specifi ed in 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article.
2. Th e medical care shall comprise–
(a) general practitioner and specialist in-patient care and out-patient care, including 
domiciliary visiting;
(b) dental care;
(c) nursing care at home or in hospital or other medical institutions;
(d) maintenance in hospitals, convalescent homes, sanatoria or other medical 
institutions;
(e) dental, pharmaceutical and other medical or surgical supplies, including 
prosthetic appliances, kept in repair, and eyeglasses; and
(f) the care furnished by members of such other professions as may at any time be 
legally recognised as allied to the medical profession, under the supervision of a 
medical or dental practitioner.
3. Where a declaration made in virtue of Article 3 is in force, the medical care shall 
include at least–
(a) general practitioner care, including domiciliary visiting;
(b) specialist care at hospitals for in-patients and out-patients, and such specialist 
care as may be available outside hospitals;
(c) the essential pharmaceutical supplies as prescribed by a medical or other 
qualifi ed practitioner; and
(d) hospitalisation where necessary.
4. Th e medical care provided in accordance with the preceding paragraphs shall be 
aff orded with a view to maintaining, restoring or improving the health of the person 
protected and his ability to work and to attend to his personal needs.
Article 35
1. Th e institutions or Government departments administering the medical care shall 
co-operate, wherever appropriate, with the general vocational rehabilitation services, 
with a view to the re-establishment of handicapped persons in suitable work.
2. National laws or regulations may authorise such institutions or departments to 
ensure provision for the vocational rehabilitation of handicapped persons.
Article 36
1. In respect of incapacity for work, total loss of earning capacity likely to be permanent 
or corresponding loss of faculty, or the death of the breadwinner, the benefi t shall be 
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a periodical payment calculated in such a manner as to comply either with the 
requirements of Article 65 or with the requirements of Article 66.
2. In case of partial loss of earning capacity likely to be permanent, or corresponding 
loss of faculty, the benefi t, where payable, shall be a periodical payment representing 
a suitable proportion of that specifi ed for total loss of earning capacity or 
corresponding loss of faculty.
3. Th e periodical payment may be commuted for a lump sum--
(a) where the degree of incapacity is slight; or
(b) where the competent authority is satisfi ed that the lump sum will be properly 
utilised.
Article 37
Th e benefi t specifi ed in Articles 34 and 36 shall, in a contingency covered, be secured at 
least to a person protected who was employed in the territory of the Member at the time 
of the accident if the injury is due to accident or at the time of contracting the disease if 
the injury is due to a disease and, for periodical payments in respect of death of the 
breadwinner, to the widow and children of such person.
Article 38
Th e benefi t specifi ed in Articles 34 and 36 shall be granted throughout the contingency, 
except that, in respect of incapacity for work, the benefi t need not be paid for the fi rst 
three days in each case of suspension of earnings.
PART VII. FAMILY BENEFIT
Article 39
Each Member for which this Part of this Convention is in force shall secure to the persons 
protected the provision of family benefi t in accordance with the following Articles of this 
Part.
Article 40
Th e contingency covered shall be responsibility for the maintenance of children as 
prescribed.
Article 41
Th e persons protected shall comprise–




(b) prescribed classes of the economically active population, constituting not less than 
20 per cent. of all residents; or
(c) all residents whose means during the contingency do not exceed prescribed limits; or
(d) where a declaration made in virtue of Article 3 is in force, prescribed classes of 
employees, constituting not less than 50 per cent. of all employees in industrial 
workplaces employing 20 persons or more.
Article 42
Th e benefi t shall be–
(a) a periodical payment granted to any person protected having completed the 
prescribed qualifying period; or
(b) the provision to or in respect of children, of food, clothing, housing, holidays or 
domestic help; or
(c) a combination of (a) and (b).
Article 43
Th e benefi t specifi ed in Article 42 shall be secured at least to a person protected who, 
within a prescribed period, has completed a qualifying period which may be three 
months of contribution or employment, or one year of residence, as may be prescribed.
Article 44
Th e total value of the benefi ts granted in accordance with Article 42 to the persons 
protected shall be such as to represent–
(a) 3 per cent. of the wage of an ordinary adult male labourer, as determined in 
accordance with the rules laid down in Article 66, multiplied by the total number of 
children of persons protected; or
(b) 1.5 per cent. of the said wage, multiplied by the total number of children of all 
residents.
Article 45
Where the benefi t consists of a periodical payment, it shall be granted throughout the 
contingency.
PART VIII. MATERNITY BENEFIT
Article 46
Each Member for which this Part of this Convention is in force shall secure to the persons 





Th e contingencies covered shall include pregnancy and confi nement and their 
consequences, and suspension of earnings, as defi ned by national laws or regulations, 
resulting therefrom.
Article 48
Th e persons protected shall comprise–
(a) all women in prescribed classes of employees, which classes constitute not less than 
50 per cent. of all employees and, for maternity medical benefi t, also the wives of men 
in these classes; or
(b) all women in prescribed classes of the economically active population, which classes 
constitute not less than 20 per cent. of all residents, and, for maternity medical 
benefi t, also the wives of men in these classes; or
(c) where a declaration made in virtue of Article 3 is in force, all women in prescribed 
classes of employees, which classes constitute not less than 50 per cent. of all 
employees in industrial workplaces employing 20 persons or more, and, for maternity 
medical benefi t, also the wives of men in these classes.
Article 49
1. In respect of pregnancy and confi nement and their consequences, the maternity 
medical benefi t shall be medical care as specifi ed in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this 
Article.
2. Th e medical care shall include at least–
(a) pre-natal, confi nement and post-natal care either by medical practitioners or by 
qualifi ed midwives; and
(b) hospitalisation where necessary.
3. Th e medical care specifi ed in paragraph 2 of this Article shall be aff orded with a view 
to maintaining, restoring or improving the health of the woman protected and her 
ability to work and to attend to her personal needs.
4. Th e institutions or Government departments administering the maternity medical 
benefi t shall, by such means as may be deemed appropriate, encourage the women 
protected to avail themselves of the general health services placed at their disposal by 
the public authorities or by other bodies recognised by the public authorities.
Article 50
In respect of suspension of earnings resulting from pregnancy and from confi nement and 
their consequences, the benefi t shall be a periodical payment calculated in such a manner 
as to comply either with the requirements of Article 65 or with the requirements of 
Article 66. Th e amount of the periodical payment may vary in the course of the 




Th e benefi t specifi ed in Articles 49 and 50 shall, in a contingency covered, be secured at 
least to a woman in the classes protected who has completed such qualifying period as 
may be considered necessary to preclude abuse, and the benefi t specifi ed in Article 49 
shall also be secured to the wife of a man in the classes protected where the latter has 
completed such qualifying period.
Article 52
Th e benefi t specifi ed in Articles 49 and 50 shall be granted throughout the contingency, 
except that the periodical payment may be limited to 12 weeks, unless a longer period of 
abstention from work is required or authorised by national laws or regulations, in which 
event it may not be limited to a period less than such longer period.
PART IX. INVALIDITY BENEFIT
Article 53
Each Member for which this Part of this Convention is in force shall secure to the persons 
protected the provision of invalidity benefi t in accordance with the following Articles of 
this Part.
Article 54
Th e contingency covered shall include inability to engage in any gainful activity, to an 
extent prescribed, which inability is likely to be permanent or persists aft er the exhaustion 
of sickness benefi t.
Article 55
Th e persons protected shall comprise–
(a) prescribed classes of employees, constituting not less than 50 per cent. of all 
employees; or
(b) prescribed classes of the economically active population, constituting not less than 
20 per cent. of all residents; or
(c) all residents whose means during the contingency do not exceed limits prescribed in 
such a manner as to comply with the requirements of Article 67; or
(d) where a declaration made in virtue of Article 3 is in force, prescribed classes of 
employees, constituting not less than 50 per cent. of all employees in industrial 




Th e benefi t shall be a periodical payment calculated as follows:
(a) where classes of employees or classes of the economically active population are 
protected, in such a manner as to comply either with the requirements of Article 65 
or with the requirements of Article 66;
(b) where all residents whose means during the contingency do not exceed prescribed 
limits are protected, in such a manner as to comply with the requirements of Article 
67.
Article 57
1. Th e benefi t specifi ed in Article 56 shall, in a contingency covered, be secured at 
least–
(a) to a person protected who has completed, prior to the contingency, in 
accordance with prescribed rules, a qualifying period which may be 15 years of 
contribution or employment, or 10 years of residence; or
(b) where, in principle, all economically active persons are protected, to a person 
protected who has completed a qualifying period of three years of contribution 
and in respect of whom, while he was of working age, the prescribed yearly 
average number of contributions has been paid.
2. Where the benefi t referred to in paragraph 1 is conditional upon a minimum period 
of contribution or employment, a reduced benefi t shall be secured at least--
(a) to a person protected who has completed, prior to the contingency, in 
accordance with prescribed rules, a qualifying period of fi ve years of 
contribution or employment; or
(b) where, in principle, all economically active persons are protected, to a person 
protected who has completed a qualifying period of three years of contribution 
and in respect of whom, while he was of working age, half the yearly average 
number of contributions prescribed in accordance with subparagraph (b) of 
paragraph 1 of this Article has been paid.
3. Th e requirements of paragraph 1 of this Article shall be deemed to be satisfi ed where 
a benefi t calculated in conformity with the requirements of Part XI but at a percentage 
of ten points lower than shown in the Schedule appended to that Part for the standard 
benefi ciary concerned is secured at least to a person protected who has completed, in 
accordance with prescribed rules, fi ve years of contribution, employment or 
residence.
4. A proportional reduction of the percentage indicated in the Schedule appended to 
Part XI may be eff ected where the qualifying period for the pension corresponding to 
the reduced percentage exceeds fi ve years of contribution or employment but is less 
than 15 years of contribution or employment; a reduced pension shall be payable in 




Th e benefi t specifi ed in Articles 56 and 57 shall be granted throughout the contingency 
or until an old-age benefi t becomes payable.
PART X. SURVIVORS’ BENEFIT
Article 59
Each Member for which this Part of this Convention is in force shall secure to the persons 
protected the provision of survivors’ benefi t in accordance with the following Articles of 
this Part.
Article 60
1. Th e contingency covered shall include the loss of support suff ered by the widow or 
child as the result of the death of the breadwinner; in the case of a widow, the right to 
benefi t may be made conditional on her being presumed, in accordance with national 
laws or regulations, to be incapable of self-support.
2. National laws or regulations may provide that the benefi t of a person otherwise 
entitled to it may be suspended if such person is engaged in any prescribed gainful 
activity or that the benefi t, if contributory, may be reduced where the earnings of the 
benefi ciary exceed a prescribed amount, and, if non-contributory, may be reduced 
where the earnings of the benefi ciary or his other means or the two taken together 
exceed a prescribed amount.
Article 61
Th e persons protected shall comprise–
(a) the wives and the children of breadwinners in prescribed classes of employees, which 
classes constitute not less than 50 per cent. of all employees; or
(b) the wives and the children of breadwinners in prescribed classes of the economically 
active population, which classes constitute not less than 20 per cent. of all residents; 
or
(c) all resident widows and resident children who have lost their breadwinner and whose 
means during the contingency do not exceed limits prescribed in such a manner as to 
comply with the requirements of Article 67; or
(d) where a declaration made in virtue of Article 3 is in force, the wives and the children 
of breadwinners in prescribed classes of employees, which classes constitute not less 





Th e benefi t shall be a periodical payment calculated as follows:
(a) where classes of employees or classes of the economically active population are 
protected, in such a manner as to comply either with the requirements of Article 65 
or with the requirements of Article 66;
(b) where all residents whose means during the contingency do not exceed prescribed 
limits are protected, in such a manner as to comply with the requirements of Article 
67.
Article 63
1. Th e benefi t specifi ed in Article 62 shall, in a contingency covered, be secured at least–
(a) to a person protected whose breadwinner has completed, in accordance with 
prescribed rules, a qualifying period which may be 15 years of contribution or 
employment, or 10 years of residence; or
(b) where, in principle, the wives and children of all economically active persons 
are protected, to a person protected whose breadwinner has completed a 
qualifying period of three years of contribution and in respect of whose 
breadwinner, while he was of working age, the prescribed yearly average number 
of contributions has been paid.
2. Where the benefi t referred to in paragraph 1 is conditional upon a minimum period 
of contribution or employment, a reduced benefi t shall be secured at least--
(a) to a person protected whose breadwinner has completed, in accordance with 
prescribed rules, a qualifying period of fi ve years of contribution or employment; 
or
(b) where, in principle, the wives and children of all economically active persons 
are protected, to a person protected whose breadwinner has completed a 
qualifying period of three years of contribution and in respect of whose 
breadwinner, while he was of working age, half the yearly average number of 
contributions prescribed in accordance with subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 of 
this Article has been paid.
3. Th e requirements of paragraph 1 of this Article shall be deemed to be satisfi ed where 
a benefi t calculated in conformity with the requirements of Part XI but a percentage 
of ten points lower than shown in the Schedule appended to that Part for the standard 
benefi ciary concerned is secured at least to a person protected whose breadwinner 
has completed, in accordance with prescribed rules, fi ve years of contribution, 
employment or residence.
4. A proportional reduction of the percentage indicated in the Schedule appended to 
Part XI may be eff ected where the qualifying period for the benefi t corresponding to 
the reduced percentage exceeds fi ve years of contribution or employment but is less 
than 15 years of contribution or employment; a reduced benefi t shall be payable in 
conformity with paragraph 2 of this Article.
5. In order that a childless widow presumed to be incapable of self-support may be 





Th e benefi t specifi ed in Articles 62 and 63 shall be granted throughout the contingency.
PART XI. STANDARDS TO BE COMPLIED WITH BY 
PERIODICAL PAYMENTS
Article 65
1. In the case of a periodical payment to which this Article applies, the rate of the 
benefi t, increased by the amount of any family allowances payable during the 
contingency, shall be such as to attain, in respect of the contingency in question, for 
the standard benefi ciary indicated in the Schedule appended to this Part, at least the 
percentage indicated therein of the total of the previous earnings of the benefi ciary or 
his breadwinner and of the amount of any family allowances payable to a person 
protected with the same family responsibilities as the standard benefi ciary.
2. Th e previous earnings of the benefi ciary or his breadwinner shall be calculated 
according to prescribed rules, and, where the persons protected or their breadwinners 
are arranged in classes according to their earnings, their previous earnings may be 
calculated from the basic earnings of the classes to which they belonged.
3. A maximum limit may be prescribed for the rate of the benefi t or for the earnings 
taken into account for the calculation of the benefi t, provided that the maximum 
limit is fi xed in such a way that the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article are 
complied with where the previous earnings of the benefi ciary or his breadwinner are 
equal to or lower than the wage of a skilled manual male employee.
4. Th e previous earnings of the benefi ciary or his breadwinner, the wage of the skilled 
manual male employee, the benefi t and any family allowances shall be calculated on 
the same time basis.
5. For the other benefi ciaries, the benefi t shall bear a reasonable relation to the benefi t 
for the standard benefi ciary.
6. For the purpose of this Article, a skilled manual male employee shall be--
(a) a fi tter or turner in the manufacture of machinery other than electrical 
machinery; or
(b) a person deemed typical of skilled labour selected in accordance with the 
provisions of the following paragraph; or
(c) a person whose earnings are such as to be equal to or greater than the earnings 
of 75 per cent. of all the persons protected, such earnings to be determined on 
the basis of annual or shorter periods as may be prescribed; or
(d) a person whose earnings are equal to 125 per cent. of the average earnings of all 
the persons protected.
7. Th e person deemed typical of skilled labour for the purposes of subparagraph (b) 
of the preceding paragraph shall be a person employed in the major group of 
economic activities with the largest number of economically active male persons 
protected in the contingency in question, or of the breadwinners of the persons 
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protected, as the case may be, in the division comprising the largest number of such 
persons or breadwinners; for this purpose, the international standard industrial 
classifi cation of all economic activities, adopted by the Economic and Social Council 
of the United Nations at its Seventh Session on 27 August 1948, and reproduced in 
the Annex to this Convention, or such classifi cation as at any time amended, shall be 
used.
8. Where the rate of benefi t varies by region, the skilled manual male employee may 
be determined for each region in accordance with paragraphs 6 and 7 of this 
Article.
9. Th e wage of the skilled manual male employee shall be determined on the basis of the 
rates of wages for normal hours of work fi xed by collective agreements, by or in 
pursuance of national laws or regulations, where applicable, or by custom, including 
cost-of-living allowances if any; where such rates diff er by region but paragraph 8 of 
this Article is not applied, the median rate shall be taken.
10. Th e rates of current periodical payments in respect of old age, employment injury 
(except in case of incapacity for work), invalidity and death of breadwinner, shall be 
reviewed following substantial changes in the general level of earnings where these 
result from substantial changes in the cost of living.
Article 66
1. In the case of a periodical payment to which this Article applies, the rate of the 
benefi t, increased by the amount of any family allowances payable during the 
contingency, shall be such as to attain, in respect of the contingency in question, for 
the standard benefi ciary indicated in the Schedule appended to this Part, at least the 
percentage indicated therein of the total of the wage of an ordinary adult male 
labourer and of the amount of any family allowances payable to a person protected 
with the same family responsibilities as the standard benefi ciary.
2. Th e wage of the ordinary adult male labourer, the benefi t and any family allowances 
shall be calculated on the same time basis.
3. For the other benefi ciaries, the benefi t shall bear a reasonable relation to the benefi t 
for the standard benefi ciary.
4. For the purpose of this Article, the ordinary adult male labourer shall be–
(a) a person deemed typical of unskilled labour in the manufacture of machinery 
other than electrical machinery; or
(b) a person deemed typical of unskilled labour selected in accordance with the 
provisions of the following paragraph.
5. Th e person deemed typical of unskilled labour for the purpose of subparagraph (b) 
of the preceding paragraph shall be a person employed in the major group of 
economic activities with the largest number of economically active male persons 
protected in the contingency in question, or of the breadwinners of the persons 
protected, as the case may be, in the division comprising the largest number of such 
persons or breadwinners; for this purpose, the international standard industrial 
classifi cation of all economic activities, adopted by the Economic and Social Council 
of the United Nations at its Seventh Session on 27 August 1948, and reproduced in 
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the Annex to this Convention, or such classifi cation as at any time amended, shall be 
used.
6. Where the rate of benefi t varies by region, the ordinary adult male labourer may 
be determined for each region in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of this 
Article.
7. Th e wage of the ordinary adult male labourer shall be determined on the basis of the 
rates of wages for normal hours of work fi xed by collective agreements, by or in 
pursuance of national laws or regulations, where applicable, or by custom, including 
cost-of-living allowances if any; where such rates diff er by region but paragraph 6 of 
this Article is not applied, the median rate shall be taken.
8. Th e rates of current periodical payments in respect of old age, employment injury 
(except in case of incapacity for work), invalidity and death of breadwinner, shall be 
reviewed following substantial changes in the general level of earnings where these 
result from substantial changes in the cost of living.
Article 67
In the case of a periodical payment to which this Article applies–
(a) the rate of the benefi t shall be determined according to a prescribed scale or a scale 
fi xed by the competent public authority in conformity with prescribed rules;
(b) such rate may be reduced only to the extent by which the other means of the family of 
the benefi ciary exceed prescribed substantial amounts or substantial amounts fi xed 
by the competent public authority in conformity with prescribed rules;
(c) the total of the benefi t and any other means, aft er deduction of the substantial 
amounts referred to in subparagraph (b), shall be suffi  cient to maintain the family of 
the benefi ciary in health and decency, and shall be not less than the corresponding 
benefi t calculated in accordance with the requirements of Article 66;
(d) the provisions of subparagraph (c) shall be deemed to be satisfi ed if the total amount 
of benefi ts paid under the Part concerned exceeds by at least 30 per cent. the total 
amount of benefi ts which would be obtained by applying the provisions of Article 66 
and the provisions of:
(i) Article 15 (b) for Part III;
(ii) Article 27 (b) for Part V;
(iii) Article 55 (b) for Part IX;
(iv) Article 61 (b) for Part X.
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SCHEDULE TO PART XI. PERIODICAL PAYMENTS TO 
STANDARD BENEFICIARIES
Part Contingency Standard Benefi ciary Percentage 
III Sickness Man with wife and two children 45
IV Unemployment Man with wife and two children 45






Man with wife and two children
Man with wife and two children





VIII Maternity Woman 45
IX Invalidity Man with wife and two children 40
X Survivors Widow with two children 40
PART XII. EQUALITY OF TREATMENT OF NON-NATIONAL 
RESIDENTS
Article 68
1. Non-national residents shall have the same rights as national residents: Provided that 
special rules concerning non-nationals and nationals born outside the territory of the 
Member may be prescribed in respect of benefi ts or portions of benefi ts which are 
payable wholly or mainly out of public funds and in respect of transitional schemes.
2. Under contributory social security schemes which protect employees, the persons 
protected who are nationals of another Member which has accepted the obligations 
of the relevant Part of the Convention shall have, under that Part, the same rights as 
nationals of the Member concerned: Provided that the application of this paragraph 
may be made subject to the existence of a bilateral or multilateral agreement 
providing for reciprocity.
PART XIII. COMMON PROVISIONS
Article 69
A benefi t to which a person protected would otherwise be entitled in compliance with 
any of Parts II to X of this Convention may be suspended to such extent as may be 
prescribed–
(a) as long as the person concerned is absent from the territory of the Member;
(b) as long as the person concerned is maintained at public expense, or at the expense of 
a social security institution or service, subject to any portion of the benefi t in excess 
of the value of such maintenance being granted to the dependants of the benefi ciary;
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(c) as long as the person concerned is in receipt of another social security cash benefi t, 
other than a family benefi t, and during any period in respect of which he is 
indemnifi ed for the contingency by a third party, subject to the part of the benefi t 
which is suspended not exceeding the other benefi t or the indemnity by a third 
party;
(d) where the person concerned has made a fraudulent claim;
(e) where the contingency has been caused by a criminal off ence committed by the 
person concerned;
(f) where the contingency has been caused by the wilful misconduct of the person 
concerned;
(g) in appropriate cases, where the person concerned neglects to make use of the medical 
or rehabilitation services placed at his disposal or fails to comply with rules prescribed 
for verifying the occurrence or continuance of the contingency or for the conduct of 
benefi ciaries;
(h) in the case of unemployment benefi t, where the person concerned has failed to make 
use of the employment services placed at his disposal;
(i) in the case of unemployment benefi t, where the person concerned has lost his 
employment as a direct result of a stoppage of work due to a trade dispute, or has left  
it voluntarily without just cause; and
(j) in the case of survivors’ benefi t, as long as the widow is living with a man as his wife.
Article 70
1. Every claimant shall have a right of appeal in case of refusal of the benefi t or 
complaint as to its quality or quantity.
2. Where in the application of this Convention a Government department responsible 
to a legislature is entrusted with the administration of medical care, the right of 
appeal provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article may be replaced by a right to have a 
complaint concerning the refusal of medical care or the quality of the care received 
investigated by the appropriate authority.
3. Where a claim is settled by a special tribunal established to deal with social security 
questions and on which the persons protected are represented, no right of appeal 
shall be required.
Article 71
1. Th e cost of the benefi ts provided in compliance with this Convention and the cost of 
the administration of such benefi ts shall be borne collectively by way of insurance 
contributions or taxation or both in a manner which avoids hardship to persons of 
small means and takes into account the economic situation of the Member and of the 
classes of persons protected.
2. Th e total of the insurance contributions borne by the employees protected shall not 
exceed 50 per cent. of the total of the fi nancial resources allocated to the protection of 
employees and their wives and children. For the purpose of ascertaining whether this 
condition is fulfi lled, all the benefi ts provided by the Member in compliance with 
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this Convention, except family benefi t and, if provided by a special branch, 
employment injury benefi t, may be taken together.
3. Th e Member shall accept general responsibility for the due provision of the benefi ts 
provided in compliance with this Convention, and shall take all measures required 
for this purpose; it shall ensure, where appropriate, that the necessary actuarial 
studies and calculations concerning fi nancial equilibrium are made periodically and, 
in any event, prior to any change in benefi ts, the rate of insurance contributions, or 
the taxes allocated to covering the contingencies in question.
Article 72
1. Where the administration is not entrusted to an institution regulated by the public 
authorities or to a Government department responsible to a legislature, representatives 
of the persons protected shall participate in the management, or be associated 
therewith in a consultative capacity, under prescribed conditions; national laws or 
regulations may likewise decide as to the participation of representatives of employers 
and of the public authorities.
2. Th e Member shall accept general responsibility for the proper administration of the 
institutions and services concerned in the application of the Convention.
PART XIV. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Article 73
Th is Convention shall not apply to–
(a) contingencies which occurred before the coming into force of the relevant Part of the 
Convention for the Member concerned;
(b) benefi ts in contingencies occurring aft er the coming into force of the relevant Part of 
the Convention for the Member concerned in so far as the rights to such benefi ts are 
derived from periods preceding that date.
Article 74
Th is Convention shall not be regarded as revising any existing Convention.
Article 75
If any Convention which may be adopted subsequently by the Conference concerning 
any subject or subjects dealt with in this Convention so provides, such provisions of this 
Convention as may be specifi ed in the said Convention shall cease to apply to any 
Member having ratifi ed the said Convention as from the date at which the said 
Convention comes into force for that Member.
(Editors’ Note: Provisions pursuant to Article 75 are contained in Conventions Nos. 121 




1. Each Member which ratifi es this Convention shall include in the annual report upon 
the application of this Convention submitted under Article 22 of the Constitution of 
the International Labour Organisation–
(a) full information concerning the laws and regulations by which eff ect is given to 
the provisions of the Convention; and
(b) evidence, conforming in its presentation as closely as is practicable with any 
suggestions for greater uniformity of presentation made by the Governing Body 
of the International Labour Offi  ce, of compliance with the statistical conditions 
specifi ed in--
(i) Articles 9 (a), (b), (c) or (d); 15 (a), (b) or (d); 21 (a) or (c); 27 (a), (b) or (d); 33 
(a) or (b); 41 (a), (b) or (d); 48 (a), (b) or (c); 55 (a (a), (b) or (d); 61 (a), (b) or 
(d), as regards the number of persons protected;
(ii) Articles 44, 65, 66 or 67, as regards the rates of benefi t;
(iii) subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2 of Article 18, as regards duration of sickness 
benefi t;
(iv) paragraph 2 of Article 24, as regards duration of unemployment benefi t; 
and
(v) paragraph 2 of Article 71, as regards the proportion of the fi nancial 
resources constituted by the insurance contributions of employees 
protected.
2. Each Member which ratifi es this Convention shall report to the Director-General of 
the International Labour Offi  ce at appropriate intervals, as requested by the 
Governing Body, on the position of its law and practice in regard to any of Parts II to 
X of the Convention not specifi ed in its ratifi cation or in a notifi cation made 
subsequently in virtue of Article 4.
Article 77
1. Th is Convention does not apply to seamen or seafi shermen; provision for the 
protection of seamen and seafi shermen has been made by the International Labour 
Conference in the Social Security (Seafarers) Convention, 1946, and the Seafarers’ 
Pensions Convention, 1946.
2. A Member may exclude seamen and seafi shermen from the number of employees, of 
the economically active population or of residents, when calculating the percentage 
of employees or residents protected in compliance with any of Parts II to X covered 
by its ratifi cation.
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PART XV. FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 78
Th e formal ratifi cations of this Convention shall be communicated to the Director-
General of the International Labour Offi  ce for registration.
Article 79
1. Th is Convention shall be binding only upon those Members of the International 
Labour Organisation whose ratifi cations have been registered with the Director-
General.
2. It shall come into force twelve months aft er the date on which the ratifi cations of two 
Members have been registered with the Director-General.
3. Th ereaft er, this Convention shall come into force for any Member twelve months aft er 
the date on which its ratifi cations has been registered.
Article 80
1. Declarations communicated to the Director-General of the International Labour 
Offi  ce in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 35 of the Constitution of the 
International Labour Organisation shall indicate–
a) the territories in respect of which the Member concerned undertakes that the 
provisions of the Convention shall be applied without modifi cation;
b) the territories in respect of which it undertakes that the provisions of the 
Convention or of any Parts thereof shall be applied subject to modifi cations, 
together with details of the said modifi cations;
c) the territories in respect of which the Convention is inapplicable and in such 
cases the grounds on which it is inapplicable;
d) the territories in respect of which it reserves its decision pending further 
consideration of the position.
2. Th e undertakings referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 of this 
Article shall be deemed to be an integral part of the ratifi cation and shall have the 
force of ratifi cation.
3. Any Member may at any time by a subsequent declaration cancel in whole or in part 
any reservation made in its original declaration in virtue of subparagraph (b), (c) or 
(d) of paragraph 1 of this Article.
4. Any Member may, at any time at which the Convention is subject to denunciation in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 82, communicate to the Director-General a 
declaration modifying in any other respect the terms of any former declaration and 




1. Declarations communicated to the Director-General of the International Labour 
Offi  ce in accordance with paragraph 4 or 5 of Article 35 of the Constitution of the 
International Labour Organisation shall indicate whether the provisions of the 
Convention or of the Parts thereof accepted by the Declaration will be applied in the 
territory concerned without modifi cation or subject to modifi cations; when the 
Declaration indicates that the provisions of the Convention or of certain Parts thereof 
will be applied subject to modifi cations, it shall give details of the said modifi cations.
2. Th e Member, Members or international authority concerned may at any time by a 
subsequent declaration renounce in whole or in part the right to have recourse to any 
modifi cation indicated in any former declaration.
3. Th e Member, Members or international authority concerned may, at any time at 
which this Convention is subject to denunciation in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 82, communicate to the Director-General a declaration modifying in any 
other respect the terms of any former declaration and stating the present position in 
respect of the application of the Convention.
Article 82
1. A Member which has ratifi ed this Convention may, aft er the expiration of the ten 
years from the date on which the Convention fi rst comes into force, denounce the 
Convention or any one or more of Parts II to X thereof by an act communicated to 
the Director-General of the International Labour Offi  ce for registration. Such 
denunciation shall not take eff ect until one year aft er the date on which it is 
registered.
2. Each Member which has ratifi ed this Convention and which does not, within the year 
following the expiration of the period of ten years mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph, exercise the right of denunciation provided for in this Article, will be 
bound for another period of ten years and, thereaft er, may denounce the Convention 
or any one of Parts II to X thereof at the expiration of each period of ten years under 
the terms provided for in this Article.
Article 83
1. Th e Director-General of the International Labour Offi  ce shall notify all Members of 
the International Labour Organisation of the registration of all ratifi cations, 
declarations and denunciations communicated to him by the Members of the 
Organisation.
2. When notifying the Members of the Organisation of the registration of the second 
ratifi cation communicated to him, the Director-General shall draw the attention of 





Th e Director-General of the International Labour Offi  ce shall communicate to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with Article 102 
of the Charter of the United Nations full particulars of all ratifi cations, declarations and 
acts of denunciation registered by him in accordance with the provisions of the preceding 
Articles.
Article 85
At such times as it may consider necessary the Governing Body of the International 
Labour Offi  ce shall present to the General Conference a report on the working of this 
Convention and shall examine the desirability of placing on the agenda of the Conference 
the question of its revision in whole or in part.
Article 86
1. Should the Conference adopt a new Convention revising this Convention in whole or 
in part, then, unless the new Convention otherwise provides:
a) the ratifi cation by a Member of the new revising Convention shall ipso jure 
involve the immediate denunciation of this Convention, notwithstanding the 
provisions of Article 82 above, if and when the new revising Convention shall 
have come into force;
b) as from the date when the new revising Convention comes into force, this 
Convention shall cease to be open to ratifi cation by the Members.
2. Th is Convention shall in any case remain in force in its actual form and content for 
those Members which have ratifi ed it but have not ratifi ed the revising Convention.
Article 87
Th e English and French versions of the text of this Convention are equally authoritative.
